There have been a plethora of studies done on what motivates young men to join the ranks of the Mujahedeen seeking jihad. From algorithmic studies on connectivity, political analysis to psycho-social evaluations of individuals and groups. What motivates someone to join an organization? To become a "terrorist"? Why is al Qaedism continuing to spread throughout the Middle East and further abroad? Should we even call it "Qaedism" as similar movements existed in Indonesia and the Philippines and many more places in between?
The fact of the matter is, this is not a strictly militant movement nor simply a religious idea as much as it is a socio-political movement. The reason that it spreads is consistent with many other movements throughout history including Islam's own history, Christianity, Buddhism, Communism, Fascism, Republicanism, etc. A brief review of basic sociologic concepts will show the long list of things inherent in a society that leads towards disaffection of individuals and whole groups of peoples to existing social, religious and political systems.
Disenfranchisement is commonly spoken of and is further broken down to familial, social, economic and political. Few mention the disenfranchisement from religion itself and the moral boundaries that it is supposed to set, forming one of the historical pillars of the social compact. Indeed, this is one of the chief complaints emanating from the ideological mavens of this current movement, that the system of morality, Islam, is under attack, culturally, socially, politically and physically by the encroachment of western mores, damaging the alleged cohesion of the greater Islamic Ummah. A grand myth of a one billion people social compact held together by faith alone.
Without fail, this over simplified idea of what holds a community together, how many greater and smaller social compacts exist, within many cultures and intertwine throughout the Ummah, is ignored or dismissed deliberately. It re-enforces the idea that all of the other reasons that may cause disenfranchisement are not the causes at all, but individuals and entire societies have been separated from this greater compact. It's a direct appeal to the basic human drive to belong to and be part of something greater than self. A common trait amongst all social movements, to attempt to bridge every divide or dismiss all other social structures.
Observing the discourse of Jihad on social media, specifically Twitter, has provided an interesting view of the many and varied supporters and active members of the Islamic Mujahedeen participating in the Syrian conflict. The levels of interaction, support and actual participation breakdown along many lines on social media. This interaction is generally viewed negatively by researchers and security analysts because of it's ability to reach people who might otherwise have had limited access to these networks.
The largest concern being the inculcation of radical ideas and the potential that "lone wolves" or cells may form to perform terrorist attacks on the West. The advent of the Syrian war itself and the many foreign fighters it has drawn in, that may also return to perform such attacks, also gives rise to security concerns.
In general, it appears that we have limited penetration into these social media networks although we can certainly observe them and the unending amount of information that it provides. Forums, the original and favorite places on the internet for these discourses have long been monitored, at times penetrated either for interaction, intelligence gathering or interruption. The latter two being the most predominant as establishing any identity or challenging ideas is made difficult by the constant monitoring of the forums by moderators, that the individuals are more cautious, aware of this monitoring and the moderators themselves can and do quickly shut down any line of conversation deemed dangerous.
However, social media like Facebook and Twitter are more prolific and less easy to monitor or moderate. While this proves problematic for the intelligence agencies and national security, it is also very problematic for the once capable militant Islamic moderators. Information about battles, people, places, types of weapons, materials and money flow as freely as any ideas are traded. Equally important are the types of interactions that occur and the fact that anyone and everyone can participate.
Where a moderator may have once been able to close a topic of discussion, restrict information or expel outsiders, the new media must be monitored by the individual account holders. The preferred method for developing a social media presence is to obtain as many followers as possible. Thus, either through sheer numbers that prevent good self monitoring or social calculation where one dissenting view out of five hundred accounts is an acceptable risk, dissenting views or followers may remain and those dissenting views range from mild to outright hostile.
As noted above, studies are underway to develop models of connectivity, to look for those who might form the hubs of this network and possibly interrupt the activities that range from moral boosting, proselytizing this new militant puritanism to recruiting to fund raising and beyond. These studies hope to evaluate the influence of individuals across their network and on nominal outsiders, but what may not be being studied is the reverse: the influence of outsiders on the network.
