Beyond Socrates' Knee: July 2013

George Salib® (@G4S90) tweeted at 9:05 PM on Sun, Jul 07, 2013: ‏فض اعتصام أنصار #مرسي عند الحرس الجمهوري وإطلاق قنابل غاز #صلاح_سالم http://t.co/7cmO16jjDQ‎ (https://twitter.com/G4S90/status/354058686605443073) Get the official Twitter app at https://twitter.com/download

Still shot, Dawn Rabaa al Adeway, from Video "Storming Republican Guard"

Ana Mubasher (@Ana_Mubasher) tweeted at 9:12 PM on Sun, Jul 07, 2013: ‏#RepublicanGuard RT ‎@G4S90: فض إعتصام #الحرس_الجمهوري في #صلاح_سالم الآن تصوير: نهى أسعد http://t.co/dKSDnU6gaw‎ (https://twitter.com/Ana_Mubasher/status/354060405527687169) Get the official Twitter app at https://twitter.com/download

Field Hospital, Rabaa after event

Ana Mubasher (@Ana_Mubasher) tweeted at 0:18 AM on Mon, Jul 08, 2013: Another #LIVE From The Filed Hospital http://t.co/fs9VdnVX2i 4shabab TV #Rabaa http://t.co/npmjFEIslc (https://twitter.com/Ana_Mubasher/status/354107271103524865) Get the official Twitter app at https://twitter.com/download

Live streaming prayers from Rabaa

Ana Mubasher (@Ana_Mubasher) tweeted at 0:06 PM on Tue, Jul 09, 2013: #LIVE from #Rabaa Sit In Praying Maghrib http://t.co/ENoELnAV7Q #Egypt http://t.co/ncu1PPytbR (https://twitter.com/Ana_Mubasher/status/354647682708549632) Get the official Twitter app at https://twitter.com/download

Storming the Egyptian Republican Guard 2

After the Shooting In Cairo : The New Yorker

Storming the Egyptian Republican Guard

Watch "بداية مجزرة الحرس الجمهوري - الجيش يهدم سور المعتصمين لفض الإعتصام " on YouTube

Sunday, July 7, 2013

What I Discovered in 2011 About US Foreign Policy

Bipartisan cluelessness on Egypt - CNN

Saturday, July 6, 2013

Egypt Explained in Eight Minutes

Watch "Egypt....Explained!" on YouTube

Thursday, July 4, 2013

On Revolutions, Democracy and the Rule of Law: How Egypt Gets It Right

Reading this article by Noah Feldman, "Democracy Loses in Egypt and Beyond", I was struck by the tone. Mr. Feldman suggested that the greatest fear of the founding fathers of the United States was the disintegration of this new-old form of government, democracy, into "mob rule". Such as seems to exist in Egypt. Mob rule in a nascent democracy that is being carefully analyzed and picked apart by pundits and watchers in long established, western democracies.

There is amongst all this discussion a central theme, that democracy is largely about the rule of law shepharding in a peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box, representing "the voice of the people". The founding fathers, fearing the possible and continued instability post revolution, recalling their own frustrations with the monarchist British government, put in place a system of government that was supposed to be "responsive" and "representative". That, yes, the people could change through specific processes, from the ballot box through judicial proceedings, including and up to the removal of the leader, the president, through impeachment.

In essence, the founders of the United States recognized that government, even government "of, for and by the people", could create much frustration amongst "the mob". They designed a system of "legal" processes to vent steam and relieve pressure from the polity in order to prevent the nation from imploding into anarchy and insure the government remained "responsive" to the people. A wise decision that helped weather many storms, but did not prevent civil war or the many spasms that came after. Because, of course, some issues became too overwhelming for this ventilation system and had the pot boiling over a time or two.

The problems with all this discussion of the "rule of law" and "democracy" vis-a-vis Egypt and it's aborted government are many. More so when such writers as Mr. Feldman try to frame it within the context of United States democracy while brushing over important aspects of that system and it's history in order to make his point.

The first of which is that "democracy" and "the rule of law" are not only about elections. The rule of law includes these other important mechanisms for addressing the acts of government and leadership after those elections. It's the "in between" procedures that give it strength, not the movement from ballot box to ballot box.

Ideas such as "representative government" that includes elections to bi-carmel houses, elected from the people, who are the direct voices "of the people". Representatives that, by law and procedure, are supposed to provide a "check" and "balance" against the potential abuse of the executive power. All of it established by law in the constitution. The constitution spelling out the limits of goverment, not limits on the people.

