Daveed Gartenstein-Ross had an excellent article about why researchers and analysts kept getting Al Qaeda wrong. Specifically, why we might be hearing, over and over, that al Qaeda was "on the run" or "all but done." One of the issues was the possibility that politics might play a part in how people were interpreting the information.
There was one point that I thought did not get enough attention in this and that is how the politics of policy making might interfere with good analysis. Particularly when we should feel as if the political leadership is getting the right information as well as the public in order to make good policy. Instead, what might be happening is that our policies are being derived first and then information requested or shaped by that understanding under those parameters.
For instance, a long standing policy has been to try to separate Al Qaeda from all other activities or groups. Specifically, separate them from the larger Muslim population to counter al Qaeda's narrative that they are fighting on behalf of the Ummah, defending it from western aggression.
In 2011, the White House released The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism and laid out very specifically who the United States was at war with; AQ, AQAP, AQIM, ISIS and a few other entities. Even though the list of "terrorist" organizations derived is much larger and more diverse in ideology, goals and ability. In essence, the strategy paper is meant to set boundaries and guidelines for who, what and where we will focus our attention. Also, as Mr. Garenstein-Ross indicates, not everyone who speaks Islamist lingo or considers himself (or herself) a "mujihadeen" is fighting for AQ or expecting to join it in it's attempt to achieve a "global caliphate", but may have completely separate goals.
Mr. Garenstein-Ross alludes to this issue of limits and boundaries when he comments on a discussion with others and suggests that this administration wants to get out of the war on terrorism mode. Not just the administration, but plenty within the political and security apparatus, too. Aside from that political notion, that we do not want to fight everybody, that may have been only one "political" factor that had influence on the policy.
The strategy paper seems to be placing the focus on the groups deemed most dangerous, like AQ and affiliates, setting down the expectations for information and intelligence gathering. One of the long standing narratives is that past administrations were not very good and focusing on, analyzing and countering the threat. Therefore, the strategy page was created to set out the White House's priorities and direct all organizations and agencies towards those goals.
What can happen, though, is that "priorities" and "focus" can become very narrow windows through which people view a particular set of problems. In establishing the "what" and the "who" of the priorities, information that suggests that an organization has few connections might place that group as a lesser priority or discarded from a set. Even if some information may appear to the contrary of that conclusion.
This is not unusual in any person or organization. It's very natural to attempt to define and refine what an individual or organization is looking for or the information that needs to be evaluated. Particularly within an agency where the focus and priorities are continuously preached in order to enforce it and achieve some desired efficiency and effect. In doing so, unfortunately, it can also be detrimental as it enforces a type of group think.
Those inside these agencies will say this isn't so, that they are trained not to fall into this trap and the agency itself will suggest that they do everything possible to provide people with open space for thought or dissent. That they "foster" that sort of behavior within their agency and in their people. The agencies may, in fact, have numerous training programs, seminars and opportunities for people to do just that, but the mechanics of the organization and the push for priorities can easily overwhelm any well intentioned efforts to foster independent thinking.
As this article, The Fog of Organizations by Peter Munson at War on the Rocks suggests, very large organizations seek to run in a uniform way because they seek to produce a consistently reliable product. In this case, useful information and analysis to help guide policy and insure national security.
In this way, a good intentioned policy meant to set out the strategic goals of the nation and provide focus (reduce "mission drift"), coupled with the nature of large, bureaucratic organizations, can become the onus by which consistent erroneous analysis can be produced. It only gets worse as more and more layers, people and responsibilities are added because it is very typical for these same organizations to take what is believed to be a successful model, reproduce it and plug it into the larger organization.
In the commercial sector, businesses do this all the time, some with fairly decent results, but many find themselves with a struggling or failing branch of business two to three years later, having to take on long and painful reviews, re-organization and restructuring to turn that line into a profitable model. Or, in some cases, jettison it all together because it does not fit the company's "strategic goals".
That option is not available in matters of intelligence, analysis and national security. So we are left with an organization that generally gets things right enough times to provide a base of security, but is not set up to handle deviations no matter how large it gets or how often it references "deviations" in it's policies.