"Outsiders" is not a reference to agency infiltrators who may specifically be inserted into the network to disrupt that influence, but to those who are interested in the activities or who may directly oppose those activities. The Syria conflict again provides an interesting view of both of these types of outsiders on the established networks. It has also provided a view into the organizations themselves, with discussions occurring outside of any control. In short, Jihad Free Speech.
This is an interesting phenomena that the ideology of "Qaedism" has spawned unintentionally
and has increased dramatically with the proliferation of social media networks. As discussed here, "Qaedism" ideology, Militant Puritan Islam, is a militant "liberation" theology. Even though it espouses the idea that it is defending traditional Islam and the Ummah, it's actions and explicit ideology rejects the old orders of the faith built over many centuries.
For instance, who may issue a fatwa or judgment? Who may declare jihad and under what conditions? Who may go to jihad and do they need to seek permission from their parents or leaders? Do they need to obey their leaders? Can they question their leaders or offer council outside of any traditional lines or shuras (councils)?
The current militant puritan Islamic ideology has broken almost every traditional, established and acknowledged rule even as they attempt to establish a mirror to these traditions within their own groups. Lesser known scholars, imams and judges have issued fatwas (religious rulings) that support the ideologies ideas and, in some cases, men with little or no religious training or credentials.. They've used a variety of platforms to proliferate these rulings and judgments outside of what was once a very legalistic and defined system. Whenever these may be challenged by traditional or more highly respected scholars, clerics and judges, they routinely choose to ignore those rulings, refute them with more of their own or outright deny them legitimacy because they consider the source to be "corrupt" as they are working for or under the influence of "corrupt" states and leaders.
By that reasoning they have proceeded to deny all other traditions or laws, traditions and laws that were based on years of jurisprudence and scholarly enterprise, asserting other traditions and laws to primacy that had previously been restricted in use and acceptance. Most traditional views insist that leadership cannot be overthrown accept under very specific reasons where that leadership may harm Islam or the Ummah. Designating almost every leader of the Islamic nations as "corrupt", they insist it's their right to overthrow that leadership.
Where once it was asserted that those seeking jihad had to ask parental permission, the ideology insists that the duty for jihad comes first and that it's incumbent for every able bodies male Muslim to answer the call, even if it's not by a recognized leader. Going so far as to suggest that young men seeking jihad should not even let familial concerns, tribal, community or state leadership hinder participation, breaking every traditional community relationship.
The list goes on and this break has been furthered by the advent of the internet where Muslims who would have once referred their questions or sought council from their local Imam's or community leaders, now can go online to many sources to ask questions and receive answers. Where they may have relied on their immediate community for social acceptance and guidance, they may find this community anywhere on the internet, including social media networks.
What is more interesting is that these networks allow them to discuss issues amongst themselves that might other wise have been taboo in their families or communities. Current studies focus on the proliferation of the Qaedist ideology and violent extremism while ignoring in some ways the phenomena of "free speech", one of the many taboos within most Islamic societies, and the possibility of moderating effect.
Where moderators in the forums shut questions down, on social networking sites, the questions and concerns can go on and on, moving from one account to the next. One issue noted here, was the question of suicide bombings or "martyrdom attacks" where it was questioned whether this was really an acceptable method of attack against a fellow mujahedeen and, since it was not against an actual enemy of Islam, but in regards to an internal dispute, did that negate the designation of "martyr" and any concomitant rewards?
Another discussion rose up over the use of "takfir", designating another Muslim an apostate, also once considered only ascribable by a select few judges and rarely used. In this discussion the accusation that one group, ISIS, had proclaimed others "takfir" was roundly debated, with many insisting that ISIS had never "made takfir" on anyone. Which was then refuted when Abu Bakr released a statement that, indeed, did proclaim all of those not part of the recognized Islamist organizations and mujahedeen, "takfiri".
Another round of arguments ensued over the right and wrong, the why, the who and the how that this was declared. This included the insertion of some secular rebel elements or supporters to the argument, not just the jihad cadre and supporters. In some cases, those who generally supported ISIS acquiesced that it might have been wrong for that declaration to have been made, a few became entrenched in their views that ISIS was correct to name them "takfiri" while many outside participants who had only participated on the margins seemed to go away dissatisfied, confused and somewhat disturbed, if not a little disillusioned, by this entire event.
