Friday, January 31, 2014
Thursday, January 30, 2014
Lessons From Abbottabad: Bin Laden Letters and Mao
Because the people's support of the mujahedeen is as important as the water for fish - Osama bin LadenIn a video from 2012, Nelly Lahoud from West Points Center for Combatting Terrorism, discusses the 17 released documents captured from the Abbattobad compound upon the death of Osama Bin Laden. It was an interesting video, though I found the speaker seemed to give a more sympathetic view of the letters and issues presented within the contents. The letters can be found here.
The letters did present a number of concerns. In fact, it was interesting to read them as it suggests that Bin Laden, no longer on the front lines and having witnessed several decades of war, was beginning to think more about where the revolution was going. The word "revolution", although unused in any of the letters or other previous documents, has never been used to my knowledge. However, it is the most appropriate term and describes how Bin Laden thought of their efforts: to free Muslims from oppressive regimes. That seems to be the essence of "revolution".
Why that word was never used expressly is hard to fathom. It may have had to do with Islamic law where Muslims are often and expressly forbidden to disobey their rulers accept in situations where the ruler is definitively harming the religion and the people's belief in that religion. Revolution, then, is never the cause of observant Muslims, but the tradition of choosing rightly guided leaders is. Revolution, however, is exactly what Bin Laden had called for and expressly and explicitly supported.
As Nelly Lahoud expressed in her comments on the letters, it's clear that bin Laden was beginning to think about the movement in legalistic terms. What is right or wrong, what acts are acceptable or not, how one should view their oaths to even a kufr (unbeliever) nation versus the call to jihad, etc.
Some of this has very practical applications in regards to maintaining support of the people which he rightly ascertains has been damaged over time by indiscriminate and unthinking continuous acts of violence against Muslims. He was not unaware of the black eye that Al Qa'ida had received from Zarqawi and AQI's activities in Iraq nor the fact that they were blamed for killing more Muslims than kufr or Jews or any other perceived enemy. Of course, this was not the first time that was noted, nor would it be the last, even after bin Laden's death as Zawahiri is constantly attempting to counsel the groups in the field.
What was interesting is the language in which he expressed this concern about losing support within the Ummah (greater body of Muslim people). Many had remarked on bin Laden and Zawahiri's previous attempts to reign in the overt mass murders that held little strategic purpose but as much bloodshed as possible. This counseling had become louder and more persistent and continued to amplify even after bin Laden had been killed.
Clearly, it had been making some impact on a few leaders in the field. A letter captured from the abandoned AQIM compound in Mali indicates that their commander, Drukdel, had issued the same admonishing to his lieutenants in the Sahaal sometime in 2013. Further, groups like Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia and Libya (to an extent) have attempted to heed his advice about shifting more towards governance, treating the people well and other seeming civic activities. Most important, not to be harsh to the people.
In Libya and Tunisia, we see Ansar al Sharia doing sack races and tug of war, handing out small gifts and then proceeding to indoctrinate their audience with their ideology. The same thing is occurring in Syria in areas where ISIS and JAN control with little interruption. ISIS is publicizing it's role in providing public services like trash pick up, running schools, running water, and even acting as traffic police.
All of this has slowly been occurring over time, but seems to have picked up speed after Zawahiri released a statement giving the rules of conduct for mujahedeen fighting Jihad in 2013. Based on the letters obtained from the Abbottabad compound, these seem to be rules that bin Laden had been working out between Zawahiri, Adam Gadahn and several others. Zawahiri appears to have formalized those rules, the men clearly understanding that the puritanical Islam that they had relied on to set the ideology and guide the conduct of the fighters in the field had clearly not been sufficient.
Most particularly when the ideologues and senior council were too far away to control the action directly and had to rely on basic communications, remaining private which allowed different leaders to act on them or not as they saw fit. The act of keeping these private was to insure that their circumstances of leadership remained murky as well as continue to present some façade of unity amongst all the groups. (Say no to fitnah). In some cases, as the letters represent, bin Laden had felt it was better to maintain disassociation from al Qa'ida to protect these movements from being attacked by the US or other nations. To, in fact, remain local.
However, it's clear from the continuing problems that leaders in the field have with implementing these directives or with Zawahiri being able to influence their acts, that this quiet method was not working. Thus, we see Zawahiri more recently giving more and more statements and directives. Not all of them, as is the case with ISIS and JAN/IF/Ahrar al Sham fitnah in Syria, are being accepted immediately, but that should not be construed as Zawahiri having no influence.
Some groups in Syria have attempted to follow those directives. On the other hand, Ahrar al Sham and ISIS have both attempted to use Zawahiri's words against the other. Thus, while it appears that both are ignoring Zawahiri to an extent, probably because they can, the fact that they are both trying to use his words against the other means that Zawahiri still holds a position of authority and influence, if not direct control.
Regarding the Zawahiri letter outlining conduct of the Mujahadeen, when it was released it garnered some attention, but many jeers from western public and some analysts. What was missed was that this was, in fact, a continuation of not only Zawahiri and bin Laden's admonishments over the years, but directly the result of these lengthy discussions on the movement outlined in the captured letters dated throughout 2010.
Further, as Nelly Lahoud remarks in the video, after Bin Laden was killed, Zawahiri not only began to give directions more openly and often, where the field commanders could no longer hide them from most of their followers, he also began doing what Bin Laden had been refusing to do: take bayah from other groups and openly acknowledging them as Al Qa'ida. These organizations took that opportunity almost immediately. More importantly, we see various groups had already been discussing what was clearly in the content of the letters from Abbottabad prior to that release and even more directly implementing them after Zawahiri made his very public announcement about expected conduct of Jihad as noted above.
This suggests that Zawahiri might not possess absolute control and influence over these groups, but that he does still possess enough influence and respect to get their attention and move them in the direction that he, and what appears to be bin Laden's shura or council of men (including none other than Adam Gadahn), determination out the direction of their revolution.
At the time of the statement of conduct, I suggested in a discussion that something had changed in the council, either a new member or a member being elevated or an outside counselor had been introduced. Someone who had read Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare". Very specifically the section titled "The Political Problems Of Guerrilla Warfare"
There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.
And this section, "What is Guerrilla Warfare?" on the nature of guerrilla warfare and the people, Mao wrote:
The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity.One commenter suggested that this was possibly and simply the natural evolution of any revolutionary or guerilla forces where, as the continuous letters have pointed out, Al Qa'ida has continually been discussing the need to change and evolve their tactics and standing within the Ummah. But then, as I re-read the letters from Abbottabad, the phrase at the top of this post popped out, page 6 of the PDF, page 12 of the actual letter:
Because the people's support of the mujahedeen is as important as the water for fishThis is Mao, On the Political Problems of Guerilla Warfare:
lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water the latter to the fish who inhabit it.Which brings up several questions:
1) When did Osama Bin Laden read the Godless Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare"?
2) When did we know that Bin Laden had based his "20 Year Program" on Mao's book ("awakening the people" bin Laden translates to "Awakening")?
3) Is this one of the books that Adam Gadahn translated for Bin Laden as Nelly Lahoud alludes to in her talk about the letters?
There are many other aspects of Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare" throughout the 17 letters released from Abbottabad regarding discipline, governance, unity of purpose and the use of propaganda. However, what we also learn is that, despite some analysts' beliefs that Zawahiri has lost all control and is only a sad man, far removed from the conflict, he is very obviously attempting to assert control and influence and may be achieving that to some degree based on what we see some of these groups doing to try to achieve Al Qa'ida's stated goals.
What does that mean for the future of bin Laden's revolution and our security?
Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: “They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi”: Nasheed for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham « JIHADOLOGY
Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: “They have closed ranks and pledged bay’ah to Baghdadi”: Nasheed for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham « JIHADOLOGY
(Baghdadi Nasheed in which his declaration of caliphate & Caliph is practically open)
(Baghdadi Nasheed in which his declaration of caliphate & Caliph is practically open)
The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups: AQC/AQAP Chart
The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups
The following chart depicts the organizational structure of AQC and AQAP. Open-source information indicates that while the United States and its allies have been highly effective at killing or capturing high-level members of AQC, the central leadership of AQAP remains largely intact—Yemeni counterparts have experienced only limited success targeting AQAP, with most of its kills or captures consisting of mid-level regional AQAP commanders.
The following chart depicts the organizational structure of AQC and AQAP. Open-source information indicates that while the United States and its allies have been highly effective at killing or capturing high-level members of AQC, the central leadership of AQAP remains largely intact—Yemeni counterparts have experienced only limited success targeting AQAP, with most of its kills or captures consisting of mid-level regional AQAP commanders.
Manhunt: Search for Al Qaeda
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Tuesday, January 28, 2014
Facing the Fog of War in Syria: the Rise of the Salafi-Nationalists? | Red (Team) Analysis
Facing the Fog of War in Syria: the Rise of the Salafi-Nationalists? | Red (Team) Analysis
As was already underway during September, the various groups opposing the regime of Bashar al-Assad have pursued their reconfiguration, while the relationships and interactions among them have evolved.
As was already underway during September, the various groups opposing the regime of Bashar al-Assad have pursued their reconfiguration, while the relationships and interactions among them have evolved.
Monday, January 27, 2014
Observing Jihad: Thoughts on Proliferation of Organizations, Importance of Contact and Support and the Girl Scout Way
One of the problems, I believe, is that analysis tends to look at these groups as a totally new phenomena that has created a completely new method of organization and networking. Analysis, as Mr. Gerenstein-Ross notes, is hindered by the fact that they are "clandestine", meaning that parts of their operations are hidden so that analysts are unable to see what or how they are doing it. Which is true to a point, but tends to ignore the fact that we do know how other organizations work and that there has been a great deal of work, even open source, that does indicate parts of the organization.
From that I am suggesting that we can, indeed, know how they operate even if we don't always know what individual is doing what part of the operation at what time. This also goes towards the discussion of trying to determine "who is Al Qaeda". Keeping in mind, al Qaeda is a very limited and limiting term for the entire enterprise and I do mean "enterprise" in the same manner we evaluate "criminal enterprises". That this is much bigger than a few men in Pakistan organizing activities in far away places or trying to influence those activities, depending on whether the individual analyst views the entire enterprise as some how disconnected or competing with any other group.
Stepping back from that for a moment, I want to think about how groups form because this is important to the question of "who is" as much as any idea of whether "Al Qaeda" is a leadership group with hierarchic activities and control of any other group. It's also imperative to step away from the whole "terrorist organization" framing of this issue and come back to the reality of every day human interaction and social organizations.
How does anyone start a movement or a group that is not terrorist/jihad related?
For instance, something completely benign: starting a Girl Scout Troop.
It may be that a local person may decide to start a similar, ad hoc group, imagining that they do not have to be part of THE Girl Scouts in order to do many of the things that the Girl Scouts do. This intrepid self starter may know how to do arts and crafts, go camping and generally be able to organize several local girls into a small group.
Such an individual could also go on line and find many materials for the Girl Scouts, their mission statements, core ideas and even purchase uniforms and patches without ever having contacted the Girl Scouts directly, but the group will still not BE the Girl Scouts. More so, without ever having been a Girl Scout, gone to their leadership training or camps, this group would very likely be significantly different, creating their own mission statement, organizational structure, activities and over all behavior of the group depending on the leader's and members focus, experiences and personal interests.
Equally important would be the reception of any local young girls who might like to join such a group. The first question arising from that group is, why not just join the Girl Scouts? The Girl Scouts are already a recognized group, have significant branding, available support structures and camps to learn how to be a Girl Scout. Plus, they already have a well established funding program and network that provides things like training materials, hand books and the famous cookie sales that not only raise money for the larger Girl Scout organization, but allows the local groups to keep some of the funds for their local activities. It is also used to pay for camps as well as provide assistance for Girl Scouts to attend these camps.
Of course, local Girl Scout groups still have to provide most of their own funding locally, raising money through local activities, friends, families and other local philanthropic organizations. They buy their own uniforms and many of their own craft materials, pay for their own locally organized field trips and so on. Yet, there is still considerable value of the materials, training and camps that the main fund raising for the larger organization through cookie sales provides for many local troops.