One of the other questions that Mr. Gerenstein-Ross raises is why did this erroneous analysis occur outside of these national agencies? He goes on to explain that these terrorist organizations are "clandestine", making some information "difficult to glean" and that information on this "clandestine behavior" obtained by national agencies (also, "clandestine") is often listed as "classified" and outside of the purview of many open source analysts' domain.
However, he also points out something very interesting and that is that the analysts who were much closer to the correct analysis of Al Qaeda's situation and potential were those who are essentially working outside of any government agency or sponsored program. Which tends to suggest that there is another problem altogether.
Many of the set research programs (START - Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) and think tanks are funded by and/or do work with these central government organizations in an effort to put "mass" on the problem. In doing so, they are necessarily impacted by the operations, priorities and policies of these agencies and, to put it bluntly, can be infected with the same problems that plague these agencies when it comes to evaluating or looking for deviancies within known data.
Of course, there will be great denial of this idea because people are, technically, outside of the organizational structures. However, we only have to look at the nature of organizations to understand why and how they impact their outside partners.
The short answer is that these organizations are looking for, expecting and demanding the same things from their partners as they do from themselves. Consistency and focus on the policies and priorities of the "purchasing company" or customer. Some may object to this presentation of the relationship in a commercial nature, but that is, in fact, the manner of the relationship.
An example of this kind of relationship would be the Ford Motor Company. It consistently and reliably produces masses of consistently reliable vehicles. These are not luxury automobiles, like a Maybach, created one at a time and by hand. They roll off a factory floor at a regular pace. Ford requires many parts to create each vehicle and it needs reliable, consistent parts timely, reliably and consistently. That is what it is looking for in it's suppliers and that is what it re-enforces to it's suppliers through various communications, policies and quality assurance programs.
We can argue that research and analyst programs are not factories and individuals within are more autonomous. More importantly, training and the nature of the business at hand rejects that type of behavior. However, the same type of re-enforcement of these concepts occurs through repeated interaction with these centralized government organizations where by needs and demands of the organizations are consistently communicated through requests for information, by policy and procedures that dictate the relationship and, most importantly, re-enforcement by reward for expected outcomes (ie, government funding for programs or purchasing of final analytic product).
In this manner, the behavior of the partner is influenced by the other and ideas and concepts spread like a contagion. When it's a good idea, contagion is also good and can serve to produce masses of viable information and analytics. The same holds true when it's a bad idea and the contagion can paralyze diverse thinking through out the system.
Open source, independent analysts can also be infected with these erroneous ideas. In many cases because, as Mr. Garenstein-Ross notes, much of the information on clandestine organizations collected clandestinely, remains beyond non-affiliated researchers' reach and that which is released is released from these same agencies with background information provided that often re-enforces the agency's position or view.
Media reports, in particular, can be good sources of information, but can often skew towards the information provided by the agencies as staff writers look to provide news for consumption, not an avenue for investigation. Which is why many independent, open source analysts have a variety of resources to choose from and don't feel necessarily constrained to those accepted or validated by these institutions. I.E. Independent.
At the end of the day, the entire process of analysis and established policy can create a circle of self-perpetuating erroneous analysis and behavior inside and outside of the various professional organizations and institutions. Where the much more independent researchers and analysts have prevailed is that, in fact, they are not dependent on these relationships and the very important aspect of analysis and research, to challenge any information that seems to fit too readily into the accepted paradigm, is allowed to prevail.
Reliably and consistently, these questions of what and how something went wrong arise whenever it's obvious that the system failed to perform as expected. Most often when some large, unforeseen or devastating event occurs. Mr. Garenstein-Ross provides some thoughts on how the system might be improved both in process and in thinking that may contribute to improving this important aspect of national security.
As for the policy set forth in the National Strategy for Counter-terrorism and the policies derived thereof, it may have to be accepted for what it is, a policy meant to limit or set boundaries on what is defined as a threat to be countered, the actions applied or the groups it is applied to. However, it is incumbent upon agencies, institutions and independents alike not to let the policy limit deviating data within their analysis or from challenging the established paradigm.