This occurred again when the discussion over ISIS crimes drew recriminations and accusations from all sides, each blaming the other for committing different crimes, in some ways attempting to abrogate the guilt, suggesting others were just as bad or that it was war and terrible things happened. Several times, members of the discussion attempted to moderate or shut the discussion down, but it went on for some time. Again, the secular rebel supporters joined in, but the most interesting discussions occurred among the jihad cadre and those nominal supporters far away in other countries. And, again, some of the nominal supporters expressed dissatisfaction and mild disturbance.
To comprehend the importance of these discussions, the advent of "Jihad Free Speech", we must also understand the reason why jihad and the idea of mujahedeen is attractive to many. It's portrayed as a noble, if not knightly and chivalrous idea, surrounded in mytho-historical mystique. Pictures are routinely circulated of groups of men or individuals posing with a banner and their weapons or at times holding the index finger of their right hand aloft signifying the Tawhid, or oneness of God and implying the unity of all Muslims.
While the advent of social media may seem to spread this idea and mystique, it also serves to break it as the activities and behaviors are openly debated. Questions that outsiders may have had in the past that they could not discuss or could only get answers through closed forums, reading online literature that did not provide feed back or watching a video, even when they could leave questions and get answers, sometimes waiting days, are now answered immediately. More importantly, they are not just answered by a single source or a few veteran practitioners, but everybody and anybody with a multitude of experience and answers, even highly dissenting views.
This may not be the case on all social media, but Twitter, largely open to all comers, even people who don't have to "follow" to answer, is the ultimate purveyor of this free speech. This explains one of the reasons why the core leadership of the Jihad groups have repeatedly called for these conversations to go back into the highly moderated forums. Not only to protect information that might be useful to intelligence, but also to protect their image and the ideology.
Because, even as they "liberate" Islam from it's traditional structures, they try to define it and limit the expansion of this "liberation" to within their own limited structures. Yet, through their very acts and the use of liberating technology, have opened their ideas up to continuous debate. While this may remain on some peripheral parts of the network, the effects difficult to monitor and the virulent spread of these networks a paramount concern, this phenomena should not be ignored.
Often, the most moderating force on an ideology and society are the people within that society that the ideology purports to represent. The second most moderating force are those who are outside that choose to interact with it and counter the ideology.
The fact of the matter is, this is not a strictly militant movement nor simply a religious idea as much as it is a socio-political movement. The reason that it spreads is consistent with many other movements throughout history including Islam's own history, Christianity, Buddhism, Communism, Fascism, Republicanism, etc. A brief review of basic sociologic concepts will show the long list of things inherent in a society that leads towards disaffection of individuals and whole groups of peoples to existing social, religious and political systems.
Disenfranchisement is commonly spoken of and is further broken down to familial, social, economic and political. Few mention the disenfranchisement from religion itself and the moral boundaries that it is supposed to set, forming one of the historical pillars of the social compact. Indeed, this is one of the chief complaints emanating from the ideological mavens of this current movement, that the system of morality, Islam, is under attack, culturally, socially, politically and physically by the encroachment of western mores, damaging the alleged cohesion of the greater Islamic Ummah. A grand myth of a one billion people social compact held together by faith alone.
Without fail, this over simplified idea of what holds a community together, how many greater and smaller social compacts exist, within many cultures and intertwine throughout the Ummah, is ignored or dismissed deliberately. It re-enforces the idea that all of the other reasons that may cause disenfranchisement are not the causes at all, but individuals and entire societies have been separated from this greater compact. It's a direct appeal to the basic human drive to belong to and be part of something greater than self. A common trait amongst all social movements, to attempt to bridge every divide or dismiss all other social structures.
Observing the discourse of Jihad on social media, specifically Twitter, has provided an interesting view of the many and varied supporters and active members of the Islamic Mujahedeen participating in the Syrian conflict. The levels of interaction, support and actual participation breakdown along many lines on social media. This interaction is generally viewed negatively by researchers and security analysts because of it's ability to reach people who might otherwise have had limited access to these networks.