Any local group that decided to fore go this association would be completely on it's own in regards to funding, materials and support and may find its little troop quickly disintegrating. Particularly if there is an actual Girl Scout Troop in the vicinity where members of the ad hoc group may peel off and decide to join the larger, better organized, supported and recognized group. The ad hoc group may remain for a time after that, but they will become smaller and smaller, their activities limited by their funding, the time any leader wants to give to the group and their skills or capabilities.
Getting back to the central question, why not just BE the Girl Scouts?
In many cases, the intrepid troop leader may look around for troops that already exist in the area to join, but anyone who was already imagining starting her own ad hoc group has likely already considered this and may have rejected it for several reasons. The distance to that group's area, the area itself or possibly having visited with that group, doesn't like the general dynamics of the troop or the troop leader. Believe me, this does happen. Or, simply, she may want to be her own troop leader for personal reasons and believe they have enough interested girls in the immediate vicinity to form their own troop.
It should be noted that this intrepid Leader may not be new to the Girl Scout way. It is often the case that either due to differences with the leadership of an existing troop her scout is a member of, because the Leader and her Scout may have moved to a new area without a troop or because she might know of other girls in their immediate area that are interested in forming a troop, but do not want to join a troop that is further away that leads to the idea of starting her own troop.
The erstwhile hopeful troop leader will then contact either the Girl Scout Council in the area or the national headquarters and make inquiries as to what it would take to join the Girl Scouts and create their own troop. The hopeful leader may be directed there either through their own research or by having contact with another troop leader who has the contact numbers and names for the regional or central council. Contacting the regional council, the hopeful troop leader will first be directed back to already existing troops in the area with the suggesting that they should join that group.
This is for several reasons. First, for purposes of control. As much as the Girl Scouts would like to have as many members as possible, they must also control the image and brand of the Girl Scouts. Well established and long standing troops are more likely to have had more training, interaction and camp time where they have learned to BE Girl Scouts and troop leaders. This insures that all new Girl Scouts will learn to be Girl Scouts the Girl Scout Way from other already indoctrinated Girl Scouts.
There is also the matter of funding for local troops. As noted, while the larger organization provides some materials and funding for organizational activities and under-writes the costs for items like uninforms, patches and Girl Scout Camps, the local troops have to provide much of their own funding for local activities and purchase of materials and uniforms, even if they do get the Girl Scout discounted or under-written price. Thus, the more members in a troop, the more that cost of activities is disseminated across a wider membership who can then tap their family members, friends and neighbors for funding (the usual sources for the local troops as well as for the larger Girl Scout Organization).
Also, that provides more Girl Scouts for that troop who can do the larger fund raising activities like selling thousands of boxes of cookies. That means that the funds that the troops get to keep from the sale of these cookies has fewer places to be allocated, meaning more funds for a single troop to use for their local activities, creating a better Girl Scout experience for a wider contingent of Scouts.
Let us say, for the various reasons listed, the intrepid Leader decides that they do not want to join or remain in an established troop and petitions the local council to be accepted as a separate troop. The Council will require references, a background check and a personal interview to insure that the hopeful leader meets their standards, will not harm the organization or any of the Scouts they will be over seeing. This interview may be arranged by having the hopeful leader come to the regional council or the regional council may send a member to the leader to conduct it at their convenience.
They will also explain the criteria for creating such a troop which includes having the requisite number of girls in the neighborhood who would join to create this troop. The Council will then evaluate, again, the request to create a separate troop against the existing troops in the area. Largely because they do not want to create a competitive troop that would harm any already existing troops' membership or funding. Over saturation can be as bad as having too few members.
The Council may indicate that the Intrepid Leader must have ten girls to start a new troop. If the intrepid Leader only has six, she will have to go find another four girls who will sign up to be a member of the troop. While these may be girls from an existing troop, generally the Council requires that entirely new girls be recruited in order to refrain from raiding and degrading an existing troops.
This might not only create a tangential problem for existing troops, but also may create a harmful rivalry between the new troop and the existing troops that would undermine the entire premise of the Girl Scouts which is to support all girls in their personal and inter-personal growth through a network of Girl Scouts and activities. Girl empowerment.
Having met the requirements for number of girls to join the troop as well as cleared the background check and references, the new Leader will be required to attend orientation and training sessions through the regional leadership including leadership camps. Even if this can't be arranged immediately, she may be assigned a mentor such as a local member of the regional council or a leader from an existing troop. The new Leader may also be encouraged to visit the other troops to observe how that troop is organized, run and absorb the Girl Scout way. Additionally, through invitation or pre-arranged scheduling, the new Leader's mentor may appear and/or provide consultation through other means on how to organize and run their new troop.
Eventually, however, the new Leader will be required to attend training classes and seminars in order to insure they are leading Girl Scout troops the Girl Scout way. There are also "service units" who are not necessarily part of any leadership hierarchy, may include members of the Council, other local troop leaders and volunteers who are available to provide assistance and mentoring to the troop leader. Further, the Leaders of all the troops in a specific area are encouraged to network and get together with each other to share experiences and exchange ideas. These meetings are encouraged to be physical, but they can also call each other, email and other forms of contact outside of any regularly scheduled meetings.
The Girl Scouts provide a plethora of materials, books, pamphlets, the Girl Scout magazine, as well as online forums where the Leaders, as well as Girl Scouts themselves, can join, share information, express concerns or issues, or relay good news about their troops' activities. This provides another layer of support and re-enforcement of the Girl Scout way. Thus, while a Girl Scout Leader and her troops may be relatively autonomous on a day to day, troop meeting to troop meeting basis, organizing most of the troops regular activities, she and her troops remain connected to the local, regional, national and international organization and leadership.
While many of the activities that the local troop does is determined by the Scout Leader, the over all goals and ideas of the Girl Scouts are laid out in books and activity lists. The local troops can choose to do most of those activities at their leisure based on local conditions and schedules, but they must conform or support building the Girl Scout the Girl Scout Way including learning about honesty, integrity, civic duties, educational activities and so forth, but, most importantly building character and relations with other girls.
Girl Scouts are also encouraged to serve as mentors for the younger Scouts in their troop as well as peers in their community. Peer to peer interaction helps spread the Girl Scout ideas and drives additional recruitment to the Girl Scouts. The troop Leader may also invite outside speakers or even members of the local Council to join the troop for the day, teach them a new skill or talk about all things Girl Scout.
The national and regional councils have scheduled events throughout the year which they expect the local troops to participate in whether funding drives, specific civic events (Earth Day where the troops may be encouraged to go clean up a park) and Girl Scout camps. Not all Girl Scouts can go to camp. Those that do learn new skills, network with other girls and are further taught the Girl Scout way. They then return to their local troop where they can share their experiences and teach these same skills and ideas to the other scouts in their troop.
Camp supervisors are trusted, long term members of the regional or national Council while counselors that over see the many groups at camp are either current troop leaders, long time Girl Scout volunteers or former Girl Scouts who volunteer their time in order to remain connected to the organization and it's ideas. Troop leaders are also expected to attend leadership training and seminars throughout the year as well as participate in various forums. All of which is designed to insure that anyone associated with the Girl Scouts, even though they are relatively autonomous in their regular troop activities, continues to represent the Girl Scouts and do things the Girl Scout Way.
Other things we know about the Girl Scouts:
The list of ways in which the Girl Scouts act to proliferate their organization, the Girl Scout Way, develop networks of support and funding is lengthy and even this commentary only scratches the surface of the various activities and ideas of the Girl Scouts. Fortunately, the Girl Scouts are not a militant group although some who have been swarmed by Girl Scouts to buy cookies might think differently.
The point of this exercise was to take away the fog and fear of "terrorism", "terrorist organizations" and their clandestine nature and place them more firmly in the realm of the known and understood. Where we do understand how networks work, groups proliferate, transmit their ideas, skill sets and experiences and cooperate to achieve over all movement and organizational goals.
Returning to the original premise of the post, we should be able to understand that, yes, local and ad hoc groups can appear organically, but they are unlikely to remain independent. Further, ideas may be transmitted, but, in order for an organization to actually mirror and proliferate the ideas and ways of the originating group, it requires sustained connections, interactions and support. Other wise the group not only develops its own character and ideas significantly different than the originating organization, but is also more likely to fail than connected and supported groups.
The next post on Global Islamic Jihad will be reviewing how we can understand the likely leadership structure, general framework and behavior of the organization as a networked social movement.
From that I am suggesting that we can, indeed, know how they operate even if we don't always know what individual is doing what part of the operation at what time. This also goes towards the discussion of trying to determine "who is Al Qaeda". Keeping in mind, al Qaeda is a very limited and limiting term for the entire enterprise and I do mean "enterprise" in the same manner we evaluate "criminal enterprises". That this is much bigger than a few men in Pakistan organizing activities in far away places or trying to influence those activities, depending on whether the individual analyst views the entire enterprise as some how disconnected or competing with any other group.
Stepping back from that for a moment, I want to think about how groups form because this is important to the question of "who is" as much as any idea of whether "Al Qaeda" is a leadership group with hierarchic activities and control of any other group. It's also imperative to step away from the whole "terrorist organization" framing of this issue and come back to the reality of every day human interaction and social organizations.
How does anyone start a movement or a group that is not terrorist/jihad related?
For instance, something completely benign: starting a Girl Scout Troop.
It may be that a local person may decide to start a similar, ad hoc group, imagining that they do not have to be part of THE Girl Scouts in order to do many of the things that the Girl Scouts do. This intrepid self starter may know how to do arts and crafts, go camping and generally be able to organize several local girls into a small group.
Such an individual could also go on line and find many materials for the Girl Scouts, their mission statements, core ideas and even purchase uniforms and patches without ever having contacted the Girl Scouts directly, but the group will still not BE the Girl Scouts. More so, without ever having been a Girl Scout, gone to their leadership training or camps, this group would very likely be significantly different, creating their own mission statement, organizational structure, activities and over all behavior of the group depending on the leader's and members focus, experiences and personal interests.
Equally important would be the reception of any local young girls who might like to join such a group. The first question arising from that group is, why not just join the Girl Scouts? The Girl Scouts are already a recognized group, have significant branding, available support structures and camps to learn how to be a Girl Scout. Plus, they already have a well established funding program and network that provides things like training materials, hand books and the famous cookie sales that not only raise money for the larger Girl Scout organization, but allows the local groups to keep some of the funds for their local activities. It is also used to pay for camps as well as provide assistance for Girl Scouts to attend these camps.
Of course, local Girl Scout groups still have to provide most of their own funding locally, raising money through local activities, friends, families and other local philanthropic organizations. They buy their own uniforms and many of their own craft materials, pay for their own locally organized field trips and so on. Yet, there is still considerable value of the materials, training and camps that the main fund raising for the larger organization through cookie sales provides for many local troops.
Any local group that decided to fore go this association would be completely on it's own in regards to funding, materials and support and may find its little troop quickly disintegrating. Particularly if there is an actual Girl Scout Troop in the vicinity where members of the ad hoc group may peel off and decide to join the larger, better organized, supported and recognized group. The ad hoc group may remain for a time after that, but they will become smaller and smaller, their activities limited by their funding, the time any leader wants to give to the group and their skills or capabilities.
Getting back to the central question, why not just BE the Girl Scouts?
In many cases, the intrepid troop leader may look around for troops that already exist in the area to join, but anyone who was already imagining starting her own ad hoc group has likely already considered this and may have rejected it for several reasons. The distance to that group's area, the area itself or possibly having visited with that group, doesn't like the general dynamics of the troop or the troop leader. Believe me, this does happen. Or, simply, she may want to be her own troop leader for personal reasons and believe they have enough interested girls in the immediate vicinity to form their own troop.
It should be noted that this intrepid Leader may not be new to the Girl Scout way. It is often the case that either due to differences with the leadership of an existing troop her scout is a member of, because the Leader and her Scout may have moved to a new area without a troop or because she might know of other girls in their immediate area that are interested in forming a troop, but do not want to join a troop that is further away that leads to the idea of starting her own troop.
