Reading on the history of Mohammed and the establishment of Islam, several interesting things became apparent as to the names and nom de guerres that the groups or individuals take for themselves.
For instance, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham):
Note the second paragraph. Descendence from a particular line and it's relationship to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions is very important in regards to leadership or positions of authority. To become an "emir in a jihadi group", to be considered able to press the ideological foundations of Qaedism, returning to the "base" of Islam and rejecting all future corruptions, requires an authentic connection to the original "base" of Islam, either the Prophet or his Companions.
This is in some ways reflective of the tribal organization of the communities that still exist today where these patents of genealogy effectively establish the relationship of the tribe to others and where they reside within the classes of tribes. The groups themselves do not acknowledge any "classism" in their language (see Observation on Jihad; language of Ummah to cross all divides) and yet this very system of class (ie, assumed nobility and/or authority based on genealogy) is how they derive their powers or make relationships with tribes even if the tribes do not implicitly support their causes or endeavors.
So, if Baghdadi can claim to be from the Quraish tribe, having been an "Imam" or religious cleric, this gives him a kind of religious AND community authority. This would be true outside of jihad organizations, but is very important, particularly in his claim to be establishing "true and full sharia" (as one jihad Tweeter recently told me). He has the right by education, religious position and, very importantly, his inheritance or ancestry.
In some ways, this suggests a sort of mysticism, as if the knowledge of what was "real sharia" was passed down, not only by education and tradition, but through some genealogical carnation of inherent knowledge, ancestor to ancestor. In fact, a recent discussion on social media took place in which one commenter suggested that "it's in the DNA". An interesting take using modern science as a support for a mystical idea and mytho-historical ideology.
Baghdadi further sought to seal his position of authority, legalistically and ideologically, by claiming the name "Abu Bakr". In many cases, names like Abu Yayah or Abu Aissa, reference a familial connection. IE, Abu (Father of) Yayah (John). However, Baghdadi's use of Abu Bakr is much more about establishing his position of authority and authenticity by claiming the name of one of the Prophet Mohammed's first and foremost companions in Mecca who fled with him to Medina when Mohammed was under threat from local groups.
Abu Bakr also has the distinction of being one of Mohammed's most prolific proselytizers in the early days of establishing Islam. Likewise, he was a wealthy merchant in the city of Mecca that likely provided material assistance to Mohammed during his long periods of contemplation and revelation. Much like a patron, though Hadith or historical acknowledgements within Islam place him below Mohammed as only a "companion" or "apostle".
Another name of interest in regards to the flourishing of Qaedist ideology and groups who there appears to be great confusion over their relationship to al Qaeda core is "Ansar al Sharia", the Helpers of Sharia. While this seems simple to understand, that they are "helping" to establish "Sharia", the law of Islam", proselytizing, etc, it's helpful to understand the significance of the "ansar" or helpers in the story of Mohammed and the spread of Islam.
In the early days, Mohammed's followers were subject to rounds of persecution. The poorer or less connected of his followers were driven out of Mecca en masse at least twice before Mohammed himself was finally forced to flee. These groups had travelled to Medina and Abyssinia where they were better received and treated and where they proceeded to set up their own small communities. These were "muhijareen", or foreigners who travelled to other locations and helped spread the ideas of Mohammed.
The diaspora in Medina had offered Mohammed a place in their community many times, but he had refused to abandon Mecca for some time as he was intent on establishing his ideas there. When he was forced to flee, the "ansar", the helpers, arranged for his secret travel and reception into Medina. Thus, the "Ansar" today believe they are paving the way for the re-establishment of sharia, but, also, and possibly likely, based on their name, are the front for the introduction of Qaedist militants.
This is also established by how these groups begin. While some analysts see them as grass roots organizations within the areas they arise, that's not exactly true. Ansar al Sharia in Libya, for instance, has been linked to Al-Libi, a well known Qaedist and associate of Zawahiri. He claims to have quit Al Qaeda and returned to Libya only to participate against Gaddaffi and then due to his deteriorating health.
