Friday, February 28, 2014
Thursday, February 27, 2014
Wednesday, February 26, 2014
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
This is Snowden: Ethical hacking organization hacked, website defaced with Edward Snowden's passport | The Verge
Ethical hacking organization hacked, website defaced with Edward Snowden's passport | The Verge
Left Snowden's passport picture all over the site. Called himself Eugene Belford from the movie "Hackers". Left a message "Defaced again? Yep, good job reusing your passwords, morons."
This is Snowden.
1) He believes he is still working for the NSA. That he is making them "better". "...good job reusing your passwords, morons."
2) Movie reference. This is Snowden's signature.
3) More than one movie reference. Snowden has taken information of names and other identification information of military, police and security officials. "Skyfall".
4) Snowden's original run in with a supervisor at the CIA was regarding "poor security" in the online personnel files of the CIA where he put allegedly harmless coding into the program to show its "flaws". Snowden was reprimanded and sent home from Geneva. One of several recurring failures in his life. According to Snowden, he had already been collecting information at that time. He may or may not have already taken personnel information. This is either to show that he still can or as reprisal for the suggestion by media and government officials that he had already done so and put enumerable lives at risk.
5) Snowden's personality, superiority, overcoming those lingering feelings of failure are all similar to other serial criminals. Snowden is a serial criminal. He's known to have taken information from at least two different locations, very likely more. Being stuck in Putin's Russia where freedom, as he has repeatedly said he believes he is defending, is basically non-existent. In order to maintain his personal view of himself, he is likely to continue to try to prove his continuing superiority as well as act as if he is doing the intelligence and government agencies a favor.
Narcissism is likely also driving him to continue to try to insert himself into the story. His handlers in Russia, however he arrived at them, have tucked Snowden away in order to remove him and his potential of being exposed as a spy so that the story that is being perpetrated can come to the fore. Snowden's need to be seen as a hero, for himself, for his father and for the accolades he receives from various audiences, drives him to continue to act.
The only question is whether he did this with knowledge, participation or urging of any handlers or whether they will be surprised to know that he acted. In either event, it continues to act against and on the psyche of the relative agencies that are responsible for intelligence and security, thus serving their purpose.
6) Ethical Hacking organization. Also highly important as one of Snowden's activities while in Japan, prior to going to Hawaii was to attend an "Ethical hacking course" in India.
7) Which brings us to another recent hack that stole 309k records of administration, faculty, students and others attached or attending University of Maryland where Snowden was working when first employed by the CIA. He also attended the university's sub-campus in Japan (University of Maryland University College - Asia). This also bares signature, not just because Snowden attended, but because the University at first was very quick to point out that Snowden hadn't actually attended the main campus, but was a security guard only attending a semester at the Japan campus.
Again, ego may be at issue here as Snowden is reported to have had a consistent problem with his lack of education even as he consistently bragged about his ability to over come it. Largely by puffing up his resume or giving the impression he had done more or for longer than he had actually done so. Suggestions have been made that this might have even been one of his purposes for hacking the personnel files in the first place or even to discover that he did indeed have a derogatory report on his file.
UPDATE: Questions arise whether Snowden would be so foolish as to use his own passport as a signature instead of a copycat who wants to be or invoke Snowden's image or cause. From the perspective of this analysis, this is very likely a purposeful signature. Taken along with the other aspects and signatures, this seems to be a proverbial taunt. That he was there. That the revocation of his American passport did not keep him from fleeing and that he had a new passport and country. In essence, "in your face" act.
Another question was posed about whether Snowden would break his own operational security to hack something so publicly that possibly exposes his location. From the perspective of this analysis, Snowden is now inside Russia and has been reported to be staying in safe housing surrounding the Russian intelligence complex. This likely gives him a false sense of security, rendering him "untouchable". He also considers himself to be relatively brilliant or genius programmer or hack that can cover his tracks well enough even though his insider hacks left a considerable trail once the investigators began to look.
As far as breaking operational security, during his long efforts of collecting information, Snowden had gone relatively quiet on the regular forums that he frequented on Ars Technica after he collected his first batch of information from the Geneva location. However, during that operation his appearance on those forums and various IRC chats had increased significantly.
Later, at significant moments during other operations, he re-appeared on the forums, if only briefly. Significantly, in 2012 when he commented on people being inordinately obedient to "spooky types". This was around the same time that he is suspected of beginning to collect data or at least left his "foot print". He may have been in other unpublicized IRC chats at this time.
The question remains about leaving "foot prints" and whether Snowden has good operational security practices. In general, his practices were good enough to keep him off the radar or at least have a plausible reason for his actions at three different locations. On the other hand, he did leave "foot prints" at each of these locations. This can either be described as not having absolute perfect "OpSec", but good enough or that he may have intentionally left those traces.
Mr. Snowden was not adverse to showing himself at the time that he released the information, nor has he been adverse to appearing in interviews, chats or simple writings for columns. Each time invariably leaves an opening or explicitly violates operational security that would other wise be maintained by a person who was in fear of being found. In other words, mooting the idea that Snowden, in person or as a hacker, is overly concerned with operational security as opposed to making himself seen and heard.
This not about being a hacker or a spy per se. This is about character and patterns that Mr. Snowden set well before he was known to the general public, particularly in his on line life.
This is Snowden. Hereafter, there is a likelihood future events may be copy cats as he purposefully or inadvertently inspires other actors. Targets, messages and references for future hacks may provide superficial clues in the future as to whether it is a Snowden Hack or other. Forensic studies of the hack will likely produce more definitive information as to the process and location from where the hacks occurred.
Mr. Snowden is not nearly as good at hiding his tracks as he thinks he is or is intentionally acting in the open. "Catch me if you can."
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - Spy Wars and the Internet 2009
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - In Context (The Big Picture)
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - The Geneva Decision
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered (the movie-esque quality of Snowden Spy Craft)
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - Administrative Discharge
Idiot Wind: A Compendium of Snowden, WikiLeaks, Greenwald, Poitras and Appelbaum Topics
Ed v. Ed or How to Think About the Snowden Operation
Russian Intelligence is Behind the Snowden Show: German Intelligence
On Snowden and Coincidences
The End of the Snowden Operation
Edward Lucas: The New Cold War
Edward Lucas: The Snowden Operation
Catherine Fitzpatrick: Privacy For Me and Not For Thee
Left Snowden's passport picture all over the site. Called himself Eugene Belford from the movie "Hackers". Left a message "Defaced again? Yep, good job reusing your passwords, morons."
This is Snowden.
1) He believes he is still working for the NSA. That he is making them "better". "...good job reusing your passwords, morons."
2) Movie reference. This is Snowden's signature.
3) More than one movie reference. Snowden has taken information of names and other identification information of military, police and security officials. "Skyfall".
4) Snowden's original run in with a supervisor at the CIA was regarding "poor security" in the online personnel files of the CIA where he put allegedly harmless coding into the program to show its "flaws". Snowden was reprimanded and sent home from Geneva. One of several recurring failures in his life. According to Snowden, he had already been collecting information at that time. He may or may not have already taken personnel information. This is either to show that he still can or as reprisal for the suggestion by media and government officials that he had already done so and put enumerable lives at risk.
5) Snowden's personality, superiority, overcoming those lingering feelings of failure are all similar to other serial criminals. Snowden is a serial criminal. He's known to have taken information from at least two different locations, very likely more. Being stuck in Putin's Russia where freedom, as he has repeatedly said he believes he is defending, is basically non-existent. In order to maintain his personal view of himself, he is likely to continue to try to prove his continuing superiority as well as act as if he is doing the intelligence and government agencies a favor.
Narcissism is likely also driving him to continue to try to insert himself into the story. His handlers in Russia, however he arrived at them, have tucked Snowden away in order to remove him and his potential of being exposed as a spy so that the story that is being perpetrated can come to the fore. Snowden's need to be seen as a hero, for himself, for his father and for the accolades he receives from various audiences, drives him to continue to act.
The only question is whether he did this with knowledge, participation or urging of any handlers or whether they will be surprised to know that he acted. In either event, it continues to act against and on the psyche of the relative agencies that are responsible for intelligence and security, thus serving their purpose.
6) Ethical Hacking organization. Also highly important as one of Snowden's activities while in Japan, prior to going to Hawaii was to attend an "Ethical hacking course" in India.
7) Which brings us to another recent hack that stole 309k records of administration, faculty, students and others attached or attending University of Maryland where Snowden was working when first employed by the CIA. He also attended the university's sub-campus in Japan (University of Maryland University College - Asia). This also bares signature, not just because Snowden attended, but because the University at first was very quick to point out that Snowden hadn't actually attended the main campus, but was a security guard only attending a semester at the Japan campus.
Again, ego may be at issue here as Snowden is reported to have had a consistent problem with his lack of education even as he consistently bragged about his ability to over come it. Largely by puffing up his resume or giving the impression he had done more or for longer than he had actually done so. Suggestions have been made that this might have even been one of his purposes for hacking the personnel files in the first place or even to discover that he did indeed have a derogatory report on his file.
UPDATE: Questions arise whether Snowden would be so foolish as to use his own passport as a signature instead of a copycat who wants to be or invoke Snowden's image or cause. From the perspective of this analysis, this is very likely a purposeful signature. Taken along with the other aspects and signatures, this seems to be a proverbial taunt. That he was there. That the revocation of his American passport did not keep him from fleeing and that he had a new passport and country. In essence, "in your face" act.
Another question was posed about whether Snowden would break his own operational security to hack something so publicly that possibly exposes his location. From the perspective of this analysis, Snowden is now inside Russia and has been reported to be staying in safe housing surrounding the Russian intelligence complex. This likely gives him a false sense of security, rendering him "untouchable". He also considers himself to be relatively brilliant or genius programmer or hack that can cover his tracks well enough even though his insider hacks left a considerable trail once the investigators began to look.
As far as breaking operational security, during his long efforts of collecting information, Snowden had gone relatively quiet on the regular forums that he frequented on Ars Technica after he collected his first batch of information from the Geneva location. However, during that operation his appearance on those forums and various IRC chats had increased significantly.
Later, at significant moments during other operations, he re-appeared on the forums, if only briefly. Significantly, in 2012 when he commented on people being inordinately obedient to "spooky types". This was around the same time that he is suspected of beginning to collect data or at least left his "foot print". He may have been in other unpublicized IRC chats at this time.
The question remains about leaving "foot prints" and whether Snowden has good operational security practices. In general, his practices were good enough to keep him off the radar or at least have a plausible reason for his actions at three different locations. On the other hand, he did leave "foot prints" at each of these locations. This can either be described as not having absolute perfect "OpSec", but good enough or that he may have intentionally left those traces.
Mr. Snowden was not adverse to showing himself at the time that he released the information, nor has he been adverse to appearing in interviews, chats or simple writings for columns. Each time invariably leaves an opening or explicitly violates operational security that would other wise be maintained by a person who was in fear of being found. In other words, mooting the idea that Snowden, in person or as a hacker, is overly concerned with operational security as opposed to making himself seen and heard.
This not about being a hacker or a spy per se. This is about character and patterns that Mr. Snowden set well before he was known to the general public, particularly in his on line life.
This is Snowden. Hereafter, there is a likelihood future events may be copy cats as he purposefully or inadvertently inspires other actors. Targets, messages and references for future hacks may provide superficial clues in the future as to whether it is a Snowden Hack or other. Forensic studies of the hack will likely produce more definitive information as to the process and location from where the hacks occurred.
Mr. Snowden is not nearly as good at hiding his tracks as he thinks he is or is intentionally acting in the open. "Catch me if you can."
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - Spy Wars and the Internet 2009
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - In Context (The Big Picture)
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - The Geneva Decision
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered (the movie-esque quality of Snowden Spy Craft)
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - Administrative Discharge
Idiot Wind: A Compendium of Snowden, WikiLeaks, Greenwald, Poitras and Appelbaum Topics
Ed v. Ed or How to Think About the Snowden Operation
Russian Intelligence is Behind the Snowden Show: German Intelligence
On Snowden and Coincidences
The End of the Snowden Operation
Edward Lucas: The New Cold War
Edward Lucas: The Snowden Operation
Catherine Fitzpatrick: Privacy For Me and Not For Thee
Monday, February 24, 2014
Sunday, February 23, 2014
Saturday, February 22, 2014
Friday, February 21, 2014
Wednesday, February 19, 2014
Tuesday, February 18, 2014
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - Spy Wars and the Internet 2009
In the Beginning....
It was 2006. Edward Snowden had just started his career as "a spy", landing a job with the CIA as a Communications Officer. Laura Poitras was making a name as a controversial film maker, her film "My Country, My Country", a view from the other side of the Iraq War, had been nominated for an Academy Award. Glenn Greenwald was still a vociferous and controversial blogger who took regular and virulent swings at American politics, politicians and policy, most particularly over the Iraq War. Julian Assange had just organized Wikileaks, a site that was ostensibly created to expose corruption within any government, advocating for open societies.
All of these actors come to the fore just as the first shots were being fired in what would be a long, hot and very visible war between Russian, American, British and Israeli intelligence agencies with the occasional appearance of the Chinese and Iranians. The covert/overt war of diplomatic/intelligence officers would span across multiple countries and, at times, become deadly.
All of these actors come to the fore just as the first shots were being fired in what would be a long, hot and very visible war between Russian, American, British and Israeli intelligence agencies with the occasional appearance of the Chinese and Iranians. The covert/overt war of diplomatic/intelligence officers would span across multiple countries and, at times, become deadly.
Friday, February 14, 2014
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - In Context
When building Edward Snowden's "picture", it's easy to get lost in the details and lose sight of the big picture. Like a puzzle, putting all of the straight edges together to form a frame work then working on the pieces inside, matching tiny details of each piece to put them together to form the picture. Snowden's puzzle though is not a simple one. It is the complicated variety where there are two pictures: the first, the one presented to the public through his interlocutors as an iconic hero of freedom and privacy, a whislteblower; the second, when flipped over, a young man in the center of a larger picture of espionage and counter-espionage, international economic and political relationships.
