Tuesday, January 7, 2014

Syria and the Propaganda of War: Staring into the Abyss

Three weeks ago, JM Berger, Daveed Garenstein-Ross and Kelsey Atherton spoke about the use of social media for propagating messages and social connections by jihadists in Syria and the Regime.  It can be found here and I highly recommend watching the video for insights on the way that social media can be used both for messaging and analyzing messages. 

This post is without direct links to media due to time, but wanted to put down a few thoughts on the subject of propaganda and how it can be used to skew information and analysis.  Something that was touched on in this post on the Politics of Analysis. 

Generally, I watch Twitter and read posts from a variety of sources from professional media, researchers and analysts and, most important, from people within various countries, many of them either political activists or active political commentators.  I also like to follow some people who are not active in the political discussions, but post common everyday occurrences.  The reason is fairly simple: you can't judge the political nature of a country of interest by the political class alone. 

In essence, the political class becomes an echo chamber of the same few ideas and the general population acts as a type of control.  When I see political issues enter into the flow of common intercourse, it can be a type of measure for the penetration of a political idea or problem.  Admittedly, this is not very scientific, but it does provide for some sanity against the back drop of often exceedingly polarizing, hyperbolic political commentary. 

In looking at the Syrian war, I've used a similar method for collecting information by selecting several accounts from multiple groups including ISIS, JAN, Kurds and the SNC/SRF/secular groups.  This is where I admit again to not approaching it overly scientifically by insuring an absolute equal number of each.  Partly because it is difficult to separate ISIS and JAN sources of information when they often overlap.  Or, did, up until the recent split. 

Even then, I see the same sources flowing through each of these accounts.  Unsurprisingly, often the same media with a slightly different twist to the message.  The same sometimes occurs with the Kurd and SNC/SRF accounts, overlapping between each other and even using the same media as ISIS and JAN with an entirely different message.  Which shows just how incestuous the world of social media propaganda can be and how it might lead to bad information analysis. 

Case in point, a photo was shown by a known ISIS tweeter, ShamiWitness, that portrayed ten men kneeling on the ground and who, according to this tweeter, were Assad regime soldiers that were soon after executed.  All of the men had beards.  Which apparently gave the ISIS tweeter a moment of pause because he pointed it out himself and insisted that, in the times of war, even Assad's men could not shave or that beards were simply popular. 

This photo was later passed around by the secularist Syrian rebel supporters indicating that the men were, in fact, from Ahrar al Sham and that ISIS had executed them out of hand. 

A short while later, the Kurdish group passed the same picture, this time stating that the men were, in fact, FSA (non-Islamist Jihad) that were executed.  The photo was then passed to other secular Syrians who repeated the Kurdish claim. 

In the propaganda war, often the first out of the chute shapes the narrative for a larger audience as well as the target audiences.  In the case of ShamiWitness, both jihadi sympathizers and a number of other non-jihad rebels to include a very interesting mix of western and Middle East media, researchers and analysts.  Some who interact with him occasionally, politely asking for clarification, explanation and even his personal insights. 

It's easy to see why ShamiWitness would seem to be an acceptable resource as he generally remains polite, attempts to verify his sources (has even withdrawn some statements as false) and is seemingly correct often enough to warrant the title of a good source of information.  Accept when he isn't and, in some cases, must be categorized, not as a source of information, but, in fact, a direct conduit for all sorts of propaganda (even when he is acting as a verifiable source).  By that, I mean, that he has actively and knowingly proliferated wrong, misleading or even false information, repetitively as well as acted as a director for funneling the same information to subordinate accounts.

Considering that the above mentioned photo of alleged Assad's soldiers being executed was shown at the height of the infighting between ISIS, JAN, Ahrar al Shame, IF & the SRF groups, it seems very unlikely that Assad soldiers would have been in or near what was clearly rebel controlled territory.  It could be that the rumors surrounding the ejection of ISIS, that it was a coordinated effort with Assad's regime and various outside entities, prompted the originator to decry the men as "Assad regime" and Shami simply passed it along.  The problem would be the numerous other photos and pieces of bad information that were repeatedly shown even when challenged on good grounds. 

Which goes to show that, if anyone is using this media for information or analysis, they have to be as careful, if not more so, when the information is gleaned from any other known affiliated sources.  I mention that because it's quite possible, if not probable, that the ability to interact with these sources directly can cause a creeping form of familiarity and trust that skews analysis and objective views. 

The non-jihad and "jihad lite" groups are equally as bad, if not often worse, because their efforts are not coordinated or as sophisticated as the ISIS group and they tend to post anything that comes their way that is negative about Assad's actions or the Jihadis whom they revile equally.  That's not to say that there isn't any information that can be gleaned from these sources, but the most important information that can be noted is that the ISIS group has a much larger, streamlined and sophisticated propaganda program than the non-jihad or even JAN organizations. 

Part of that program is based on very simple marketing techniques: to have "presence"'; be first out with information; provide continuous, repetitive information; have only a few "reputed" sources that funnel the information (particularly, in English when most of the other providers are in Arabic or another language) and give the appearance of being an honest broker of information. 

