Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: On Developing a Model

In trying to determine the who and the what of Al Qaeda or the differences between any group proclaiming "jihad" or "global jihad" or generally Islamic Militant language, it helps first to have some basic understanding of how sociological and ideological movements develop and proliferate.  There are a number of excellent books about terrorism, terrorist organizations and psychology of both groups and individuals involved in this activity.  Many of these books focus on the sociological, psychological and ideological drives of individuals and groups that might lead them to decide to join a group or commit acts of terrorism.

One book, The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and State of Mind, included an essay by Dr. Martha Crenshaw on the "psycho-logical" aspects of decision making for committing an act of terrorism.  Studies have focused on the make up of groups, their networks and how they behave.  Many more hours have been spent on mapping out connections between various groups.  Even towards developing complicated algorithms to establish risk factors and networking. 

And, yet, we remain here, stuck with unsatisfying answers  that remain contentious amongst experts and intelligence agencies, media and pundits, politicians and the population.  In some ways it's because the mode and manner of communication has demanded simplification for consumption.  In others, because it may be deemed too complicated or even a point of secrecy belaying the necessity to convey it properly to the population at large. 

This may explain the inability or lack of interest of providing explanation to the population, producing confusion, but it hardly explains why there is such a cognitive difference amongst all those whose job it is to actually determine this information and provide it for national, agency or academic consumption.  In either case, the dichotomy may provide a wider range of views and ideas from which to approach the situation, but it may also create a bifurcation in policy that results in less successful counter measures.  Or, equally important, evaluating situations for dangers to the population, nation, interests and personnel abroad such as the case of Benghazi.

While political motivations as well as misapprehension of the nature of threats continues to push this debate along, the most recent report actually suggests that, indeed, we are in need of a new method of evaluating and conveying the basics; stepping back from the noise of the multitude opinions, studies and books and surveying the groundwork for a workable model.  One that is comprehensible for all those that must make policy as well as the population that must consume information and push those policies along. 

First issue that must be recognized is that there are many forms of Islamic militant activity and groups.  Al Qaeda is one manifestation.  It's language, ideology and political goals are global in nature even as it is confined to acting largely in specific locations within the Middle East and Central Asia.  It has chosen to attack targets around the world as an offensive measure in order to intimidate nations from acting to defend their interests; force countries to withdraw militarily, politically and economically from specific areas; and, provoke reactions that will re-enforce it's propaganda and ideology among it's target population for proliferation. 

That ideology insists that Muslims and Islam are under attack by both non-Islamic nations (infidels, kufr) as well as leaders of Islamic nations who are heretics, apostates or non-believers (takfir, munifiqeen) and their various government agencies, employees and even many citizens.  Their goals are to establish Islamic government based on their stringent interpretation of Islam and it's law (shar'iah) within nations that are largely populated by Muslims or nations that they claim are historically part of a greater Islamic empire (Caliphate). 

While many other groups espouse a similar ideology, their goals and capabilities are focused on specific locales within this larger region.  Many of these same groups expect that, once they have established within these nations, they will join this greater Islamic union to form a larger Pan-Islamic empire (Caliphate).  Others, still espousing similar ideology, may not have any confidence in creating this trans-national Caliphate, but believe they will have established one of many like minded nations that will ally for defense of their newly established Islamic state. 

There are also groups that espouse an Islamic militant ideology whose goals are entirely local and consider themselves defending their existing population, proselytizing stringent, fundamental Islam and organizing local governance in compliance with their ideology.  In any scenario, trans-national, regional, national or local, these organizations and groups, the general ideology, is hostile to any nation, population or organization that does not fit within their ideology or who they see as hostile or an obstruction to their over all goals. 

There are groups who organize under an Islamic name, that are militant in nature and espouse an Islamic language, may be defensive or offensive in nature, but do not align with groups or organizations that profess Global Islamic Jihad.  Who they are hostile towards depends largely on local political situations, but may bleed over onto national or international groups or organizations as they struggle to defend, take or hold specific territory. 

Finally, there are groups who organize under an Islamic name, who are political or evangelical in nature, who may espouse Global Islamic goals or simply proselytize a stringent, fundamental Islam.  They are not militant, but may become militant or create militant offshoots if they believe they are under threat or are unable to reach their goals through generally peaceful means.  They may also become militant once they reach a certain number of members or if certain members begin to espouse militant ideas.

Each of these organizations presents a different threat.  The issue is how to determine which category each of these organizations belong to and what risk they pose to nations, populations and any transnational interests.  While there is a danger in not recognizing that all militant groups in these categories represent a security threat on various levels, there is also a danger in lumping all of these groups into one category. 

In doing so, it suggests only one solution to a multi-layered political and security landscape.  In order to reduce the threat or potential threat from these various groups, it would be better to have different policies and tools to address each situation and reduce the likelihood of these differing groups refining or redefining their struggle or goals to match those of Global Islamic Jihad and specifically Al Qaeda.

However, it should be recognized plainly that any non-state militant organization can be a threat to personnel, locations and interests.  Particularly in locations where on-going hostilities, internecine or intermittent combat or violent clashes continue due to political unrest.  Further, when there is a weak government, military or other security apparatus that cannot be relied on to provide consistent security for international agencies, embassies or interests, political or commercial. 

The last appears to be an accepted logic, but, as the events at the Benghazi indicate, the actual nature of these threats can be underestimated or risks to security underplayed for purely political reasons.  In this case, a newly "liberated" nation where various groups formed nominal alliances with local, national and international groups, but quickly fell into political discord and internecine clashes of a power struggle.  Where once they may have considered the United States an ally, some determined that the presence of the United States, or it's political power behind other groups, would become an obstacle to their political goals, locally and nationally. 

The Libyan political and militant landscape is an excellent representation of the levels of Islamic Militant organizations and the multiplicity of security threats posed by these organizations.  It also provides another important lesson as reports continue to muddle through who was involved in Benghazi, what organization and what rationales were used for the attack.  That lesson is that these different organizations and their political goals may be separate, but that there is no absolute delineation between members and organizations. 

In fact, many members migrate between organizations, they may share resources and many organizations may cooperate in small and large ways in order to accomplish their separate goals.  This, too, has attributed to the general population's view that, indeed, then they are all part of the Global Islamic Jihad movement and represent the same threat. Or, more succinctly, are part of Al Qaeda, considered to be the main and most persistent threat.  As has the idea that, because they all espouse some form of Islamist militant language and/or ideology, that all Muslims then pose the same threat. 