Therein lay the problem in Egypt. Yes, Mr. Morsi was elected as president, but the new Egyptian constitution put more checks on the people in Egypt than the government. The elected parliament was dissolved and instead of calling for new elections so the people would have their voices heard, Mr. Morsi and his cabinet seemed determined to rule without it. In fact, having made one of those mistakes Mr. Feldman brushes over: making a constitutional declaration giving himself the powers of parliament. Allegedly until a new parliament was seated under new electoral laws.

These electoral laws were being delayed by the judiciary, but that was entirely due to Mr. Morsi's administration and his political allies who were attempting to gerrymander the system to ensure their electoral domination. The people, represented by the judicial branch dissolving parliament, objected to this gerrymandering.

In a long established democracy like the United States, we are familiar with "gerrymandering" districts for seats in congress. Due to our electoral and long established legal processes, these attempts are largely mitigated year over year between the two dominant parties. None can truly dominate the government for long or drag the rest of the country, kicking and screaming, too far in any one direction. One of those pesky "rules of law" that keeps the majority rule in check.

While this "gerrymandering" attempt is a normal behavior of parties in a long established government with a derivative check from opponents, such behavior in a newly minted, democratic government, post revolution, is hardly "democracy and the rule of law". It is, as many Egyptians saw it, the use of law to subvert democracy and institute a government by only part of the people who would then easily write laws and develop government on their ideas alone, without real opposition, checks or a care in the world what the other half of Egypt wanted from government.

Mr. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood used these same tactics to stack the constitutional committee with their own people or allies, not equal representatives from across the political spectrum as the founders of the United States experienced. Then they proceeded to write a constitution that, as noted even by Mr. Feldman, was a twisted and tortured horror of mangled laws that, as noted above, did more to put checks on the people and their agencies than on the government. A government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and it's "Islamic Project". A government without any real representation for the rest of the people, with a process for objecting to the laws that was only paper without seated representatives.

A government in Egypt without that last, final check we so cherish, though rarely use: the ability to remove the executive for abuse of power or breaking the law without waiting for the next election. A check Mr. Morsi had removed by fiat of a "constitutional declaration", declaring himself unremovable until the next election together with giving himself the power of the parliament to pass laws. An election the Muslim Brotherhood had every intention of dominating through both the "rule of law" (gerrymandering) and the ballot box.

There were many other instances where Mr. Morsi and his cohorts attempted to use the rule of law, not to bolster a truly representative democracy, but to do as they had learned from the preceding regime: to dominate the government, disenfranchise their opposition and further entrench their hold on government through increasingly stringent "rules of law". An act that we in the United States would rightly identify as a threat to our democracy and refuse it.

In fact, we object to this kind of psuedo-democracy frequently and fervently, rightly pointing out such regimes in China, Iran and Russia. Governments who have a democratic facade of elections, where government is not "for, of and by the people", but is government by "Rule of Law". Wherein, by "rule of law", individuals or a small cadre of chosen elite seem to rule in perpetuity because they are the only game in town on election day or because they use the "rule of law" to de-legitimize their opponents. By "rule of law".

This is the problem with the fetishizing of "the rule of law" in a democracy as opposed to emphasizing the important aspect of democracy: demo - the people. The "rule of law" means nothing if it is not supported by the people, responsive to the needs of the people or protects them from the abuses of power inherent in any centralized system of government regardless of who sits at the helm or how they arrived there.

While Mr. Feldman points out all this love for the rule of law and fear of "mob rule" by the founding fathers of the United States, he also misses another extremely important aspect. The reason these same gentlemen are referred to as "the founding fathers" is because they rebelled. Not against anarchy or the lack of laws, but expressly against "the rule of law" as it existed in 1776. The rule of law that afforded them no representation, diminished their rights as citizens and saw them hunted and imprisoned for voicing their objections. Reasons for this rebellion can be found here and it begins with:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident...endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights..."

And includes such validations as:

"That to secure these rights, government is instituted among Men, deriving their just powers by consent of the governed..."

But, then, a warning to those who would govern, that having established government and "the rule of law", it does not insulate them from the rule of the people:

"That, whenever Any Form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it..."

