Amongst the commentariat, the slow moving game of diplomacy over Syria is painful and, yes, slow. Worse, because the commentary still insists there are only two options, to strike or do nothing, the current situation appears to be nothing more than a political morass that the US is unable to steer clear.
From the original post, Syria & Gunboat Diplomacy, it was clear that the primary goal of deploying forces was not to engage in a military campaign, but to bring the third option back to the table: negotiations. Placing five US destroyers, two carriers and a plethora of other strategic resources off shore was meant and received as the US indicating the choices were between military action and negotiating, not "doing nothing".
This gambit has proved to be successful in restarting that original demand. The US vote in congress was not completely assured to be an affirmation of the administration's authority to strike. That, however, was not a risk that the Russians were willing to take.
Despite many detractors discussing the inadvisability of the last two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, these do provide a powerful lesson on US politics vis-a-vis American wars and use of military power. Security of the United States, one of three primary roles of any US president, will always come first. No politician dare risk it or risk placing it second to any other issue.
Perceived threats have always aroused the American people to act, even if it is reluctantly. That is not only a lesson of the last two wars, but over two hundred years of history. Putin, despite his bravado, nor any of the other actors in this situation, can be unmindful of that nor of the fact that many people still do not trust Russian motives.
Syria and Assad, as allies of Iran, cannot be confused on the subject either. Regardless of the current fashion amongst some political factions of refashioning Assad as fighting terrorism, this is a new and unstable trend. A potential friend today is tomorrow's ugly dictator. This is not simply the political view in DC, but has been trending amongst the US public.
While uncomfortable to some, these factors could not be dismissed and are among several that makes this use of US military power still credible even as some view US credibility and power waning. There is something to be said about the current chaotic, unpredictable and seeming schizophrenic US policy and body politic.
The Russians, for their part, are not unresponsive mannequins. The Russian navy is slowly deploying multiple small ships to the Mediterranean, acting as a blocking force or, as some suspect, a potential evacuation force. The question on many minds is whether the US is willing to risk war with Russia over Syria?
A similar question can be asked of the Russian mind set and strategy. Is Russia willing to risk war over Syria?
For Russia, Syria represents several interests. The first being it's sole remaining military base, all be it small and run down, outside of Russia. More importantly, the only base beyond the Bosphorous Straits where the small naval force projecting "power" into the Mediterranean Sea, protecting Russia's only warm water access to the Atlantic, can rest and refuel. This is no small matter in terms of the long history of Russia to gain and maintain this access for trade and defense.
The second most important aspect is the projection of power into the Middle East. Russia has slowly lost this projection over several decades of the Cold War and the two decades thereafter. This projection has always been a lever against US and Western trade and energy resources. An ability, as Russia has seen it, to act as a potential check against future aggression or expansion of western political and economic power and interdiction to militarily necessary resources.
Vis-a-vis US and western presence and influence in the Eurasian countries as well as the 'Stans and Georgia, this has become an imperative for slowing or recovering Russia's shrinking borders and sphere of influence. This also leads to the third issue for Russia, Putin's government specifically, as much of it's current power lies in the perception of it's strength abroad, re-enforcing it's perceived strength domestically.
These interests take precedence for Russia beyond and above whether Syria survives as a state or who rules the nation or whether Assad maintains control of his chemical weapons. This is why Russia was quick to jump on the opportunity to negotiate the removal of these weapons. In essence, it is a very cheap price to pay for negotiating Russia's continued maintenance of the regime and, ultimately, Russia's presence in the Mediterranean.
The emergence of Russia as Assad's chief, public interlocutor has caused considerable consternation amongst some viewers of the ongoing diplomatic dance. With the positioning of Russian naval assets off Syria's shores and Putin's public defense of Assad's regime, many view this as an impenetrable umbrella under which Assad can survive.
This ignores the reality of the situation. Russia has been Assad's chief ally and lifeline as well as his international interlocutor for a very long time. Without Russian arms, munitions and supplies, Assad's army and his regime whithers and dies. Without Russia's political support, Assad becomes Kadafhi or Saddam: a dictator without friends who is then vulnerable to the whims of the other nation states.
