In 2005, a letter written from Al Zawahiri to Zarqawi in Iraq was captured. In it we saw the first inkling of understanding about the information war that is an essential part of every war. Not only did Zawahiri note the bad reputation that Zarqawi was giving their cause by killing more Muslims than Americans, he made a definitive statement outlining the importance of the information war:
"Half the battle is in the media."
This is not a new concept. Information and disinformation campaigns have been a part of war since ancient times. Some examples would include the story of Alexander the Great and the Oracle of Delphi where his personal historian puts it about that the Oracle had essentially declared Alexander the Son of Zeus, a demi-god. This was used more than once in order to suggest Alexander's divine right to rule and, in the face of his enemies, a nearly immortal warrior whose forces were protected and acting by the grace of divine beings. A powerful statement made even more powerful by tales of actual battles that appeared to prove this fact.
Another ancient example of a powerful information campaign is the story of Genghis Kahn and the 10,000 head pyramid at the gates of Samarkand. This is one of many fierce stories of Genghis' exploits that included sometimes huge exaggerations of his forces and capabilities, using diversionary tactics as well as camouflaging the actual size of his forces by tying brush to the tails of their horses or forcing women and children to march in the train. True or not, as the stories of the campaigns in Khorasan made their way through the countryside, whole cities were induced to throw open their gates to avoid similar slaughter without any struggle.
In modern times, one of the more notable disinformation campaigns from World War II was the alleged build up of Allied forces in England, suggesting that these forces would be crossing to land at Calais, the closest landing point in France. This included disseminating stories to the press, pictures of wooden and blow up tanks and planes, and the placement of a large number of troops so that any reconnaissance from the air or spies would report this same information to the Germans. Many other disinformation campaigns were carried out. Instead, as is well known, massive Allied Forces were gathered near Devon and landed in Normandy on June 6. The rest, as they say, is history.
From these we can understand that information and disinformation plays a vital role in developing and carrying out strategies and specific campaigns. In the example of the Normandy invasion, history also informs us that, even though leaks occur and the reality of a situation can be right in front of the faces of the public as well as the enemy, insisting that the disinformation is still the correct information can continue to obscure the plan and allow a strategy or campaign to continue, even to success. Some people directly participate in this disinformation and information campaign, others are incidentally drawn into it, useful and often unknowing tools.
In the current struggle, this is no exception. Al Qaeda has used both tools to forward it's activities or cover it's mistakes. The United States and it's allies in the West and across the region have done the same. Both have used the latest media tools, from traditional media to the internet and social media in their information campaigns. No side, no country, no organization is innocent of these activities. Both have insisted that something is true when it is not or partially, even when the truth can be seen by the public.
All is fair in war and history is written by the victors. Or, anyone left standing to write their histories for their public's consumption.
The struggle with this revolutionary movement currently called "Al Qaeda" has been on going for over two decades although we may accept that the official "start" of outright war was declared in 1996 and again in 1998. The Western public typically links this to September 11, 2001 when instead of seeming minor "terrorist" events, that date represents a major act of war often compared in size and scope to December 7, 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor.
However, the United States and it's Allies did not accept this as an absolute act of war as it was not perpetrated openly by any nation state, but labeled it terrorism, thus beginning the Counter Offensive called the Global War on Terror. Many have complained about this naming device. From the rejection of the idea that this is "Global War", to the rejection of "Terror" as a tactic as opposed to a group of people, to the more literalists who would rather that it be described as a war with Islamic Extremists.
The purpose of referring to it as a war on "terror" was to both delegitimize any group participating as being simple, murderous criminals as well as avoid the issue of their claims to be fighting on behalf of a one billion strong population of Muslims. One of the core claims of "Al Qaeda" and a primary part of their information campaign. This idea did not satisfy many and, in fact, has later been used to stir up discontent among Muslim populations within the West and abroad who feel offended at being routinely, by their standards, lumped together as "terrorists".
Obviously, this had to be dealt with in order to prevent that disaffection turning into greater support for "Al Qaeda" across this population. Also, calling it a "Global War" had it's own bad connotations by suggesting, in deed, that the claims of "Al Qaeda" were true, that they were all around the globe in large numbers doing exactly what they claimed: fighting to free Muslims by being at war with the West. There was, and still is, very little acceptance of referring to the culprits as "Islamic Extremists" or by the cooperative name the groups had announced "Global Islamic Jihad Front" written on the 1998 declaration of war.