All of which percolates into our intelligence, security and academic organizations to create multiple and convoluted models and assessments that do little to clear the situation, develop appropriate policies or present viable concepts for threat assessments.   This returns to the original point of this article, that after all these years and man power spent, we should have come to some universal conclusions and developed appropriate models for comprehending this current sociological movement and combatting it's threat when and wherever necessary. 

What is this model and is it necessarily a "new" model?  Or, amongst all the studies and assessments, does it already exist?  Should it necessarily be about or focus on Global Islamic Jihad as the only or largest threat, as many professionals consider other trans-national and national domestic terrorist and criminal organizations to be equally or more threatening? 

Moving along that line of thinking, haven't we seen this all before and is it possible that existing sociological studies and models can provide a better method for viewing this most recent incarnation? 
 

How a Radical New Teaching Method Could Unleash a Generation of Geniuses | Wired Business | Wired.com

How a Radical New Teaching Method Could Unleash a Generation of Geniuses | Wired Business | Wired.com

Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: The Unsatisfying Answer

As the debate over the Benghazi attack of September 11, 2012 continues, one issue remains prevalent and continues to be the focal point of the debate: was the attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda, an Al Qaeda linked "affiliate" or by a local group with it's own agenda?  Much of that debate is politically driven, but is of interest because it also mirrors the on going debate about what Al Qaeda is and it's over all structure or organization.  Most importantly, whether Al Qaeda is a growing organization with growing capabilities to direct attacks or whether it is slowly becoming just another player in the field as "global jihad" groups proliferate across the region and Al Qaeda's command and control slips away.

In viewing the various debates, studies and expert contentions, it seems more than likely that the answer will be unsatisfying to all and that is: all of the above. 

One of the issues is that this spread of militant Islamism and groups continues to be treated as a new phenomena as if violent organizations or even ideologically driven movements have never been seen before, on this scale or even coalesced to create either revolutionary movements or criminal, violent enterprises.  Or, in fact, not coalesced as a large organized movement, but did proceed to proliferate through societies, becoming a persistent danger to the societies wherein they operate, spawning offshoots and creating whole underground and commiserate, cooperating organizations that undermine or erode society and civil order. 

The debates and on-going struggle for definition is driven by the overwhelming desire to determine a way to successfully counter and hopefully defeat these movements.  In the end, as one observer called it, "defend civilization", but, more broadly, defend people, society, cities, nation states and interests. 

This, amongst other issues, has driven the search for "the answer" and, through out continued inability to comprehend sociological phenomena and movements, increasingly unsatisfactory answers as to what it is, how it works and how best to combat it.  Even the word "combat" is unsatisfying as it suggests "war" when not every instance of it's existence lends towards the physicality of "war" as the greater part of society understands it, even as violent activity surrounding those instances would seem to suggest just that solution. 

But, if we want to "combat" it, in any sense of the word, we have to have a place to start.  From the law enforcement, national security and intelligence view, that means focusing on it's known entities and operations.  The connectivity of those entities and operations once again suggesting a greater organization that can be identified and reduced through attrition at various key points such as funding as well as eliminating individuals seen as lynch pins. 

These activities are, in reality, "tactics" while a greater "strategy" appears murky and continuingly out of step with the entire advent of an apparently globalized sociological violent movement that is ever fluid.  Equally disconcerting is that it's proliferation has created a redundancy model.  Meaning that, even as one group or individual or method is countered or eliminated, another group or individual or resource arises to take it's place.     

This has created significant frustration within the general population in comprehending what is happening and how to put an end to it.  The debates over what it is and whether it is organized and controlled or not has led to general confusion within the population that lends to ever present disjointed policies or misapprehension of how those policies and commiserate tactics ought to be applied, to whom and to which situations. 

That is re-enforced by the movement's own rhetoric that professes global aspirations even as it acts or is confined to local spaces.  Their ability to appear and operate is completely dependent on local situations, existing conditions and the make up of the population itself.  Like similar sociological movements, it tends to take root in places where governance and security is weak, the economy is poor and other stressors, such as political or social disenfranchisement, are apparent. 

In the case of "global jihad", the other prevalent indicator is a Muslim population even as these groups take advantage of and interact with other, non-Islamic, populations, criminal organizations and activities or groups for smuggling weapons, drugs, diamonds, oil, stolen cars, cigarettes, knock off products, money laundering, etc.  The list is amazingly long and suggests a plethora of areas where intelligence and security operations must focus on and interdict in order to slow or attrite these various groups although it does nothing to combat the sociological movement itself. 

This is compounded even more by the advent of state actors using these movements as political tools without seeming to care that they are creating an ungovernable monster that, in the end, is likely to come back around to infiltrate amongst their own populations.  Authoritarian police states, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, are two such states that imagine their control is infinite and that the supposed homogeneity of their populations provide a buffer.  However, historical evidence of ideological and sociological movements suggests that it is impossible to completely eliminate or confine, even in a police state. 

China and Russia could be included in this list even as Pakistan, a grand purveyor of the non-state actors for indirect warfare, finds itself in a persistent state of internal, low grade civil war. This has become such a normative within Pakistan that the state itself has adapted and set it's goals for governance and control to specific areas or seats of power such as the military, treasury, huge bureaucracy with little control beyond specific population centers.  Thus, Pakistan has the appearance of a state with defined borders and government apparatus, but is more akin to a large, armed, occupying force barely keeping the lid on an ever boiling situation and using it to push it's regional political agenda that routinely bleeds out onto the international arena. 

Neither can we dismiss the interaction of western states where designation as terrorist groups and even outright support of particular groups is highly politically motivated.  As indicated by the European Union's slow and bifurcated approach to designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization or even the United States and allies debating whether to designate Jabhat al-Nusra even slightly after it pledged "bayt" or allegiance to Al Qaeda. 

All of this can be added to the pot and stirred around to create utterly unwieldy policy and security mechanisms along with confusion in the ranks from policy makers to those tasked with securing the nation and within the population itself.  The last simply wanting to know how those designated as "responsible" will keep them safe from what appears to be an ever growing violent movement. 