The erstwhile hopeful troop leader will then contact either the Girl Scout Council in the area or the national headquarters and make inquiries as to what it would take to join the Girl Scouts and create their own troop. The hopeful leader may be directed there either through their own research or by having contact with another troop leader who has the contact numbers and names for the regional or central council. Contacting the regional council, the hopeful troop leader will first be directed back to already existing troops in the area with the suggesting that they should join that group.
This is for several reasons. First, for purposes of control. As much as the Girl Scouts would like to have as many members as possible, they must also control the image and brand of the Girl Scouts. Well established and long standing troops are more likely to have had more training, interaction and camp time where they have learned to BE Girl Scouts and troop leaders. This insures that all new Girl Scouts will learn to be Girl Scouts the Girl Scout Way from other already indoctrinated Girl Scouts.
There is also the matter of funding for local troops. As noted, while the larger organization provides some materials and funding for organizational activities and under-writes the costs for items like uninforms, patches and Girl Scout Camps, the local troops have to provide much of their own funding for local activities and purchase of materials and uniforms, even if they do get the Girl Scout discounted or under-written price. Thus, the more members in a troop, the more that cost of activities is disseminated across a wider membership who can then tap their family members, friends and neighbors for funding (the usual sources for the local troops as well as for the larger Girl Scout Organization).
Also, that provides more Girl Scouts for that troop who can do the larger fund raising activities like selling thousands of boxes of cookies. That means that the funds that the troops get to keep from the sale of these cookies has fewer places to be allocated, meaning more funds for a single troop to use for their local activities, creating a better Girl Scout experience for a wider contingent of Scouts.
Let us say, for the various reasons listed, the intrepid Leader decides that they do not want to join or remain in an established troop and petitions the local council to be accepted as a separate troop. The Council will require references, a background check and a personal interview to insure that the hopeful leader meets their standards, will not harm the organization or any of the Scouts they will be over seeing. This interview may be arranged by having the hopeful leader come to the regional council or the regional council may send a member to the leader to conduct it at their convenience.
They will also explain the criteria for creating such a troop which includes having the requisite number of girls in the neighborhood who would join to create this troop. The Council will then evaluate, again, the request to create a separate troop against the existing troops in the area. Largely because they do not want to create a competitive troop that would harm any already existing troops' membership or funding. Over saturation can be as bad as having too few members.
The Council may indicate that the Intrepid Leader must have ten girls to start a new troop. If the intrepid Leader only has six, she will have to go find another four girls who will sign up to be a member of the troop. While these may be girls from an existing troop, generally the Council requires that entirely new girls be recruited in order to refrain from raiding and degrading an existing troops.
This might not only create a tangential problem for existing troops, but also may create a harmful rivalry between the new troop and the existing troops that would undermine the entire premise of the Girl Scouts which is to support all girls in their personal and inter-personal growth through a network of Girl Scouts and activities. Girl empowerment.
Having met the requirements for number of girls to join the troop as well as cleared the background check and references, the new Leader will be required to attend orientation and training sessions through the regional leadership including leadership camps. Even if this can't be arranged immediately, she may be assigned a mentor such as a local member of the regional council or a leader from an existing troop. The new Leader may also be encouraged to visit the other troops to observe how that troop is organized, run and absorb the Girl Scout way. Additionally, through invitation or pre-arranged scheduling, the new Leader's mentor may appear and/or provide consultation through other means on how to organize and run their new troop.
Eventually, however, the new Leader will be required to attend training classes and seminars in order to insure they are leading Girl Scout troops the Girl Scout way. There are also "service units" who are not necessarily part of any leadership hierarchy, may include members of the Council, other local troop leaders and volunteers who are available to provide assistance and mentoring to the troop leader. Further, the Leaders of all the troops in a specific area are encouraged to network and get together with each other to share experiences and exchange ideas. These meetings are encouraged to be physical, but they can also call each other, email and other forms of contact outside of any regularly scheduled meetings.
The Girl Scouts provide a plethora of materials, books, pamphlets, the Girl Scout magazine, as well as online forums where the Leaders, as well as Girl Scouts themselves, can join, share information, express concerns or issues, or relay good news about their troops' activities. This provides another layer of support and re-enforcement of the Girl Scout way. Thus, while a Girl Scout Leader and her troops may be relatively autonomous on a day to day, troop meeting to troop meeting basis, organizing most of the troops regular activities, she and her troops remain connected to the local, regional, national and international organization and leadership.
While many of the activities that the local troop does is determined by the Scout Leader, the over all goals and ideas of the Girl Scouts are laid out in books and activity lists. The local troops can choose to do most of those activities at their leisure based on local conditions and schedules, but they must conform or support building the Girl Scout the Girl Scout Way including learning about honesty, integrity, civic duties, educational activities and so forth, but, most importantly building character and relations with other girls.
Girl Scouts are also encouraged to serve as mentors for the younger Scouts in their troop as well as peers in their community. Peer to peer interaction helps spread the Girl Scout ideas and drives additional recruitment to the Girl Scouts. The troop Leader may also invite outside speakers or even members of the local Council to join the troop for the day, teach them a new skill or talk about all things Girl Scout.
The national and regional councils have scheduled events throughout the year which they expect the local troops to participate in whether funding drives, specific civic events (Earth Day where the troops may be encouraged to go clean up a park) and Girl Scout camps. Not all Girl Scouts can go to camp. Those that do learn new skills, network with other girls and are further taught the Girl Scout way. They then return to their local troop where they can share their experiences and teach these same skills and ideas to the other scouts in their troop.
Camp supervisors are trusted, long term members of the regional or national Council while counselors that over see the many groups at camp are either current troop leaders, long time Girl Scout volunteers or former Girl Scouts who volunteer their time in order to remain connected to the organization and it's ideas. Troop leaders are also expected to attend leadership training and seminars throughout the year as well as participate in various forums. All of which is designed to insure that anyone associated with the Girl Scouts, even though they are relatively autonomous in their regular troop activities, continues to represent the Girl Scouts and do things the Girl Scout Way.
Other things we know about the Girl Scouts:
- Local groups may spin up and mirror the Girl Scouts, but they will not be the Girl Scouts or proliferate the Girl Scout Way.
- Local groups may use Girl Scout ideas and materials, but are likely to deviate in significant and fundamental ways, ideas and activities due to the character, experiences and general capabilities of the leadership, local support network or the troops themselves. (Because, really, if they wanted to be the Girl Scouts, they would have just joined the Girl Scouts).
- Local groups that do not have the support network, recognition of or funding of the Girl Scouts are unlikely to survive as an ad hoc group over the long run or will remain a small and relatively ineffective group.
- Any local group that wants to be like the Girl Scouts are likely to simply join the Girl Scouts because it already exists, has brand recognition, established culture, ideas, activities, materials, training, camps and funding programs.
- The Girl Scouts want to control their brand and ideas, so while a group can spin up and look like the Girl Scouts, if they try to claim relationship to the Girl Scouts or mirror it too closely without being a recognized Girl Scout group, that group may find themselves in direct confrontation with the Girl Scouts.
- Local ad hoc groups that spin up and then find themselves unable to meet their original goals, in need of support or because they decide that being a Girl Scout troop is better can petition the Girl Scout Council to become a Girl Scout troop. They will, however, be vetted, required to do the training, participate in Girl Scout activities and learn to do things the Girl Scout Way.
- Any girl can join the Girl Scouts and a local troop, but these troops are most often made up of family, friends and neighbors that the girls know. As another girl joins, their relationships with family, friends and neighbors create a widening pool of potential recruits to the Girl Scouts.
- While any girl can join the Girl Scouts at the troop level, not anyone can just declare themselves a leader and create a troop of Girl Scouts. Leadership is vetted, required to do regular training, provided a mentor and introduced to a network of support that routinely re-enforces the Girl Scout Way.
- A local troop of Girl Scouts and their Leader are relatively autonomous when it comes to planning their meetings and activities, but the Girl Scouts leadership provides a calendar of activities that troops are expected to participate in if and when they can.
- While a local troop is relatively autonomous, the Girl Scout Council provides a broad list of programs, material and projects meant to educate and re-enforce The Girl Scout Way. Local leadership chooses which programs, material and projects to introduce at what time to their troops based on the stage of troop development, age, abilities and experience of their Scouts.
- Girl Scouts go to Girl Scout camp to learn more about being a Girl Scout. These camps are local, regional, national and international. The Girl Scout's ability to go to these camps depends on abilities, stage of her Girl Scout development and funding available. They are recommended by their troop leaders, the local Council and then must be selected by the national or international Council as a candidate for the national and international camps.
- Going to Girl Scout camp is not mandatory, but is encouraged in order to build a better Girl Scout and cement bonds with the Girl Scout Organization and other Girl Scouts (building a support network).
- Girl Scouts who go to camp come back and share their experiences with other Girl Scouts in their troops, sharing new skills and re-enforcing the Girl Scout Way.
- The Girl Scouts have developed a wide range of support networks for the local troop leaders to tap into (Service Units), get assistance for problem solving, help lead the troop in a specific activity or outing, come and teach a skill or lecture on an aspect of The Girl Scout Way.
- The Service Unit is made up of members of the local, regional and national Councils, other troop leaders and volunteers who are often former Girl Scouts or leaders.
- The Service Unit is not a leadership council and does not provide direct orders or direct the local troops' regular activities although this network may provide information, suggestions and generally push the local troops and leadership to participate in activities, fund raising and general adherence to The Girl Scout Way.
- The National and International Council of the Girl Scouts has a defined leadership that is responsible for over seeing the general activities, funding and organization of the Girl Scouts. The Council also includes a number of volunteers as well as interested philanthropists that are not members of the Girl Scouts or part of the leadership team, but assist the Council in these activities, obtaining funding and donations, arranging for printing of materials, public relations, communications, training and the development of programs.
- The regional and local Councils also have defined leadership elements who's job it is to over see these critical aspects of the Girl Scouts in their area. They are also assisted by volunteers and local interested parties or groups.
- Leadership elements include a president, vice president, treasurer and various secretaries. However, The Girl Scout way is to empower all Girls so the Council itself acts as just that where all opinions and ideas are important, shared and discussed. No one sees the line or hierarchy of leadership as immutable, only the idea of the Girl Scouts and The Girl Scout Way, even if top elements of leadership do not change as frequently as in regional or local councils or at the troop leader level.
- While the Leadership Councils over see the general funding, organization and day to day business of the Girl Scouts at the international, national and regional levels, they do not direct, order or control the daily activities of the Girl Scout troops at the local level. They rely on their ideas, materials, training and support networks to transmit information and generally guide the troops to do Girl Scout activities.
- This network of support though is a powerful tool and can be used by the National and International Councils to put out a call to participate in greater organized activities or suggest local activities the local troops should participate in.
- The ability to provide funding, organization and expertise through the network of councils, service units and other local groups gives the calls from the upper leadership council of the organization for cross organization and large scale activities more weight.
- Even though the national and international Councils can't order local troops to participate, they know when they put out the call that many or enough of these troops will respond and participate, helping the larger Girl Scout organization reach it's goals.
- Being aware of the limitations in their ability to direct as well as the limitations of the various troops due to leadership, size, funding, skills and experience, these calls for larger activities and participation are carefully calibrated to those things that the National Council can insure will be successful such as cookie sales, camps and general civic activities (Earth Day, etc)
- Large scale and cross organization activities, however, are organized and funded by the national and international Council such as camps, international conferences with other organizations, funding and donation drives as well as national or international activities.
- Where general organization and direction might be provided by the upper council, organizing to participate is left at the local troop level including most of their own funding from their own members, relationships or other local philanthropic groups.
- Local troops can request assistance, materials and funding from the regional and upper council in order to participate or carry out these activities if they lack the resources themselves and where these upper councils believe the activity is imperative to the over all organization and mission of the Girl Scouts.