Maybe the craziest way to put a two sided puzzle together is from the inside out. Or, catching an image in a few pieces of the puzzle and putting that small piece of the picture together without knowing exactly where it fits. No framework, just waiting to see which picture is emerging, building the picture of Edward Snowden.
Edward Snowden does not appear in a vacuum. It only looks that way because, like the thousands of pieces of a puzzle dumped out on a table, the public has been bombarded with thousands of pieces of information, other events seeming obliterated beneath the bombardment of images and words splashed across the screens of televisions and computers. The big picture gets lost.
Maybe the craziest way to put a two sided puzzle together is from the inside out. Or, catching an image in a few pieces of the puzzle and putting that small piece of the picture together without knowing exactly where it fits. No framework, just waiting to see which picture is emerging, building the picture of Edward Snowden.
Edward Snowden does not appear in a vacuum. It only looks that way because, like the thousands of pieces of a puzzle dumped out on a table, the public has been bombarded with thousands of pieces of information, other events seeming obliterated beneath the bombardment of images and words splashed across the screens of televisions and computers. The big picture gets lost.
Thursday, February 13, 2014
Wednesday, February 12, 2014
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - Administrative Discharge
Oh what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practise to deceive! Sir Walter Scott, Marmion, Canto vi. Stanza 17.
"Society really seems to have developed an unquestioning obedience towards spooky types" Edward Snowden
"I've been a spy almost all of my adult life." - Edward Snowden
As noted previously, Mr. Snowden has a problem with embellishing his stories, both on line and in person, causing aberrations in the system. Aberrations are often indicators of larger problems. When there are consistent aberrations it means that there is a significant problem or malfunction that may cause an entire system or structure to collapse. In this case, an entire story constructed to embellish Mr. Snowden's credentials as both a patriot and an honest broker of information that is being released.
When first we practise to deceive! Sir Walter Scott, Marmion, Canto vi. Stanza 17.
"Society really seems to have developed an unquestioning obedience towards spooky types" Edward Snowden
"I've been a spy almost all of my adult life." - Edward Snowden
As noted previously, Mr. Snowden has a problem with embellishing his stories, both on line and in person, causing aberrations in the system. Aberrations are often indicators of larger problems. When there are consistent aberrations it means that there is a significant problem or malfunction that may cause an entire system or structure to collapse. In this case, an entire story constructed to embellish Mr. Snowden's credentials as both a patriot and an honest broker of information that is being released.
Monday, February 10, 2014
Sunday, February 9, 2014
Ed v. Ed or How to Think About the Snowden Operation - Wired State
Ed v. Ed or How to Think About the Snowden Operation - Wired State
It looks far more likely that he was trying to cripple the NSA and its allies, and to hurt America's standing in the world. Taking a huge cache of documents, and in a way that largely defies description, analysis or mitigation, is not the action of a patriotic whistleblower. It is the behaviour of a saboteur.
I couldn't agree more. A saboteur. And that is how Congress and the president and the courts need to look at this: deliberate sabotage, in the service of a radical agenda, helped by a radical movement, that has been exploited by Russia. We don't need to prove the hand of Moscow or Moscow gold in this affair to act -- and act cautiously and prudently.
Saturday, February 8, 2014
Code Name "VERAX": Snowden Uncovered - The Geneva Decision
Much of what I saw in Geneva really disillusioned me about how my government functions and what its impact is in the world," Snowden told The Guardian. "I realized that I was part of something that was doing far more harm than good."
Aberrations In the System
Mr. Snowden's story about Geneva was an aberration in the system. Not only because it seemed out of place with the rest of his story about seeing unmitigated data collections, a story unto itself, nor simply because it sounded like a movie; an unnecessary embellishment when the information that was about to be released was already a significant weight for his version of "the truth". It was an aberration because it did not fit other common practices employed for developing a resource that are far less risky if also far less sexy.
Developing an informant is the key phrase, A banker in an important position at a bank is not a "throw away" informant. This would be a source that would and could be used over a longer period of time so it would be imperative to develop a relationship, not potentially kill him or her.
Whether it was because it was unnecessary backdrop against the rest of the story, because it was too movie-esque or outside of more common practices, Mr. Snowden presented an aberration. This aberration begged for more attention to his time in Geneva, a time when his personnel file would show he had already attempted or had obtained information and when his own aberrant behavior had brought him unwanted attention.
Geneva - March 2007 to February 2009
Friday, February 7, 2014
Code Name "VERAX": Edward Snowden Uncovered
"I've been a spy almost all of my adult life." - Edward Snowden
“the most massive and most damaging theft of intelligence information in our history.” -Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper
The first principle of creating any cover story is to keep it simple: K.I.S.S. Include as much truth as possible. It is easier to remember and, if there are any minor discrepancies, they will be dismissed as that: minor discrepancies. That is often easier said then done for some subjects. Once the subject begins to embellish parts of the story, he might reveal actual details of his real intentions or parts of the operation.
Worse, having embellished the story, the subject often feels it necessary to continue to do so. Particularly if he believes he might have revealed information that he needs to obfuscate, if there is another incident that may come to light or if he believes that part of his story is receiving positive feed back.
This is the case of Edward Snowden, code name "VERAX". Had Mr. Snowden kept to the simple line of his story, that he had worked for a United States intelligence agency and contractors and realized that there was massive surveillance of it's own citizens, breaking the fourth and fifth amendments, he might have remained an enigma. His possible relationship with a foreign intelligence agency forever obscured behind the façade of a patriot whose life was at risk from his own government for telling "the truth". A heroic figure who had to sacrifice his life and freedom for that of others by escaping into enemy hands.
For some, that myth may remain inviolable to the bitter end. It will not be the first time that this has occurred. Neither is he the first to have claimed to have acted on principles while giving secrets to Russia.
But, Mr. Snowden, while competently carrying out the technical aspects of the operation, failed to maintain the first principle of creating and maintaining a cover story. He embellished, liberally and often. It may be due to the "catastrophic success" he achieved at Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) in Hawaii after long years of variable success at collecting intelligence. Having "accomplished his mission", he had to leave and quickly. It could have been stress, fear or any number of reasons.
In any case, Mr. Snowden provided an extensive interview and then went on with another, where his claims became increasingly paranoid and volumnous. One, which in hindsight, appears to have been poorly managed by his contacts as Mr. Snowden's actual personality, a young man who could not resist bragging or embellishing his escapades, bled through his scripted talking points. Fortunately, Mr. Snowden was whisked off to a private residence, guarded by Hong Kong police and then, per reports, the Russian Consulate in Hong Kong.
Finally arriving in Moscow, well insulated from the public, Mr. Snowden's interviews have become further and far between, almost all carried out through encrypted chat and only given to sympathetic reporters.
If it had not been for his statements regarding alleged events in Geneva, the key moment that Snowden claims to have "hardened him" to the decision to steal information, other events would have passed with little public notice. Snowden alleges:
“the most massive and most damaging theft of intelligence information in our history.” -Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper
The first principle of creating any cover story is to keep it simple: K.I.S.S. Include as much truth as possible. It is easier to remember and, if there are any minor discrepancies, they will be dismissed as that: minor discrepancies. That is often easier said then done for some subjects. Once the subject begins to embellish parts of the story, he might reveal actual details of his real intentions or parts of the operation.
Worse, having embellished the story, the subject often feels it necessary to continue to do so. Particularly if he believes he might have revealed information that he needs to obfuscate, if there is another incident that may come to light or if he believes that part of his story is receiving positive feed back.
This is the case of Edward Snowden, code name "VERAX". Had Mr. Snowden kept to the simple line of his story, that he had worked for a United States intelligence agency and contractors and realized that there was massive surveillance of it's own citizens, breaking the fourth and fifth amendments, he might have remained an enigma. His possible relationship with a foreign intelligence agency forever obscured behind the façade of a patriot whose life was at risk from his own government for telling "the truth". A heroic figure who had to sacrifice his life and freedom for that of others by escaping into enemy hands.
For some, that myth may remain inviolable to the bitter end. It will not be the first time that this has occurred. Neither is he the first to have claimed to have acted on principles while giving secrets to Russia.
But, Mr. Snowden, while competently carrying out the technical aspects of the operation, failed to maintain the first principle of creating and maintaining a cover story. He embellished, liberally and often. It may be due to the "catastrophic success" he achieved at Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) in Hawaii after long years of variable success at collecting intelligence. Having "accomplished his mission", he had to leave and quickly. It could have been stress, fear or any number of reasons.
In any case, Mr. Snowden provided an extensive interview and then went on with another, where his claims became increasingly paranoid and volumnous. One, which in hindsight, appears to have been poorly managed by his contacts as Mr. Snowden's actual personality, a young man who could not resist bragging or embellishing his escapades, bled through his scripted talking points. Fortunately, Mr. Snowden was whisked off to a private residence, guarded by Hong Kong police and then, per reports, the Russian Consulate in Hong Kong.
Finally arriving in Moscow, well insulated from the public, Mr. Snowden's interviews have become further and far between, almost all carried out through encrypted chat and only given to sympathetic reporters.
If it had not been for his statements regarding alleged events in Geneva, the key moment that Snowden claims to have "hardened him" to the decision to steal information, other events would have passed with little public notice. Snowden alleges:
In an attempt to learn secret financial information, Snowden alleged that undercover CIA agents would get the banker drunk and "encourage" him to drive home in his car. When the banker was eventually arrested for drunk driving, the CIA operatives offered to help him out of the jam, paving the way for recruitment as a source.
"Much of what I saw in Geneva really disillusioned me about how my government functions and what its impact is in the world," Snowden told The Guardian. "I realized that I was part of something that was doing far more harm than good."
Thursday, February 6, 2014
Wednesday, February 5, 2014
Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring - Ideology v Strategy
Thomas Hegghammer writes, Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring. Rethinking Islamist Politics. In it, Hegghammer lays out several questions about what has occurred over the course of this long developing conflict and how certain assumptions may be leading to bad analysis. Some issues affecting analysis addressed here, Al Qaeda and the Politics of Analysis (how policy may be driving analysis instead of the other way around); Who is Fooling Whom? (effect of information and disinformation campaigns on analysis).
The top of Hegghammer's article notes that this is part of a series for "Rethinking Islamist Politics". This may be the most important comment on the subject with an emphasis on "politics". In the various studies of terrorism, particularly the Islamic Jihad variety, one thing that continues to be missed is that this is a political movement. As Mr. Hegghammer notes, there is often too much emphasis placed on ideology as a driving force and not enough placed on the absolutely political nature and aims of the movement, those who founded the movement and continue to guide it in many ways still today.
The problem, of course, is that the movement uses the language of religion, specifically Islam, in order to justify it's acts, motivate it's followers and establish a legalistic form of rules (sharia) that it uses as a framework for controlling and governing its people and the areas that it nominally controls. However, this IS a political movement and it has specific political and geo-political goals. The fact that it uses "terrorism" (political violence), a tactic, to achieve these goals is only relevant to the stage and strength of the political movement and organizations within the movement's network.
The Islamist ideology that is espoused is not the sole basis of the ideology even if it is the language used to convey their ideas, plans and strategies. For instance, as noted in Lessons from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Letters and Mao, a thorough reading of the letters shows that Mao's works on revolution, most significantly "On Guerilla War", has had significant influence on the thinking and strategies of the movement. Not only do several of the letters rest on the frame work of Mao's work, but bin Laden is clearly paraphrasing several of Mao's better known quotes and tenets.
This is not the first time this occurs. In the video released of Bin Laden celebrating the 9/11 attacks he clearly uses the phrase "America is a paper tiger". This is also Mao and we see that in the writings of others, such as al Suri who articulates the idea of focusing all jihadis attention on the "external enemy" and, later, Naji in 2004 where he paraphrases Mao on the problems of "militants" (Mao, militarists) that do not understand the need for political work to go hand in hand with military efforts. Both al Suri and Naji are channeling Mao's "On Guerilla War".
Even Zawahiri gets into the picture when he recently released the Guidelines for Conducting Jihad. This is nearly parallel to Mao's Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. Zawahiri peppers his guidelines with a few more items and tailors it towards the Islamic Jihad movement. We may even see Mao's influence in Al Qaeda's "20yr plan" where one of the first points of the plan was "The Awakening", a direct construct from Mao's principles of revolution. We may also see a knowledge of the actual history of the Chinese Communist revolution, the methods used to propagate Communism and how long it actually took Mao and the Communists to take over the Chinese state.
There are likely many more examples of this interesting amalgamation of ideas and concepts, not only with Mao, but other internationally recognized political and military thinkers. After the shooting of the young Pakistani woman, Malala, by the Taliban, the Taliban spokesman made a reference to Rousseau, amongst other philosophers, greatly consternating a number of Rousseau's philosophical followers. In the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, bin Laden makes note of a Rand study he read, a recent book by a western military theorist and asks that a list of books be translated for his consumption.
At the same time, all of the above mentioned "jihad thinkers" use references, stories and verses from the Hadith and various Islamic thinkers to support these other ideas that are obviously not Islamic in nature or origination. This is done because this is the language that they understand and that many of their followers, who are not as educated in other philosophies or histories, can readily understand, imbibe and regurgitate because they do have a basic Islamic education. These references to Islamic precepts of faith and noted Islamic thinkers also lend a significant amount of authority to the ideas and strategies that they do wish to proliferate. This is further re-enforced by commentary and fatwas (religious rulings) of modern scholars of jurisprudence and respected clerics.