The other groups are not nearly as organized, have multiple people producing and introducing information, can rarely verify from where the original information came and, thru all that, appear to be almost all propaganda (in it's worse sense) and little information.  Worse, their interaction with media and others following through twitter or other media are sometimes hostile stemming from a perception that the western media and governments simply do not care what happens to the rest of the population, but only about the presence of the jihad/AQ/ISIS/JAN groups.  Groups that they have been insisting for a long time do not represent the much larger body of rebel organizations. 

Partly due to their own lack of centralized, trustworthy media representatives, partly because ISIS and JAN do have this kind of source and also because, they are right, the very presence of AQ affiliated or ideological travelers is an attention getter for western media, war analysts and politicos.  All of this serves to create a view that ISIS, JAN, etc are the most effective and dominating forces on the battle field.  That is what is repeatedly reported and it serves ISIS, JAN, AQ, et al in obtaining recruits, donations and boosting internal moral.  Any good military leader will say that good moral is a force multiplier. 

Types and forms of propaganda that is being used to perpetuate this idea fall under the categories noted above and include some interesting concepts.

  1. The black flag of ISIS is everywhere, therefore, ISIS is everywhere
    • Repeated pictures of an ISIS flag on a building, hill, rock, pole or even supported by two or three men, often with nothing else around it to provide identification of an area or geographical space (It's not always what's in the picture, but what isn't)
    • Painting the ISIS flag or other signs on buildings, road signs and streets to mark a wider territory, even if they actually do not have enough men to effectively control that area
  2. Keeping a tight focus on a group of fighters in a small space to appear to be larger in numbers
  3. Showing the same few fighters in front of different buildings or streets or even the same areas, but from different angles to make it appear there are more fighters
  4. Showing the same equipment, captured or in use, from different angles and in different stages to make it appear that more activity is occurring.
    • A recent event involved fighters in Iraq who had seized a checkpoint and police vehicle
    • According to the repeated tweets from different angles and stages of destruction, these were separate and multiple events
    • The give away was the vehicle had very specific markings, dents and ad hoc welded frame on the back that was apparent in each picture, even as it was burning to the ground
    • Another give away was the street and buildings; buildings with particular signs ran along one side of the street and the other faced out into a wide barren area, both visible in greater or lesser degrees in each photograph
    • In this case, it is what is in the picture that provided the actual story
  5. Being the first to announce an operation and claiming it for the ISIS organization or led by ISIS or only successful due to ISIS timely intervention
    • The other opposition groups not being as timely, prolific or possibly as concerned with the media aspect as it was with actually consolidating it's hold, taking care of wounded or planning the next attack. Or, even that it simply lacks the talent and/or focus for this type of operation.
There are many other techniques and outlets in use.  These various outlets share the same propaganda over and over again.  ISIS, being led by a veteran of the jihad and including many members who have been trained and indoctrinated by al Qaeda, have implemented Al Qaeda's strategies and Ayman al Zawahiri's stern admonishment that "half the battle is in the media."

It is and, until the moment the non-ISIS groups began pushing ISIS back towards Iraq, much of the media and "experts" believed that propaganda and were somewhat shocked to find ISIS on the run.  The same effect is occurring in Iraq with many headlines trumpeting "Al Qaeda linked militants take over Fallujah".   That isn't to say that ISIS isn't in Iraq as that was a position it fell back to, not only to escape the situation in Syria, but to consolidate their grip on territory that was under threat by the Iraq army. 

It is to say that the media, experts (barring one, Kirk Sowell at Inside Iraq Politics; @UticensisRisk) and pundits are, once again buying ISIS propaganda as well as that of President Maliki who is calling any Sunni that opposes his government "al Qaeda".  When Iraq is a much more complicated situation that has been on going while everyone was watching Syria, Iran, Snowden and various other events.

The lessons in this are:
  1. Be skeptical
  2. The loudest and most persistent voices do not equal truth; 
  3. Watch what is in the pictures;
  4. Watch what is not in the pictures
  5. Listen/read what is said
  6. Listen/read what is not said
  7. Propaganda is propaganda and means to sway opinions
  8. It doesn't matter how friendly, helpful, willing or charming the source of information is, there is always an agenda
  9. Staring into the abyss too long makes it appear that only the abyss exists
***Some other interesting propaganda includes a very lovely, staged picture of a long convoy of vehicles with clear ISIS markings and flags and many men dressed in their best "jihadi black", traveling openly thru the Iraq desert as if on dress parade.  The message accompanying it was an incredulous "HUGE convoy on the way to Mosul, Iraq".  Not unsurprisingly, there was no confirmation from Iraq media or government sources nor even any follow on event that this convoy would seem to have presaged. 

***Photoshopped pictures of men carrying ISIS flags positioned on some main highway in Iraq.  The blurred lines around the flags (attempting to blend into new background), poor cutaways around limbs and obvious appearance of parts of whatever picture it originally came from gave it away. 

***Photos previously shown by Iraqi Sunni affiliated media as local tribal fighters later appearing on the ISIS social media sites, re-captioned as "ISIS fighters in Iraq". 

All of these attempting to show that ISIS had more men and presence in the area as was their usual propaganda tactic.  Given that, it really makes you think that estimations of ISIS having up to 11,000 fighters may be seriously over-estimated. 


 

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