All the while, the power of the people's pleasure or displeasure is used to push one policy or another, represented in the political arena of party, national and international politics.  None of whom seem to agree what it is or isn't that we are up against.  Worse yet, that the general population have not comprehended the difference between being "safe" and "defeating" a movement. 

The first may be generally accomplished, the latter, based on history, may be impossible to accomplish completely until or if it coalesces into a state, government and army that can be directly targeted.  Or, as in the case with FARC in Colombia, after thirty years and the state slowly gaining governance, economic and security measures, the movement becomes exhausted and their sociological and political pull becomes irrelevant to the parts of society that once gave them support.  Only at that point taking out key entities within the organization and attrition of resources may result in it's final crumbling, although, again, not it's complete demise.

That unsatisfying answer is the elephant in the room, an answer that no one is willing to give because it means political death even if it would be more likely to result in better policies, mechanism and focus from all agencies and actors involved and, in the end, possibly keep us safer. 


 

Dr H.A. Hellyer discusses Egypt with Holt McCallany in the Cutting Room | Dr H.A. Hellyer د. إتش

Dr H.A. Hellyer discusses Egypt with Holt McCallany in the Cutting Room | Dr H.A. Hellyer د. إتش

Reading Syria: Articles, Studies

From Foreign Policy, overview: The Political Science of Syria's Civil War 

More In Depth from POMEPS, PDF: The Political Science of Syria's Civil War

Syria's Oil Pipeline

From Foreign Policy, Charles Lister - Next Phase of the Syrian Conflict  
 

Overview of Syria Situation and Related Issues

Thought I'd try a little exercise in writing down some general impressions of current events...

Syria -

If Assad falls, there will be an immediate civil war, likely more horrible & costly to civilians.  Current militias are focused on Assad & Assad is focused on militias.  Current terror being inflicted on civilians is still largely "collateral".  All sides are still trying to present themselves as defenders of the people.  Not necessarily true, but there is still a propaganda war to manage. 

Once this proceeds to trying to gain power to rule Syria, all sides will likely turn, reminiscent of Afghanistan post Soviet withdrawal and collapse of Communist government.  As one pundit put it, they will be fighting to be king's of ashes. 

For ISIS, the most important aspect will be holding on to a large part of the state to create a safe haven and some pretense of an Islamic state, similar to their attempts in Iraq.  They may, for a time, make some sort of pact with JAN, but any attempt by JAN to establish authority in a government or on a shura council will be rebuffed.  Likely to cause JAN to break into further factions. 

This will become a contest between the two AQ related organizations and, ultimately, prove whether ISIS, seeming on the outs with AQ central as embodied by Zawahiri, will establish it's own power base and become a truly rival organization to AQ's jihadist ideology.  It's hard to say if this would be good or bad in the fight against extremism.  Certainly, organizations developing internal rivalries can create weaknesses, but, as shown by such orgs as al Shabaab in Somalia and Belmohktar's AQIM, often pushes these organizations to do even greater violent acts to prove their strength and capabilities. 

Already, ISIS certainly surpasses AQAP & AQIM as the most prominent group drawing money, fighters and recognition.  However, current events in Africa and continuing operations in the Sinai suggest that this will only last so long and is contingent upon ISIS further survival. 

If Assad should fall or ISIS is capable to form a rump state in some sort of ill sitting status quo, there's a possibility that greater cooperation amongst states will result in it being immediately under attack as a pariah state. 

On the potential for Assad's fall or abdication, current situations suggest that this is a serious possibility.  First, the US pushing for the removal of Assad's chemical weapons and the agreement of various states including Russia and Iran, suggests that the idea is not foreign or out of the realm of plausibility.  Assad seems to imagine that this process, along with his assertion that he is fighting terrorists like AQ, is some form of rehabilitation to allow him to remain in the political process.  My impression is that Assad is dispensable by the outside groups involved. 

More worrisome is the devolution of the Syrian state in which all manner of arms & equipment would then be available to any number of non-state actors and be a danger to every state in the region.  Assad would be fooling himself if he imagined this was not the major driver for all those involved, but it's hard to say what he believes as the circle around him creates a real barrier to reality.

Some of these realities include what appears to be a clear choking off of supplies, fuel & munitions.  Aside from the scarcity of food and the clear hi-jacking of humanitarian aid then being sold in markets, other scarcities are apparent.  Reports include the destruction or inoperability of electrical and heating plants along with reports that several water plants have completely shut down, likely also due to fuel shortages and inability to perform maintenance.  In essence, the only places still getting light are in the north, like Raqqa, where ISIS is nominally running utilities, and very localized to immediate areas around Assad's command in Damascus.

Other indicators include the reduction of tank battles and few, if any, fighter jets flying missions.  This is partly due to the rebels overtaking several bases and appropriating or destroying equipment.  It's also indicative of the state of fuel and the remaining equipment.  The little oil that Syria is currently receiving is coming either from the ports in Latakia and Tartus via Russian shipments or possibly overland from Iraq.  Both of these logistical routes are constantly threatened by "rebel" groups, possession of key towns along the routes routinely switching hands. 

Another indicator has been his choice of weapons/munitions and their delivery.  Earlier events, such as the chemical weapons attacks on areas like Ghoutta that have sparked removal, seemed to indicate two very important aspects: 1) some form of desperation in attempting to break the siege and 2) conservation of men & munitions. This seems to be re-enforced by more recent events which includes the use of homemade barrel bombs delivered via helicopters.

The barrel bombs, as shown in various photos, are filled with fuel and ignited with very basic fuses.  What's interesting there is the use of fuel and oil.  This seems to indicate that, while fuel is short, there's a likelihood that equipment that could use the fuel is even less available.  The question would be better answered if the type of fuel being used was known, such as jet fuel, diesel, regular petrol or even raw oil (inability to refine for use in machinery would limit it's value beyond an ignition source). 

The fact that it's being delivered by helicopter likely means that this is the equipment that is still most reliable mechanically as well as has pilots to fly.  It's possible that the grounding of jets could be related to early defections of pilots, a fear of loss of loyalty in these ranks or simply that there is not enough parts or capable mechanics to perform maintenance and keep them flying. Loss of significant air bases, like Menagh, would also limit availability. 

One other event that went by with little fanfare was the attempt to barrel bomb a dam on the Euphrates in September in one of the few remaining attacks using a jet.  This may have simply been an attempt to deprive the upper area of Syria, controlled by the rebels, of any electricity or water, but it's success would have had even more significant destructive outcome flooding the valley below and likely killing hundreds of civilians in one fell swoop. 