Please note the words "Any Form", capitalized and emphasized. A warning even to themselves as they flirted with establishing democracy. Meaning, not even the government they sought to establish, or one they had held long allegiance to, was safe from the people. Apparently, an idea that Mr. Feldman et al have missed in their rush to defend the Egyptian, democratically elected president, Mr. Morsi.

Now the warning, to both the people (the mob rule Mr. Feldman suggested was a terrible fear of the founders) and, again, to those seeking to hold the reins of power:

"Prudence, indeed, suggests that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; ...that Mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long line of usurpations and abuses pursuing invariably the same Objective evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right and their Duty to throw off such government and provide New Guards for their future security."

Thereafter, the founders saw fit to list out the "rules of law" which they felt had been particularly oppressive and abused. Mr. Feldman and the others emphasizing "the rule of law" in democracy, always seem to skip over this important part of the founding of this democracy. That, prior to the "rule of law" and democracy established by the constitution was this Declaration of Independence. Rebellion. rejection of the existing "rule of law". Mob rule. The fear of which did not cause the the founders to establish a "rule of law" to contain "the mob", but to insure they had adequate recourse to change their government without constantly resorting to rebellion.

An idea that apparently did not wind it's way across the ocean in Egypt or sink in to the Brother's minds during all those hours of electoral study at American universities and civil society NGOs. An idea that was clearly missing and had Mr. Morsi, following Mr. Feldman's train of thought on democracy and the rule of law, repeating over and over again:

Legitimacy! Legitimacy! Legitimacy!

There is no "legitimacy", no "rule of law" in any government, not even a democracy, unless a majority of the people believe it, support it and it is responsive to their will. That is the truth about democracy. As one of my Egyptian acquaintances assured me while we were discussing the question of "What comes next in Egypt?", it doesn't matter. The people of Egypt have spoken and the next government will know to fear the people. I wished him, sincerely, luck and the hand of Providence in that endeavor, but on further reflection believe he may be right.

Some as Mr. Feldman repeat this idea about the "rule of law" and "democracy" because they fear continuing chaos in the Middle East may spread to other parts of the world and greatly harm the stability that allows for the great commerce and relative peace between other nations globally. Still, as many of these same people work within the United States' government or make their living by and under it's aegis of "rule of law", there is something subconscious afoot. Having stared into the abyss that is Egypt post it's first "democratic election", they must experience a little fear of their own. That there, but for the grace of God, go I.

This is a reminder to all those who seek power in a democracy. It isn't the rule of law that makes democracy work, it's the consent of the people.

As I write this, it is July 4th in the United States, Independence Day. Thinking of that tiny fear that must shake our own representatives as they look upon Egypt brings one word to mind: Good.

Monday, July 1, 2013

In Search of Principled US Foreign Policy: Take 2

Now that Egypt has done a "reset" on their revolution, it's time to revisit our (US) own problem with Foreign Policy. Namely, the rise of "realpolitik" as the guiding principle for foreign policy and the subjugation of United States values to this ramshackle, dubiously short sighted approach.

I wrote "In Search of Principled Foreign Policy" in 2011 at the height of the Arab Spring after reading a New Yorker article titled "How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy". I said at the time, the article should have been called:

"How Events Make You Spin On Your Head and Do Incomprehensible and Contradictory Things When You Lack Principled Policies"

In the article, President Obama states that he would have no "blanket policies" for dealing with states, particularly in the Middle East. Instead, he would assess the situations as they arose and react accordingly. This is "realpolitik" writ large and is, in fact, a "blanket policy", ie to have no policy at all, but to deal with events as they arise.

"Realpolitik" is not a principle. It is a reactionary behavior that is sometimes necessary when dealing with nations and events. To have that in the primary and overt role of US foreign policy means that the US is ALWAYS reacting to events instead of setting the tone and reaching for a satisfactory goal.

It doesn't matter what forum or agency or organization, when having to react on the fly, mistakes will constantly be made over and over again. In today's world of constant fluctuating events, it means that the US is constantly caught off guard and reeling without a firm foundation to stand on or guide it's policies. It not only makes the US appear weak to it's enemies and allies alike, it also leaves an untold number of people in definitely unfree places looking to the light of that free "city on the hill" and wondering if the lights have gone out for good. Thinking that the United States has abandoned them and is, in fact, no better than any of the other nations trying to protect their interests at the expense of those masses "yearning to be free".