What does this say then about the ideology of the Islamic Jihad movement? Primarily, that despite our own narrow focus on Salafism or Wahhabism as THE ideological driver, these are nothing more than a base frame work. This is simply a tool by which to further their political cause and to delineate who may be a member of the group even as they claim to represent the interests of a much wider body of people; exclusive and inclusive at the same time. This very nature is one of the reasons that the movement appeals across a wide stratum of people, even those that are not practicing Muslims, newly minted "reverts" (converts), those who have been "back sliders" and those that are not living within the conflict areas.
The "thinkers" that have inspired and influenced the movement are much more pragmatic about incorporating other ideas into their ideology because they have been influenced by more than Islam. This may not be a novel revelation to some analysts, but it is likely to be novel to others, as well as some within the political class, whose focus has remained on the Islamic and religious language and ideas of the movement.
Mr. Hegghammer would be correct then in noting that there is too much focus on the ideology in respect to analysis that does not reflect what is obviously a pragmatic approach to revolutionary ideals. Particularly if analysis focuses on the narrow constraints of it's religious meme. Where analysis seems to be falling down is in recognizing these other influences and how they may effect the dynamic evolution of the movement. Not only the ideology, but it's appeal to a wide range of people, the strategies that the movement employs and how it may relate other seemingly disconnected groups and activities to the larger movement.
Mr. Hegghammer says:
He goes on to note:
And:
Mr. Hegghammer then suggests that this is a "mis-match between rhetoric and behavior" and that there was nothing in past rhetoric that suggested Syria would be a destination of choice. The question then is what motivates the organizations within the movement to focus on Syria and what motivates foreign fighters to flock to that destination as opposed to anywhere else?
First, I'd like to agree that relying too heavily on the rhetoric or ideology for explanations or to predict future actions is a highly fallible methodology. However, it would be remiss to ignore completely the previous writings of the "jihad thinkers" that shaped, not only the ideology, but the general trajectory and strategy of the revolution.
The operative words here are "relying too heavily". Because, having read the many writings of al Suri, Zawahiri, Naji and bin Laden (who may be Naji as well) and others, they were all relatively explicit about how they saw the revolution unfolding, to which countries it would move to and a general order they believed this would occur. Not all of them agreed on the order that it would occur, but they almost all agreed which countries it would occur in and they went about setting up their networks to facilitate these activities. But we see, in the formulation of their ideology, the actual strategy they will employ.
For instance, Zawahiri issues a directive to Zarqawi in Iraq, 2005, that, instead of focusing solely on ejecting US forces and overthrowing the entire Shi'ite led government, Zarqawi should work to set up a network extending through the Levant. A form of this network was already in place as it had been facilitating fighters to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq from many other destinations and back again, but they had yet to formalize or focus on establishing robust revolutionary cells that would spread their ideas and accelerate facilitating revolution inside the designated countries.
The letter essaying these directives is chockfull of ideological and mytho-historical references as well as some relatively normal religious invocations for the success of the plan.
On the other hand, the well known idiom, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy", would apply here. While Zawahiri gives some specifics about how he thinks this initiative will take place, the broad strategy for this was laid out in the "20 Year Plan" publicly published in 2005. The plan had suggested that Syria was the next target and suggested the date range would be between 2007 and 2010. This was feasible because the group had already established a network through Syria and this network had been greatly facilitated by the Iraq war, but more importantly, by Assad's intelligence agency.
The infiltration by Assad's intelligence agencies is a significant factor in derailing the time table for this expected event. Being inside the network, Assad's agencies could not be unaware of the plan and, in 2008 thru 2009, as the Iraq War wound to a close, Assad's security forces began to aggressively round up and imprison many known members of the network. In many ways, not only stopping the known cells from acting, but holding them hostage against future incursions by the Al Qaeda network.
In the west, we view these activities as being part of Western strategy where the United States had pressured Assad to reel in these militants and help bring the war to a close. We should be viewing it as it really was, a self-serving act that not only staved off an immediate insurgency inside Syria, but allowed Assad to ingratiate himself to the United States and the West in general. The problem for Assad was that the jihad militants were not the only rabble rousing rebels in Syria and that he miscalculated his ability to put down the other rebels.
When his first act of outright massacring of civilians did not stop the rebellion, Assad's regime released hundreds of prisoners, most, as the non-Islamist rebels insist, were Islamist militants. Here we see Assad's actions facilitate putting the Islamic Jihad movements back on track with their originally stated goals.
Many reject this idea on the grounds that it would seem illogical to set up a second foe, particularly one that would appear to be more dedicated in his destruction. Those that do reject this idea apparently have never read the histories of various revolutions; from the Russian revolution in 1917 when the newly formed predecessor of the KGB instigated a terror campaign by extremists in order to discredit the Bolshevik movement, to the Algerian Civil War where the Islamist movements were infiltrated by the intelligence agencies and proceeded to drive them towards ever more discrediting acts of unmitigated and inexplicable violence.
Viewing it from the Assad regime's position, this makes perfect sense as they were already inside the network, knew who the different members were, how they worked and their contacts. They could, by their estimation, finish off the non-Islamist rebellion and then turn to either make accommodation with the Islamists or, as they had done before, quickly round them up and finish the movement off in Syria. While, at the same time, be able to claim on the world stage that he was fighting everyone's arch nemesis, Islamic terrorists. As the saying goes, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy". Enter the United States, Turkey, KSA and the Gulf States.
Obviously, these facts have occurred to the policy makers in Washington as they resist Assad's assertions to make "fighting terrorism" the primary aegis of Geneva II and dismiss offers to coordinate with his intelligence agency to round up known terrorists. We even see this in the calculation of the West's demands that Assad must go, but his military and security apparatus should remain place. Not just to broadly secure the country, but because, indeed, they know who the militants are and are inside those organizations.
What do these events have to do with ideology? The original thinkers and founders had laid Syria out as part of their broader goals and in context with the very broad ideas of their revolutionary ideology, where Syria and Damascus features prominently in the Quran and Hadith, where Israel and Jews are the perpetual enemy of Islam in all rhetoric and the liberation of Palestine features prominently in the ideology. Strategically, Syria is geographically close to Israel and can be used as a base to strike it, thus fulfilling both ideology and the next phase of the revolutions strategy.
The second problem then is not that we are viewing their ideology too rigidly, but that we are conflating ideology with strategy. Wherein, ideology may inform the strategy and can contain elements of the strategy, but is not the strategy itself.
How does ideology shape this strategy when, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, Syria does not fit within the ideological rhetoric that seems to prevail and Mali, with French forces seeming to invade and appear to fit the notion of the "clash of civilizations"? I would first direct attention back to the original writings of the "jihad thinkers" and their list of countries. Mali actually does not appear on the list. The countries on the list for revolution are all Arab countries or where there are high concentrations of Arab people.
This may be an oversight, but it is more likely rooted in another, little recognized fact, that there is a streak of bigotry in the ideology. This can be seen throughout the development of the Islamic jihad movement when, during the Russian Afghan war, it is well known and reported that the Saudi Arabian contingent of the mujahedeen largely kept themselves separate from the rest. Even Zubaydah remarked on this in his diaries and that other mujahedeen believed they were arrogant, elitist snobs.
This is also apparent in how the Global Islamic Jihad counsel was constituted when bin Laden, Zawahiri and his compatriots made sure to stack the counsel with their fellow "Arabs" and, equally important, those who shared their general view of appropriate strategy for their revolution. They may have had to include the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban on the counsel because they were their hosts and they needed allies as the US invaded Afghanistan, but, despite all of the niceties of referring to each other as "brothers" in religion and arms, with it's concomitant inclusionary rhetoric, the TTP are often viewed as backwards and, at times, are lectured for their lack of Islamic Jihad values.
It is ridiculous to assume that such a highly exclusionary ideology views everyone and every area in the struggle as equal or a priority. Thus, Mali falls outside of ideology and can be viewed largely in context of the strategic, providing a base for operation. The actual goals of AQIM have always been focused on Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, areas that al Suri said their movement will "spread out along the base". Before they turn towards their central goal of overtaking Saudi Arabia, Medina and Mecca.
Other, less ideological reasons are likely to play a role in why Mali is not a choice destination. It's farther away than Syria. It does not have as robust a network for funneling fighters into the area. It is difficult to access. It is not on the nightly news, but only mentioned in passing. That other, higher conflict areas like Syria, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq, generally pre-occupy the forums and social media of the jihad and non-jihad network.
For Al Qaeda, Syria is about strategy. The general strategy is to move as close to Israel as possible and strike there, hoping that this strike will further "awaken" the Muslim population and draw them to their cause as the only and true "defenders" of Islam, Muslims and the Arab people. This is also an essential part of their ideology.
As for the other supporting ideology, Syria hits the trifecta. The three criteria being "an external" supporting "enemy"; corrupt, non-Islamic leadership and occupied by a corrupt form of Islam. Westerners, having imbibed long years of Al Qaeda's rhetoric, believe that this idea of "external enemy" only applies to them and mostly to the United States.
This is sincere hubris and is not supported by other writings of the "jihad thinkers". Most significantly al Suri, who goes on at length in his book with a list of "external enemies" to Muslims and their revolutionary movement. These include Russia and Iran. We see this acted out as Zawahiri takes pains to connect with the Chechen Islamist movement, providing them with money, connections and training. We also see this in the networks and terrorist cells that were set up in the Balochistan province of Iran where the group authored increasing attacks, including attempting to assassinate then President Ahmadinejad during a tour of that province.
Russia proceeded to climb through the Islamist networks and eliminate it, largely through extra-judicial killings. Iran did the same, but also rounded up large numbers of militants, their families and connections around 2008, after the Iraq war was coming to a close and allowing the network to operate on their territory became more dangerous to them directly more than beneficial. Like Assad's regime in Syria, we can also view this as tantamount to hostage taking. Particularly when we see by the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, Iran was in silent negotiations with Al Qaeda to slowly release their members and family while insuring the groups good behavior on their turf.
In other words, as long as the fighters moved on and into Syria, leaving Iran alone, Al Qaeda would be relatively free to operate. This shows that ideology may inspire the strategy, but pragmatic approach to strategy trumps ideology.
Where we might get into trouble or be confused is that, in ideology or strategy, all pronouncements are mixed together with similar semantics, rhetoric, linguistics and religious references making it difficult at times to determine where this may fall: ideological rhetoric or strategy? For instance, Mr. Hegghammer gives the example of the declaration of war against the United States labeling it amongst others as "Crusaders" and "Jews". Throughout the rhetoric of the Islamic Jihad movement, this is rhetoric of attack against the United States and the West is often repeated.
Is this ideology? Yes. Where as the United States is represented as one of the primary reasons why Muslims are oppressed and why the Islamic Jihad movement must fight it. Is this denoting strategy? Yes. Selecting a single "external enemy" that is repeatedly referenced in ideological rhetoric, is also a strategy. Not only does it serve to continuously put pressure on the United States, but to put fear in the minds of it's citizens. It also serves as a single unifying point that, above all the other questions or issues surrounding the ideology, a great number of people can support, widening the support base of the movement itself.
This strategy of the "anti-(fill in the blank)" movement is laid out in Mao's "On Guerrilla War", the Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare:
However, we can only know if this suggests the priority in strategy or is the current priority in strategy by reading what was previously written, by reviewing other current intelligence and evaluating actions on the ground. Throughout the above referenced letter and the others in the trove, he spells out how to set priorities for attack and what to do if no US forces, personnel or interests are in the area.
Further, he says that, if they put away the external enemy and all that is left is the internal enemy, the mujahedeen must focus on a third priority which is building the basis of the Islamic state. This again is a construct of Mao's guerrilla war, translated to the realities and language of the Islamic Jihad movement. It also suggests that despite ideological rhetoric and general strategy that places the US at the top of the enemy list, the other aspects of the ideology and strategy, like apostate rulers, the indoctrination of the one true religion and the work to build a state, can move forward under the right circumstances.
In other words, Syria.
Does this then, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, show some "mis-match" between ideology and behavior? The answer must be "no", but only because we must know the rules by which we are judging words and actions, ideology v strategy:
Ideology can inform strategy.
Ideology can contain strategy.
Ideology can be part of the strategy.
But, ideology cannot be the strategy.
In closing, we should not ignore ideology for the above stated reasons, but we should place it in it's proper context and not conflate it's role in strategy with the actual strategy. Further, so long as we continue to emphasize "terrorism", a violent tactic, over the political nature of the movement we are likely to continue to mis-diagnose it's activities, it's relationship to other groups and it's trajectory in relations to it's stated goals. Finally, so long as we continue to emphasize the religious aspects of the ideology over it's political nature, that it is a revolutionary ideology, we will continue to misunderstand it's appeal to recruits, both "foreign" and "local".
Next up, what draws foreign fighters, specifically "western", to Syria more than Iraq or Afghanistan or, as Mr. Hegghammer asks, Mali? Do they act on strategy or ideology or is there another driver? Stay tuned for Part II - Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring - This is a Revolution
The top of Hegghammer's article notes that this is part of a series for "Rethinking Islamist Politics". This may be the most important comment on the subject with an emphasis on "politics". In the various studies of terrorism, particularly the Islamic Jihad variety, one thing that continues to be missed is that this is a political movement. As Mr. Hegghammer notes, there is often too much emphasis placed on ideology as a driving force and not enough placed on the absolutely political nature and aims of the movement, those who founded the movement and continue to guide it in many ways still today.
The problem, of course, is that the movement uses the language of religion, specifically Islam, in order to justify it's acts, motivate it's followers and establish a legalistic form of rules (sharia) that it uses as a framework for controlling and governing its people and the areas that it nominally controls. However, this IS a political movement and it has specific political and geo-political goals. The fact that it uses "terrorism" (political violence), a tactic, to achieve these goals is only relevant to the stage and strength of the political movement and organizations within the movement's network.