A form of "total war" that would hope to decimate rebel strongholds in the rear that supplies the forces currently putting Damascus to siege.  As with the other events, including a short lived mechanized push through Ghoutta, this seems a very desperate, "Hail Mary" attempt in the face of dwindling resources and forces.

In essence, Assad remains under siege and has been unable to break it even with the influx of militias like Hezbollah and their related groups from Iraq.  The Iranian Qods who have been helping to train the NDF (national defense forces) have suffered several key losses in officers.  They have also met with major difficulties in organizing the forces, discipline and equipment.  Hezbollah has suffered hundreds of casualties and appear less enthusiastic about confronting the rebel and jihadi groups after key victories that were quickly halted. 

Further, attacks on Hezbollah and Iranian property and specific individuals in Lebanon, with concomitant political fall, out may also be depleting Hezbollah's will to invest further as they're position in Lebanon, political and militia holding territory, may be weakened.  The question also remains whether Iran will continue to invest or invest even more in shoring up Assad's government and military forces.

If Assad falls, Iran's direct, physical link with Hezbollah will be broken along with it's ability to provide physical and political support.  Equally troubling for Iran is that it's corridor to the Mediterranean via Syria and Lebanon will cease to exist along with it's conceived defensive/offensive corridor to Israel.  With Israel still making noises about attacking Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure.

It's fairly certain that his is a major issue for Iran and is likely one of the reasons that Iran was willing to negotiate, not only over Assad's chemical weapons, but over it's nuclear activities.  In essence, attempting to forestall what could possibly be an immediate strike by Israel post Assad demise.  Another indicator that the Iranians are not confident in the continued survival of Assad's regime. 

As an aside on Iran, recent events such as unexplained explosions and fires at nuclear facilities and research sites as well as very public assassinations of key figures, may indicate that Israel has a bead on these sites and people through intelligent networks.  Or, equally troubling, that there is, indeed, some internal fractures that are becoming very apparent to the outside world and may shake Iran politically. 

The possibility of Geneva II resulting in any sort of peace agreement seems far off and unlikely.  More importantly, this pushing the date back could be equally a device by the greater interlocutors to allow the fighting to grind on and grind down the participants.  Of course, winter has arrived and makes some war activities more difficult and the build up, repositioning of equipment and supplies for a spring offensive, by both sides in hopes of finally breaking the status quo, equally possible. 

By Jolani's (JAN) recent interview, the rebels and AQ groups seem fairly confident that they will have the upper hand even as Assad seems willing to go to Geneva for negotiations. 

One other player that seems to have receded into the background, but remains vital to Assad's continued existence, is Russia.  There are few if any reports coming out that indicates what type and quantity of supplies are being shipped in as this remains the vital key to the SAAs survival and capabilities.  If Assad were to fall, Tartus would become a flash point and Russia would lose it's last Mediterranean base for fueling and maintenance of it's external fleet.

That Russia is considering this a possibility seems apparent by recent announcements of beefing up it's Black Sea and Baltic fleets.  The Black Sea fleet would act as a wedge or bulk head against the potential restriction or closing of the Mediterranean shipping lanes.  Even the potential that it will become, once again, completely controlled by European and US fleets would be a fearful prospect in Moscow.  The Baltic Fleet would be it's wedge against constriction of it's Atlantic reach. 

Even with both of these, Russia would be at a significant strategic disadvantage and completely reliant on the good will of it's neighbors for import and export of goods, oil, natural gas and fuel.  This would give the EU, for instance, greater leverage in negotiation for fuel and natural gas.  Considering Russia's strong arm tactics in past negotiations and it's heavy economic reliance on these resources, that is a terrifying outcome. 

And, then, there is Israel.  If Assad falls, even in the midst of civil war, ISIS & JAN are very likely to immediately begin attacking Israel directly.  The point being to establish their credentials as THE resistance against Israel, delegitimize any internal forces against them, draw in even more fighters and support.  Even better, it would immediately force any surrounding nations to begin realigning or force a total admittance of support for it's existence.  In essence, it would be calling out every Arab nation and their leaders on their policies towards Israel; policies which AQ and the general Global Jihad movement has painted as hypocritical. 

Far beyond the side dramas of Egypt's internal political drama and any relationship with democracy, this possibility, along with the instability growing in Africa with it's disparate jihadi militant groups, is what is informing US policy.  A neutral Egypt or one that at least performs as a backstop and defense in Israel's rear is far more important at this crucial moment.  Since it aligns with Egypt's current political stance of "fighting terrorism", it will probably continue, if less visible to the public. 

Finally, not forgetting Jordan, this is where the real possibility for instability and proliferation of AQ/jihad terrorism will come to land.  In fact, there is a very real possibility that this would occur simultaneously or prior to any attack on Israel in an attempt to cut off any possible alliance.  That Jordan has thus far escaped can be placed firmly on the amount of material, training and intelligence that the US and other nations are providing. 

All of this is but slow motion probability as the sustainment of Assad's regime grows ever weaker without some other form of direct intervention. 

Not to forget Iraq because ISIS never did.  They're efforts there appear to be more of a rear guard than any real ability to break off and completely control the areas bordering Syria.  Right now, according to Kirk Sowell, noted analyst, ISIS is using that area for extorting money, obtaining supplies, likely transit of foreign fighters from Saudi, GCC and Jordan and rest and respite.  However, they have been picking up attacking military targets, expanding it's reach.  This may change strategy to more fully take control of the area and create bumper for Syria activities.

One thing that seems clear from here, but not to groups like ISIS/JAN and their various cheerleaders on the internet...post Assad, their ability to actually exist will become extremely difficult as they become the central target of every regional and extra-regional nation.  Unless they turn to attack Iran, there's a strong possibility some of their current backers around the Peninsula and Gulf will reduce their support.  Then again, ISIS and JAN may not need as much as they will have immediate access to untold weapons and ammunition. 

In the long run, it's hard to see Assad continuing to survive in any meaningful way over any significant period of time.  Which begs the question....does anyone else have a plan for post Assad?

The answer seems to be "yes...fly by the seat of our pants."


 

Iran's Praetorian Guard

I was going to write something long and informative on the rise of the IRGC as a political force and opponent of the Iranian clergy's rule, but apparently, someone beat me to it. 

