Lessons From Abbottabad: Bin Laden Letters and Mao

Because the people's support of the mujahedeen is as important as the water for fish - Osama bin Laden

 In a video from 2012, Nelly Lahoud from West Points Center for Combatting Terrorism, discusses the 17 released documents captured from the Abbattobad compound upon the death of Osama Bin Laden.  It was an interesting video, though I found the speaker seemed to give a more sympathetic view of the letters and issues presented within the contents.  The letters can be found here. 

The letters did present a number of concerns.  In fact, it was interesting to read them as it suggests that Bin Laden, no longer on the front lines and having witnessed several decades of war, was beginning to think more about where the revolution was going.  The word "revolution", although unused in any of the letters or other previous documents, has never been used to my knowledge.  However, it is the most appropriate term and describes how Bin Laden thought of their efforts: to free Muslims from oppressive regimes.  That seems to be the essence of "revolution". 

Why that word was never used expressly is hard to fathom.  It may have had to do with Islamic law where Muslims are often and expressly forbidden to disobey their rulers accept in situations where the ruler is definitively harming the religion and the people's belief in that religion.  Revolution, then, is never the cause of observant Muslims, but the tradition of choosing rightly guided leaders is.  Revolution, however, is exactly what Bin Laden had called for and expressly and explicitly supported. 

As Nelly Lahoud expressed in her comments on the letters, it's clear that bin Laden was beginning to think about the movement in legalistic terms.  What is right or wrong, what acts are acceptable or not, how one should view their oaths to even a kufr (unbeliever) nation versus the call to jihad, etc.

Some of this has very practical applications in regards to maintaining support of the people which he rightly ascertains has been damaged over time by indiscriminate and unthinking continuous acts of violence against Muslims.  He was not unaware of the black eye that Al Qa'ida had received from Zarqawi and AQI's activities in Iraq nor the fact that they were blamed for killing more Muslims than kufr or Jews or any other perceived enemy.  Of course, this was not the first time that was noted, nor would it be the last, even after bin Laden's death as Zawahiri is constantly attempting to counsel the groups in the field. 

What was interesting is the language in which he expressed this concern about losing support within the Ummah (greater body of Muslim people).  Many had remarked on bin Laden and Zawahiri's previous attempts to reign in the overt mass murders that held little strategic purpose but as much bloodshed as possible.  This counseling had become louder and more persistent and continued to amplify even after bin Laden had been killed. 

Clearly, it had been making some impact on a few leaders in the field.  A letter captured from the abandoned AQIM compound in Mali indicates that their commander, Drukdel, had issued the same admonishing to his lieutenants in the Sahaal sometime in 2013.  Further, groups like Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia and Libya (to an extent) have attempted to heed his advice about shifting more towards governance, treating the people well and other seeming civic activities.  Most important, not to be harsh to the people. 

In Libya and Tunisia, we see Ansar al Sharia doing sack races and tug of war, handing out small gifts and then proceeding to indoctrinate their audience with their ideology.  The same thing is occurring in Syria in areas where ISIS and JAN control with little interruption.  ISIS is publicizing it's role in providing public services like trash pick up, running schools, running water, and even acting as traffic police. 

All of this has slowly been occurring over time, but seems to have picked up speed after Zawahiri released a statement giving the rules of conduct for mujahedeen fighting Jihad in 2013.  Based on the letters obtained from the Abbottabad compound, these seem to be rules that bin Laden had been working out between Zawahiri, Adam Gadahn and several others.  Zawahiri appears to have formalized those rules, the men clearly understanding that the puritanical Islam that they had relied on to set the ideology and guide the conduct of the fighters in the field had clearly not been sufficient. 

Most particularly when the ideologues and senior council were too far away to control the action directly and had to rely on basic communications, remaining private which allowed different leaders to act on them or not as they saw fit.  The act of keeping these private was to insure that their circumstances of leadership remained murky as well as continue to present some façade of unity amongst all the groups.  (Say no to fitnah).  In some cases, as the letters represent, bin Laden had felt it was better to maintain disassociation from al Qa'ida to protect these movements from being attacked by the US or other nations.  To, in fact, remain local.

However, it's clear from the continuing problems that leaders in the field have with implementing these directives or with Zawahiri being able to influence their acts, that this quiet method was not working.  Thus, we see Zawahiri more recently giving more and more statements and directives.  Not all of them, as is the case with ISIS and JAN/IF/Ahrar al Sham fitnah in Syria, are being accepted immediately, but that should not be construed as Zawahiri having no influence.

Some groups in Syria have attempted to follow those directives.  On the other hand, Ahrar al Sham and ISIS have both attempted to use Zawahiri's words against the other.  Thus, while it appears that both are ignoring Zawahiri to an extent, probably because they can, the fact that they are both trying to use his words against the other means that Zawahiri still holds a position of authority and influence, if not direct control. 

Regarding the Zawahiri letter outlining conduct of the Mujahadeen, when it was released it garnered some attention, but many jeers from western public and some analysts.  What was missed was that this was, in fact, a continuation of not only Zawahiri and bin Laden's admonishments over the years, but directly the result of these lengthy discussions on the movement outlined in the captured letters dated throughout 2010.  

Further, as Nelly Lahoud remarks in the video, after Bin Laden was killed, Zawahiri not only began to give directions more openly and often, where the field commanders could no longer hide them from most of their followers, he also began doing what Bin Laden had been refusing to do: take bayah from other groups and openly acknowledging them as Al Qa'ida.  These organizations took that opportunity almost immediately.  More importantly, we see various groups had already been discussing what was clearly in the content of the letters from Abbottabad prior to that release and even more directly implementing them after Zawahiri made his very public announcement about expected conduct of Jihad as noted above. 

This suggests that Zawahiri might not possess absolute control and influence over these groups, but that he does still possess enough influence and respect to get their attention and move them in the direction that he, and what appears to be bin Laden's shura or council of men (including none other than Adam Gadahn), determination out the direction of their revolution. 

At the time of the statement of conduct, I suggested in a discussion that something had changed in the council, either a new member or a member being elevated or an outside counselor had been introduced.  Someone who had read Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare".  Very specifically the section titled "The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare"

There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

And this section, "What is Guerrilla Warfare?" on the nature of guerrilla warfare and the people, Mao wrote:

The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity.

One commenter suggested that this was possibly and simply the natural evolution of any revolutionary or guerilla forces where, as the continuous letters have pointed out, Al Qa'ida has continually been discussing the need to change and evolve their tactics and standing within the Ummah.  But then, as I re-read the letters from Abbottabad, the phrase at the top of this post popped out, page 6 of the PDF, page 12 of the actual letter:

Because the people's support of the mujahedeen is as important as the water for fish

This is Mao, On the Political Problems of Guerilla Warfare:

lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it.

Which brings up several questions:

1) When did Osama Bin Laden read the Godless Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare"?
2) When did we know that Bin Laden had based his "20 Year Program" on Mao's book ("awakening the people" bin Laden translates to "Awakening")?
3) Is this one of the books that Adam Gadahn translated for Bin Laden as Nelly Lahoud alludes to in her talk about the letters?

There are many other aspects of Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare" throughout the 17 letters released from Abbottabad regarding discipline, governance, unity of purpose and the use of propaganda.  However, what we also learn is that, despite some analysts' beliefs that Zawahiri has lost all control and is only a sad man, far removed from the conflict, he is very obviously attempting to assert control and influence and may be achieving that to some degree based on what we see some of these groups doing to try to achieve Al Qa'ida's stated goals.

What does that mean for the future of bin Laden's revolution and our security?