However, as the Qaedists ideology is based on mytho-historical concepts, it's important to recall this very early history of Islam. In which, during the early days of persecution, Mohammed had given his followers leave to practice "Takfir Wa'al Hijra" where they would worship and act as the rest of the community, even in pagan rituals, in order to protect themselves from persecution. This has been a common tactic among many cells that were derived from al Qaeda's core and immediate affiliates.
So, here we can understand that while analysts say that "not everyone can be al Qaeda or is al Qaeda", suggesting that these groups have tenuous links and are likely local groups with similar leanings, this is not necessarily correct. Neither is the idea that anyone "leaves al Qaeda", although some who have travelled the path to extremism and terrorism have renounced it, they have never been members of the core or base of al Qaeda.
Equally important is the way in which al Qaeda uses it's members or transfers them depending on their abilities or usefulness. Zubaydah is an example. After he was grievously wounded, leaving a hole in his skull and his various attempts to return to jihad were thwarted by this wound (he was once flipped by a trainee during combat training and lost consciousness; complained of his deteriorating eye sight), when he went to bin Laden and the Qaeda shoura to offer his services, they sent him where he would now be most useful: administrator of the House of Martyrs, funneling money, material and fighters back and forth to the camps as well as out to do operations.
Therefore, while al Libi may have had health issues and one of his intents was to participate in the uprising against Gaddafi, these are not the only "truths", but are true so much as he would publicly say about his endeavors. However, these truths may have reduced his usefulness in direct activity of al Qaeda planning and operations. Moving to and from safe houses, between groups, delivering information or acting as a commander in the field for direct attacks was likely no longer possible, thus, he moves to one of the other operations of al Qaeda.
In this instance, al Qaeda's attempts to set up organizations under the radar and separate from "terrorism" where they could claim some sort of protection against "persecution" as only a social movement. This being the establishment of an Ansar al Sharia in Libya.
Some analysts disagree that this is an al Qaeda operation and suggest that there is just a form of coincidence or copy cat activity were in similar grass roots organizations in different countries adopt the same name. Others believe this is al Qaeda "rebranding itself" because the name al Qaeda has become some what tainted by events in Iraq and other countries where al Qaeda pledged groups have consistently done things that undermine al Qaeda's image and message.
Based on the reading of Islamic history and the early establishment of Islam along with Qaedst interpretation and use as an operational guide, neither of these are likely correct assumptions. Instead, this should be viewed as an al Qaeda operation to establish a toe hold in these countries, in the same way they see the history of Islam where the "Ansar" or the "helpers" established a community within another community that were ready and able to assist the "muhajireen" (muhajirun; muhajir) or "refugees" (originally, Mohammed & his companions) when they arrive. In general, to pave the way.
It also suggests a higher order of planning and direction even as some analysts dispute the idea. Not all Ansar al Sharia supposedly have direct links to Al Qaeda. Even al Libi appeared to keep his distance and covered his existence (Takfir wa'al Hijra; forced practice of apostasy of the refugee) by returning to his family who he had been long separated from during his years as an active member of al Qaeda. Others appear to be established by like minded, but non-affiliated men who have trained in various jihad camps whose appearance to establish the same branded organizations suggest only a vague relationship to the ideology, not some central organization or organized plan.
Again, Zubaydah's diary suggests otherwise. While in Afghanistan there were many camps with different commanders or patrons. While some camps remained totally separate and refused to work with each other, they still cooperated nominally on the battlefield. Other camps routinely funneled men back and forth, some camps providing specialized or better training on one subject or another. More importantly, during book four and into book five of Zubaydah's diary, he discusses how the various sheikhs or leaders of the camps and/or their lieutenants often travel to a central camp (Kaldun) where they meet in a form of shoura council to discuss different matters, cooperation and general activities. Even indicating that he asks for trainers from these other camps, including bin Laden's, as well as some material support.