Mullah's v Iranian Guard

Or, as I styled this post, the Praetorian Guard.  In history, Rome's Praetorian Guard started out as a loyal group of soldiers, hand picked by Caesar from close and loyal associates within the Roman Legions.  Eventually, what was once an honor that came with gifts and privileges, became a form of power brokerage with eventual Caesar's, such as Caligula and Nero, having to pay substantial bribes to the leaders and individuals to retain their nominal loyalty.

Like the IRGC, the Roman Praetorian Guard would often carry out the political dirty work of Caesar, assassinating and intimidating any opponents.  However, the Praetorian Guard was also most likely to murder the rulers.  Caligula and Nero meeting the same fate. 

That is just about the only the IRGC hasn't done yet, but I wouldn't bet the house that it stays that way.



 

Zubaydah Diaries: The Banality of Banal Assessments & Goofball Terrorists

Abu Zubaydah and the banality of 'jihadism' - Terry McDermot

The world is full of dangerous goofballs, but we can't treat them all as threats to civilization

Mr. McDermot may have some of that correct, but that and most of his article leave much to be desired.  Much. 

Abu Zubaydah's six released diaries can be located here.

Starting with this statement:

They also help substantiate what should by now be clear: The U.S. has made significant, basic errors in its response to 9/11 and the threat of radical Islam

It's fairly certain that the rest of everything you are going to read is some ideological manifestations of Mr. McDermott's opinion and policy preferences as opposed to actually showing, through excerpts or any substantiation or analysis of what Zubaydah wrote, that those who pursue jihad, and to a larger extent "terrorism", are "banal".  Common.  Or, even in Mr. McDermott's assessment "goofballs". 

It's true, when you read the first two diaries, Zubaydah presents himself as a young, confused man who has significant personal issues.  He struggles with his family where several parental separations occur, his mother is a weak personality while he spends much time talking about trying to please his father.  He has vague conversations with his friends about the Israeli-Palestine situation and comments once, early on, about an argument between friends concerning when jihad is permissible and whether it is permissible or good to align with any secular organization like the PLO.

However, Mr. Zubaydah's drive to go to jihad in Afghanistan is not made overtly manifest until he had spent over a year in India attending university to get a degree in computer science.  A project that his father frowned on, but paid for never the less.  Failure at university, lack of familial support, few external relationships and personal struggles with his adherence to the tenets of his faith, most notably "chastity until marriage", are several of his motivators for leaving India to join the mujihadeen in Afghanistan.

Other significant motivators are a few of the other expatriate friends he had made who were planning to travel to Afghanistan.  He also has some poor experiences with neighbors and people he believes to be his "friends".  He has little money and lives very poorly, sometimes convincing himself that is all he requires.  He is indirectly accused of having an affair or improper relations with his host's wife.  The adventure, the purpose and direction that he is missing, his personal trauma and drama, are what leads him to determine to leave school and travel with an acquaintance to Pakistan.

This is the "goofball" that Mr McDermott suggests and reads significantly similar to many other young men who have either traveled abroad to join one of the jihad organizations or even remained behind to commit acts of terror in their home countries.  Most recently, the Tsarnaev brothers (Boston), Adebolajo and Adebowale (murder of a British Soldier), Nidal Hasan (Ft. Hood) and Lindsay "Jamal" Graham (July 2005, London). 

None start out as violent extremist, but they do seek it out as a panacea for their other conceived failures or personal trauma.  With the exception of Hasan, these are young men who, prior to determination to turn to terrorism, would present as "goofballs".  As do a number of others in the recent past who committed violent crimes such as the Aurora Theater mass shooting, Columbine and Newtown mass murderer.

Describing Zubaydah as a "goofball" would certainly apply to his immaturity and inexperience.  Even though Zubaydah is approximately 20 when he begins his diaries, he writes and thinks with the dexterity, comprehension and focus of a fifteen year old.  This slowly disappears over the course of the war and later throughout his diaries.  By the end, Zubaydah has certainly matured and garnered considerable self-esteem and self-control. 

He is no longer "a goofball".  The fact that Mr. McDermott goes on to suggest this continues to be true throughout Zubaydah's career, even as he presents tidbits of information that suggests otherwise, is misleading at best and only plausible if someone had not actually read Zubaydah's diaries.

Zubaydah, born in Palestine and raised in middle-class comfort in Saudi Arabia, rose through the 1990s — by what abilities it is not clear — to a position of some stature within radical Islam

Zubaydah actually makes "clear" what "abilities" allow him to rise through the ranks until he becomes a significant player in the funding, organization and transit of fighters to the various camps for jihad.  When he first arrives in Afghanistan, Zubaydah, who styles himself as "Hani" in his diaries, goes to a number of basic training camps.  He struggles at first with the physical fitness aspects, but eventually pushes himself to improve, stop smoking and makes detailed, organized plans and sets goals for improving his fitness, maintaining his weight and becoming a more faithful follower of Islam. 

Zubaydah then organizes a plan to become better trained in all the aspects of war, moving from camp to camp that offers different or better training on weapons and tactics.  He outlines these plans in specific detail.  A trait that becomes a prominent "ability", helping him to rise through the ranks.  Zubaydah has excellent organizational skills, he has battle experience after nearly two years at the front, he has significant experience in training camps, watched other leaders and received mentoring as well as assessed what was good and bad amongst all of these activities.

When the main war is over and the Communist government of Afghanistan had fallen, Zubaydah remains in Afghanistan even as the civil war gets underway.  He's appalled at the disunity, but, having dedicated himself to the "cause" of jihad for the sake of his religion, is determined to remain and put his efforts where he feels he's been most successful.  At this point, jihad against whomever, simply for the sake of Islam, without further context, is his motivator.  Western policies have little room in his discourse except a brief internal discussion on whether he should go to Palestine. 

In the late 1990s he was instrumental in running a training camp just across the Pakistani border in Afghanistan

Zubaydah was actually the administrator of a very large camp that was filtering up to 400 trainees from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, etc.  He outlines numerous issues he had with organizing and obtaining supplies and shelter for the number of recruits sent to him when the original number was supposed to be 100.  He discusses disciplinary issues, money, theft, obtaining trainers, organizing classes and equipment and so on. 