The Islamist ideology that is espoused is not the sole basis of the ideology even if it is the language used to convey their ideas, plans and strategies. For instance, as noted in Lessons from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Letters and Mao, a thorough reading of the letters shows that Mao's works on revolution, most significantly "On Guerilla War", has had significant influence on the thinking and strategies of the movement. Not only do several of the letters rest on the frame work of Mao's work, but bin Laden is clearly paraphrasing several of Mao's better known quotes and tenets.
"Without the people, the mujahedeen would be like fish without water."
This is not the first time this occurs. In the video released of Bin Laden celebrating the 9/11 attacks he clearly uses the phrase "America is a paper tiger". This is also Mao and we see that in the writings of others, such as al Suri who articulates the idea of focusing all jihadis attention on the "external enemy" and, later, Naji in 2004 where he paraphrases Mao on the problems of "militants" (Mao, militarists) that do not understand the need for political work to go hand in hand with military efforts. Both al Suri and Naji are channeling Mao's "On Guerilla War".
Even Zawahiri gets into the picture when he recently released the Guidelines for Conducting Jihad. This is nearly parallel to Mao's Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. Zawahiri peppers his guidelines with a few more items and tailors it towards the Islamic Jihad movement. We may even see Mao's influence in Al Qaeda's "20yr plan" where one of the first points of the plan was "The Awakening", a direct construct from Mao's principles of revolution. We may also see a knowledge of the actual history of the Chinese Communist revolution, the methods used to propagate Communism and how long it actually took Mao and the Communists to take over the Chinese state.
There are likely many more examples of this interesting amalgamation of ideas and concepts, not only with Mao, but other internationally recognized political and military thinkers. After the shooting of the young Pakistani woman, Malala, by the Taliban, the Taliban spokesman made a reference to Rousseau, amongst other philosophers, greatly consternating a number of Rousseau's philosophical followers. In the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, bin Laden makes note of a Rand study he read, a recent book by a western military theorist and asks that a list of books be translated for his consumption.
At the same time, all of the above mentioned "jihad thinkers" use references, stories and verses from the Hadith and various Islamic thinkers to support these other ideas that are obviously not Islamic in nature or origination. This is done because this is the language that they understand and that many of their followers, who are not as educated in other philosophies or histories, can readily understand, imbibe and regurgitate because they do have a basic Islamic education. These references to Islamic precepts of faith and noted Islamic thinkers also lend a significant amount of authority to the ideas and strategies that they do wish to proliferate. This is further re-enforced by commentary and fatwas (religious rulings) of modern scholars of jurisprudence and respected clerics.
What does this say then about the ideology of the Islamic Jihad movement? Primarily, that despite our own narrow focus on Salafism or Wahhabism as THE ideological driver, these are nothing more than a base frame work. This is simply a tool by which to further their political cause and to delineate who may be a member of the group even as they claim to represent the interests of a much wider body of people; exclusive and inclusive at the same time. This very nature is one of the reasons that the movement appeals across a wide stratum of people, even those that are not practicing Muslims, newly minted "reverts" (converts), those who have been "back sliders" and those that are not living within the conflict areas.
The "thinkers" that have inspired and influenced the movement are much more pragmatic about incorporating other ideas into their ideology because they have been influenced by more than Islam. This may not be a novel revelation to some analysts, but it is likely to be novel to others, as well as some within the political class, whose focus has remained on the Islamic and religious language and ideas of the movement.
Mr. Hegghammer would be correct then in noting that there is too much focus on the ideology in respect to analysis that does not reflect what is obviously a pragmatic approach to revolutionary ideals. Particularly if analysis focuses on the narrow constraints of it's religious meme. Where analysis seems to be falling down is in recognizing these other influences and how they may effect the dynamic evolution of the movement. Not only the ideology, but it's appeal to a wide range of people, the strategies that the movement employs and how it may relate other seemingly disconnected groups and activities to the larger movement.
Mr. Hegghammer says:
One of the biggest lessons of the past few years is that jihadi political thought, which scholars like me have studied as “ideology” (implying something relatively rigid), is more fickle and malleable than (at least I) previously assumed.
He goes on to note:
transnational jihadists in Syria and their adoption of a new enemy hierarchy with the Syrian regime and to some extent Shiites more broadly, at the top
And:
in the past transnational jihadis showed relatively little interest in sectarian conflicts — Iraq only interested them when the Americans were there. In fact, between 2012 and 2013 we should have expected foreign fighters to go to Mali, not Syria, because after the French‐led invasion, Mali fit the jihadi “civilizational conflict narrative
Mr. Hegghammer then suggests that this is a "mis-match between rhetoric and behavior" and that there was nothing in past rhetoric that suggested Syria would be a destination of choice. The question then is what motivates the organizations within the movement to focus on Syria and what motivates foreign fighters to flock to that destination as opposed to anywhere else?
First, I'd like to agree that relying too heavily on the rhetoric or ideology for explanations or to predict future actions is a highly fallible methodology. However, it would be remiss to ignore completely the previous writings of the "jihad thinkers" that shaped, not only the ideology, but the general trajectory and strategy of the revolution.
The operative words here are "relying too heavily". Because, having read the many writings of al Suri, Zawahiri, Naji and bin Laden (who may be Naji as well) and others, they were all relatively explicit about how they saw the revolution unfolding, to which countries it would move to and a general order they believed this would occur. Not all of them agreed on the order that it would occur, but they almost all agreed which countries it would occur in and they went about setting up their networks to facilitate these activities. But we see, in the formulation of their ideology, the actual strategy they will employ.
For instance, Zawahiri issues a directive to Zarqawi in Iraq, 2005, that, instead of focusing solely on ejecting US forces and overthrowing the entire Shi'ite led government, Zarqawi should work to set up a network extending through the Levant. A form of this network was already in place as it had been facilitating fighters to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq from many other destinations and back again, but they had yet to formalize or focus on establishing robust revolutionary cells that would spread their ideas and accelerate facilitating revolution inside the designated countries.
The letter essaying these directives is chockfull of ideological and mytho-historical references as well as some relatively normal religious invocations for the success of the plan.
On the other hand, the well known idiom, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy", would apply here. While Zawahiri gives some specifics about how he thinks this initiative will take place, the broad strategy for this was laid out in the "20 Year Plan" publicly published in 2005. The plan had suggested that Syria was the next target and suggested the date range would be between 2007 and 2010. This was feasible because the group had already established a network through Syria and this network had been greatly facilitated by the Iraq war, but more importantly, by Assad's intelligence agency.
The infiltration by Assad's intelligence agencies is a significant factor in derailing the time table for this expected event. Being inside the network, Assad's agencies could not be unaware of the plan and, in 2008 thru 2009, as the Iraq War wound to a close, Assad's security forces began to aggressively round up and imprison many known members of the network. In many ways, not only stopping the known cells from acting, but holding them hostage against future incursions by the Al Qaeda network.
In the west, we view these activities as being part of Western strategy where the United States had pressured Assad to reel in these militants and help bring the war to a close. We should be viewing it as it really was, a self-serving act that not only staved off an immediate insurgency inside Syria, but allowed Assad to ingratiate himself to the United States and the West in general. The problem for Assad was that the jihad militants were not the only rabble rousing rebels in Syria and that he miscalculated his ability to put down the other rebels.
When his first act of outright massacring of civilians did not stop the rebellion, Assad's regime released hundreds of prisoners, most, as the non-Islamist rebels insist, were Islamist militants. Here we see Assad's actions facilitate putting the Islamic Jihad movements back on track with their originally stated goals.
Many reject this idea on the grounds that it would seem illogical to set up a second foe, particularly one that would appear to be more dedicated in his destruction. Those that do reject this idea apparently have never read the histories of various revolutions; from the Russian revolution in 1917 when the newly formed predecessor of the KGB instigated a terror campaign by extremists in order to discredit the Bolshevik movement, to the Algerian Civil War where the Islamist movements were infiltrated by the intelligence agencies and proceeded to drive them towards ever more discrediting acts of unmitigated and inexplicable violence.
Viewing it from the Assad regime's position, this makes perfect sense as they were already inside the network, knew who the different members were, how they worked and their contacts. They could, by their estimation, finish off the non-Islamist rebellion and then turn to either make accommodation with the Islamists or, as they had done before, quickly round them up and finish the movement off in Syria. While, at the same time, be able to claim on the world stage that he was fighting everyone's arch nemesis, Islamic terrorists. As the saying goes, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy". Enter the United States, Turkey, KSA and the Gulf States.
Obviously, these facts have occurred to the policy makers in Washington as they resist Assad's assertions to make "fighting terrorism" the primary aegis of Geneva II and dismiss offers to coordinate with his intelligence agency to round up known terrorists. We even see this in the calculation of the West's demands that Assad must go, but his military and security apparatus should remain place. Not just to broadly secure the country, but because, indeed, they know who the militants are and are inside those organizations.
What do these events have to do with ideology? The original thinkers and founders had laid Syria out as part of their broader goals and in context with the very broad ideas of their revolutionary ideology, where Syria and Damascus features prominently in the Quran and Hadith, where Israel and Jews are the perpetual enemy of Islam in all rhetoric and the liberation of Palestine features prominently in the ideology. Strategically, Syria is geographically close to Israel and can be used as a base to strike it, thus fulfilling both ideology and the next phase of the revolutions strategy.
The second problem then is not that we are viewing their ideology too rigidly, but that we are conflating ideology with strategy. Wherein, ideology may inform the strategy and can contain elements of the strategy, but is not the strategy itself.
How does ideology shape this strategy when, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, Syria does not fit within the ideological rhetoric that seems to prevail and Mali, with French forces seeming to invade and appear to fit the notion of the "clash of civilizations"? I would first direct attention back to the original writings of the "jihad thinkers" and their list of countries. Mali actually does not appear on the list. The countries on the list for revolution are all Arab countries or where there are high concentrations of Arab people.
This may be an oversight, but it is more likely rooted in another, little recognized fact, that there is a streak of bigotry in the ideology. This can be seen throughout the development of the Islamic jihad movement when, during the Russian Afghan war, it is well known and reported that the Saudi Arabian contingent of the mujahedeen largely kept themselves separate from the rest. Even Zubaydah remarked on this in his diaries and that other mujahedeen believed they were arrogant, elitist snobs.
This is also apparent in how the Global Islamic Jihad counsel was constituted when bin Laden, Zawahiri and his compatriots made sure to stack the counsel with their fellow "Arabs" and, equally important, those who shared their general view of appropriate strategy for their revolution. They may have had to include the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban on the counsel because they were their hosts and they needed allies as the US invaded Afghanistan, but, despite all of the niceties of referring to each other as "brothers" in religion and arms, with it's concomitant inclusionary rhetoric, the TTP are often viewed as backwards and, at times, are lectured for their lack of Islamic Jihad values.
It is ridiculous to assume that such a highly exclusionary ideology views everyone and every area in the struggle as equal or a priority. Thus, Mali falls outside of ideology and can be viewed largely in context of the strategic, providing a base for operation. The actual goals of AQIM have always been focused on Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, areas that al Suri said their movement will "spread out along the base". Before they turn towards their central goal of overtaking Saudi Arabia, Medina and Mecca.
Other, less ideological reasons are likely to play a role in why Mali is not a choice destination. It's farther away than Syria. It does not have as robust a network for funneling fighters into the area. It is difficult to access. It is not on the nightly news, but only mentioned in passing. That other, higher conflict areas like Syria, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq, generally pre-occupy the forums and social media of the jihad and non-jihad network.
For Al Qaeda, Syria is about strategy. The general strategy is to move as close to Israel as possible and strike there, hoping that this strike will further "awaken" the Muslim population and draw them to their cause as the only and true "defenders" of Islam, Muslims and the Arab people. This is also an essential part of their ideology.
As for the other supporting ideology, Syria hits the trifecta. The three criteria being "an external" supporting "enemy"; corrupt, non-Islamic leadership and occupied by a corrupt form of Islam. Westerners, having imbibed long years of Al Qaeda's rhetoric, believe that this idea of "external enemy" only applies to them and mostly to the United States.
This is sincere hubris and is not supported by other writings of the "jihad thinkers". Most significantly al Suri, who goes on at length in his book with a list of "external enemies" to Muslims and their revolutionary movement. These include Russia and Iran. We see this acted out as Zawahiri takes pains to connect with the Chechen Islamist movement, providing them with money, connections and training. We also see this in the networks and terrorist cells that were set up in the Balochistan province of Iran where the group authored increasing attacks, including attempting to assassinate then President Ahmadinejad during a tour of that province.
Russia proceeded to climb through the Islamist networks and eliminate it, largely through extra-judicial killings. Iran did the same, but also rounded up large numbers of militants, their families and connections around 2008, after the Iraq war was coming to a close and allowing the network to operate on their territory became more dangerous to them directly more than beneficial. Like Assad's regime in Syria, we can also view this as tantamount to hostage taking. Particularly when we see by the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, Iran was in silent negotiations with Al Qaeda to slowly release their members and family while insuring the groups good behavior on their turf.
In other words, as long as the fighters moved on and into Syria, leaving Iran alone, Al Qaeda would be relatively free to operate. This shows that ideology may inspire the strategy, but pragmatic approach to strategy trumps ideology.
Where we might get into trouble or be confused is that, in ideology or strategy, all pronouncements are mixed together with similar semantics, rhetoric, linguistics and religious references making it difficult at times to determine where this may fall: ideological rhetoric or strategy? For instance, Mr. Hegghammer gives the example of the declaration of war against the United States labeling it amongst others as "Crusaders" and "Jews". Throughout the rhetoric of the Islamic Jihad movement, this is rhetoric of attack against the United States and the West is often repeated.
Is this ideology? Yes. Where as the United States is represented as one of the primary reasons why Muslims are oppressed and why the Islamic Jihad movement must fight it. Is this denoting strategy? Yes. Selecting a single "external enemy" that is repeatedly referenced in ideological rhetoric, is also a strategy. Not only does it serve to continuously put pressure on the United States, but to put fear in the minds of it's citizens. It also serves as a single unifying point that, above all the other questions or issues surrounding the ideology, a great number of people can support, widening the support base of the movement itself.