- Girl Scouts participate as a group in local activities and events not related to Girl Scouts in order to show their presence, their importance and relationship to the community and as opportunities to connect, create interest and recruit future scouts for their troop or the Girl Scouts in general.
- Girl Scout troops are Girl Scout troops, identify themselves as Girl Scouts and are recognized as Girl Scouts by the National Council and given identification numbers (troop 4009). However, the local troops often choose another name to identify their group, location, general ideas, make up or focus of the troop such as "The Darren Heights Daisies", "12th Street Cookie Monsters" or "Panda Pals Troop".
- This local designation is encouraged by the Girl Scout Council to help develop cohesion at the local troop level among the girls so that they not only consider themselves Girl Scouts, but Girls working together in their community, supporting each other locally and that the local community can distinguish them from all other Girl Scout troops, engendering local support.
- This is also encouraged at the regional, national and international camps where the Scouts are grouped together and choose a name and a logo or icon to represent their group. This cements bonding and creates a larger, more connected network over time. Girl Scouts make friendships at camp that can last a lifetime and prove a vital support network during their time as a Girl Scout and into the future.
- For the most part, unless someone in the community has a family member in the local troop or volunteering, the presence of a Girl Scout troop may go generally unnoticed and unremarked. The community knows they are there, but the troop does not impact daily life in the community accept when the Girl Scouts do one of their activities like cookie sales or other fund raising, participating in community events (where Girl Scouts are encouraged to dress like a Girl Scout, carry their banners or otherwise indicate their Girl Scout connections) or when the Girl Scouts are coming and going from scouting activities.
- While the Girl Scout uniform is encouraged to show affiliation, commitment to the Girl Scouts and generally make the Girl Scouts known within the community, Girl Scouts do not always wear all of the uniform or badges. Because not all of the scouts in a troop can afford to purchase the entire uniform or all of the accoutrements. Some troops may decide their group will only wear the vest or sash or a badge or none at all, where their association as a Girl Scout troop is only represented by the Girl Scout banner hanging where they meet or other representative paraphernalia.
- This may lead to difficulty within the community in identifying who exactly is a member of the Girl Scouts unless they have direct relationship with them or have directly interacted with a scout or the troop. The most active groups, however, maintain an active, visible presence in the community and are more likely to be known as members of a troop and the Girl Scouts organization.
- Some of the largest funding for Girl Scouts comes from Girl Scout cookie drives. People buy Girl Scout cookies for many reasons: because they like the Girl Scouts and want to support their projects and ideas; because Girl Scout cookies are good; because everybody else is buying Girl Scout cookie;s and sometimes it's just easier to buy the cookies and send the Girl Scouts on their way even if people know that they'll keep coming back over and over again asking them to buy more cookies. People who don't buy cookies but have family members, friends or neighbors who do or who have girls in the Girl Scouts may be criticized for not supporting the Girl Scouts and find their character diminished in the eyes of their neighbors, family and friends.
The list of ways in which the Girl Scouts act to proliferate their organization, the Girl Scout Way, develop networks of support and funding is lengthy and even this commentary only scratches the surface of the various activities and ideas of the Girl Scouts. Fortunately, the Girl Scouts are not a militant group although some who have been swarmed by Girl Scouts to buy cookies might think differently.
The point of this exercise was to take away the fog and fear of "terrorism", "terrorist organizations" and their clandestine nature and place them more firmly in the realm of the known and understood. Where we do understand how networks work, groups proliferate, transmit their ideas, skill sets and experiences and cooperate to achieve over all movement and organizational goals.
Returning to the original premise of the post, we should be able to understand that, yes, local and ad hoc groups can appear organically, but they are unlikely to remain independent. Further, ideas may be transmitted, but, in order for an organization to actually mirror and proliferate the ideas and ways of the originating group, it requires sustained connections, interactions and support. Other wise the group not only develops its own character and ideas significantly different than the originating organization, but is also more likely to fail than connected and supported groups.
The next post on Global Islamic Jihad will be reviewing how we can understand the likely leadership structure, general framework and behavior of the organization as a networked social movement.
Sunday, January 26, 2014
Saturday, January 25, 2014
Friday, January 24, 2014
Thursday, January 23, 2014
Al-Qaeda slaughters on Syria's killing fields - Features - Al Jazeera English
Al-Qaeda slaughters on Syria's killing fields - Features - Al Jazeera English
Al-Qaeda fighters have struck a bloody blow in scenes of medieval violence in Syria's northern border-town of Jarabulus. Fighting came to a head on January 17, between rebel groups Liwa al-Tawhid Brigade and the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the town, when reinforcements arrived from Raqqa and reclaimed the city in a brutal four-hour battle.
By nightfall, at least 10 men had been beheaded, their heads mounted on spikes, and more than 1,000 refugees fled the 3kms across the border to Turkey.
Al-Qaeda fighters have struck a bloody blow in scenes of medieval violence in Syria's northern border-town of Jarabulus. Fighting came to a head on January 17, between rebel groups Liwa al-Tawhid Brigade and the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the town, when reinforcements arrived from Raqqa and reclaimed the city in a brutal four-hour battle.
By nightfall, at least 10 men had been beheaded, their heads mounted on spikes, and more than 1,000 refugees fled the 3kms across the border to Turkey.
Syrian Freedom - الحرية السورية • Assad regime abetted extremists to subvert peaceful uprising, says former intelligence official
Syrian Freedom - الحرية السورية • Assad regime abetted extremists to subvert peaceful uprising, says former intelligence official
The Algerian Effect
“The regime did not just open the door to the prisons and let these extremists out, it facilitated them in their work, in their creation of armed brigades,” said the former member of Syria’s Military Intelligence Directorate, one of more than a dozen of Syria’s secretive intelligence agencies.
Groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) and Jabhat Al Nusra have been infiltrated by Syria’s security forces, the former intelligence officer said, with regime personnel helping them wage war against other Islamic groups and, in some cases, even against Syrian regime forces.
“This regime is clever, no one on the outside will ever understand what goes on inside,” he said, describing a shadowy system of intelligence branches spying on each other, betraying one another, sometimes promoting attacks by armed rebels on other security branches – all in the name of serving the president.
The Algerian Effect
“The regime did not just open the door to the prisons and let these extremists out, it facilitated them in their work, in their creation of armed brigades,” said the former member of Syria’s Military Intelligence Directorate, one of more than a dozen of Syria’s secretive intelligence agencies.
Groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) and Jabhat Al Nusra have been infiltrated by Syria’s security forces, the former intelligence officer said, with regime personnel helping them wage war against other Islamic groups and, in some cases, even against Syrian regime forces.
“This regime is clever, no one on the outside will ever understand what goes on inside,” he said, describing a shadowy system of intelligence branches spying on each other, betraying one another, sometimes promoting attacks by armed rebels on other security branches – all in the name of serving the president.
Sunday, January 19, 2014
Observing Jihad: What's in a Name? - Bara Brigades
Per our erstwhile ISIS propagandist ShamiWitness...
"Sahaba" - The companions of Mohamed
"Ansar" - The "Helpers" that helped Mohamed and his companions escape Medina and waged war on behalf of Islam.
"mushrikeen" - Generally, "polytheists" or people who worship more than one god. In ibn Malik's story, it applies to the Persians who were not yet conquered or practicing Islam. This word is also used to apply to Jews and Christians. Jews because of their Talmudic practices which Islam insists is tantamount to polytheism and Christians because the Holy Trinity, Father, Son & Holy Ghost, the deification of Christ, is considered polytheist despite belief in a monotheist "God". Sometimes also used to refer to modern Shia because they worship pray to or worship saints.
Ever wondered why so many jihadi "martyrdom brigades" are named after Bara ibn Malik ? (1)
Bara ibn Maliki al Ansari: Not coz he was just known for his bravery, but in battlefield he fought so daringly, so ferociously,.. (2)
... and not for victory,but for martyrdom.(3)
In single-handed combat he defeated,killed many opponents and in the thick of battle he was an outstanding fighter against the mushrikeen(4)
Al-Bara' ibn Malik
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Al-Baraa ibn Malik al-Ansari (Arabic: البراء بن مالك الأنصاري) was one of the Sahaba, an Ansar from Banu Khazraj. He is the brother of Anas ibn Malik.[1]
He was well known for his bravery, engaging in numerous conflicts until he was martyred in 640 at the battle of Tustar while fighting the forces of the Persian Empire.[2]
He was well known for his bravery, engaging in numerous conflicts until he was martyred in 640 at the battle of Tustar while fighting the forces of the Persian Empire.[2]
"Sahaba" - The companions of Mohamed
"Ansar" - The "Helpers" that helped Mohamed and his companions escape Medina and waged war on behalf of Islam.
"mushrikeen" - Generally, "polytheists" or people who worship more than one god. In ibn Malik's story, it applies to the Persians who were not yet conquered or practicing Islam. This word is also used to apply to Jews and Christians. Jews because of their Talmudic practices which Islam insists is tantamount to polytheism and Christians because the Holy Trinity, Father, Son & Holy Ghost, the deification of Christ, is considered polytheist despite belief in a monotheist "God". Sometimes also used to refer to modern Shia because they worship pray to or worship saints.
108 terrorist memoirs, analyzed - Ideas - The Boston Globe
108 terrorist memoirs, analyzed - Ideas - The Boston Globe
But the important thing for the moment is the broad impressions that emerge from this body of work.
And the first broad impression is that being in a terrorist group for any length of time is surprisingly challenging. While the terrorist memoirists are quite diverse, they almost all describe numerous failed operations and internal disagreements. Even those who strive to present their organizations as completely united describe institutions—internal courts, for example—that only make sense if they do in fact face regular disciplinary challenges....
The most sympathetic memoirs are those written by young men and women who join up in the name of some deeply felt political ideology and gradually become disillusioned with the awful reality of the terrorist environment.
But the important thing for the moment is the broad impressions that emerge from this body of work.
And the first broad impression is that being in a terrorist group for any length of time is surprisingly challenging. While the terrorist memoirists are quite diverse, they almost all describe numerous failed operations and internal disagreements. Even those who strive to present their organizations as completely united describe institutions—internal courts, for example—that only make sense if they do in fact face regular disciplinary challenges....
The most sympathetic memoirs are those written by young men and women who join up in the name of some deeply felt political ideology and gradually become disillusioned with the awful reality of the terrorist environment.
Saturday, January 18, 2014
Friday, January 17, 2014
Al Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives
Al Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives
This Research Paper dissects the nature of AQ’s propaganda strategy by looking how it incorporates in its ideological narrative Islam’s sacred texts and traditions and how it manages to link these to widespread contemporary grievances in the Muslim world. AQ’s survival is tied to the credibility of its narrative "story" rather than the physical survival of its leadership.
Know Your Enemy | The Weekly Standard###
Know Your Enemy | The Weekly Standard###
But there is something even more fundamental about the Obama-Petraeus debate. It goes to the heart of how we define al Qaeda itself.
More than a dozen years since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States is still confused about al Qaeda’s goals and even how the group founded by Osama bin Laden is organized. The intellectual confusion is pervasive—and some of it is deliberate.
Houses of Cards — Point of Decision — Medium
Houses of Cards — Point of Decision — Medium
When we describe these militant groups and their leaders, we have a bad habit of turning what is plural into the singular — and using our own legalistic language (merge, franchise, ally, etc.). These habits can minimize the actual complexity behind these networked associations: fluid tribal rivalries, transnational financing, local criminal or smuggling syndicates, and personality clashes make for highly changeable networks.
Lessons in the Hindu Kush — Point of Decision — Medium
Lessons in the Hindu Kush — Point of Decision — Medium
These gemstones, real and fake alike, then travel down to the valley floor, trade hands a few times, and then are either transported out of the country or they’re traded within all nearby bazaars. However, one of the largest consumers of their wealth is the insurgent financiers East of the Afghanistan border in Pakistan. In Peshawar, Islamabad, and Karachi, vast, logistical networks work day and night to ensure the safe and precise movement of these minerals. This neurotic overkill of planning is most likely because of the cash these rocks bring in to the Taliban. One carat of yellow Topaz is worth upwards of $400. Multiply this equation several times due to the raw condition of the mineral and we are talking quite a bit of money coming your way.