Some of his other duties include meeting with other groups (like Al Qaeda), transportation to and from the borders, documentation and a continuous plethora of details.  He even laments the poor condition, abilities and general commitment of the recruits, without any irony or vague recognition of his own condition when he first arrived in Afghanistan.  What is apparent is his organizational abilities, similar to those attributed to bin Laden, and growing leadership experiences and abilities.

This is the actual "banality of jihad".  The details that must be managed to move men, equipment, weapons, munitions and money in order to run a training camp.  This was discussed in Dr. Shapiro's book, "The Terrorist's Dilemma, The Management of Violent Covert Organizations", an overview and discussion with Dr. Shapiro can be found here. 

While the details of running any organization are, in fact, "banal", these details make up a significant and important aspect of terrorist activities.  Without obtaining, distributing and accounting for funds or organized logistics, no organization can long function or exist.  McDermott seems to suggest that this is insignificant and, therefore, Zubaydah's role, tracking and arrest was equally insignificant or unimportant.   

For McDermott, going after individuals amounts to conflating them into something they are not and is the wrong focus of US efforts.  What those actual efforts ought to be, he gives few directions or ideas.  Except that the west should not be worried about "goofballs" that go off to jihad. 


Worse, the US may have gotten the wrong man since Zubaydah, he insists, was never a member of al Qaeda.  This completely misses the original rationale and organization of Al Qaeda.  Not as a singular entity, but an umbrella of multiple organizations that are connected, maintain similar goals, share funding, logistics, men and materials.

It turned out the link to Al-Qaeda was more tenuous than the U.S. government had imagined. For years, the U.S. government had viewed him as a major figure within the group, at one point even elevating him to the No. 3 position on what turned out to be a fanciful Al-Qaeda organizational chart.

It's true, the US comprehension and assessment of the organization known as "Al Qaeda" was limited by it's own views of vertical organizations with clear, delineated leadership and roles.  This isn't how Al Qaeda worked then or now, largely because of the manner in which these organizations recognize leaders.  Those that are "successful" and can draw significant recruits and funding are leaders by self-selection, not appointed or given a specific title or command.  Those are given out of respect, success on the battlefield or ones they sometimes choose for themselves (see, Syria's various emirs and commanders). 

However, al Qaeda's origination and main threat was and continuous to be it's organizational, logistical, funding and management abilities, ideological draw and that it is the repository of the original veterans of "global jihad".  All of which gives the designated "core" of al Qaeda significant position and power amongst the groups if not actual "command and control" over all groups pledging "bayat" (allegiance, or, more accurately, getting plugged in to the network). 

Zubaydah does not mention bin Laden or Al Qaeda by name until book five and shortly before the September 11, 2001 attacks.  This may be why McDermott states, almost emphatically, that Zubaydah had little or no relationship with Al Qaeda.  Zubaydah's own diaries indicate other wise, all be it in seriously self censored style that Zubaydah even states in the diaries was necessary because writing things down was very dangerous. 

For instance, in the early period of Zubaydah's training in Afghanistan, he repeatedly mentions going to the Kunar camp.  One that is originally funded and organized by bin Laden prior to the organizational establishment of "Al Qaeda" and that continues to run through out the 90's.  During his period as administrator at the "Shayk's camp", Zubaydah makes several trips to the Kunar camp to obtain trainers, materials and organize transportation of the Uzbeks and Tajiks who are coming and going from his camp.

Though Zubaydah could not be considered a card carrying member of Al Qaeda "core" in the early nineties, he was no stranger to the organization and was not, as McDermott suggests, a "competitor". 

Even from the beginning, as Zubaydah described his original training and throughout his comments on the various camps, the organization and distribution of the camps depended on their focus and associations.  For instance, some camps were basic training, beginning weapons, advanced weapons, bomb making, artillery, etc.  Other camps were run by and recruited from specific groups, local or foreign, while others were fairly integrated as the different recruits arrived. 

Most of the camps cooperated logistically and tactically.  It was only after Afghanistan fell into civil war that greater rivalries existed.  Zubaydah indicates that he and the camp he was administrating steered clear of the conflict, concentrating on developing recruits for external, regional activities.  Bin Laden appeared to have supported the Taliban with funding and equipment.   In essence, Zubaydah avoids becoming a part of the rivalry that instigated the civil war.

Zubaydah's connections with Al Qaeda become more clear in books five and six which seemed to have garnered little attention from Mr. McDermott.  Possibly because, aside from a very explicit entry regarding the death of Mehsoud in North Afghanistan and 9/11, Zubaydah is very careful in discussing his activities and naming names.  At the end of book five, Zubaydah is even more explicit that anything he writes to himself from that point on will likely be in "code" because the danger that it might fall into someone else's hands and be used against him is exceedingly high.

By the end of book five, the camp where Zubaydah was acting as an administrator has been shut down by the Taliban.  Zubaydah had been attending numerous meetings amongst all the leadership of the jihad training camps.  He appears to disagree with the idea, but he also is not overly angry.  In fact, he mentions multiple times that he has "ambitions" that are about to be met.  By this time, his views have become cemented towards the degradation of Western ideas, their infiltration into Islamic communities and the need to attack the West.  Clearly, he has been regularly in contact with and receiving further indoctrination into the ideas espoused by Al Qaeda.

In Book six, his entries are fewer and spread out over longer periods.  In many of the entries he indicates the reason is that he is about to realize his ambition.  In a next entry, he indicates he has taken over administrating "The House of Martyrs" after visiting the "Kunar Camp".  This is a significant entry and validates the opinion that Zubaydah has been admitted into the inner workings of Al Qaeda. 

"The House of Martyrs" is a network of safe houses that act as a transit point for fighters moving in and out of Afghanistan.  From Peshawar to Islamabad and throughout cities in Pakistan.  According to most information available, these houses were originally established and funded by bin Laden during the Afghanistan War.  These houses also acted as a place for respite and recovery for injured mujihadeen, a collection point for information on those coming and going as well as a conduit for funds that were used to administer the houses.  More significantly, these funds were distributed amongst the various groups, training camps and dispensed to cells for terrorist activities.

Zubaydah spends a great deal of book six discussing some of these activities, the trials of administration, the difficulty in finding good help, obtaining and managing funds, the problem of establishing leadership over this significant area, the risks of traveling back and forth to the camps, transporting of fighters to and from camps and the fact that the Pakistani ISI and police are continuously very close to finding or raiding the houses.  Despite the lack of names of the camps he is going to or group affiliations, it is clear that Zubaydah has an intricate part to play in the overall logistics and operations of the organization and funneling of trainees to camps and terrorists that go on to form active cells.