This strategy of the "anti-(fill in the blank)" movement is laid out in Mao's "On Guerrilla War", the Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare:
First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement....Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.Mao continues in the same vein throughout the chapter and insists that "anti-Japanism" must also be presented and re-enforced to the people in the areas of guerrilla zones so that they may be better induced to join or assist the guerrillas. Bin Laden goes on in the same vein in this letter from Abbottabad: where he repeats continuously that the focus of Al Qaeda in message and acts must be the "external enemy", America. That people educated in their ideology must be sent out among people in other countries, particularly where the mujahedeen are present or soon to arrive, to educate these people in their ideology with a focus on expelling American hegemony.
However, we can only know if this suggests the priority in strategy or is the current priority in strategy by reading what was previously written, by reviewing other current intelligence and evaluating actions on the ground. Throughout the above referenced letter and the others in the trove, he spells out how to set priorities for attack and what to do if no US forces, personnel or interests are in the area.
Further, he says that, if they put away the external enemy and all that is left is the internal enemy, the mujahedeen must focus on a third priority which is building the basis of the Islamic state. This again is a construct of Mao's guerrilla war, translated to the realities and language of the Islamic Jihad movement. It also suggests that despite ideological rhetoric and general strategy that places the US at the top of the enemy list, the other aspects of the ideology and strategy, like apostate rulers, the indoctrination of the one true religion and the work to build a state, can move forward under the right circumstances.
In other words, Syria.
Does this then, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, show some "mis-match" between ideology and behavior? The answer must be "no", but only because we must know the rules by which we are judging words and actions, ideology v strategy:
Ideology can inform strategy.
Ideology can contain strategy.
Ideology can be part of the strategy.
But, ideology cannot be the strategy.
In closing, we should not ignore ideology for the above stated reasons, but we should place it in it's proper context and not conflate it's role in strategy with the actual strategy. Further, so long as we continue to emphasize "terrorism", a violent tactic, over the political nature of the movement we are likely to continue to mis-diagnose it's activities, it's relationship to other groups and it's trajectory in relations to it's stated goals. Finally, so long as we continue to emphasize the religious aspects of the ideology over it's political nature, that it is a revolutionary ideology, we will continue to misunderstand it's appeal to recruits, both "foreign" and "local".
Next up, what draws foreign fighters, specifically "western", to Syria more than Iraq or Afghanistan or, as Mr. Hegghammer asks, Mali? Do they act on strategy or ideology or is there another driver? Stay tuned for Part II - Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring - This is a Revolution
Tuesday, February 4, 2014
Overview of Syria: February 4, 2014
Most are now aware that Zawahiri has issued a statement disavowing association with ISIS. The reasons are many. Primary among them is ISIS refusing to heed the council of Zawahiri and other senior thinkers regarding the declaration of a state with Baghdadi at it's head.
The problems with declaring this state at this time are many. As outlined in the 17 Letters From Abbottabad, bin Laden and the prominent counselors around him largely believed that calling a state before it was viable, capable of governance or defending itself completely was inviting an attack that would likely result in it's complete destruction. Quite possibly, as bin Laden imagined, that it would have an extremely negative effect on their over all efforts, making people believe that the Islamic project was a failure and abandon the movement to it's fate.
However, bin Laden, then writing in 2011, also said he believed that it might be possible in two to three years. That would be now. Obviously, Baghdadi and his advisors have chosen to interpret those words in a literal sense and believe, as some of the other leaders of groups around the region, that Zawahiri is being overly cautious. This is not the first time that this argument has occurred.
Baghdadi has certainly been attempting to consolidate something that looks and acts like a state with courts, administration, public services, schools and, holding on to the oil wells in Deir Azzor, resources that provide an income. He also has considerable armed forces with tanks and other medium to heavy weapons. Of course, what he does not have is an air force.
Long time jihadis who have continued to fight guerrilla battles, even recognizing the serious danger from air forces and drones, do not seem to grasp that a state cannot be maintained through guerrilla fighting. It also cannot, in very early stages, rely on any commitment in full of any of the people who live in this "state". Al Suri in 2004 as well as Naji and a few other thinkers did lament the problem of so called "militarists" who do not comprehend politics (paraphrasing Mao to some extent).
While many are lauding this new turn of events as a good outcome, watching the jihadis fight between themselves and cause a rift, there are a few problems. First, ISIS will not be dislodged from Eastern Syria by the other groups that easily. The FSA and Ahrar al Sham are focusing largely on Assad and the front line even as ISIS continues to try to run up their chain of command and undermine their efficacy. JAN remains completely quiet, not speaking on the subject and neither making great activities towards Assad's regime even though a few attacks have happened over the last week.
At the same time ISIS controls the crossings with Iraq, enjoying a relatively secure logistics line. ISIS has also made significant headway in retaking several border crossings with Turkey, controlling the flow of supplies, money, weapons and men into Syria. This is a significant problem for the FSA and IF that may find themselves trapped between Assad and ISIS with JAN acting as a place holder.
Which brings up the next point. Despite Zawahiri disavowing ISIS, unless JAN makes a move against them with the other forces, ISIS will remain and further entrench itself. It is not that ISIS has more fighters, it is simply that it is wasting few on the front lines and shoring up its resources which will make it formidable. We should also not become so overly excited that we lose sight of the fact that other al Qaeda linked groups have not disavowed ISIS or Baghdadi.
This is significant because contractual agreements and understandings are from emir to emir. Which means those that have not given specific bayah to Zawahiri are actually free to choose who they would follow. Secondly, even those who have given bayah to Zawahiri are not, as of yet, directed to actually attack ISIS. Zawahiri could not be sure, even if he gave this order, that it would be carried out or that it wouldn't actually result in a further fissure within the groups (there are actually discussions around the forums and twitter to this extent, discussing examples from the hadith about refusing to carry out orders they consider wrong, also not a new concept and supported to an extent by bin Laden's strategic letters when he tried to show an example why they shouldn't just go around and attack everyone at the same time).
For now, the greater network is remaining watchful. As has been proven in the past, if ISIS and Baghdadi appear to be successful, it is likely that other groups will start signing on with him directly. A few very small groups have already made significant statements in that regard. In which case, we cannot be sure that the entire jihad network will stop working with ISIS and completely isolate it, keeping a steady flow of money, weapons and fighters into the group. Very much hedging their bets.
Further, it's possible Zawahiri is playing two games as well. Letting ISIS try to achieve the state, disavowing it now in case it fails (so that he can distance that failure from his over all movement and network), and may be induced to give it grudging acceptance at a later date. At which time, JAN remaining largely silent, may also be induced to give grudging bayah to ISIS although Jolani may not enjoy a comfortable relationship with Baghdadi in the future.
On the other hand, the lessons of Iraq cannot be forgotten. Fortunately for AQ/ISIS, Zarqawi was actually killed in 2006 and his overly brutal methods appear to have been tempered or at least shaped into a form of military campaign by the next two successive leaders: Omar Baghdadi and Bakr Baghdadi. This allowed ISIS/AQ to survive and rebuild in Iraq. If Baghdadi is actually killed that might mean a significant change in ISIS behavior.
As of this writing, there are reports that Baghdadi had been shot in the leg and wounded. 48 hours before, there were rumors circulating that he had actually been killed. A few hours before that, a single bomb in the center of Raqaa, Baghdadi's HQ, had been reported. No confirmation was ever given over those reports until today's report of being wounded. Today there were also reports that a group called "The Men of Ghouta" had taken an oath to assassinate Baghdadi and any other "jihad leaders" which seems to be aimed at ISIS.
Even though JAN remains silent, it would be a mistake to assume that it is not actively, covertly making plans against Baghdadi. The possibility of a Zarqawi scenario would help them considerably. If ISIS collapsed and was forced back into Iraq, a significant number of foreign fighters and that equipment would likely fall into JAN's hands. It's unlikely that foreign fighters or even local recruits would end up with FSA or IF/Ahrar as both have gone to great lengths to actually kill and capture as many fighters as possible from ISIS.
This will create a windfall for JAN, allowing it to build it's forces and spread it's area of control, even to the oil fields for resources. Further, it would leave JAN largely in the rear of FSA and IF, controlling by default the border crossings with Turkey making these groups now dependent on his good will and desires.
If it isn't clear, controlling the border crossings is paramount for the FSA/IF factions unless they can make headway into linking up with the south or a port area. The port areas seem to be off limits and almost impossible. The southern routes are largely cut off by Assad's forces in the south and west with ISIS commanding control of most of the Iraq/Syria border in the east.
In essence, FSA/IF forces are going to have to make another push to gain and keep control of the border crossings. This is made difficult by Assad picking up attacks in rebel held areas with barrel bombs and, recently again, fighter plane attacks as ISIS continues to slowly roll back up the rear, using suicide bombs and other drastic measures to regain those holdings.
One area that Zawahiri is correct to worry about is that, if some agreement is reached with the regime and the FSA/IF rebels, any ceasefires that hold and become anything else, ISIS will be an immediate target for any forces in the area. It might even leave JAN as a significant player on the field if it can turn it's patience into a form of political acceptance where it can then carry out the other field work all of the jihad groups have been tasked with since Bin Laden's strategic letter of 2011. Wherein bin Laden tells them to make agreements with local government so that they can carry out dawa, recruiting and embedding themselves in the population.
In this, ISIS demise and withdrawal will be extremely helpful as JAN already enjoys a different reputation among the rest of the rebel groups. Which means that, despite JAN's outward silence, it's likely that they may also take steps to insure ISIS/Baghdadi's demise. That could be anything from direct action to indirect, such as providing intelligence to the other groups to act on.
Already, a former member of ISIS with inside information has been releasing details in the last two weeks about who Baghdadi is, the shape of his command counsel and his general organizations capabilities. Even though he alludes to the relationship between ISIS and JAN, the leaker never criticizes or directly refers to JAN thereafter, suggesting JAN is in fact the leaker's benefactor. Considering that shortly before the leaks began and reported by the leaks, Haji Bakr, Baghdadi's most prominent military leader and right hand man, had been killed by rebels, that there may have been up to two attempts on Baghdadi's life in the last 72 hours, or at least one that was nearly successful, it's entirely likely that this last scenario is true.
Giving the intelligence to others to use is an excellent cover for Jolani and JAN. They will get everything they hope for while appearing to keep their hands clean among the mujahedeen and other organizations. If things do not work to this plan, they can still make an alliance with ISIS again.
There is some thought that the enmity caused by Zawahiri's announcement might make this future impossible, but there are remedies ISIS could take including removing Jolani and simply annexing JAN as they did to groups in Iraq. However, before any of these other assumptions can be determined as possible, the next five days will prove significant depending on the reaction of the other jihad groups around the region.
Zawahiri, in many ways, has staked his continuing leadership on this outcome even as he attempts to distance himself from it over all, insisting that the doors to dialogue are always open. If any of the other groups openly support ISIS, Zawahiri's political power as voice and high seat at the counsel table may become diminished. If they remain silent, then we can expect that these groups will continue to follow Zawahiri's leadership until the outcome is known and his reaction to that is gauged. If ISIS fails as Zawahiri has predicted, then we may expect that his political power will be enhanced and the plans that he has put forward (bin Laden's plans w/Zawahiri twist) will be even more closely followed.
As for Syria and the rebels, the outcomes of the talks have garnered a few interesting changes. Somewhere there is a tacit agreement that Assad would go, but there is no agreement on what would come next. Meaning, if the non-AQ forces cannot find some political agreement and balance, they will still be at the mercy of what's left of Assad's regime and the AQ Islamists in their rear.
Expect also that, as with the recent plot in Israel, there may be some diversionary efforts made to take the pressure and view off of the "fitnah" in Syria. This may be an attack on Syria, it may continue to be attacks in Lebanon or it could be, frankly, a spectacular attack in Turkey or Jordan as both may have multiple cells or sympathizers inside.
The problems with declaring this state at this time are many. As outlined in the 17 Letters From Abbottabad, bin Laden and the prominent counselors around him largely believed that calling a state before it was viable, capable of governance or defending itself completely was inviting an attack that would likely result in it's complete destruction. Quite possibly, as bin Laden imagined, that it would have an extremely negative effect on their over all efforts, making people believe that the Islamic project was a failure and abandon the movement to it's fate.
However, bin Laden, then writing in 2011, also said he believed that it might be possible in two to three years. That would be now. Obviously, Baghdadi and his advisors have chosen to interpret those words in a literal sense and believe, as some of the other leaders of groups around the region, that Zawahiri is being overly cautious. This is not the first time that this argument has occurred.
Baghdadi has certainly been attempting to consolidate something that looks and acts like a state with courts, administration, public services, schools and, holding on to the oil wells in Deir Azzor, resources that provide an income. He also has considerable armed forces with tanks and other medium to heavy weapons. Of course, what he does not have is an air force.
Long time jihadis who have continued to fight guerrilla battles, even recognizing the serious danger from air forces and drones, do not seem to grasp that a state cannot be maintained through guerrilla fighting. It also cannot, in very early stages, rely on any commitment in full of any of the people who live in this "state". Al Suri in 2004 as well as Naji and a few other thinkers did lament the problem of so called "militarists" who do not comprehend politics (paraphrasing Mao to some extent).
While many are lauding this new turn of events as a good outcome, watching the jihadis fight between themselves and cause a rift, there are a few problems. First, ISIS will not be dislodged from Eastern Syria by the other groups that easily. The FSA and Ahrar al Sham are focusing largely on Assad and the front line even as ISIS continues to try to run up their chain of command and undermine their efficacy. JAN remains completely quiet, not speaking on the subject and neither making great activities towards Assad's regime even though a few attacks have happened over the last week.