Thursday, January 16, 2014
Wednesday, January 15, 2014
Tuesday, January 14, 2014
Tsarnaev, Todashev & Waltham 3 Murders: Watertown 2010
I was reviewing the case of the Tsarnaev brothers, Igbrim Todashev and the murders of Mess, Weissman, and Teken along with the potential for relationship to the greater Watertown bust of an international drug ring that was ran by an apparent Armenian/Caucasian criminal organization.
Several pieces of information appeared to coalesce or possibly be a simple coincidence. On the other hand, nothing about this case is really that simple.
We don't have a complete motive as yet, but it appears that the Tsarnaev brothers and possibly Mr. Todashev conspired to kill Mr. Mess and his associates. Mr. Todashev, in his confession, claimed that he and Tsarnaev planned to steal the drugs in the house and kill the men to prevent identification. This seems to verify that the drugs, as the investigators had originally theorized, were the motive. This would also rap up the murders very neatly.
As per this review of some of the case details, there is a small problem. Why would Todashev & Tsarnaev go to the trouble of calling the men to make sure they were IN the apartment and not away?
We know that Tsarnaev already knew the men would be at home because, as Mess' girlfriend claimed, he had seen Mess a few days before and discussed the plans for the evening which was to watch football. The investigators now say that evidence points to Tamerlan Tsarnaev's cell phone being used in the vicinity of the murder and making direct contact with one of the men. This implies that Tsarnaev was making sure that the men were at the apartment and not away.
That suggests that the reason for the murders was not the drugs, but to kill the three men. If the drugs had been the reason, it would have been better to ascertain when the men were gone or less than three were in the apartment. Ripping off drugs from three strong men is a risky business. Especially if you leave the drugs and money in the apartment with the dead men.
One of the suggested theories is that Weissman, who was busted in January 2011 for distribution, may have provided details on the larger drug ring in the area to avoid prison. His attorney indicates that his client had been working out a "favorable" deal although his attorney emphatically denies it involved "ratting" on anyone.
Importan
The trial of former Watertown officer, Roberto Velasquez-Johnson, concluded last week. Velasquez-Johnson pled guilty to obstruction charges in regards to the greater case against the drug ring that had operated in Watertown. According to his plea, in June 2010 the former officer had told Madarati, leader of the ring, that ICE was part of the investigation and in November 2010 another phone call where he says "rats" are talking. Velasquez-Jones did not know at the time that FBI had begun wire tapping in August 2010.
Several pieces of information appeared to coalesce or possibly be a simple coincidence. On the other hand, nothing about this case is really that simple.
We don't have a complete motive as yet, but it appears that the Tsarnaev brothers and possibly Mr. Todashev conspired to kill Mr. Mess and his associates. Mr. Todashev, in his confession, claimed that he and Tsarnaev planned to steal the drugs in the house and kill the men to prevent identification. This seems to verify that the drugs, as the investigators had originally theorized, were the motive. This would also rap up the murders very neatly.
As per this review of some of the case details, there is a small problem. Why would Todashev & Tsarnaev go to the trouble of calling the men to make sure they were IN the apartment and not away?
We know that Tsarnaev already knew the men would be at home because, as Mess' girlfriend claimed, he had seen Mess a few days before and discussed the plans for the evening which was to watch football. The investigators now say that evidence points to Tamerlan Tsarnaev's cell phone being used in the vicinity of the murder and making direct contact with one of the men. This implies that Tsarnaev was making sure that the men were at the apartment and not away.
That suggests that the reason for the murders was not the drugs, but to kill the three men. If the drugs had been the reason, it would have been better to ascertain when the men were gone or less than three were in the apartment. Ripping off drugs from three strong men is a risky business. Especially if you leave the drugs and money in the apartment with the dead men.
One of the suggested theories is that Weissman, who was busted in January 2011 for distribution, may have provided details on the larger drug ring in the area to avoid prison. His attorney indicates that his client had been working out a "favorable" deal although his attorney emphatically denies it involved "ratting" on anyone.
Importan
The trial of former Watertown officer, Roberto Velasquez-Johnson, concluded last week. Velasquez-Johnson pled guilty to obstruction charges in regards to the greater case against the drug ring that had operated in Watertown. According to his plea, in June 2010 the former officer had told Madarati, leader of the ring, that ICE was part of the investigation and in November 2010 another phone call where he says "rats" are talking. Velasquez-Jones did not know at the time that FBI had begun wire tapping in August 2010.
Tsarnaev, Todashev, Waltham 3: Significant Dates
February 2010 Todashev arrested for assault. He is driving an E30 Ford Econoline Delivery Van described as "food delivery". His case is continued "without finding", he is placed on probation. Other links: assault, frightening
February 2010 FBI & local PD open investigation into international drug ring. Safwan Madarati. Owns "plumbing" business. Most of the men involved are Armenian/Caucasus.
June 2010 Officer Valesquez-Johnson warns Madarati that ICE has been called into the investigation. Immigration and Customs. This means that authorities know or suspect that drugs are being shipped in, possible foreign connection. IE International. VJ tells Madarati to "lay low", Madarati flies to Syria for several months.
June 2010 Tamerlan & Katherine Russel marry
August 2010 FBI begins wire tapping suspected individuals. Suggests officers had to conduct surveillance and other investigations to gather evidence sufficient for a wire tap
September 2010 Velasquez-Johnson tells Madarati "rats are talking". Suggests Madarati is "biggest Mule in Massachusettes".
October 2010 First "bust" in international drug ring, Newton & Bedford, Massachusettes. Drugs include marijuana, cocaine, oxycodone & other prescriptiom drugs
October 2010 Tamerlan learns he cannot box anymore due to new rules. Tamerlan reportedly has short stint as food delivery driver driving van (general time frame, exact dates unknown). Tamerlan is reportedly becoming more religious
February 2010 FBI & local PD open investigation into international drug ring. Safwan Madarati. Owns "plumbing" business. Most of the men involved are Armenian/Caucasus.
June 2010 Officer Valesquez-Johnson warns Madarati that ICE has been called into the investigation. Immigration and Customs. This means that authorities know or suspect that drugs are being shipped in, possible foreign connection. IE International. VJ tells Madarati to "lay low", Madarati flies to Syria for several months.
June 2010 Tamerlan & Katherine Russel marry
August 2010 FBI begins wire tapping suspected individuals. Suggests officers had to conduct surveillance and other investigations to gather evidence sufficient for a wire tap
September 2010 Velasquez-Johnson tells Madarati "rats are talking". Suggests Madarati is "biggest Mule in Massachusettes".
October 2010 First "bust" in international drug ring, Newton & Bedford, Massachusettes. Drugs include marijuana, cocaine, oxycodone & other prescriptiom drugs
October 2010 Tamerlan learns he cannot box anymore due to new rules. Tamerlan reportedly has short stint as food delivery driver driving van (general time frame, exact dates unknown). Tamerlan is reportedly becoming more religious
Monday, January 13, 2014
Sunday, January 12, 2014
allAfrica.com: Libya: Al-Qaeda Seeks Libya Foothold (Page 3 of 3)
allAfrica.com: Libya: Al-Qaeda Seeks Libya Foothold (Page 3 of 3)
Some security experts say that al-Qaeda boss Ayman al-Zawahiri sent operative Abd al Baset Azzouz to Derna to oversee the restructuring al-Qaeda in Libya and co-ordinate between the terror organisation's various branches in the Maghreb region.
A YouTube video that circulated in 2012 shows Azzouz preaching to Derna residents. In the clip, he is seen trying to convince a small crowd gathered in a square that the Islamists would bring security to the city.
Some security experts say that al-Qaeda boss Ayman al-Zawahiri sent operative Abd al Baset Azzouz to Derna to oversee the restructuring al-Qaeda in Libya and co-ordinate between the terror organisation's various branches in the Maghreb region.
A YouTube video that circulated in 2012 shows Azzouz preaching to Derna residents. In the clip, he is seen trying to convince a small crowd gathered in a square that the Islamists would bring security to the city.
Observations on Jihad: What is in a Name?
Reading on the history of Mohammed and the establishment of Islam, several interesting things became apparent as to the names and nom de guerres that the groups or individuals take for themselves.
For instance, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham):
Note the second paragraph. Descendence from a particular line and it's relationship to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions is very important in regards to leadership or positions of authority. To become an "emir in a jihadi group", to be considered able to press the ideological foundations of Qaedism, returning to the "base" of Islam and rejecting all future corruptions, requires an authentic connection to the original "base" of Islam, either the Prophet or his Companions.
This is in some ways reflective of the tribal organization of the communities that still exist today where these patents of genealogy effectively establish the relationship of the tribe to others and where they reside within the classes of tribes. The groups themselves do not acknowledge any "classism" in their language (see Observation on Jihad; language of Ummah to cross all divides) and yet this very system of class (ie, assumed nobility and/or authority based on genealogy) is how they derive their powers or make relationships with tribes even if the tribes do not implicitly support their causes or endeavors.
So, if Baghdadi can claim to be from the Quraish tribe, having been an "Imam" or religious cleric, this gives him a kind of religious AND community authority. This would be true outside of jihad organizations, but is very important, particularly in his claim to be establishing "true and full sharia" (as one jihad Tweeter recently told me). He has the right by education, religious position and, very importantly, his inheritance or ancestry.
In some ways, this suggests a sort of mysticism, as if the knowledge of what was "real sharia" was passed down, not only by education and tradition, but through some genealogical carnation of inherent knowledge, ancestor to ancestor. In fact, a recent discussion on social media took place in which one commenter suggested that "it's in the DNA". An interesting take using modern science as a support for a mystical idea and mytho-historical ideology.
Baghdadi further sought to seal his position of authority, legalistically and ideologically, by claiming the name "Abu Bakr". In many cases, names like Abu Yayah or Abu Aissa, reference a familial connection. IE, Abu (Father of) Yayah (John). However, Baghdadi's use of Abu Bakr is much more about establishing his position of authority and authenticity by claiming the name of one of the Prophet Mohammed's first and foremost companions in Mecca who fled with him to Medina when Mohammed was under threat from local groups.
Abu Bakr also has the distinction of being one of Mohammed's most prolific proselytizers in the early days of establishing Islam. Likewise, he was a wealthy merchant in the city of Mecca that likely provided material assistance to Mohammed during his long periods of contemplation and revelation. Much like a patron, though Hadith or historical acknowledgements within Islam place him below Mohammed as only a "companion" or "apostle".
Another name of interest in regards to the flourishing of Qaedist ideology and groups who there appears to be great confusion over their relationship to al Qaeda core is "Ansar al Sharia", the Helpers of Sharia. While this seems simple to understand, that they are "helping" to establish "Sharia", the law of Islam", proselytizing, etc, it's helpful to understand the significance of the "ansar" or helpers in the story of Mohammed and the spread of Islam.
In the early days, Mohammed's followers were subject to rounds of persecution. The poorer or less connected of his followers were driven out of Mecca en masse at least twice before Mohammed himself was finally forced to flee. These groups had travelled to Medina and Abyssinia where they were better received and treated and where they proceeded to set up their own small communities. These were "muhijareen", or foreigners who travelled to other locations and helped spread the ideas of Mohammed.
The diaspora in Medina had offered Mohammed a place in their community many times, but he had refused to abandon Mecca for some time as he was intent on establishing his ideas there. When he was forced to flee, the "ansar", the helpers, arranged for his secret travel and reception into Medina. Thus, the "Ansar" today believe they are paving the way for the re-establishment of sharia, but, also, and possibly likely, based on their name, are the front for the introduction of Qaedist militants.
This is also established by how these groups begin. While some analysts see them as grass roots organizations within the areas they arise, that's not exactly true. Ansar al Sharia in Libya, for instance, has been linked to Al-Libi, a well known Qaedist and associate of Zawahiri. He claims to have quit Al Qaeda and returned to Libya only to participate against Gaddaffi and then due to his deteriorating health.