Later, due to these many meetings, Zubaydah reports that he is about to realize one of his great ambitions. Considering the time period, his continuous mention of furthering jihad and that he later ends up being the main manager for the flow of money, men and materials in and out of camps. Even more telling is that he goes to these meetings often, suggests that he knows something he can't write over and over again and then reports joyously on 9/11, including details of how the operation was supposed to unfold, after returning from one of these meetings.
Of course, there has been continuous debate about who Zubaydah is, his real role and any real connection to al Qaeda. Most importantly whether he represented #3 in the organization. However, all of this debate obscures the other details about how exactly these organizations work, sharing of resources, materials and people as well as inter-organizational operability. Cells for activities may come from once camp or they may be men drawn from separate training camps. Experts in bomb making go from camp to camp or have men sent to them for training and have, at times, travelled to locations where cells were set up and provided on site technical training or assistance.
Returning to the issue of names and their significance, the appearance of the organizations, their shared names, the history related to the names, their mirrored structure and activities, from social assistance to Da'wa to recruitment can hardly be coincidental. In short, the suggestion that this does not represent organization of efforts seems exceedingly shortsighted.
Further, these continuing issues of who is who and their connections seems to rely almost completely on our western ideas of how organizations form, plan and operate (hierarchy) as well as ideas of leadership. Our lack of understanding of the importance of the history of the beginning of Islam and it's spread to the Qaedist ideology leaves us continually grasping for direction when that direction has been laid out for us as they believe it has been laid out for them making names of organizations and their historical attachments important for determining their purpose.
For instance, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham):
The leaks maintain that he is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Bou Badri bin Armoush, known as Abu Awwad or Abu Doaa. Abu Bakr is an alias.
According to the leaks, Baghdadi worked in Fallujah and served as an imam in a mosque in Diyala. Baghdadi is not from Baghdad, since he belongs to the Bou Badri clan, which is a part of the Bou Abbas clan from Samarra, which claims to be a descendant of Imam al-Hassan Bin Ali. This means Abu Bakr has roots in the Quraish tribe, which is a condition for becoming an emir in a jihadi group. However, the Alawi Heritage Validation Organization, which authenticates Hashemite heritage, published a statement in 2009 maintaining that the Bou Badri are neither descendants of Mohammed al-Jawad nor of Bin Idris, and thus do not belong to the Hassans as they claim.
Note the second paragraph. Descendence from a particular line and it's relationship to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions is very important in regards to leadership or positions of authority. To become an "emir in a jihadi group", to be considered able to press the ideological foundations of Qaedism, returning to the "base" of Islam and rejecting all future corruptions, requires an authentic connection to the original "base" of Islam, either the Prophet or his Companions.
This is in some ways reflective of the tribal organization of the communities that still exist today where these patents of genealogy effectively establish the relationship of the tribe to others and where they reside within the classes of tribes. The groups themselves do not acknowledge any "classism" in their language (see Observation on Jihad; language of Ummah to cross all divides) and yet this very system of class (ie, assumed nobility and/or authority based on genealogy) is how they derive their powers or make relationships with tribes even if the tribes do not implicitly support their causes or endeavors.
So, if Baghdadi can claim to be from the Quraish tribe, having been an "Imam" or religious cleric, this gives him a kind of religious AND community authority. This would be true outside of jihad organizations, but is very important, particularly in his claim to be establishing "true and full sharia" (as one jihad Tweeter recently told me). He has the right by education, religious position and, very importantly, his inheritance or ancestry.
In some ways, this suggests a sort of mysticism, as if the knowledge of what was "real sharia" was passed down, not only by education and tradition, but through some genealogical carnation of inherent knowledge, ancestor to ancestor. In fact, a recent discussion on social media took place in which one commenter suggested that "it's in the DNA". An interesting take using modern science as a support for a mystical idea and mytho-historical ideology.