Iran, Assad's second largest benefactor, provides oil, gas and fuel as well as military expertise and the assistance of it's proxy Hezbollah. However, should the Russian supply line dwindle or be withdrawn, Iran is unlikely to be able to provide sufficient military material to take up the slack. It would be logistically, monetarily and politically difficult, if not dangerous, to Iran.
The main supply route of oil, gas and fuel arrives through pipelines and land routes that are vulnerable to attack. Other material support arrives by air that is not only limited by capacity, but also by locations/airports by which it can arrive. Iran is already economically strapped and struggling to maintain it's own viability. It is also in the midst of political changes at home and attempting to begin direct talks with the United States regarding it's nuclear activities. Neither does Iran have the same international political clout as Russia and is drastically more vulnerable living under continually piling sanctions.
In fashioning Russia as an "impenetrable barrier" to Assad's survival, it certainly provides Russia with a dash of international power it has been longing to re-establish. However, this cover is hardly "impenetrable" and largely ignores Russian geopolitical behavior. Russia remains coldly and clearly focused on it's own interests. It's alliances are not made through friendship, kinship or any shared ideology. It has often and quickly removed it's support from individual leaders so long as it's main interest in the allied nation remain intact.
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kadhafi in Libya provide an example. In these two cases, Russia's interests were largely centered around the purchase of arms and munitions, one of Russia's major exports after oil and natural gas. Russia provided military assistance and materials to both nations almost up to the last moment before military intervention. It also withdrew and later returned to both countries as the primary supplier of military weapons, munitions and equipment.
While Libya was a friendly port in the Mediterranean, it was no military base, just a port in the storm. Iraq provided only a nominal projection into the Middle East and Saddam was considerably weakened by a decade of sanctions. He was also unreliable and unpredictable. In both cases, while the primary Russian interest of preserving an arms market remains, Russia lost in Libya a friendly port in the Mediterranean and in Iraq it's illusion of "projection" into the Middle East beyond Iran.
Syria represents the tri-fecta of Russian interests. After these previous though smaller losses, Syria's importance to Russia becomes paramount. Even the potential for a deep water port in Cyprus would not provide the same mechanisms as Tartaus where a very friendly alliance would allow Russian military flights into important air space amongst other privileges.
If Assad falls, whether through actual war or through negotiations, the Russians are unlikely to have the same freedom of port and air space enjoyed under Assad and his predecessor regime. Total collapse means that port becomes non-existent, negotiated end means, even if Russia retains access, a different relationship.
The recent agreement for removal of chemical weapons appears to almost completely obscure the fact that Russia has made Assad a third, if not fourth, party to his own continued existence. From this view, Russia has made it plain that it's own interests rise above Assad or the Syrian civil war.
This is actually a positive development as it means that the primary source of Assad's survival has simplified a part of the negotiations and streamlined the process. Russia knows what it wants, the United States has likely recognized those interests and will be part of future negotiations.
The date of these "peace" negotiations is already being discussed. Russia and the United States have agreed to discuss the date for Geneva 2 at the next UN meeting. A significant gain as the original date had been given up by all and discussions tabled indefinitely.
Russia, for it's part, has significant leverage with Assad to bring him to the table. Conversely, the ability of the US to bring rebels to the table is not as simple as the political and military factions of the rebellion are fragmented. US supply of weapons is less than their counterparts in Saudi Arabia. It will be necessary to assure that the Saudis are on board as well to create the necessary pressure.
The issue now becomes what Russia will accept for it's part in bringing Assad to the table and a future where Assad no longer rules Syria. Will it accept keeping a base in the Mediterranean with, all be it, slightly diminished capacity vis-a-vis Middle East projection? Will it also accept the likely retention of part of it's arms market as it is unlikely any future military in Syria will completely transition away from familiar Russian arms?
These are the questions that must be answered first before future negotiations continue. Where Russia may be satisfied, Assad's continued existence can no longer be guaranteed. That is something that should be weighing heavily on Assad's mind and any assurances from Russia that they will not abandon him should be taken with an historical grain of salt.