However, as the Qaedists ideology is based on mytho-historical concepts, it's important to recall this very early history of Islam. In which, during the early days of persecution, Mohammed had given his followers leave to practice "Takfir Wa'al Hijra" where they would worship and act as the rest of the community, even in pagan rituals, in order to protect themselves from persecution. This has been a common tactic among many cells that were derived from al Qaeda's core and immediate affiliates.
So, here we can understand that while analysts say that "not everyone can be al Qaeda or is al Qaeda", suggesting that these groups have tenuous links and are likely local groups with similar leanings, this is not necessarily correct. Neither is the idea that anyone "leaves al Qaeda", although some who have travelled the path to extremism and terrorism have renounced it, they have never been members of the core or base of al Qaeda.
Equally important is the way in which al Qaeda uses it's members or transfers them depending on their abilities or usefulness. Zubaydah is an example. After he was grievously wounded, leaving a hole in his skull and his various attempts to return to jihad were thwarted by this wound (he was once flipped by a trainee during combat training and lost consciousness; complained of his deteriorating eye sight), when he went to bin Laden and the Qaeda shoura to offer his services, they sent him where he would now be most useful: administrator of the House of Martyrs, funneling money, material and fighters back and forth to the camps as well as out to do operations.
Therefore, while al Libi may have had health issues and one of his intents was to participate in the uprising against Gaddafi, these are not the only "truths", but are true so much as he would publicly say about his endeavors. However, these truths may have reduced his usefulness in direct activity of al Qaeda planning and operations. Moving to and from safe houses, between groups, delivering information or acting as a commander in the field for direct attacks was likely no longer possible, thus, he moves to one of the other operations of al Qaeda.
In this instance, al Qaeda's attempts to set up organizations under the radar and separate from "terrorism" where they could claim some sort of protection against "persecution" as only a social movement. This being the establishment of an Ansar al Sharia in Libya.
Some analysts disagree that this is an al Qaeda operation and suggest that there is just a form of coincidence or copy cat activity were in similar grass roots organizations in different countries adopt the same name. Others believe this is al Qaeda "rebranding itself" because the name al Qaeda has become some what tainted by events in Iraq and other countries where al Qaeda pledged groups have consistently done things that undermine al Qaeda's image and message.
Based on the reading of Islamic history and the early establishment of Islam along with Qaedst interpretation and use as an operational guide, neither of these are likely correct assumptions. Instead, this should be viewed as an al Qaeda operation to establish a toe hold in these countries, in the same way they see the history of Islam where the "Ansar" or the "helpers" established a community within another community that were ready and able to assist the "muhajireen" (muhajirun; muhajir) or "refugees" (originally, Mohammed & his companions) when they arrive. In general, to pave the way.
It also suggests a higher order of planning and direction even as some analysts dispute the idea. Not all Ansar al Sharia supposedly have direct links to Al Qaeda. Even al Libi appeared to keep his distance and covered his existence (Takfir wa'al Hijra; forced practice of apostasy of the refugee) by returning to his family who he had been long separated from during his years as an active member of al Qaeda. Others appear to be established by like minded, but non-affiliated men who have trained in various jihad camps whose appearance to establish the same branded organizations suggest only a vague relationship to the ideology, not some central organization or organized plan.
Again, Zubaydah's diary suggests otherwise. While in Afghanistan there were many camps with different commanders or patrons. While some camps remained totally separate and refused to work with each other, they still cooperated nominally on the battlefield. Other camps routinely funneled men back and forth, some camps providing specialized or better training on one subject or another. More importantly, during book four and into book five of Zubaydah's diary, he discusses how the various sheikhs or leaders of the camps and/or their lieutenants often travel to a central camp (Kaldun) where they meet in a form of shoura council to discuss different matters, cooperation and general activities. Even indicating that he asks for trainers from these other camps, including bin Laden's, as well as some material support.
Later, due to these many meetings, Zubaydah reports that he is about to realize one of his great ambitions. Considering the time period, his continuous mention of furthering jihad and that he later ends up being the main manager for the flow of money, men and materials in and out of camps. Even more telling is that he goes to these meetings often, suggests that he knows something he can't write over and over again and then reports joyously on 9/11, including details of how the operation was supposed to unfold, after returning from one of these meetings.
Of course, there has been continuous debate about who Zubaydah is, his real role and any real connection to al Qaeda. Most importantly whether he represented #3 in the organization. However, all of this debate obscures the other details about how exactly these organizations work, sharing of resources, materials and people as well as inter-organizational operability. Cells for activities may come from once camp or they may be men drawn from separate training camps. Experts in bomb making go from camp to camp or have men sent to them for training and have, at times, travelled to locations where cells were set up and provided on site technical training or assistance.
Returning to the issue of names and their significance, the appearance of the organizations, their shared names, the history related to the names, their mirrored structure and activities, from social assistance to Da'wa to recruitment can hardly be coincidental. In short, the suggestion that this does not represent organization of efforts seems exceedingly shortsighted.
Further, these continuing issues of who is who and their connections seems to rely almost completely on our western ideas of how organizations form, plan and operate (hierarchy) as well as ideas of leadership. Our lack of understanding of the importance of the history of the beginning of Islam and it's spread to the Qaedist ideology leaves us continually grasping for direction when that direction has been laid out for us as they believe it has been laid out for them making names of organizations and their historical attachments important for determining their purpose.
For instance, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham):
The leaks maintain that he is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Bou Badri bin Armoush, known as Abu Awwad or Abu Doaa. Abu Bakr is an alias.
According to the leaks, Baghdadi worked in Fallujah and served as an imam in a mosque in Diyala. Baghdadi is not from Baghdad, since he belongs to the Bou Badri clan, which is a part of the Bou Abbas clan from Samarra, which claims to be a descendant of Imam al-Hassan Bin Ali. This means Abu Bakr has roots in the Quraish tribe, which is a condition for becoming an emir in a jihadi group. However, the Alawi Heritage Validation Organization, which authenticates Hashemite heritage, published a statement in 2009 maintaining that the Bou Badri are neither descendants of Mohammed al-Jawad nor of Bin Idris, and thus do not belong to the Hassans as they claim.
Note the second paragraph. Descendence from a particular line and it's relationship to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions is very important in regards to leadership or positions of authority. To become an "emir in a jihadi group", to be considered able to press the ideological foundations of Qaedism, returning to the "base" of Islam and rejecting all future corruptions, requires an authentic connection to the original "base" of Islam, either the Prophet or his Companions.
This is in some ways reflective of the tribal organization of the communities that still exist today where these patents of genealogy effectively establish the relationship of the tribe to others and where they reside within the classes of tribes. The groups themselves do not acknowledge any "classism" in their language (see Observation on Jihad; language of Ummah to cross all divides) and yet this very system of class (ie, assumed nobility and/or authority based on genealogy) is how they derive their powers or make relationships with tribes even if the tribes do not implicitly support their causes or endeavors.
So, if Baghdadi can claim to be from the Quraish tribe, having been an "Imam" or religious cleric, this gives him a kind of religious AND community authority. This would be true outside of jihad organizations, but is very important, particularly in his claim to be establishing "true and full sharia" (as one jihad Tweeter recently told me). He has the right by education, religious position and, very importantly, his inheritance or ancestry.
In some ways, this suggests a sort of mysticism, as if the knowledge of what was "real sharia" was passed down, not only by education and tradition, but through some genealogical carnation of inherent knowledge, ancestor to ancestor. In fact, a recent discussion on social media took place in which one commenter suggested that "it's in the DNA". An interesting take using modern science as a support for a mystical idea and mytho-historical ideology.
Baghdadi further sought to seal his position of authority, legalistically and ideologically, by claiming the name "Abu Bakr". In many cases, names like Abu Yayah or Abu Aissa, reference a familial connection. IE, Abu (Father of) Yayah (John). However, Baghdadi's use of Abu Bakr is much more about establishing his position of authority and authenticity by claiming the name of one of the Prophet Mohammed's first and foremost companions in Mecca who fled with him to Medina when Mohammed was under threat from local groups.
Abu Bakr also has the distinction of being one of Mohammed's most prolific proselytizers in the early days of establishing Islam. Likewise, he was a wealthy merchant in the city of Mecca that likely provided material assistance to Mohammed during his long periods of contemplation and revelation. Much like a patron, though Hadith or historical acknowledgements within Islam place him below Mohammed as only a "companion" or "apostle".
Another name of interest in regards to the flourishing of Qaedist ideology and groups who there appears to be great confusion over their relationship to al Qaeda core is "Ansar al Sharia", the Helpers of Sharia. While this seems simple to understand, that they are "helping" to establish "Sharia", the law of Islam", proselytizing, etc, it's helpful to understand the significance of the "ansar" or helpers in the story of Mohammed and the spread of Islam.
In the early days, Mohammed's followers were subject to rounds of persecution. The poorer or less connected of his followers were driven out of Mecca en masse at least twice before Mohammed himself was finally forced to flee. These groups had travelled to Medina and Abyssinia where they were better received and treated and where they proceeded to set up their own small communities. These were "muhijareen", or foreigners who travelled to other locations and helped spread the ideas of Mohammed.
The diaspora in Medina had offered Mohammed a place in their community many times, but he had refused to abandon Mecca for some time as he was intent on establishing his ideas there. When he was forced to flee, the "ansar", the helpers, arranged for his secret travel and reception into Medina. Thus, the "Ansar" today believe they are paving the way for the re-establishment of sharia, but, also, and possibly likely, based on their name, are the front for the introduction of Qaedist militants.
This is also established by how these groups begin. While some analysts see them as grass roots organizations within the areas they arise, that's not exactly true. Ansar al Sharia in Libya, for instance, has been linked to Al-Libi, a well known Qaedist and associate of Zawahiri. He claims to have quit Al Qaeda and returned to Libya only to participate against Gaddaffi and then due to his deteriorating health.
However, as the Qaedists ideology is based on mytho-historical concepts, it's important to recall this very early history of Islam. In which, during the early days of persecution, Mohammed had given his followers leave to practice "Takfir Wa'al Hijra" where they would worship and act as the rest of the community, even in pagan rituals, in order to protect themselves from persecution. This has been a common tactic among many cells that were derived from al Qaeda's core and immediate affiliates.
So, here we can understand that while analysts say that "not everyone can be al Qaeda or is al Qaeda", suggesting that these groups have tenuous links and are likely local groups with similar leanings, this is not necessarily correct. Neither is the idea that anyone "leaves al Qaeda", although some who have travelled the path to extremism and terrorism have renounced it, they have never been members of the core or base of al Qaeda.
Equally important is the way in which al Qaeda uses it's members or transfers them depending on their abilities or usefulness. Zubaydah is an example. After he was grievously wounded, leaving a hole in his skull and his various attempts to return to jihad were thwarted by this wound (he was once flipped by a trainee during combat training and lost consciousness; complained of his deteriorating eye sight), when he went to bin Laden and the Qaeda shoura to offer his services, they sent him where he would now be most useful: administrator of the House of Martyrs, funneling money, material and fighters back and forth to the camps as well as out to do operations.
Therefore, while al Libi may have had health issues and one of his intents was to participate in the uprising against Gaddafi, these are not the only "truths", but are true so much as he would publicly say about his endeavors. However, these truths may have reduced his usefulness in direct activity of al Qaeda planning and operations. Moving to and from safe houses, between groups, delivering information or acting as a commander in the field for direct attacks was likely no longer possible, thus, he moves to one of the other operations of al Qaeda.
In this instance, al Qaeda's attempts to set up organizations under the radar and separate from "terrorism" where they could claim some sort of protection against "persecution" as only a social movement. This being the establishment of an Ansar al Sharia in Libya.
Some analysts disagree that this is an al Qaeda operation and suggest that there is just a form of coincidence or copy cat activity were in similar grass roots organizations in different countries adopt the same name. Others believe this is al Qaeda "rebranding itself" because the name al Qaeda has become some what tainted by events in Iraq and other countries where al Qaeda pledged groups have consistently done things that undermine al Qaeda's image and message.