The case of Egypt is an excellent point. At the height of the Arab Spring, President Obama congratulated the people of Egypt for their fight for "self determination". I wondered in that moment why we were using that language. "Self Determination" left the door wide open for all sorts of government to be established including another dictatorship disguised as an unhealthy "democracy" under the guise of any ideology that was not "free" and inclusive, regardless of whether it was voted in. As John Stuart Mills called it, "the tyranny of the majority".

Later, the word "Democracy" was introduced, but it remained alone without it's necessary guiding principle of "freedom". The reason was clear. The United States had looked into the roiling masses and determined two things: first, that the Egyptian military would remain the power broker in Egypt and second, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most organized and politically ready organization, would likely win any on coming elections.

These were not wrong assumptions at that time. Demographics and polling in Egypt indicated that the Brotherhood did enjoy broad support. The military was and is the most stable and powerful organization in Egypt and it had no intention of being subjugated to the "reactionary" masses in a democracy.

What the United States saw on the other side of the political landscape included, indeed, reactionary, disorganized and disparate groups whose political ideologies spanned the political landscape. None of whom presented a viable platform for running a political campaign, much less governing a state.

Instead of political platforms, the "Revolutionary Youth" dispensed a 26 point list of demands, most focused on prosecuting the old regime. Intent on regaining Egypt's glory, there were calls to destroy the Camp David Accords, march to Palestine and rip open the borders to Gaza. Economic plans echoed the ultra-socialist programs of South America including nationalizing untold numbers of privately owned enterprises, prosecution of any who had purchased previous state enterprises and even increasing the Suez Canal transport fees by ten times their current rate. All allegedly to make Egypt a utopian "self sustaining" state when it had neither the raw resources or industrial infrastructure to do so. Policies that would take Egypt to the brink of war and quickly have it listing on the bottom of failed states. Or, at least, a listing, almost failed welfare state whose bank would be the economically fraught US and western allies. Not an option.

The Muslim Brotherhood, politically poised to take the helm, was obviously the entity the United States would have to work with in the coming years. They were not selected by the United States, but by popular elections. In that election, they became the default partners of the United States.

In the run up to the elections, US envoys met with the Muslim Brotherhood several times and the Brotherhood took advantage of US NGO's to help refine their political address. Of course, US envoys met with the opposition numerous times, but there were over 20 competing parties and not all of them were received as often as the Brotherhood. While many attended meetings and met with civil society NGOs, they were just getting started, while the Brotherhood with it's organized groups was able to take full advantage of the information and training being provided.

This led to an unchallenged rumor that the United States was supporting the MBs and assisting them to win the elections. Chosen by an outside force, not an elective democratic process. That became even worse as the Brothers challenged not only parliamentary elections and won, but the presidency and constitutional referendums. Partly by the use of pulpits in the Mosque. A technique that the opposition could not match and felt was undemocratic in a civil state. The Brotherhood insisted they did no such thing, but it was clear that their influence and that of their allies in the Mosque had paved the way.

As these events unfolded, the MB continued to consolidate their hold on government entities, the Upper Shura Council, the constitutional process and the state media among others. They used old and new laws to silence the worst of their critics, branding them as traitors to the revolution, infidels and many other unsavory insults. They were doing exactly as the previous regime had done.

Worse, they were doing it under the guise of the revolution and democracy. A revolution who brought them to power with the idea that surely, having faced similar persecution and inequality, the Muslim Brothers would not do the same.

The United States, for it's part, remained relatively silent except for those occasional utterances about self determination. There were attempts to slow the process and give the opposition time to form parties, competing effectively in elections and creating a balance against the Brotherhood. Then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, had advised that elections be put off for a year. Neither the Brotherhood, SCAF nor some of the opposition parties were interested in this slowing process. Their needs had coalesced. The Brothers knew they would have the upper hand in quick elections. SCAF wanted a civilian face on the government and a number of the reactionary revolutionaries were on fire to depose the remnants of the former regime. They wanted democracy and they wanted it now.

There are things to be said about the lack of real understanding regarding political processes, polls and demographics by various political entities in Egypt. There is even more that could be said about the differences between "freedom", "democracy" and "the rule of law". Ideas that the opposition had not fully digested.

Many at the time expressed the idea that democracy, the ability to choose their leaders at the ballot box, was equal to freedom. It never was or will be. It was a hard lesson for the opposition who were quickly shunted aside by the Brotherhood.
A lesson they may still not yet understand or be able to fully articulate to the masses as they perform yet another popular, leaderless revolt without expressing any defining ideas beyond rejection of the Brothers and their Islamic project. A lesson they ignore as they run full tilt at confrontation with the other half of Egypt under the same misconception of the Muslim Brotherhood and their earlier misconception in 2011: that some how numbers in the streets equals a clear majority that can reject or subjugate this other alleged minority.