At the same time ISIS controls the crossings with Iraq, enjoying a relatively secure logistics line. ISIS has also made significant headway in retaking several border crossings with Turkey, controlling the flow of supplies, money, weapons and men into Syria. This is a significant problem for the FSA and IF that may find themselves trapped between Assad and ISIS with JAN acting as a place holder.
Which brings up the next point. Despite Zawahiri disavowing ISIS, unless JAN makes a move against them with the other forces, ISIS will remain and further entrench itself. It is not that ISIS has more fighters, it is simply that it is wasting few on the front lines and shoring up its resources which will make it formidable. We should also not become so overly excited that we lose sight of the fact that other al Qaeda linked groups have not disavowed ISIS or Baghdadi.
This is significant because contractual agreements and understandings are from emir to emir. Which means those that have not given specific bayah to Zawahiri are actually free to choose who they would follow. Secondly, even those who have given bayah to Zawahiri are not, as of yet, directed to actually attack ISIS. Zawahiri could not be sure, even if he gave this order, that it would be carried out or that it wouldn't actually result in a further fissure within the groups (there are actually discussions around the forums and twitter to this extent, discussing examples from the hadith about refusing to carry out orders they consider wrong, also not a new concept and supported to an extent by bin Laden's strategic letters when he tried to show an example why they shouldn't just go around and attack everyone at the same time).
For now, the greater network is remaining watchful. As has been proven in the past, if ISIS and Baghdadi appear to be successful, it is likely that other groups will start signing on with him directly. A few very small groups have already made significant statements in that regard. In which case, we cannot be sure that the entire jihad network will stop working with ISIS and completely isolate it, keeping a steady flow of money, weapons and fighters into the group. Very much hedging their bets.
Further, it's possible Zawahiri is playing two games as well. Letting ISIS try to achieve the state, disavowing it now in case it fails (so that he can distance that failure from his over all movement and network), and may be induced to give it grudging acceptance at a later date. At which time, JAN remaining largely silent, may also be induced to give grudging bayah to ISIS although Jolani may not enjoy a comfortable relationship with Baghdadi in the future.
On the other hand, the lessons of Iraq cannot be forgotten. Fortunately for AQ/ISIS, Zarqawi was actually killed in 2006 and his overly brutal methods appear to have been tempered or at least shaped into a form of military campaign by the next two successive leaders: Omar Baghdadi and Bakr Baghdadi. This allowed ISIS/AQ to survive and rebuild in Iraq. If Baghdadi is actually killed that might mean a significant change in ISIS behavior.
As of this writing, there are reports that Baghdadi had been shot in the leg and wounded. 48 hours before, there were rumors circulating that he had actually been killed. A few hours before that, a single bomb in the center of Raqaa, Baghdadi's HQ, had been reported. No confirmation was ever given over those reports until today's report of being wounded. Today there were also reports that a group called "The Men of Ghouta" had taken an oath to assassinate Baghdadi and any other "jihad leaders" which seems to be aimed at ISIS.
Even though JAN remains silent, it would be a mistake to assume that it is not actively, covertly making plans against Baghdadi. The possibility of a Zarqawi scenario would help them considerably. If ISIS collapsed and was forced back into Iraq, a significant number of foreign fighters and that equipment would likely fall into JAN's hands. It's unlikely that foreign fighters or even local recruits would end up with FSA or IF/Ahrar as both have gone to great lengths to actually kill and capture as many fighters as possible from ISIS.
This will create a windfall for JAN, allowing it to build it's forces and spread it's area of control, even to the oil fields for resources. Further, it would leave JAN largely in the rear of FSA and IF, controlling by default the border crossings with Turkey making these groups now dependent on his good will and desires.
If it isn't clear, controlling the border crossings is paramount for the FSA/IF factions unless they can make headway into linking up with the south or a port area. The port areas seem to be off limits and almost impossible. The southern routes are largely cut off by Assad's forces in the south and west with ISIS commanding control of most of the Iraq/Syria border in the east.
In essence, FSA/IF forces are going to have to make another push to gain and keep control of the border crossings. This is made difficult by Assad picking up attacks in rebel held areas with barrel bombs and, recently again, fighter plane attacks as ISIS continues to slowly roll back up the rear, using suicide bombs and other drastic measures to regain those holdings.
One area that Zawahiri is correct to worry about is that, if some agreement is reached with the regime and the FSA/IF rebels, any ceasefires that hold and become anything else, ISIS will be an immediate target for any forces in the area. It might even leave JAN as a significant player on the field if it can turn it's patience into a form of political acceptance where it can then carry out the other field work all of the jihad groups have been tasked with since Bin Laden's strategic letter of 2011. Wherein bin Laden tells them to make agreements with local government so that they can carry out dawa, recruiting and embedding themselves in the population.
In this, ISIS demise and withdrawal will be extremely helpful as JAN already enjoys a different reputation among the rest of the rebel groups. Which means that, despite JAN's outward silence, it's likely that they may also take steps to insure ISIS/Baghdadi's demise. That could be anything from direct action to indirect, such as providing intelligence to the other groups to act on.
Already, a former member of ISIS with inside information has been releasing details in the last two weeks about who Baghdadi is, the shape of his command counsel and his general organizations capabilities. Even though he alludes to the relationship between ISIS and JAN, the leaker never criticizes or directly refers to JAN thereafter, suggesting JAN is in fact the leaker's benefactor. Considering that shortly before the leaks began and reported by the leaks, Haji Bakr, Baghdadi's most prominent military leader and right hand man, had been killed by rebels, that there may have been up to two attempts on Baghdadi's life in the last 72 hours, or at least one that was nearly successful, it's entirely likely that this last scenario is true.
Giving the intelligence to others to use is an excellent cover for Jolani and JAN. They will get everything they hope for while appearing to keep their hands clean among the mujahedeen and other organizations. If things do not work to this plan, they can still make an alliance with ISIS again.
There is some thought that the enmity caused by Zawahiri's announcement might make this future impossible, but there are remedies ISIS could take including removing Jolani and simply annexing JAN as they did to groups in Iraq. However, before any of these other assumptions can be determined as possible, the next five days will prove significant depending on the reaction of the other jihad groups around the region.
Zawahiri, in many ways, has staked his continuing leadership on this outcome even as he attempts to distance himself from it over all, insisting that the doors to dialogue are always open. If any of the other groups openly support ISIS, Zawahiri's political power as voice and high seat at the counsel table may become diminished. If they remain silent, then we can expect that these groups will continue to follow Zawahiri's leadership until the outcome is known and his reaction to that is gauged. If ISIS fails as Zawahiri has predicted, then we may expect that his political power will be enhanced and the plans that he has put forward (bin Laden's plans w/Zawahiri twist) will be even more closely followed.
As for Syria and the rebels, the outcomes of the talks have garnered a few interesting changes. Somewhere there is a tacit agreement that Assad would go, but there is no agreement on what would come next. Meaning, if the non-AQ forces cannot find some political agreement and balance, they will still be at the mercy of what's left of Assad's regime and the AQ Islamists in their rear.
Expect also that, as with the recent plot in Israel, there may be some diversionary efforts made to take the pressure and view off of the "fitnah" in Syria. This may be an attack on Syria, it may continue to be attacks in Lebanon or it could be, frankly, a spectacular attack in Turkey or Jordan as both may have multiple cells or sympathizers inside.
Monday, February 3, 2014
Al Qaeda Disavows ISIS
Al Qaeda Disavows ISIS
and our care for all our Muslim and Mujahid brothers.
More at the link above...
1. FIRSTLY: Qae'dat al-Jihad (AQ) declares that it has no links to the ISIS
group. We were not informed about it's creation, nor counseled.
2. Nor were we satisfied with it rather we ordered it to stop. ISIS is not a
branch of AQ & we have no organizational relationship with it.
3. Nor is al-Qaeda responsible for its actions and behaviors.
4. The branches of AQ are those that have been announced by the Central
Command, those are the ones we acknowledge.
5. With our assurance of loyalty and love and support for every Mujahid,
and our care for all our Muslim and Mujahid brothers.
More at the link above...
Analysis, Strategy, The Death of Al Qaeda, 17 Letters and Benghazi: Who is Fooling Whom?
In 2005, a letter written from Al Zawahiri to Zarqawi in Iraq was captured. In it we saw the first inkling of understanding about the information war that is an essential part of every war. Not only did Zawahiri note the bad reputation that Zarqawi was giving their cause by killing more Muslims than Americans, he made a definitive statement outlining the importance of the information war:
"Half the battle is in the media."
This is not a new concept. Information and disinformation campaigns have been a part of war since ancient times. Some examples would include the story of Alexander the Great and the Oracle of Delphi where his personal historian puts it about that the Oracle had essentially declared Alexander the Son of Zeus, a demi-god. This was used more than once in order to suggest Alexander's divine right to rule and, in the face of his enemies, a nearly immortal warrior whose forces were protected and acting by the grace of divine beings. A powerful statement made even more powerful by tales of actual battles that appeared to prove this fact.
Another ancient example of a powerful information campaign is the story of Genghis Kahn and the 10,000 head pyramid at the gates of Samarkand. This is one of many fierce stories of Genghis' exploits that included sometimes huge exaggerations of his forces and capabilities, using diversionary tactics as well as camouflaging the actual size of his forces by tying brush to the tails of their horses or forcing women and children to march in the train. True or not, as the stories of the campaigns in Khorasan made their way through the countryside, whole cities were induced to throw open their gates to avoid similar slaughter without any struggle.
In modern times, one of the more notable disinformation campaigns from World War II was the alleged build up of Allied forces in England, suggesting that these forces would be crossing to land at Calais, the closest landing point in France. This included disseminating stories to the press, pictures of wooden and blow up tanks and planes, and the placement of a large number of troops so that any reconnaissance from the air or spies would report this same information to the Germans. Many other disinformation campaigns were carried out. Instead, as is well known, massive Allied Forces were gathered near Devon and landed in Normandy on June 6. The rest, as they say, is history.
From these we can understand that information and disinformation plays a vital role in developing and carrying out strategies and specific campaigns. In the example of the Normandy invasion, history also informs us that, even though leaks occur and the reality of a situation can be right in front of the faces of the public as well as the enemy, insisting that the disinformation is still the correct information can continue to obscure the plan and allow a strategy or campaign to continue, even to success. Some people directly participate in this disinformation and information campaign, others are incidentally drawn into it, useful and often unknowing tools.
In the current struggle, this is no exception. Al Qaeda has used both tools to forward it's activities or cover it's mistakes. The United States and it's allies in the West and across the region have done the same. Both have used the latest media tools, from traditional media to the internet and social media in their information campaigns. No side, no country, no organization is innocent of these activities. Both have insisted that something is true when it is not or partially, even when the truth can be seen by the public.
All is fair in war and history is written by the victors. Or, anyone left standing to write their histories for their public's consumption.
The struggle with this revolutionary movement currently called "Al Qaeda" has been on going for over two decades although we may accept that the official "start" of outright war was declared in 1996 and again in 1998. The Western public typically links this to September 11, 2001 when instead of seeming minor "terrorist" events, that date represents a major act of war often compared in size and scope to December 7, 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor.
However, the United States and it's Allies did not accept this as an absolute act of war as it was not perpetrated openly by any nation state, but labeled it terrorism, thus beginning the Counter Offensive called the Global War on Terror. Many have complained about this naming device. From the rejection of the idea that this is "Global War", to the rejection of "Terror" as a tactic as opposed to a group of people, to the more literalists who would rather that it be described as a war with Islamic Extremists.
The purpose of referring to it as a war on "terror" was to both delegitimize any group participating as being simple, murderous criminals as well as avoid the issue of their claims to be fighting on behalf of a one billion strong population of Muslims. One of the core claims of "Al Qaeda" and a primary part of their information campaign. This idea did not satisfy many and, in fact, has later been used to stir up discontent among Muslim populations within the West and abroad who feel offended at being routinely, by their standards, lumped together as "terrorists".
Obviously, this had to be dealt with in order to prevent that disaffection turning into greater support for "Al Qaeda" across this population. Also, calling it a "Global War" had it's own bad connotations by suggesting, in deed, that the claims of "Al Qaeda" were true, that they were all around the globe in large numbers doing exactly what they claimed: fighting to free Muslims by being at war with the West. There was, and still is, very little acceptance of referring to the culprits as "Islamic Extremists" or by the cooperative name the groups had announced "Global Islamic Jihad Front" written on the 1998 declaration of war.
Instead, we have the Obama administration presenting a new strategy white paper in 2011 stating that the United States was at war with Al Qaeda, but, interestingly, referring to each branch as a separate and distinct entity such as Core Al Qaeda (AQC), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda In the Meghreb (AQIM), etc. This is meant to suggest these groups are smaller, localized and have a more tenuous attachment to the central leadership. This strategy is, again, meant to delegitimize the size, scope and ability of the organization, not only to the population they wish to win over, but within the organization itself as well as to the greater world.
It even suggests the over all US strategy: to attack these areas and groups as separate entities using strategies and tactics best suited to defeat each section or locale, leading to the over all defeat (we hope) of the entire organization. We do this by supporting local governments with money, intelligence, weapons and even consultative and training forces creating regional (think "global") army, defusing cost and effort while creating force multipliers. A necessity when fighting a long war.
This naming problem, it's information value as well as strategic importance is also a problem for "Al Qaeda". In the 17 letters released in May 2012, we see the leadership council discussing it amongst themselves. For instance, the US has successfully reduced the Al Qaeda name to just those two words and, per AQC, has disassociated the group from it's cause as well as from the people they wish most to influence on their behalf, the Muslim Ummah (community). They also discuss how events in the past had impacted the value of that name, had caused great focus to be placed on their central organization and, if any other group takes it up, could lead to that group being tarnished and targeted.