There was one point that I thought did not get enough attention in this and that is how the politics of policy making might interfere with good analysis. Particularly when we should feel as if the political leadership is getting the right information as well as the public in order to make good policy. Instead, what might be happening is that our policies are being derived first and then information requested or shaped by that understanding under those parameters.
For instance, a long standing policy has been to try to separate Al Qaeda from all other activities or groups. Specifically, separate them from the larger Muslim population to counter al Qaeda's narrative that they are fighting on behalf of the Ummah, defending it from western aggression.
In 2011, the White House released The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism and laid out very specifically who the United States was at war with; AQ, AQAP, AQIM, ISIS and a few other entities. Even though the list of "terrorist" organizations derived is much larger and more diverse in ideology, goals and ability. In essence, the strategy paper is meant to set boundaries and guidelines for who, what and where we will focus our attention. Also, as Mr. Garenstein-Ross indicates, not everyone who speaks Islamist lingo or considers himself (or herself) a "mujihadeen" is fighting for AQ or expecting to join it in it's attempt to achieve a "global caliphate", but may have completely separate goals.
Mr. Garenstein-Ross alludes to this issue of limits and boundaries when he comments on a discussion with others and suggests that this administration wants to get out of the war on terrorism mode. Not just the administration, but plenty within the political and security apparatus, too. Aside from that political notion, that we do not want to fight everybody, that may have been only one "political" factor that had influence on the policy.
The strategy paper seems to be placing the focus on the groups deemed most dangerous, like AQ and affiliates, setting down the expectations for information and intelligence gathering. One of the long standing narratives is that past administrations were not very good and focusing on, analyzing and countering the threat. Therefore, the strategy page was created to set out the White House's priorities and direct all organizations and agencies towards those goals.
What can happen, though, is that "priorities" and "focus" can become very narrow windows through which people view a particular set of problems. In establishing the "what" and the "who" of the priorities, information that suggests that an organization has few connections might place that group as a lesser priority or discarded from a set. Even if some information may appear to the contrary of that conclusion.
This is not unusual in any person or organization. It's very natural to attempt to define and refine what an individual or organization is looking for or the information that needs to be evaluated. Particularly within an agency where the focus and priorities are continuously preached in order to enforce it and achieve some desired efficiency and effect. In doing so, unfortunately, it can also be detrimental as it enforces a type of group think.
Those inside these agencies will say this isn't so, that they are trained not to fall into this trap and the agency itself will suggest that they do everything possible to provide people with open space for thought or dissent. That they "foster" that sort of behavior within their agency and in their people. The agencies may, in fact, have numerous training programs, seminars and opportunities for people to do just that, but the mechanics of the organization and the push for priorities can easily overwhelm any well intentioned efforts to foster independent thinking.
As this article, The Fog of Organizations by Peter Munson at War on the Rocks suggests, very large organizations seek to run in a uniform way because they seek to produce a consistently reliable product. In this case, useful information and analysis to help guide policy and insure national security.
This is an excellent example and a reminder of what larger organizations are built to do. They normalize actions and minimize deviations.Despite efforts not to fall into this pattern, large organizations, particularly ones that operate on a redundancy model to instill "resilience", do it as a matter of nature. Upper management re-enforces it to middle management, they re-enforce it to lower management who then instills it in their subordinates. "This is what is wanted and this is what is needed" will always over ride "and, by the way, look out for anything that might be different". It doesn't take much to understand which of these two concepts are most likely to be more consistently followed as it is also most consistently rewarded.
In this way, a good intentioned policy meant to set out the strategic goals of the nation and provide focus (reduce "mission drift"), coupled with the nature of large, bureaucratic organizations, can become the onus by which consistent erroneous analysis can be produced. It only gets worse as more and more layers, people and responsibilities are added because it is very typical for these same organizations to take what is believed to be a successful model, reproduce it and plug it into the larger organization.
In the commercial sector, businesses do this all the time, some with fairly decent results, but many find themselves with a struggling or failing branch of business two to three years later, having to take on long and painful reviews, re-organization and restructuring to turn that line into a profitable model. Or, in some cases, jettison it all together because it does not fit the company's "strategic goals".
That option is not available in matters of intelligence, analysis and national security. So we are left with an organization that generally gets things right enough times to provide a base of security, but is not set up to handle deviations no matter how large it gets or how often it references "deviations" in it's policies.