Having listed but a few of these events, it is important to note what exactly was missing from the United States' rhetoric. The word "freedom" and any of it's corresponding ideas about rights, the dangers of democracy without them and a real emphasis on the social compact necessary for real, inclusive and successful democracy. Instead, we emphasized "self determination"; a "realpolitik" identification of what the United States expected would occur with the Muslim Brotherhood at the helm and the military at it's back door.

The issue here is not that "realpolitik" has no place in foreign policy, but that it's overt practice and iteration, as opposed to closed door evaluation, is a danger in it's self. In fact, publicly abdicating the United States role as the leader and arbiter of these very ideas that are in demand in the Middle East: Freedom and Democracy.

This missing language and support for freedom, this overt "realpolitik" was not missed by those revolutionaries who indeed believed in the western ideas of freedom. The continued silence over the Brotherhood's continued consolidation of power and acts that were expressly anti-freedom, not only as we would read them, but the other half of the non-Islamist Egyptians as well, led those revolutionaries to believe they had been abandoned without even the illusion of a lifeline. Worse, it seemed to explicitly imply that the Brother's Islamic Project and their lack of true consensus from the other half of Egypt had tacit approval of the United States. There were few words, if any, publicly or privately that held even a moderating hint of these principles.

There are limits, of course, to the influence of the United States, even in nations where extensive aid is provided. Recognizing those limits is "realpolitik". Being far sighted enough to recognize who will be the winners or losers in politics is "realpolitik". Establishing a working relationship with those "winners" is "realpolitik".

Voicing out loud those ideas that we call "values", freedom, democracy, rule of law, the ideas we always articulate, regardless of whom we may need to work with in any given nation, those are principles. Principles we can stand on and live by. Principles that, regardless of the "realpolitik" of having to work with various governments, are always "the beacon on the hill" for those masses living under those regimes. Masses yearning to be free. That is the story of the Arab Spring.

What might this have done in Egypt? Would the Brotherhood have moderated their behavior? Would SCAF have finally comprehended the need to include moderating ideas when meeting with the Brothers or designing their "road map"? Would this have empowered the much disparate and unorganized "liberal" opposition in developing a real political platform to contest elections? Move the dialogue forward on ideas of laws, government and freedom?

Could this current crisis in Egypt have been avoided? A crisis that may have entrenched a combative, uncooperative Muslim Brotherhood and equally combative opposition to the detriment of Egypt and the interests of the United States. Interests supposedly served by this non policy foreign policy.

Maybe. Maybe not. As I noted, there are limits to the ways in which an outside nation can influence internal politics of another nation. Usually, as in Egypt when SCAF removed President Mubarak, only when our political needs or desires align. Short of invasion or outright meddling in a nation's affairs, it is limited. That is "realpolitik".

What is most important is that, no matter what happened in Egypt or the surrounding countries, if the United States had maintained an overt foreign policy based on the principles of freedom and democracy, we would have been, and always would be, "on the right side of history".

When you are on the right side of history, you never go wrong.

But, here we are, reviled in Egypt by both sides as co-conspirators of the other. Because we did not articulate our principles clearly. Because we let "realpolitik" get in the way of establishing a real foreign policy on principles that have always allowed us to weather any storm. Principles for a world demanding freedom and democracy.

What influence will we have now as confrontation arises in Egypt and conflagration waits for the smallest spark? Hard to say. That is a dose of "realpolitik" for this administration.

On the other hand, it is not too late to find and re-affirm our principles, to adjust our foreign policy so that those principles rise to the top and "realpolitik" goes back where it belongs: in the service of freedom and democracy.

Not "self determination". Freedom and democracy.

Women Twitterati: Get Your Specialists Here

Max Abrahms (@MaxAbrahms) tweeted at 8:01 AM on Mon, Jul 01, 2013: MT @TaraMaller Help promote women in foreign policy on Twitter like @karlula: http://t.co/6fkmwevSx4 (https://twitter.com/MaxAbrahms/status/351686959619506178) Get the official Twitter app at https://twitter.com/download

Monday, July 29, 2013

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Tuesday, July 9, 2013

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Thursday, July 4, 2013

Monday, July 1, 2013