The men discuss the possibility of renaming the group as well as suggestions for insuring other groups, who are not part of the militant base but participating in other low profile activities, should be named something that suggests their work in spreading their ideology. It is interesting to note that the released document with the suggested names is actually incomplete, cut off at page 3 of a longer document. Here we can see that the US does not want to let the group know what we know about their organization while simultaneously informing them that the US does know. Meaning also that those on the outside do not know what the intelligence agencies might actually have in regards to what names may relate to now existing organizations. Those outside include enemy forces, western or middle east populations and, to the consternation of academia, open source analysts.
In the midst of this, there are a number of analysts trying to make sense of the organization and what is happening inside of it and to it. There are any number of current and former public officials, elected and appointed, making numerous statements. Some of them quite obviously geared towards shaping the public perception of policy and strategy. Al Qaeda, for want of a better name and in keeping with policy, makes its own statements and plans, some of which are known due to these 17 Letters.
In that time, Al Qaeda has been pronounced dead or dying several times. Osama bin Laden's demise not only obfuscating the reality of the network, but lending to the shaping of policy and strategy. Clearly, at the same time, the groups within this network are working hard to expand their capabilities while also suffering set backs and attempting to obfuscate their activities and losses. Each event being analyzed against the backdrop of the locale and individual group, trying to determine each group's status. This is not completely wrong unless each separate event is being used to analyze the entire picture that is "Al Qaeda" network as opposed to the other way around.
This leads to Benghazi, September 11, 2012, the death of Ambassador Stevens, a movie and so called "AQ linked" terrorists or terrorist groups. Looking at the broad picture, obviously September 11 is an important date for the Al Qaeda organization. Every year since September 11, this group has gone to great pains to release a statement on or around that time. In fact, this is discussed several times in the 17 Letters from Abbottabad.
The 17 letters lay out both a broad strategy for Al Qaeda and it's associates as well as directions for conducting an array of activities, some in great detail. An example is bin Laden giving specific directions regarding avoiding drone strikes, intelligence efforts and the security of his son. One of those broad strategies include:
of those countries, especially diplomats. The kidnapping of
diplomats of a country is far more embarrassing to that country
than the kidnapping of ordinary citizens. The pressure on that
country to free its diplomats is far greater than to free
ordinary citizens.
Here bin Laden is directing all associated groups and commanders to conduct kidnappings of citizens and diplomats. He specifically suggests any countries that are assisting the United States, particularly any who have forces deployed to Afghanistan. This is in 2011, just prior to bin Laden's demise.
We can see that this is being carried out throughout the areas that Al Qaeda associates exist including Libya where a Korean commerce official was kidnapped as well as Egyptian diplomats. In Yemen they managed to kidnap an Iranian diplomat. AQIM's most famous raid against the Ain Amenas Gas Plant in Algeria 2012. In the Palestinian Territories, a convoy carrying German diplomats was fired upon in a likely kidnapping attempt. Those are just the most recent or noted events and some, without direct claim, might be contributable to simple banditry. Yet, it would be completely irresponsible to suggest that these do not have any link to the directions given by bin Laden in these letters.
It would also be irresponsible to suggest that this would not apply to American citizens and diplomats even if the language seems to point out allied countries. Particularly when , throughout the 17 letters, bin Laden continues to exhort focusing attacks on the United States and it's interests. Repeatedly. Anyone inside the network or hanging around the fringes would have received this message loud and clear.
We know that several demonstrations occurred in different countries on September 11 at various US embassies. One might assume that US embassies, protests and September 11 simply go together, but that would assume that there is a giant protest outside of US embassies every September 11 in all of these countries and that is not historically true. Of note are three particular protests. The first in Pakistan organized by Al Qaeda's nearest and dearest partners in the area, the TTP, Terhik I Talibani Pakistan. The second in Cairo, Egypt, organized by Zawahiri's brother, Mohammed Zawahiri with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Ayman Zawahiri's original group), that stormed the walls and raised the Black Flag over the embassy. The Third significant was Benghazi, Libya where Ambassador Stevens met his demise.
This is carried out, per various government reports, by several allegedly disperate groups who are either "Al Qaeda linked" or have "Al Qaeda linked members" and has been alternately suggested as a purely spontaneous effort or "Al Qaeda inspired". Which is some fancy hair splitting to obfuscate the point that at least one or more of these groups and individuals is, in fact, part of the Al Qaeda network and did act on a strategic direction given by bin Laden even if it was not a current order or even coordinated with the central council. Something we don't actually know given the murkiness of their communication lines and our own intelligence unwilling to share that information.
These groups met at the consulate at approximately 9:40 and almost immediately proceeded to storm the building, leading to the death of Ambassador Stevens. They then went onto the "annex" and proceeded to lay down a large amount of firepower including the accurate use of mortar fire. Which seems to be less spontaneous and definitively coordinated, including apparent knowledge and reconnaissance of this area.
Who is fooling whom? Does this make the groups or individuals members of "Al Qaeda"? Does this make this an "Al Qaeda plot"? In the broad sense of the term, the answer is "yes" if we assume that there was a broad strategy iterated by bin Laden, likely endorsed by his leadership council, disseminated out among the various jihad groups via the network and then acted upon. The question of these groups affiliations then comes down to the hair splitting question of are they actually "Al Qaeda" as in having given bayah to Zawahiri & recognized by him as a member of Al Qaeda?
This is where the problem becomes more confusing. None of these groups have publicly stated that relationship and neither has Zawahiri who has been busy since Bin Laden's death actually admitting or recognizing groups to the common network. Those groups include al Shabaab in Somalia, Jahmat al Nusra in Syria. This was also a discussion amongst bin Laden, Zawahiri and others in the leadership council where bin Laden, seeming to have the last word at the time, suggested that this was problematic and did not fit with the broader strategy outlined in the letters.
That strategy, noted above and in Lessons from Abbottabad, is to maintain the links to these groups as shadowy as possibly while maintaining their local flavor in order to provide them room to do the basic work: spreading their ideology, building a shadow state and getting ready for the moment when they would be prepared to rise up and declare a state. This is to keep the target off these group's backs as much as possible while still working towards the goal.
"The Girl Scout Way", which is to have small local groups who act in their area, work within & through a larger network, refer to themselves as a local designation, even though they themselves consider their group to be part of the Islamic Jihad movement whose leadership council includes al Qaeda as the most politically powerful group at the table. The Al Qaeda leadership has held the "chair" on the council for decades. Many of these groups do not believe they are under any obligation to give bayah (swear allegiance) to Al Qaeda or Zawahiri to be part of this movement. Yet, if they were asked, they would, to a man, declare themselves mujahedeen committing jihad.
It would seem very simple then to cut to the chase and call these groups what they are, designate them as terrorists and go after them openly, forcefully and relentlessly. Where that runs afoul is in policy and strategy, the information and disinformation war, clearly the most significant reason why the State Department, Intelligence spokespeople and the White House refuse to acknowledge these links and obvious strategy of Al Qaeda and the council. Even though we can publicly see these groups interacting and have access to the strategy outlined in the 17 Letters.
We also know that it's been the long time strategy of Al Qaeda to fight a "Long War" where they bleed the United States and it's allies through "a thousand cuts", provoking outsized reactions in order to induce over spending on blood and treasure, forcing a "collapse" as they believe they did to the USSR in Afghanistan. Equally important, and re-emphasized in the 17 Letters, is the hope that such over-reaction will provoke a reaction from the greater Muslim population, bringing more fighters and money into their organization.
Our own strategy has turned to mirror that strategy by reducing our footprint and enabling local governments, with much more support from their own populations, to confront these groups. Pretending, as Al Qaeda does, that these are purely local phenomena with local solutions. In fact, creating a kind of force multiplier while the US and her allies conserve or rebuild their capabilities to confront anything that might arise as bigger and more threatening. Whether that be the Islamic Jihad movement in the Middle East or a threat in Asia.
The problem turns to explaining that to the public in some way that a) states a strategy without giving it wholly away to the enemy even though it can guess what that strategy is by public actions; b) keeps the public's fire burning, but banked to be able to continue to confront the threat; c) not let the worst tendencies of public opinion force a change in strategy and do exactly what Al Qaeda and the Global Islamic Jihad council would like, commit another army to smashing around the area; d) allows us to continue to pursue and destroy these groups quietly and as clandestinely possible as they attempt to operate.
All of which requires an information and disinformation campaign that suffers due to the very public nature and connectedness of modern communications. Which isn't that new, considering the WWII and invasion of Normandy example where a crossword puzzle with the names of operations was published in the media, all sorts of leaks occurred and, yet, the allies continued to act as if it was wholly false.
This will likely result in any administration in power to have to take it's licks politically while continuing to do what they were elected to do: keep the United States safe and steady in the face of on going conflict. It will also continue to result in a very confused and divided population that will use this very conflict between policy, strategy and information to deliver those political licks. At some point, the obvious may become so glaringly obvious or another devastating terrorist attack may occur that forces the United States and it's allies to change course on the tactical use of information.
Finally, we arrive at analysts and analysis, mostly outside of the intelligence agencies, but possibly inside as well, who are trying to fathom some truth out of the mess. A mess complicated, as Mrr. Gerenstein-Ross has stated, by the clandestine nature of both the Global Islamic Jihad movement and the nature of our own intelligence, muddled further by barely articulated policy and strategy with active information and disinformation campaigns from all sides.
The first defense is to recognize that, indeed, all of the things articulated in the last paragraph are true. "Half the battle is in the media" meaning that not only is it likely that the enemy is trying to mislead us, but that those in trusted positions, even ones considered a reliable source, may be doing so as well; because they believe it is the right policy and needs to be furthered or because they are held by oath of office to do so.
These are not terrible things as much as they make the job harder to accomplish. We are in the middle of a conflict where all things are fair. What needs to be recalled is why analysts outside of the policy and intelligence agencies are doing these analysis. Is it strictly for the benefit of academic careers, supporting public policy or is it equally and more importantly to provide the best information to the public as well as policy makers to insure the best decisions are made?
This is a very important function of the open source analysts community. Because, if analysts fail to remain independent and follow the precepts of their profession, analysts may end up simply re-confirming bad information amongst themselves and the public, leading to continuous cycle of bad policies that leads to devastating attacks.
In short, analysts should not consider information synonymous with the truth nor confuse public policy and strategy as actual analysis of a situation.
Al Qaeda may be dead. Or, as Mary Harf recently suggested "Core Al Qaeda is mostly dead" because most of the original planners or leaders of 9/11 are dead or in prison. Both of these assumptions may come as a complete surprise to Zawahiri who continues to issue statements in it's name and to the groups within the network who continue to follow his "advice", recognizing in speech and adherence, an organization called "Al Qa'idat al Jihad" and it's leader "Dr. Zawahiri".
As of the close of this writing, Al Qa'idat al Jihad has publicly disavowed an organization called ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, referring to them as just another "Jahmaat" or group, not a state, and calling all others to fall in line with that pronouncement, even as it leaves the door open for consultation with ISIS to mend it's ways. We may know the power of Al Qaeda and Zawahiri over the Islamic Jihad movement and the over all network by the response this message receives.
Then we may actually know if, as Phillip Mudd said in April 2013, "Al Qaeda is dead, the revolution lives on."
"Half the battle is in the media."
This is not a new concept. Information and disinformation campaigns have been a part of war since ancient times. Some examples would include the story of Alexander the Great and the Oracle of Delphi where his personal historian puts it about that the Oracle had essentially declared Alexander the Son of Zeus, a demi-god. This was used more than once in order to suggest Alexander's divine right to rule and, in the face of his enemies, a nearly immortal warrior whose forces were protected and acting by the grace of divine beings. A powerful statement made even more powerful by tales of actual battles that appeared to prove this fact.
Another ancient example of a powerful information campaign is the story of Genghis Kahn and the 10,000 head pyramid at the gates of Samarkand. This is one of many fierce stories of Genghis' exploits that included sometimes huge exaggerations of his forces and capabilities, using diversionary tactics as well as camouflaging the actual size of his forces by tying brush to the tails of their horses or forcing women and children to march in the train. True or not, as the stories of the campaigns in Khorasan made their way through the countryside, whole cities were induced to throw open their gates to avoid similar slaughter without any struggle.
In modern times, one of the more notable disinformation campaigns from World War II was the alleged build up of Allied forces in England, suggesting that these forces would be crossing to land at Calais, the closest landing point in France. This included disseminating stories to the press, pictures of wooden and blow up tanks and planes, and the placement of a large number of troops so that any reconnaissance from the air or spies would report this same information to the Germans. Many other disinformation campaigns were carried out. Instead, as is well known, massive Allied Forces were gathered near Devon and landed in Normandy on June 6. The rest, as they say, is history.
From these we can understand that information and disinformation plays a vital role in developing and carrying out strategies and specific campaigns. In the example of the Normandy invasion, history also informs us that, even though leaks occur and the reality of a situation can be right in front of the faces of the public as well as the enemy, insisting that the disinformation is still the correct information can continue to obscure the plan and allow a strategy or campaign to continue, even to success. Some people directly participate in this disinformation and information campaign, others are incidentally drawn into it, useful and often unknowing tools.
In the current struggle, this is no exception. Al Qaeda has used both tools to forward it's activities or cover it's mistakes. The United States and it's allies in the West and across the region have done the same. Both have used the latest media tools, from traditional media to the internet and social media in their information campaigns. No side, no country, no organization is innocent of these activities. Both have insisted that something is true when it is not or partially, even when the truth can be seen by the public.
All is fair in war and history is written by the victors. Or, anyone left standing to write their histories for their public's consumption.
The struggle with this revolutionary movement currently called "Al Qaeda" has been on going for over two decades although we may accept that the official "start" of outright war was declared in 1996 and again in 1998. The Western public typically links this to September 11, 2001 when instead of seeming minor "terrorist" events, that date represents a major act of war often compared in size and scope to December 7, 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor.