Baghdadi further sought to seal his position of authority, legalistically and ideologically, by claiming the name "Abu Bakr". In many cases, names like Abu Yayah or Abu Aissa, reference a familial connection. IE, Abu (Father of) Yayah (John). However, Baghdadi's use of Abu Bakr is much more about establishing his position of authority and authenticity by claiming the name of one of the Prophet Mohammed's first and foremost companions in Mecca who fled with him to Medina when Mohammed was under threat from local groups.
Abu Bakr also has the distinction of being one of Mohammed's most prolific proselytizers in the early days of establishing Islam. Likewise, he was a wealthy merchant in the city of Mecca that likely provided material assistance to Mohammed during his long periods of contemplation and revelation. Much like a patron, though Hadith or historical acknowledgements within Islam place him below Mohammed as only a "companion" or "apostle".
Another name of interest in regards to the flourishing of Qaedist ideology and groups who there appears to be great confusion over their relationship to al Qaeda core is "Ansar al Sharia", the Helpers of Sharia. While this seems simple to understand, that they are "helping" to establish "Sharia", the law of Islam", proselytizing, etc, it's helpful to understand the significance of the "ansar" or helpers in the story of Mohammed and the spread of Islam.
In the early days, Mohammed's followers were subject to rounds of persecution. The poorer or less connected of his followers were driven out of Mecca en masse at least twice before Mohammed himself was finally forced to flee. These groups had travelled to Medina and Abyssinia where they were better received and treated and where they proceeded to set up their own small communities. These were "muhijareen", or foreigners who travelled to other locations and helped spread the ideas of Mohammed.
The diaspora in Medina had offered Mohammed a place in their community many times, but he had refused to abandon Mecca for some time as he was intent on establishing his ideas there. When he was forced to flee, the "ansar", the helpers, arranged for his secret travel and reception into Medina. Thus, the "Ansar" today believe they are paving the way for the re-establishment of sharia, but, also, and possibly likely, based on their name, are the front for the introduction of Qaedist militants.
This is also established by how these groups begin. While some analysts see them as grass roots organizations within the areas they arise, that's not exactly true. Ansar al Sharia in Libya, for instance, has been linked to Al-Libi, a well known Qaedist and associate of Zawahiri. He claims to have quit Al Qaeda and returned to Libya only to participate against Gaddaffi and then due to his deteriorating health.
However, as the Qaedists ideology is based on mytho-historical concepts, it's important to recall this very early history of Islam. In which, during the early days of persecution, Mohammed had given his followers leave to practice "Takfir Wa'al Hijra" where they would worship and act as the rest of the community, even in pagan rituals, in order to protect themselves from persecution. This has been a common tactic among many cells that were derived from al Qaeda's core and immediate affiliates.
So, here we can understand that while analysts say that "not everyone can be al Qaeda or is al Qaeda", suggesting that these groups have tenuous links and are likely local groups with similar leanings, this is not necessarily correct. Neither is the idea that anyone "leaves al Qaeda", although some who have travelled the path to extremism and terrorism have renounced it, they have never been members of the core or base of al Qaeda.
Equally important is the way in which al Qaeda uses it's members or transfers them depending on their abilities or usefulness. Zubaydah is an example. After he was grievously wounded, leaving a hole in his skull and his various attempts to return to jihad were thwarted by this wound (he was once flipped by a trainee during combat training and lost consciousness; complained of his deteriorating eye sight), when he went to bin Laden and the Qaeda shoura to offer his services, they sent him where he would now be most useful: administrator of the House of Martyrs, funneling money, material and fighters back and forth to the camps as well as out to do operations.
Therefore, while al Libi may have had health issues and one of his intents was to participate in the uprising against Gaddafi, these are not the only "truths", but are true so much as he would publicly say about his endeavors. However, these truths may have reduced his usefulness in direct activity of al Qaeda planning and operations. Moving to and from safe houses, between groups, delivering information or acting as a commander in the field for direct attacks was likely no longer possible, thus, he moves to one of the other operations of al Qaeda.