In another interim period, he indicates that he had travelled to a camp, which he does not explicitly name, and that something very significant is about to occur.  Shortly after, he announces the the events of September 11 in which he praises "Shaikh bin Laden" and those that perpetrated the attacks.  He even spells out exactly what locations the attacks were supposed to take out.  Most notably the failed Flight 93 that crashed into the Pennsylvania field.  In Zubaydah's remarks, coming right from a meeting in an undisclosed camp in Afghanistan, the plane was supposed to take out the White House. 

He even goes to great lengths justifying Mehsoud's assassination on the grounds that the Northern Alliance, post 9/11, would be most likely used as a conduit for attacks against "them" (as in, whatever group he is actually working with which seems to be Al Qaeda as it was manifested at that time, "the base" for jihad).  In any degree, it is hard to imagine that Zubaydah is not intricately involved in or aware of Al Qaeda activities. 

 In book six, Zubaydah does present himself as his own man in a way that he rarely indicates reporting directly to a superior.  He does mention having to provide some accounting for activities and funds, but rarely suggests he is being ordered or guided.  For many, including Mr. McDermott, this suggests some form of absolute autonomy from any organization.  As if Zubaydah has simply appeared from no where with no connections, direction or directive, to collect and send fighters and money willy-nilly into Afghanistan with only a vague purpose of "jihad against the west".

This is either extreme naivety or wishful thinking.  Even Zubaydah himself states in this last diary that he would not discuss anyone else, who he talked to or where he went to in Afghanistan.  Again, for the sake of secrecy and protection.  More importantly, Zubaydah knows, in detail, who is coming and going from the safe houses, to where and for what purpose.  If he did not know, he would have been unable to fulfill the function that he takes great pride in.

If anything is understood about Al Qaeda and it's various terrorist cells that have perpetrated attacks, division of activities and maintaining separation was and remains important to protect the other members and activities.   In some cases, not even knowing who the other members are until it becomes necessary to come together shortly before to put the pieces together and perpetrate the event such as 9/11 or the March 2003 attack in Madrid.

While Zubaydah's responsibilities and activities did not make him number 3 in the organization in any "linear" sense of leadership hierarchy, it does not make him a "low level member" of Al Qaeda either.  He was in charge of logistics and funding, a significant branch of activities for the over all organizational network even if it and Zubaydah appeared to operate as if separate and autonomous.  His operations are a significant "leg" of the over all network and information received from his arrest likely provided information on other parts or members of the network that could be followed up.

There is one statement that can be fully agreed upon generally:

Terrorists are not supermen; they are not brilliant tacticians or highly trained warriors

This is generally true as the network relies on many different people with different skill sets, few of whom represent any type of overall genius, but who are fairly capable at the jobs and activities assigned.  If they are not, they are either replaced or discovered.  More importantly, they are bound by the rules of the world in which they operate even as they seek to undermine those rules.  Even the act of organizing and committing terrorist activities demands time and attention to mundane details, interaction and exposure to people, the limits of time, space and travel and the necessity to maintain some records of activities in order to manage towards the over all goals. 

This is why Zubaydah's capture was important and relatively significant to undermining the Al Qaeda network.  At least, temporarily.  Al Qaeda as a networked organization, like many legitimate organizations, has established forms of redundancy throughout it's activities.  It's dispersed hierarchy, whether intentional or incidental, means that one disruption could slow operations, but may not ever create a "killing blow". 

Mr. McDermott suggests that focusing on individuals puts too much significance on these individuals as opposed to evaluating and determining a plan to interdict radical Islam as an ideology.  Not having an effective plan against the ideology may be one of the major issues effecting the ability to counter or create the demise of radical Islam, but not focusing on individuals who play significant parts in the network is equally fallible.  It suggests leaving them to proliferate and widen their capabilities without any attempt to slow or disrupt.

He goes further in suggesting that, just like the mass shooters of Columbine and Newtown, the ability to prevent death by an individual or group of "goofballs" is limited so why focus on it?  Which shows that Mr. McDermott has spent little time in analyzing these events where, in fact, the perpetrators gave off signals and presented several periods where they could have been interdicted.  It may never be perfect, but it hardly suggests not looking for ways to maintain the safety of people and nations.

Far from the lessons that McDermott says he learned from reading Zubaydah's diary, that these were a bunch of "small" and hapless "goofballs" who happened to get lucky a few times, the lesson is that the organization and perpetration of "jihad" terrorism do require attention to numerous banal details.  It is effectively mapping and connecting these banal details that allows the disruption of actual attacks such as the Christmas Shoe bomber, Richard Reid, or the attempted underwear bombing and even the placement of bombs in printing toner cartridges on cargo air planes.

 These interventions keep people safe in the near term, but Mr. McDermott may be correct in asking if we have established an effective plan against the proliferation of radical Islam.  The answer he may have provided accidentally:

Why do a bunch of "goofballs" go off to join an ideology and violent terrorist organization?  Individuals may differ slightly, but the overall, banal answer seems to be, as in Zubaydah's case, because they have nothing better to do.

Answering Prof. Nichols: This Is Not the Murder of Hypatia

"The Democratization of Knowledge" is not "The Murder of Hypatia". 

I am sure I do not need to give Prof. Nichols a lesson in history, but, as I intend to use it as a point of contention with Prof. Nichols' complaints, I'll simply have to beg forgiveness for my presumption in doing so. 

For the sake of the readers here, Hypatia was a well known female scholar in the city of Alexandria who was murdered by religious zealots circa 415 A.D.  Her story or legend, what will you, has been used as an allegory for the destruction of reason by the ignorance of dogma represented by the uneducated and unwashed masses of religious zealots. 

The event was handily married to one of the multitudinous destructions of the Library of Alexandria in the movie "Agora".  A film I recommend even if some of the historical content (the sacking of the library illustrated takes place in 391 AD and drastically shortens the period after in which Hypatia is murdered) may prove inaccurate.  It does capture the idea of "the death of reason" rather neatly and resounds with Prof. Nichols' polemic on "The Death of Expertise". 