The largest concern being the inculcation of radical ideas and the potential that "lone wolves" or cells may form to perform terrorist attacks on the West. The advent of the Syrian war itself and the many foreign fighters it has drawn in, that may also return to perform such attacks, also gives rise to security concerns.
In general, it appears that we have limited penetration into these social media networks although we can certainly observe them and the unending amount of information that it provides. Forums, the original and favorite places on the internet for these discourses have long been monitored, at times penetrated either for interaction, intelligence gathering or interruption. The latter two being the most predominant as establishing any identity or challenging ideas is made difficult by the constant monitoring of the forums by moderators, that the individuals are more cautious, aware of this monitoring and the moderators themselves can and do quickly shut down any line of conversation deemed dangerous.
However, social media like Facebook and Twitter are more prolific and less easy to monitor or moderate. While this proves problematic for the intelligence agencies and national security, it is also very problematic for the once capable militant Islamic moderators. Information about battles, people, places, types of weapons, materials and money flow as freely as any ideas are traded. Equally important are the types of interactions that occur and the fact that anyone and everyone can participate.
Where a moderator may have once been able to close a topic of discussion, restrict information or expel outsiders, the new media must be monitored by the individual account holders. The preferred method for developing a social media presence is to obtain as many followers as possible. Thus, either through sheer numbers that prevent good self monitoring or social calculation where one dissenting view out of five hundred accounts is an acceptable risk, dissenting views or followers may remain and those dissenting views range from mild to outright hostile.
As noted above, studies are underway to develop models of connectivity, to look for those who might form the hubs of this network and possibly interrupt the activities that range from moral boosting, proselytizing this new militant puritanism to recruiting to fund raising and beyond. These studies hope to evaluate the influence of individuals across their network and on nominal outsiders, but what may not be being studied is the reverse: the influence of outsiders on the network.
"Outsiders" is not a reference to agency infiltrators who may specifically be inserted into the network to disrupt that influence, but to those who are interested in the activities or who may directly oppose those activities. The Syria conflict again provides an interesting view of both of these types of outsiders on the established networks. It has also provided a view into the organizations themselves, with discussions occurring outside of any control. In short, Jihad Free Speech.
This is an interesting phenomena that the ideology of "Qaedism" has spawned unintentionally
and has increased dramatically with the proliferation of social media networks. As discussed here, "Qaedism" ideology, Militant Puritan Islam, is a militant "liberation" theology. Even though it espouses the idea that it is defending traditional Islam and the Ummah, it's actions and explicit ideology rejects the old orders of the faith built over many centuries.
For instance, who may issue a fatwa or judgment? Who may declare jihad and under what conditions? Who may go to jihad and do they need to seek permission from their parents or leaders? Do they need to obey their leaders? Can they question their leaders or offer council outside of any traditional lines or shuras (councils)?
The current militant puritan Islamic ideology has broken almost every traditional, established and acknowledged rule even as they attempt to establish a mirror to these traditions within their own groups. Lesser known scholars, imams and judges have issued fatwas (religious rulings) that support the ideologies ideas and, in some cases, men with little or no religious training or credentials.. They've used a variety of platforms to proliferate these rulings and judgments outside of what was once a very legalistic and defined system. Whenever these may be challenged by traditional or more highly respected scholars, clerics and judges, they routinely choose to ignore those rulings, refute them with more of their own or outright deny them legitimacy because they consider the source to be "corrupt" as they are working for or under the influence of "corrupt" states and leaders.
By that reasoning they have proceeded to deny all other traditions or laws, traditions and laws that were based on years of jurisprudence and scholarly enterprise, asserting other traditions and laws to primacy that had previously been restricted in use and acceptance. Most traditional views insist that leadership cannot be overthrown accept under very specific reasons where that leadership may harm Islam or the Ummah. Designating almost every leader of the Islamic nations as "corrupt", they insist it's their right to overthrow that leadership.
Where once it was asserted that those seeking jihad had to ask parental permission, the ideology insists that the duty for jihad comes first and that it's incumbent for every able bodies male Muslim to answer the call, even if it's not by a recognized leader. Going so far as to suggest that young men seeking jihad should not even let familial concerns, tribal, community or state leadership hinder participation, breaking every traditional community relationship.