However, the United States and it's Allies did not accept this as an absolute act of war as it was not perpetrated openly by any nation state, but labeled it terrorism, thus beginning the Counter Offensive called the Global War on Terror. Many have complained about this naming device. From the rejection of the idea that this is "Global War", to the rejection of "Terror" as a tactic as opposed to a group of people, to the more literalists who would rather that it be described as a war with Islamic Extremists.
The purpose of referring to it as a war on "terror" was to both delegitimize any group participating as being simple, murderous criminals as well as avoid the issue of their claims to be fighting on behalf of a one billion strong population of Muslims. One of the core claims of "Al Qaeda" and a primary part of their information campaign. This idea did not satisfy many and, in fact, has later been used to stir up discontent among Muslim populations within the West and abroad who feel offended at being routinely, by their standards, lumped together as "terrorists".
Obviously, this had to be dealt with in order to prevent that disaffection turning into greater support for "Al Qaeda" across this population. Also, calling it a "Global War" had it's own bad connotations by suggesting, in deed, that the claims of "Al Qaeda" were true, that they were all around the globe in large numbers doing exactly what they claimed: fighting to free Muslims by being at war with the West. There was, and still is, very little acceptance of referring to the culprits as "Islamic Extremists" or by the cooperative name the groups had announced "Global Islamic Jihad Front" written on the 1998 declaration of war.
Instead, we have the Obama administration presenting a new strategy white paper in 2011 stating that the United States was at war with Al Qaeda, but, interestingly, referring to each branch as a separate and distinct entity such as Core Al Qaeda (AQC), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda In the Meghreb (AQIM), etc. This is meant to suggest these groups are smaller, localized and have a more tenuous attachment to the central leadership. This strategy is, again, meant to delegitimize the size, scope and ability of the organization, not only to the population they wish to win over, but within the organization itself as well as to the greater world.
It even suggests the over all US strategy: to attack these areas and groups as separate entities using strategies and tactics best suited to defeat each section or locale, leading to the over all defeat (we hope) of the entire organization. We do this by supporting local governments with money, intelligence, weapons and even consultative and training forces creating regional (think "global") army, defusing cost and effort while creating force multipliers. A necessity when fighting a long war.
This naming problem, it's information value as well as strategic importance is also a problem for "Al Qaeda". In the 17 letters released in May 2012, we see the leadership council discussing it amongst themselves. For instance, the US has successfully reduced the Al Qaeda name to just those two words and, per AQC, has disassociated the group from it's cause as well as from the people they wish most to influence on their behalf, the Muslim Ummah (community). They also discuss how events in the past had impacted the value of that name, had caused great focus to be placed on their central organization and, if any other group takes it up, could lead to that group being tarnished and targeted.
The men discuss the possibility of renaming the group as well as suggestions for insuring other groups, who are not part of the militant base but participating in other low profile activities, should be named something that suggests their work in spreading their ideology. It is interesting to note that the released document with the suggested names is actually incomplete, cut off at page 3 of a longer document. Here we can see that the US does not want to let the group know what we know about their organization while simultaneously informing them that the US does know. Meaning also that those on the outside do not know what the intelligence agencies might actually have in regards to what names may relate to now existing organizations. Those outside include enemy forces, western or middle east populations and, to the consternation of academia, open source analysts.
In the midst of this, there are a number of analysts trying to make sense of the organization and what is happening inside of it and to it. There are any number of current and former public officials, elected and appointed, making numerous statements. Some of them quite obviously geared towards shaping the public perception of policy and strategy. Al Qaeda, for want of a better name and in keeping with policy, makes its own statements and plans, some of which are known due to these 17 Letters.
In that time, Al Qaeda has been pronounced dead or dying several times. Osama bin Laden's demise not only obfuscating the reality of the network, but lending to the shaping of policy and strategy. Clearly, at the same time, the groups within this network are working hard to expand their capabilities while also suffering set backs and attempting to obfuscate their activities and losses. Each event being analyzed against the backdrop of the locale and individual group, trying to determine each group's status. This is not completely wrong unless each separate event is being used to analyze the entire picture that is "Al Qaeda" network as opposed to the other way around.
This leads to Benghazi, September 11, 2012, the death of Ambassador Stevens, a movie and so called "AQ linked" terrorists or terrorist groups. Looking at the broad picture, obviously September 11 is an important date for the Al Qaeda organization. Every year since September 11, this group has gone to great pains to release a statement on or around that time. In fact, this is discussed several times in the 17 Letters from Abbottabad.
The 17 letters lay out both a broad strategy for Al Qaeda and it's associates as well as directions for conducting an array of activities, some in great detail. An example is bin Laden giving specific directions regarding avoiding drone strikes, intelligence efforts and the security of his son. One of those broad strategies include:
View the list of countries which had deployed troops to
Afghanistan, to help the Americans there. Then, kidnap citizensof those countries, especially diplomats. The kidnapping of
diplomats of a country is far more embarrassing to that country
than the kidnapping of ordinary citizens. The pressure on that
country to free its diplomats is far greater than to free
ordinary citizens.
Here bin Laden is directing all associated groups and commanders to conduct kidnappings of citizens and diplomats. He specifically suggests any countries that are assisting the United States, particularly any who have forces deployed to Afghanistan. This is in 2011, just prior to bin Laden's demise.
We can see that this is being carried out throughout the areas that Al Qaeda associates exist including Libya where a Korean commerce official was kidnapped as well as Egyptian diplomats. In Yemen they managed to kidnap an Iranian diplomat. AQIM's most famous raid against the Ain Amenas Gas Plant in Algeria 2012. In the Palestinian Territories, a convoy carrying German diplomats was fired upon in a likely kidnapping attempt. Those are just the most recent or noted events and some, without direct claim, might be contributable to simple banditry. Yet, it would be completely irresponsible to suggest that these do not have any link to the directions given by bin Laden in these letters.
It would also be irresponsible to suggest that this would not apply to American citizens and diplomats even if the language seems to point out allied countries. Particularly when , throughout the 17 letters, bin Laden continues to exhort focusing attacks on the United States and it's interests. Repeatedly. Anyone inside the network or hanging around the fringes would have received this message loud and clear.
We know that several demonstrations occurred in different countries on September 11 at various US embassies. One might assume that US embassies, protests and September 11 simply go together, but that would assume that there is a giant protest outside of US embassies every September 11 in all of these countries and that is not historically true. Of note are three particular protests. The first in Pakistan organized by Al Qaeda's nearest and dearest partners in the area, the TTP, Terhik I Talibani Pakistan. The second in Cairo, Egypt, organized by Zawahiri's brother, Mohammed Zawahiri with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Ayman Zawahiri's original group), that stormed the walls and raised the Black Flag over the embassy. The Third significant was Benghazi, Libya where Ambassador Stevens met his demise.
This is carried out, per various government reports, by several allegedly disperate groups who are either "Al Qaeda linked" or have "Al Qaeda linked members" and has been alternately suggested as a purely spontaneous effort or "Al Qaeda inspired". Which is some fancy hair splitting to obfuscate the point that at least one or more of these groups and individuals is, in fact, part of the Al Qaeda network and did act on a strategic direction given by bin Laden even if it was not a current order or even coordinated with the central council. Something we don't actually know given the murkiness of their communication lines and our own intelligence unwilling to share that information.
These groups met at the consulate at approximately 9:40 and almost immediately proceeded to storm the building, leading to the death of Ambassador Stevens. They then went onto the "annex" and proceeded to lay down a large amount of firepower including the accurate use of mortar fire. Which seems to be less spontaneous and definitively coordinated, including apparent knowledge and reconnaissance of this area.
Who is fooling whom? Does this make the groups or individuals members of "Al Qaeda"? Does this make this an "Al Qaeda plot"? In the broad sense of the term, the answer is "yes" if we assume that there was a broad strategy iterated by bin Laden, likely endorsed by his leadership council, disseminated out among the various jihad groups via the network and then acted upon. The question of these groups affiliations then comes down to the hair splitting question of are they actually "Al Qaeda" as in having given bayah to Zawahiri & recognized by him as a member of Al Qaeda?
This is where the problem becomes more confusing. None of these groups have publicly stated that relationship and neither has Zawahiri who has been busy since Bin Laden's death actually admitting or recognizing groups to the common network. Those groups include al Shabaab in Somalia, Jahmat al Nusra in Syria. This was also a discussion amongst bin Laden, Zawahiri and others in the leadership council where bin Laden, seeming to have the last word at the time, suggested that this was problematic and did not fit with the broader strategy outlined in the letters.
That strategy, noted above and in Lessons from Abbottabad, is to maintain the links to these groups as shadowy as possibly while maintaining their local flavor in order to provide them room to do the basic work: spreading their ideology, building a shadow state and getting ready for the moment when they would be prepared to rise up and declare a state. This is to keep the target off these group's backs as much as possible while still working towards the goal.
"The Girl Scout Way", which is to have small local groups who act in their area, work within & through a larger network, refer to themselves as a local designation, even though they themselves consider their group to be part of the Islamic Jihad movement whose leadership council includes al Qaeda as the most politically powerful group at the table. The Al Qaeda leadership has held the "chair" on the council for decades. Many of these groups do not believe they are under any obligation to give bayah (swear allegiance) to Al Qaeda or Zawahiri to be part of this movement. Yet, if they were asked, they would, to a man, declare themselves mujahedeen committing jihad.
It would seem very simple then to cut to the chase and call these groups what they are, designate them as terrorists and go after them openly, forcefully and relentlessly. Where that runs afoul is in policy and strategy, the information and disinformation war, clearly the most significant reason why the State Department, Intelligence spokespeople and the White House refuse to acknowledge these links and obvious strategy of Al Qaeda and the council. Even though we can publicly see these groups interacting and have access to the strategy outlined in the 17 Letters.
We also know that it's been the long time strategy of Al Qaeda to fight a "Long War" where they bleed the United States and it's allies through "a thousand cuts", provoking outsized reactions in order to induce over spending on blood and treasure, forcing a "collapse" as they believe they did to the USSR in Afghanistan. Equally important, and re-emphasized in the 17 Letters, is the hope that such over-reaction will provoke a reaction from the greater Muslim population, bringing more fighters and money into their organization.
Our own strategy has turned to mirror that strategy by reducing our footprint and enabling local governments, with much more support from their own populations, to confront these groups. Pretending, as Al Qaeda does, that these are purely local phenomena with local solutions. In fact, creating a kind of force multiplier while the US and her allies conserve or rebuild their capabilities to confront anything that might arise as bigger and more threatening. Whether that be the Islamic Jihad movement in the Middle East or a threat in Asia.
The problem turns to explaining that to the public in some way that a) states a strategy without giving it wholly away to the enemy even though it can guess what that strategy is by public actions; b) keeps the public's fire burning, but banked to be able to continue to confront the threat; c) not let the worst tendencies of public opinion force a change in strategy and do exactly what Al Qaeda and the Global Islamic Jihad council would like, commit another army to smashing around the area; d) allows us to continue to pursue and destroy these groups quietly and as clandestinely possible as they attempt to operate.
All of which requires an information and disinformation campaign that suffers due to the very public nature and connectedness of modern communications. Which isn't that new, considering the WWII and invasion of Normandy example where a crossword puzzle with the names of operations was published in the media, all sorts of leaks occurred and, yet, the allies continued to act as if it was wholly false.
This will likely result in any administration in power to have to take it's licks politically while continuing to do what they were elected to do: keep the United States safe and steady in the face of on going conflict. It will also continue to result in a very confused and divided population that will use this very conflict between policy, strategy and information to deliver those political licks. At some point, the obvious may become so glaringly obvious or another devastating terrorist attack may occur that forces the United States and it's allies to change course on the tactical use of information.
Finally, we arrive at analysts and analysis, mostly outside of the intelligence agencies, but possibly inside as well, who are trying to fathom some truth out of the mess. A mess complicated, as Mrr. Gerenstein-Ross has stated, by the clandestine nature of both the Global Islamic Jihad movement and the nature of our own intelligence, muddled further by barely articulated policy and strategy with active information and disinformation campaigns from all sides.
The first defense is to recognize that, indeed, all of the things articulated in the last paragraph are true. "Half the battle is in the media" meaning that not only is it likely that the enemy is trying to mislead us, but that those in trusted positions, even ones considered a reliable source, may be doing so as well; because they believe it is the right policy and needs to be furthered or because they are held by oath of office to do so.
These are not terrible things as much as they make the job harder to accomplish. We are in the middle of a conflict where all things are fair. What needs to be recalled is why analysts outside of the policy and intelligence agencies are doing these analysis. Is it strictly for the benefit of academic careers, supporting public policy or is it equally and more importantly to provide the best information to the public as well as policy makers to insure the best decisions are made?
This is a very important function of the open source analysts community. Because, if analysts fail to remain independent and follow the precepts of their profession, analysts may end up simply re-confirming bad information amongst themselves and the public, leading to continuous cycle of bad policies that leads to devastating attacks.
In short, analysts should not consider information synonymous with the truth nor confuse public policy and strategy as actual analysis of a situation.
Al Qaeda may be dead. Or, as Mary Harf recently suggested "Core Al Qaeda is mostly dead" because most of the original planners or leaders of 9/11 are dead or in prison. Both of these assumptions may come as a complete surprise to Zawahiri who continues to issue statements in it's name and to the groups within the network who continue to follow his "advice", recognizing in speech and adherence, an organization called "Al Qa'idat al Jihad" and it's leader "Dr. Zawahiri".
As of the close of this writing, Al Qa'idat al Jihad has publicly disavowed an organization called ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, referring to them as just another "Jahmaat" or group, not a state, and calling all others to fall in line with that pronouncement, even as it leaves the door open for consultation with ISIS to mend it's ways. We may know the power of Al Qaeda and Zawahiri over the Islamic Jihad movement and the over all network by the response this message receives.
Then we may actually know if, as Phillip Mudd said in April 2013, "Al Qaeda is dead, the revolution lives on."
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