While I sympathize with the professor's position, I must disagree with him on his supposition.  The current period of "flattening of information" and "the democratization of knowledge" does not equate to "the murder of Hypatia". 

While it may feel chaotic and challenging, the advent of the internet (the flattening of information) along with scores of treatise, papers,  e-books, websites, blogs and forums (professional and otherwise) with the appearance of professors, professionals and experts, such as Prof. Nichols and Prof. Schindler, enumerable conversations and challenges via this forum, Twitter, etc with all comers (the democratization of knowledge using tools that flatten information) would be comparable to more felicitous and momentous occasions in history. 

Moments like the invention of the Gutenberg Press in 1450 (the flattening of information) at the height of the Renaissance  thru the Age of Enlightenment  where the ability to read, write and think critically or even independently began to filter down from higher echelons to the common people ("demo"; the Democratization of Knowledge).   A period in time when even a butcher's son imagined that he had the tools at his finger tips to change his destiny and the world, to, in fact, challenge a professor (experts?) on the ideas that the professor had spent a life time divining and refining. 

The "Age of Enlightenment" would never have happened without the invention of the Gutenberg Press nor had such a resounding impact on civilization, society, politics and religion.  As the noted philosopher Francis Bacon wrote, the press was one of the three inventions that "changed the whole face and state of the world."  The other two inventions, equally useful and democratizing, were the firearm and the compass. 

The Gutenberg Press is most often noted as having printed hundreds of thousands of copies of the Bible in multiple languages.  This ability to read and discern the religious texts by common laymen leads to the creation of religious sects by every other Tom, Dick and Martin Luther, directly challenging the orthodoxy and authority of the church in Rome. 

The idea that new technology used to disseminate information, that permits the flattening of information and the democratization of knowledge, is dangerous as it may be abused by the uninformed to spread uninformed ideas is hardly new.  I frequently imagine these types of conversations occurring in the Vatican about the time the one hundred thousandth Bible had been printed.

This new technology and democratization of information was dangerous.  Largely for the order of things held sacrosanct.  It led to the decimation of the organizational power of the Church and to religiously tinged political wars of empire. During these wars, thousands of "heretics", who imagined themselves capable of determining their own faith and fate of their souls, are tortured, hung and burned at the stake by either side of the divide. 

The persecution of heretics eventually leads to mass exodus or exile to a newly discovered continent.  Their travel aided and abetted by the compass, their defense in a hostile territory provided by the currently lamented firearm.  A few hundred years later, the proliferation of firearms and ideas spread to every common man via the printing press (again) eventually results in a revolution and truths that are now commonly believed to be "self evident".  The rest, as they say, is history. 

It's not a bad history.  During this same period from the invention of the press through the Age of Enlightenment, even as the world was turned upside down, the social order was irrevocably changed and everyone and anyone felt capable of challenging religious, political or even scientific orthodoxy, the one thing that did not happen was the ignoble demise of expertise.  Rather, it led to the proliferation of universities and the demand for more experts and professors in every field.

Universities, education and the educator were irrevocably changed by this democratizing technology.  It demanded that these professors (experts), be even more educated, to take their knowledge to greater heights (not moribund and stagnated), continuously refine that knowledge and be prepared to defend their ideas from all comers.  While universities continued their age old traditions of learning at a master's knee and "peer to peer" review anointing another lettered professor, they did not and could not prevent ideas proliferating in the streets from sneaking in and up through the ranks, challenging perceived knowledge and, yes, improving educators and the educated alike. 

For which we should be eternally grateful lest we still be writing with quills and ink pots by candlelight or being unmercifully bled for "ill humors" every time we felt a bit off.  Looking at beautifully scripted letters in a book we could not touch, much less read.  Subjects bound to land and lord begging for crumbs from his table, hoping that next winter he won't come out of his castle and destroy our crops because we objected to his onerous taxation.  And, so on.

(Is it ironic that we are having this conversation via personal computers invented by men who never finished university?) 

In conclusion, instead of fearing this technology and the challenges of the every man "layman", it should be celebrated.  As history clearly shows, it is these moments, this convergence of technology and the democratization of knowledge, even the temerity of a poor layman to imagine his opinions and ideas equal to those of a professor, that leads to great leaps and bounds forward of human civilization, survival and proliferation of knowledge.  

Dangers abound.  There are barbarians at the gates and zealots ready to tear Hypatia from her carriage and stone her in the temple, but she is not dead yet.  Indeed, instead of imagining the bliss of being shut away in that ivory tower, protected from the clamoring, uninformed masses, it should be embraced and nurtured.  Because, surely as the sun rises in the east and the earth spins round the sun, this rejection runs counter to the tides of history and human advancement. 

Unless we imagine the first caveman to pick up two stones and strike them together, creating fire, did so under the auspices of a professor?

I thank Prof. Nichols for the forum and opportunity to address his comments.  Though I disagree with his opinion on this matter, I give full respect to his position and long years of education and experience.  This is, after all, one of the reasons that I follow him: to receive knowledge and challenge my own.  Possibly proving his point that knowledge is built upon knowledge of experts. 

Finally, I thank that long ago blacksmith, Mr. Gutenberg.  Without whom this common daughter of a policeman would never have had the tools or been so bold as to challenge the ideas of a professor. 

God bless you, sirs, and God grant that our descendants look back in history to find this moment not the beginning of the next Dark Age, but the Second Age of Enlightenment.

The Flattening of Information v Democratization of Knowledge

“Knowledge forbidden?
Suspicious, reasonless. Why should their Lord
Envy them that? Can it be a sin to know?
Can it be death?”
― John Milton, Paradise Lost    

In a strange twist of internet fate, one of my general follows, Prof, Tom Nichols, posted a rather stirring rant on the Death of Expertise in which he laments the "democratization of knowledge". 

But democracy, as I wrote in an essay about C.S. Lewis and the Snowden affair, denotes a system of government, not an actual state of equality. Having equal rights does not mean having equal talents, equal abilities, or equal knowledge. It means, instead, that we enjoy equal rights versus the government, and in relation to each other.

It assuredly does not mean that “everyone’s opinion about anything is as good as anyone else’s,” because no one really lives that way.

He then proceeds to give various examples that are generally true i.e. surgeons, mechanics, etc.  I mean, who would you rather have performing your brain surgery?  Your mechanic or a highly trained neuro-surgeon with years of experience?