Based on the reading of Islamic history and the early establishment of Islam along with Qaedst interpretation and use as an operational guide, neither of these are likely correct assumptions. Instead, this should be viewed as an al Qaeda operation to establish a toe hold in these countries, in the same way they see the history of Islam where the "Ansar" or the "helpers" established a community within another community that were ready and able to assist the "muhajireen" (muhajirun; muhajir) or "refugees" (originally, Mohammed & his companions) when they arrive. In general, to pave the way.
It also suggests a higher order of planning and direction even as some analysts dispute the idea. Not all Ansar al Sharia supposedly have direct links to Al Qaeda. Even al Libi appeared to keep his distance and covered his existence (Takfir wa'al Hijra; forced practice of apostasy of the refugee) by returning to his family who he had been long separated from during his years as an active member of al Qaeda. Others appear to be established by like minded, but non-affiliated men who have trained in various jihad camps whose appearance to establish the same branded organizations suggest only a vague relationship to the ideology, not some central organization or organized plan.
Again, Zubaydah's diary suggests otherwise. While in Afghanistan there were many camps with different commanders or patrons. While some camps remained totally separate and refused to work with each other, they still cooperated nominally on the battlefield. Other camps routinely funneled men back and forth, some camps providing specialized or better training on one subject or another. More importantly, during book four and into book five of Zubaydah's diary, he discusses how the various sheikhs or leaders of the camps and/or their lieutenants often travel to a central camp (Kaldun) where they meet in a form of shoura council to discuss different matters, cooperation and general activities. Even indicating that he asks for trainers from these other camps, including bin Laden's, as well as some material support.
Later, due to these many meetings, Zubaydah reports that he is about to realize one of his great ambitions. Considering the time period, his continuous mention of furthering jihad and that he later ends up being the main manager for the flow of money, men and materials in and out of camps. Even more telling is that he goes to these meetings often, suggests that he knows something he can't write over and over again and then reports joyously on 9/11, including details of how the operation was supposed to unfold, after returning from one of these meetings.
Of course, there has been continuous debate about who Zubaydah is, his real role and any real connection to al Qaeda. Most importantly whether he represented #3 in the organization. However, all of this debate obscures the other details about how exactly these organizations work, sharing of resources, materials and people as well as inter-organizational operability. Cells for activities may come from once camp or they may be men drawn from separate training camps. Experts in bomb making go from camp to camp or have men sent to them for training and have, at times, travelled to locations where cells were set up and provided on site technical training or assistance.
Returning to the issue of names and their significance, the appearance of the organizations, their shared names, the history related to the names, their mirrored structure and activities, from social assistance to Da'wa to recruitment can hardly be coincidental. In short, the suggestion that this does not represent organization of efforts seems exceedingly shortsighted.
Further, these continuing issues of who is who and their connections seems to rely almost completely on our western ideas of how organizations form, plan and operate (hierarchy) as well as ideas of leadership. Our lack of understanding of the importance of the history of the beginning of Islam and it's spread to the Qaedist ideology leaves us continually grasping for direction when that direction has been laid out for us as they believe it has been laid out for them making names of organizations and their historical attachments important for determining their purpose.
Saturday, January 11, 2014
Video Alleged American General & SRF General Syria - YouTube
فيديو يظهر جولة قيادي في الجيش الحر مع جنرال امريكي داخل سوريا F&S - YouTube
According to the tweet that accompanied this video, this is an American General and a General of the SRF/SMC discussing positions in Syria. The location of the video is not clear, nor the time, though it has a recent time stamp.
According to the tweet that accompanied this video, this is an American General and a General of the SRF/SMC discussing positions in Syria. The location of the video is not clear, nor the time, though it has a recent time stamp.
Observing Jihad on Social Media: Jihad Free Speech, Moderation and the Influence of Networks.
There have been a plethora of studies done on what motivates young men to join the ranks of the Mujahedeen seeking jihad. From algorithmic studies on connectivity, political analysis to psycho-social evaluations of individuals and groups. What motivates someone to join an organization? To become a "terrorist"? Why is al Qaedism continuing to spread throughout the Middle East and further abroad? Should we even call it "Qaedism" as similar movements existed in Indonesia and the Philippines and many more places in between?
The fact of the matter is, this is not a strictly militant movement nor simply a religious idea as much as it is a socio-political movement. The reason that it spreads is consistent with many other movements throughout history including Islam's own history, Christianity, Buddhism, Communism, Fascism, Republicanism, etc. A brief review of basic sociologic concepts will show the long list of things inherent in a society that leads towards disaffection of individuals and whole groups of peoples to existing social, religious and political systems.
Disenfranchisement is commonly spoken of and is further broken down to familial, social, economic and political. Few mention the disenfranchisement from religion itself and the moral boundaries that it is supposed to set, forming one of the historical pillars of the social compact. Indeed, this is one of the chief complaints emanating from the ideological mavens of this current movement, that the system of morality, Islam, is under attack, culturally, socially, politically and physically by the encroachment of western mores, damaging the alleged cohesion of the greater Islamic Ummah. A grand myth of a one billion people social compact held together by faith alone.
Without fail, this over simplified idea of what holds a community together, how many greater and smaller social compacts exist, within many cultures and intertwine throughout the Ummah, is ignored or dismissed deliberately. It re-enforces the idea that all of the other reasons that may cause disenfranchisement are not the causes at all, but individuals and entire societies have been separated from this greater compact. It's a direct appeal to the basic human drive to belong to and be part of something greater than self. A common trait amongst all social movements, to attempt to bridge every divide or dismiss all other social structures.
Observing the discourse of Jihad on social media, specifically Twitter, has provided an interesting view of the many and varied supporters and active members of the Islamic Mujahedeen participating in the Syrian conflict. The levels of interaction, support and actual participation breakdown along many lines on social media. This interaction is generally viewed negatively by researchers and security analysts because of it's ability to reach people who might otherwise have had limited access to these networks.
The largest concern being the inculcation of radical ideas and the potential that "lone wolves" or cells may form to perform terrorist attacks on the West. The advent of the Syrian war itself and the many foreign fighters it has drawn in, that may also return to perform such attacks, also gives rise to security concerns.
In general, it appears that we have limited penetration into these social media networks although we can certainly observe them and the unending amount of information that it provides. Forums, the original and favorite places on the internet for these discourses have long been monitored, at times penetrated either for interaction, intelligence gathering or interruption. The latter two being the most predominant as establishing any identity or challenging ideas is made difficult by the constant monitoring of the forums by moderators, that the individuals are more cautious, aware of this monitoring and the moderators themselves can and do quickly shut down any line of conversation deemed dangerous.
However, social media like Facebook and Twitter are more prolific and less easy to monitor or moderate. While this proves problematic for the intelligence agencies and national security, it is also very problematic for the once capable militant Islamic moderators. Information about battles, people, places, types of weapons, materials and money flow as freely as any ideas are traded. Equally important are the types of interactions that occur and the fact that anyone and everyone can participate.
Where a moderator may have once been able to close a topic of discussion, restrict information or expel outsiders, the new media must be monitored by the individual account holders. The preferred method for developing a social media presence is to obtain as many followers as possible. Thus, either through sheer numbers that prevent good self monitoring or social calculation where one dissenting view out of five hundred accounts is an acceptable risk, dissenting views or followers may remain and those dissenting views range from mild to outright hostile.
As noted above, studies are underway to develop models of connectivity, to look for those who might form the hubs of this network and possibly interrupt the activities that range from moral boosting, proselytizing this new militant puritanism to recruiting to fund raising and beyond. These studies hope to evaluate the influence of individuals across their network and on nominal outsiders, but what may not be being studied is the reverse: the influence of outsiders on the network.
"Outsiders" is not a reference to agency infiltrators who may specifically be inserted into the network to disrupt that influence, but to those who are interested in the activities or who may directly oppose those activities. The Syria conflict again provides an interesting view of both of these types of outsiders on the established networks. It has also provided a view into the organizations themselves, with discussions occurring outside of any control. In short, Jihad Free Speech.
This is an interesting phenomena that the ideology of "Qaedism" has spawned unintentionally
and has increased dramatically with the proliferation of social media networks. As discussed here, "Qaedism" ideology, Militant Puritan Islam, is a militant "liberation" theology. Even though it espouses the idea that it is defending traditional Islam and the Ummah, it's actions and explicit ideology rejects the old orders of the faith built over many centuries.
For instance, who may issue a fatwa or judgment? Who may declare jihad and under what conditions? Who may go to jihad and do they need to seek permission from their parents or leaders? Do they need to obey their leaders? Can they question their leaders or offer council outside of any traditional lines or shuras (councils)?
The current militant puritan Islamic ideology has broken almost every traditional, established and acknowledged rule even as they attempt to establish a mirror to these traditions within their own groups. Lesser known scholars, imams and judges have issued fatwas (religious rulings) that support the ideologies ideas and, in some cases, men with little or no religious training or credentials.. They've used a variety of platforms to proliferate these rulings and judgments outside of what was once a very legalistic and defined system. Whenever these may be challenged by traditional or more highly respected scholars, clerics and judges, they routinely choose to ignore those rulings, refute them with more of their own or outright deny them legitimacy because they consider the source to be "corrupt" as they are working for or under the influence of "corrupt" states and leaders.
By that reasoning they have proceeded to deny all other traditions or laws, traditions and laws that were based on years of jurisprudence and scholarly enterprise, asserting other traditions and laws to primacy that had previously been restricted in use and acceptance. Most traditional views insist that leadership cannot be overthrown accept under very specific reasons where that leadership may harm Islam or the Ummah. Designating almost every leader of the Islamic nations as "corrupt", they insist it's their right to overthrow that leadership.
Where once it was asserted that those seeking jihad had to ask parental permission, the ideology insists that the duty for jihad comes first and that it's incumbent for every able bodies male Muslim to answer the call, even if it's not by a recognized leader. Going so far as to suggest that young men seeking jihad should not even let familial concerns, tribal, community or state leadership hinder participation, breaking every traditional community relationship.
The list goes on and this break has been furthered by the advent of the internet where Muslims who would have once referred their questions or sought council from their local Imam's or community leaders, now can go online to many sources to ask questions and receive answers. Where they may have relied on their immediate community for social acceptance and guidance, they may find this community anywhere on the internet, including social media networks.
What is more interesting is that these networks allow them to discuss issues amongst themselves that might other wise have been taboo in their families or communities. Current studies focus on the proliferation of the Qaedist ideology and violent extremism while ignoring in some ways the phenomena of "free speech", one of the many taboos within most Islamic societies, and the possibility of moderating effect.
Where moderators in the forums shut questions down, on social networking sites, the questions and concerns can go on and on, moving from one account to the next. One issue noted here, was the question of suicide bombings or "martyrdom attacks" where it was questioned whether this was really an acceptable method of attack against a fellow mujahedeen and, since it was not against an actual enemy of Islam, but in regards to an internal dispute, did that negate the designation of "martyr" and any concomitant rewards?
Another discussion rose up over the use of "takfir", designating another Muslim an apostate, also once considered only ascribable by a select few judges and rarely used. In this discussion the accusation that one group, ISIS, had proclaimed others "takfir" was roundly debated, with many insisting that ISIS had never "made takfir" on anyone. Which was then refuted when Abu Bakr released a statement that, indeed, did proclaim all of those not part of the recognized Islamist organizations and mujahedeen, "takfiri".
Another round of arguments ensued over the right and wrong, the why, the who and the how that this was declared. This included the insertion of some secular rebel elements or supporters to the argument, not just the jihad cadre and supporters. In some cases, those who generally supported ISIS acquiesced that it might have been wrong for that declaration to have been made, a few became entrenched in their views that ISIS was correct to name them "takfiri" while many outside participants who had only participated on the margins seemed to go away dissatisfied, confused and somewhat disturbed, if not a little disillusioned, by this entire event.