The list goes on and this break has been furthered by the advent of the internet where Muslims who would have once referred their questions or sought council from their local Imam's or community leaders, now can go online to many sources to ask questions and receive answers. Where they may have relied on their immediate community for social acceptance and guidance, they may find this community anywhere on the internet, including social media networks.
What is more interesting is that these networks allow them to discuss issues amongst themselves that might other wise have been taboo in their families or communities. Current studies focus on the proliferation of the Qaedist ideology and violent extremism while ignoring in some ways the phenomena of "free speech", one of the many taboos within most Islamic societies, and the possibility of moderating effect.
Where moderators in the forums shut questions down, on social networking sites, the questions and concerns can go on and on, moving from one account to the next. One issue noted here, was the question of suicide bombings or "martyrdom attacks" where it was questioned whether this was really an acceptable method of attack against a fellow mujahedeen and, since it was not against an actual enemy of Islam, but in regards to an internal dispute, did that negate the designation of "martyr" and any concomitant rewards?
Another discussion rose up over the use of "takfir", designating another Muslim an apostate, also once considered only ascribable by a select few judges and rarely used. In this discussion the accusation that one group, ISIS, had proclaimed others "takfir" was roundly debated, with many insisting that ISIS had never "made takfir" on anyone. Which was then refuted when Abu Bakr released a statement that, indeed, did proclaim all of those not part of the recognized Islamist organizations and mujahedeen, "takfiri".
Another round of arguments ensued over the right and wrong, the why, the who and the how that this was declared. This included the insertion of some secular rebel elements or supporters to the argument, not just the jihad cadre and supporters. In some cases, those who generally supported ISIS acquiesced that it might have been wrong for that declaration to have been made, a few became entrenched in their views that ISIS was correct to name them "takfiri" while many outside participants who had only participated on the margins seemed to go away dissatisfied, confused and somewhat disturbed, if not a little disillusioned, by this entire event.
This occurred again when the discussion over ISIS crimes drew recriminations and accusations from all sides, each blaming the other for committing different crimes, in some ways attempting to abrogate the guilt, suggesting others were just as bad or that it was war and terrible things happened. Several times, members of the discussion attempted to moderate or shut the discussion down, but it went on for some time. Again, the secular rebel supporters joined in, but the most interesting discussions occurred among the jihad cadre and those nominal supporters far away in other countries. And, again, some of the nominal supporters expressed dissatisfaction and mild disturbance.
To comprehend the importance of these discussions, the advent of "Jihad Free Speech", we must also understand the reason why jihad and the idea of mujahedeen is attractive to many. It's portrayed as a noble, if not knightly and chivalrous idea, surrounded in mytho-historical mystique. Pictures are routinely circulated of groups of men or individuals posing with a banner and their weapons or at times holding the index finger of their right hand aloft signifying the Tawhid, or oneness of God and implying the unity of all Muslims.
While the advent of social media may seem to spread this idea and mystique, it also serves to break it as the activities and behaviors are openly debated. Questions that outsiders may have had in the past that they could not discuss or could only get answers through closed forums, reading online literature that did not provide feed back or watching a video, even when they could leave questions and get answers, sometimes waiting days, are now answered immediately. More importantly, they are not just answered by a single source or a few veteran practitioners, but everybody and anybody with a multitude of experience and answers, even highly dissenting views.
This may not be the case on all social media, but Twitter, largely open to all comers, even people who don't have to "follow" to answer, is the ultimate purveyor of this free speech. This explains one of the reasons why the core leadership of the Jihad groups have repeatedly called for these conversations to go back into the highly moderated forums. Not only to protect information that might be useful to intelligence, but also to protect their image and the ideology.
Because, even as they "liberate" Islam from it's traditional structures, they try to define it and limit the expansion of this "liberation" to within their own limited structures. Yet, through their very acts and the use of liberating technology, have opened their ideas up to continuous debate. While this may remain on some peripheral parts of the network, the effects difficult to monitor and the virulent spread of these networks a paramount concern, this phenomena should not be ignored.
Often, the most moderating force on an ideology and society are the people within that society that the ideology purports to represent. The second most moderating force are those who are outside that choose to interact with it and counter the ideology.
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