In this instance, al Qaeda's attempts to set up organizations under the radar and separate from "terrorism" where they could claim some sort of protection against "persecution" as only a social movement. This being the establishment of an Ansar al Sharia in Libya.
Some analysts disagree that this is an al Qaeda operation and suggest that there is just a form of coincidence or copy cat activity were in similar grass roots organizations in different countries adopt the same name. Others believe this is al Qaeda "rebranding itself" because the name al Qaeda has become some what tainted by events in Iraq and other countries where al Qaeda pledged groups have consistently done things that undermine al Qaeda's image and message.
Based on the reading of Islamic history and the early establishment of Islam along with Qaedst interpretation and use as an operational guide, neither of these are likely correct assumptions. Instead, this should be viewed as an al Qaeda operation to establish a toe hold in these countries, in the same way they see the history of Islam where the "Ansar" or the "helpers" established a community within another community that were ready and able to assist the "muhajireen" (muhajirun; muhajir) or "refugees" (originally, Mohammed & his companions) when they arrive. In general, to pave the way.
It also suggests a higher order of planning and direction even as some analysts dispute the idea. Not all Ansar al Sharia supposedly have direct links to Al Qaeda. Even al Libi appeared to keep his distance and covered his existence (Takfir wa'al Hijra; forced practice of apostasy of the refugee) by returning to his family who he had been long separated from during his years as an active member of al Qaeda. Others appear to be established by like minded, but non-affiliated men who have trained in various jihad camps whose appearance to establish the same branded organizations suggest only a vague relationship to the ideology, not some central organization or organized plan.
Again, Zubaydah's diary suggests otherwise. While in Afghanistan there were many camps with different commanders or patrons. While some camps remained totally separate and refused to work with each other, they still cooperated nominally on the battlefield. Other camps routinely funneled men back and forth, some camps providing specialized or better training on one subject or another. More importantly, during book four and into book five of Zubaydah's diary, he discusses how the various sheikhs or leaders of the camps and/or their lieutenants often travel to a central camp (Kaldun) where they meet in a form of shoura council to discuss different matters, cooperation and general activities. Even indicating that he asks for trainers from these other camps, including bin Laden's, as well as some material support.
Later, due to these many meetings, Zubaydah reports that he is about to realize one of his great ambitions. Considering the time period, his continuous mention of furthering jihad and that he later ends up being the main manager for the flow of money, men and materials in and out of camps. Even more telling is that he goes to these meetings often, suggests that he knows something he can't write over and over again and then reports joyously on 9/11, including details of how the operation was supposed to unfold, after returning from one of these meetings.
Of course, there has been continuous debate about who Zubaydah is, his real role and any real connection to al Qaeda. Most importantly whether he represented #3 in the organization. However, all of this debate obscures the other details about how exactly these organizations work, sharing of resources, materials and people as well as inter-organizational operability. Cells for activities may come from once camp or they may be men drawn from separate training camps. Experts in bomb making go from camp to camp or have men sent to them for training and have, at times, travelled to locations where cells were set up and provided on site technical training or assistance.
Returning to the issue of names and their significance, the appearance of the organizations, their shared names, the history related to the names, their mirrored structure and activities, from social assistance to Da'wa to recruitment can hardly be coincidental. In short, the suggestion that this does not represent organization of efforts seems exceedingly shortsighted.
Further, these continuing issues of who is who and their connections seems to rely almost completely on our western ideas of how organizations form, plan and operate (hierarchy) as well as ideas of leadership. Our lack of understanding of the importance of the history of the beginning of Islam and it's spread to the Qaedist ideology leaves us continually grasping for direction when that direction has been laid out for us as they believe it has been laid out for them making names of organizations and their historical attachments important for determining their purpose.
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