One of the other questions that Mr. Gerenstein-Ross raises is why did this erroneous analysis occur outside of these national agencies? He goes on to explain that these terrorist organizations are "clandestine", making some information "difficult to glean" and that information on this "clandestine behavior" obtained by national agencies (also, "clandestine") is often listed as "classified" and outside of the purview of many open source analysts' domain.
However, he also points out something very interesting and that is that the analysts who were much closer to the correct analysis of Al Qaeda's situation and potential were those who are essentially working outside of any government agency or sponsored program. Which tends to suggest that there is another problem altogether.
Many of the set research programs (START - Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) and think tanks are funded by and/or do work with these central government organizations in an effort to put "mass" on the problem. In doing so, they are necessarily impacted by the operations, priorities and policies of these agencies and, to put it bluntly, can be infected with the same problems that plague these agencies when it comes to evaluating or looking for deviancies within known data.
Of course, there will be great denial of this idea because people are, technically, outside of the organizational structures. However, we only have to look at the nature of organizations to understand why and how they impact their outside partners.
The short answer is that these organizations are looking for, expecting and demanding the same things from their partners as they do from themselves. Consistency and focus on the policies and priorities of the "purchasing company" or customer. Some may object to this presentation of the relationship in a commercial nature, but that is, in fact, the manner of the relationship.
An example of this kind of relationship would be the Ford Motor Company. It consistently and reliably produces masses of consistently reliable vehicles. These are not luxury automobiles, like a Maybach, created one at a time and by hand. They roll off a factory floor at a regular pace. Ford requires many parts to create each vehicle and it needs reliable, consistent parts timely, reliably and consistently. That is what it is looking for in it's suppliers and that is what it re-enforces to it's suppliers through various communications, policies and quality assurance programs.
We can argue that research and analyst programs are not factories and individuals within are more autonomous. More importantly, training and the nature of the business at hand rejects that type of behavior. However, the same type of re-enforcement of these concepts occurs through repeated interaction with these centralized government organizations where by needs and demands of the organizations are consistently communicated through requests for information, by policy and procedures that dictate the relationship and, most importantly, re-enforcement by reward for expected outcomes (ie, government funding for programs or purchasing of final analytic product).
In this manner, the behavior of the partner is influenced by the other and ideas and concepts spread like a contagion. When it's a good idea, contagion is also good and can serve to produce masses of viable information and analytics. The same holds true when it's a bad idea and the contagion can paralyze diverse thinking through out the system.
Open source, independent analysts can also be infected with these erroneous ideas. In many cases because, as Mr. Garenstein-Ross notes, much of the information on clandestine organizations collected clandestinely, remains beyond non-affiliated researchers' reach and that which is released is released from these same agencies with background information provided that often re-enforces the agency's position or view.
Media reports, in particular, can be good sources of information, but can often skew towards the information provided by the agencies as staff writers look to provide news for consumption, not an avenue for investigation. Which is why many independent, open source analysts have a variety of resources to choose from and don't feel necessarily constrained to those accepted or validated by these institutions. I.E. Independent.
At the end of the day, the entire process of analysis and established policy can create a circle of self-perpetuating erroneous analysis and behavior inside and outside of the various professional organizations and institutions. Where the much more independent researchers and analysts have prevailed is that, in fact, they are not dependent on these relationships and the very important aspect of analysis and research, to challenge any information that seems to fit too readily into the accepted paradigm, is allowed to prevail.
Reliably and consistently, these questions of what and how something went wrong arise whenever it's obvious that the system failed to perform as expected. Most often when some large, unforeseen or devastating event occurs. Mr. Garenstein-Ross provides some thoughts on how the system might be improved both in process and in thinking that may contribute to improving this important aspect of national security.
As for the policy set forth in the National Strategy for Counter-terrorism and the policies derived thereof, it may have to be accepted for what it is, a policy meant to limit or set boundaries on what is defined as a threat to be countered, the actions applied or the groups it is applied to. However, it is incumbent upon agencies, institutions and independents alike not to let the policy limit deviating data within their analysis or from challenging the established paradigm.
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