This occurred again when the discussion over ISIS crimes drew recriminations and accusations from all sides, each blaming the other for committing different crimes, in some ways attempting to abrogate the guilt, suggesting others were just as bad or that it was war and terrible things happened. Several times, members of the discussion attempted to moderate or shut the discussion down, but it went on for some time. Again, the secular rebel supporters joined in, but the most interesting discussions occurred among the jihad cadre and those nominal supporters far away in other countries. And, again, some of the nominal supporters expressed dissatisfaction and mild disturbance.
To comprehend the importance of these discussions, the advent of "Jihad Free Speech", we must also understand the reason why jihad and the idea of mujahedeen is attractive to many. It's portrayed as a noble, if not knightly and chivalrous idea, surrounded in mytho-historical mystique. Pictures are routinely circulated of groups of men or individuals posing with a banner and their weapons or at times holding the index finger of their right hand aloft signifying the Tawhid, or oneness of God and implying the unity of all Muslims.
While the advent of social media may seem to spread this idea and mystique, it also serves to break it as the activities and behaviors are openly debated. Questions that outsiders may have had in the past that they could not discuss or could only get answers through closed forums, reading online literature that did not provide feed back or watching a video, even when they could leave questions and get answers, sometimes waiting days, are now answered immediately. More importantly, they are not just answered by a single source or a few veteran practitioners, but everybody and anybody with a multitude of experience and answers, even highly dissenting views.
This may not be the case on all social media, but Twitter, largely open to all comers, even people who don't have to "follow" to answer, is the ultimate purveyor of this free speech. This explains one of the reasons why the core leadership of the Jihad groups have repeatedly called for these conversations to go back into the highly moderated forums. Not only to protect information that might be useful to intelligence, but also to protect their image and the ideology.
Because, even as they "liberate" Islam from it's traditional structures, they try to define it and limit the expansion of this "liberation" to within their own limited structures. Yet, through their very acts and the use of liberating technology, have opened their ideas up to continuous debate. While this may remain on some peripheral parts of the network, the effects difficult to monitor and the virulent spread of these networks a paramount concern, this phenomena should not be ignored.
Often, the most moderating force on an ideology and society are the people within that society that the ideology purports to represent. The second most moderating force are those who are outside that choose to interact with it and counter the ideology.
The fact of the matter is, this is not a strictly militant movement nor simply a religious idea as much as it is a socio-political movement. The reason that it spreads is consistent with many other movements throughout history including Islam's own history, Christianity, Buddhism, Communism, Fascism, Republicanism, etc. A brief review of basic sociologic concepts will show the long list of things inherent in a society that leads towards disaffection of individuals and whole groups of peoples to existing social, religious and political systems.
Disenfranchisement is commonly spoken of and is further broken down to familial, social, economic and political. Few mention the disenfranchisement from religion itself and the moral boundaries that it is supposed to set, forming one of the historical pillars of the social compact. Indeed, this is one of the chief complaints emanating from the ideological mavens of this current movement, that the system of morality, Islam, is under attack, culturally, socially, politically and physically by the encroachment of western mores, damaging the alleged cohesion of the greater Islamic Ummah. A grand myth of a one billion people social compact held together by faith alone.
Without fail, this over simplified idea of what holds a community together, how many greater and smaller social compacts exist, within many cultures and intertwine throughout the Ummah, is ignored or dismissed deliberately. It re-enforces the idea that all of the other reasons that may cause disenfranchisement are not the causes at all, but individuals and entire societies have been separated from this greater compact. It's a direct appeal to the basic human drive to belong to and be part of something greater than self. A common trait amongst all social movements, to attempt to bridge every divide or dismiss all other social structures.
Observing the discourse of Jihad on social media, specifically Twitter, has provided an interesting view of the many and varied supporters and active members of the Islamic Mujahedeen participating in the Syrian conflict. The levels of interaction, support and actual participation breakdown along many lines on social media. This interaction is generally viewed negatively by researchers and security analysts because of it's ability to reach people who might otherwise have had limited access to these networks.
The largest concern being the inculcation of radical ideas and the potential that "lone wolves" or cells may form to perform terrorist attacks on the West. The advent of the Syrian war itself and the many foreign fighters it has drawn in, that may also return to perform such attacks, also gives rise to security concerns.
In general, it appears that we have limited penetration into these social media networks although we can certainly observe them and the unending amount of information that it provides. Forums, the original and favorite places on the internet for these discourses have long been monitored, at times penetrated either for interaction, intelligence gathering or interruption. The latter two being the most predominant as establishing any identity or challenging ideas is made difficult by the constant monitoring of the forums by moderators, that the individuals are more cautious, aware of this monitoring and the moderators themselves can and do quickly shut down any line of conversation deemed dangerous.
However, social media like Facebook and Twitter are more prolific and less easy to monitor or moderate. While this proves problematic for the intelligence agencies and national security, it is also very problematic for the once capable militant Islamic moderators. Information about battles, people, places, types of weapons, materials and money flow as freely as any ideas are traded. Equally important are the types of interactions that occur and the fact that anyone and everyone can participate.
Where a moderator may have once been able to close a topic of discussion, restrict information or expel outsiders, the new media must be monitored by the individual account holders. The preferred method for developing a social media presence is to obtain as many followers as possible. Thus, either through sheer numbers that prevent good self monitoring or social calculation where one dissenting view out of five hundred accounts is an acceptable risk, dissenting views or followers may remain and those dissenting views range from mild to outright hostile.
As noted above, studies are underway to develop models of connectivity, to look for those who might form the hubs of this network and possibly interrupt the activities that range from moral boosting, proselytizing this new militant puritanism to recruiting to fund raising and beyond. These studies hope to evaluate the influence of individuals across their network and on nominal outsiders, but what may not be being studied is the reverse: the influence of outsiders on the network.
"Outsiders" is not a reference to agency infiltrators who may specifically be inserted into the network to disrupt that influence, but to those who are interested in the activities or who may directly oppose those activities. The Syria conflict again provides an interesting view of both of these types of outsiders on the established networks. It has also provided a view into the organizations themselves, with discussions occurring outside of any control. In short, Jihad Free Speech.
This is an interesting phenomena that the ideology of "Qaedism" has spawned unintentionally
and has increased dramatically with the proliferation of social media networks. As discussed here, "Qaedism" ideology, Militant Puritan Islam, is a militant "liberation" theology. Even though it espouses the idea that it is defending traditional Islam and the Ummah, it's actions and explicit ideology rejects the old orders of the faith built over many centuries.
For instance, who may issue a fatwa or judgment? Who may declare jihad and under what conditions? Who may go to jihad and do they need to seek permission from their parents or leaders? Do they need to obey their leaders? Can they question their leaders or offer council outside of any traditional lines or shuras (councils)?
The current militant puritan Islamic ideology has broken almost every traditional, established and acknowledged rule even as they attempt to establish a mirror to these traditions within their own groups. Lesser known scholars, imams and judges have issued fatwas (religious rulings) that support the ideologies ideas and, in some cases, men with little or no religious training or credentials.. They've used a variety of platforms to proliferate these rulings and judgments outside of what was once a very legalistic and defined system. Whenever these may be challenged by traditional or more highly respected scholars, clerics and judges, they routinely choose to ignore those rulings, refute them with more of their own or outright deny them legitimacy because they consider the source to be "corrupt" as they are working for or under the influence of "corrupt" states and leaders.
By that reasoning they have proceeded to deny all other traditions or laws, traditions and laws that were based on years of jurisprudence and scholarly enterprise, asserting other traditions and laws to primacy that had previously been restricted in use and acceptance. Most traditional views insist that leadership cannot be overthrown accept under very specific reasons where that leadership may harm Islam or the Ummah. Designating almost every leader of the Islamic nations as "corrupt", they insist it's their right to overthrow that leadership.
Where once it was asserted that those seeking jihad had to ask parental permission, the ideology insists that the duty for jihad comes first and that it's incumbent for every able bodies male Muslim to answer the call, even if it's not by a recognized leader. Going so far as to suggest that young men seeking jihad should not even let familial concerns, tribal, community or state leadership hinder participation, breaking every traditional community relationship.
The list goes on and this break has been furthered by the advent of the internet where Muslims who would have once referred their questions or sought council from their local Imam's or community leaders, now can go online to many sources to ask questions and receive answers. Where they may have relied on their immediate community for social acceptance and guidance, they may find this community anywhere on the internet, including social media networks.
What is more interesting is that these networks allow them to discuss issues amongst themselves that might other wise have been taboo in their families or communities. Current studies focus on the proliferation of the Qaedist ideology and violent extremism while ignoring in some ways the phenomena of "free speech", one of the many taboos within most Islamic societies, and the possibility of moderating effect.
Where moderators in the forums shut questions down, on social networking sites, the questions and concerns can go on and on, moving from one account to the next. One issue noted here, was the question of suicide bombings or "martyrdom attacks" where it was questioned whether this was really an acceptable method of attack against a fellow mujahedeen and, since it was not against an actual enemy of Islam, but in regards to an internal dispute, did that negate the designation of "martyr" and any concomitant rewards?
Another discussion rose up over the use of "takfir", designating another Muslim an apostate, also once considered only ascribable by a select few judges and rarely used. In this discussion the accusation that one group, ISIS, had proclaimed others "takfir" was roundly debated, with many insisting that ISIS had never "made takfir" on anyone. Which was then refuted when Abu Bakr released a statement that, indeed, did proclaim all of those not part of the recognized Islamist organizations and mujahedeen, "takfiri".
Another round of arguments ensued over the right and wrong, the why, the who and the how that this was declared. This included the insertion of some secular rebel elements or supporters to the argument, not just the jihad cadre and supporters. In some cases, those who generally supported ISIS acquiesced that it might have been wrong for that declaration to have been made, a few became entrenched in their views that ISIS was correct to name them "takfiri" while many outside participants who had only participated on the margins seemed to go away dissatisfied, confused and somewhat disturbed, if not a little disillusioned, by this entire event.
This occurred again when the discussion over ISIS crimes drew recriminations and accusations from all sides, each blaming the other for committing different crimes, in some ways attempting to abrogate the guilt, suggesting others were just as bad or that it was war and terrible things happened. Several times, members of the discussion attempted to moderate or shut the discussion down, but it went on for some time. Again, the secular rebel supporters joined in, but the most interesting discussions occurred among the jihad cadre and those nominal supporters far away in other countries. And, again, some of the nominal supporters expressed dissatisfaction and mild disturbance.
To comprehend the importance of these discussions, the advent of "Jihad Free Speech", we must also understand the reason why jihad and the idea of mujahedeen is attractive to many. It's portrayed as a noble, if not knightly and chivalrous idea, surrounded in mytho-historical mystique. Pictures are routinely circulated of groups of men or individuals posing with a banner and their weapons or at times holding the index finger of their right hand aloft signifying the Tawhid, or oneness of God and implying the unity of all Muslims.
While the advent of social media may seem to spread this idea and mystique, it also serves to break it as the activities and behaviors are openly debated. Questions that outsiders may have had in the past that they could not discuss or could only get answers through closed forums, reading online literature that did not provide feed back or watching a video, even when they could leave questions and get answers, sometimes waiting days, are now answered immediately. More importantly, they are not just answered by a single source or a few veteran practitioners, but everybody and anybody with a multitude of experience and answers, even highly dissenting views.
This may not be the case on all social media, but Twitter, largely open to all comers, even people who don't have to "follow" to answer, is the ultimate purveyor of this free speech. This explains one of the reasons why the core leadership of the Jihad groups have repeatedly called for these conversations to go back into the highly moderated forums. Not only to protect information that might be useful to intelligence, but also to protect their image and the ideology.
Because, even as they "liberate" Islam from it's traditional structures, they try to define it and limit the expansion of this "liberation" to within their own limited structures. Yet, through their very acts and the use of liberating technology, have opened their ideas up to continuous debate. While this may remain on some peripheral parts of the network, the effects difficult to monitor and the virulent spread of these networks a paramount concern, this phenomena should not be ignored.
Often, the most moderating force on an ideology and society are the people within that society that the ideology purports to represent. The second most moderating force are those who are outside that choose to interact with it and counter the ideology.
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