Instead, we have the Obama administration presenting a new strategy white paper in 2011 stating that the United States was at war with Al Qaeda, but, interestingly, referring to each branch as a separate and distinct entity such as Core Al Qaeda (AQC), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda In the Meghreb (AQIM), etc. This is meant to suggest these groups are smaller, localized and have a more tenuous attachment to the central leadership. This strategy is, again, meant to delegitimize the size, scope and ability of the organization, not only to the population they wish to win over, but within the organization itself as well as to the greater world.
It even suggests the over all US strategy: to attack these areas and groups as separate entities using strategies and tactics best suited to defeat each section or locale, leading to the over all defeat (we hope) of the entire organization. We do this by supporting local governments with money, intelligence, weapons and even consultative and training forces creating regional (think "global") army, defusing cost and effort while creating force multipliers. A necessity when fighting a long war.
This naming problem, it's information value as well as strategic importance is also a problem for "Al Qaeda". In the 17 letters released in May 2012, we see the leadership council discussing it amongst themselves. For instance, the US has successfully reduced the Al Qaeda name to just those two words and, per AQC, has disassociated the group from it's cause as well as from the people they wish most to influence on their behalf, the Muslim Ummah (community). They also discuss how events in the past had impacted the value of that name, had caused great focus to be placed on their central organization and, if any other group takes it up, could lead to that group being tarnished and targeted.
The men discuss the possibility of renaming the group as well as suggestions for insuring other groups, who are not part of the militant base but participating in other low profile activities, should be named something that suggests their work in spreading their ideology. It is interesting to note that the released document with the suggested names is actually incomplete, cut off at page 3 of a longer document. Here we can see that the US does not want to let the group know what we know about their organization while simultaneously informing them that the US does know. Meaning also that those on the outside do not know what the intelligence agencies might actually have in regards to what names may relate to now existing organizations. Those outside include enemy forces, western or middle east populations and, to the consternation of academia, open source analysts.
In the midst of this, there are a number of analysts trying to make sense of the organization and what is happening inside of it and to it. There are any number of current and former public officials, elected and appointed, making numerous statements. Some of them quite obviously geared towards shaping the public perception of policy and strategy. Al Qaeda, for want of a better name and in keeping with policy, makes its own statements and plans, some of which are known due to these 17 Letters.
In that time, Al Qaeda has been pronounced dead or dying several times. Osama bin Laden's demise not only obfuscating the reality of the network, but lending to the shaping of policy and strategy. Clearly, at the same time, the groups within this network are working hard to expand their capabilities while also suffering set backs and attempting to obfuscate their activities and losses. Each event being analyzed against the backdrop of the locale and individual group, trying to determine each group's status. This is not completely wrong unless each separate event is being used to analyze the entire picture that is "Al Qaeda" network as opposed to the other way around.
This leads to Benghazi, September 11, 2012, the death of Ambassador Stevens, a movie and so called "AQ linked" terrorists or terrorist groups. Looking at the broad picture, obviously September 11 is an important date for the Al Qaeda organization. Every year since September 11, this group has gone to great pains to release a statement on or around that time. In fact, this is discussed several times in the 17 Letters from Abbottabad.
The 17 letters lay out both a broad strategy for Al Qaeda and it's associates as well as directions for conducting an array of activities, some in great detail. An example is bin Laden giving specific directions regarding avoiding drone strikes, intelligence efforts and the security of his son. One of those broad strategies include:
of those countries, especially diplomats. The kidnapping of
diplomats of a country is far more embarrassing to that country
than the kidnapping of ordinary citizens. The pressure on that
country to free its diplomats is far greater than to free
ordinary citizens.
Here bin Laden is directing all associated groups and commanders to conduct kidnappings of citizens and diplomats. He specifically suggests any countries that are assisting the United States, particularly any who have forces deployed to Afghanistan. This is in 2011, just prior to bin Laden's demise.
We can see that this is being carried out throughout the areas that Al Qaeda associates exist including Libya where a Korean commerce official was kidnapped as well as Egyptian diplomats. In Yemen they managed to kidnap an Iranian diplomat. AQIM's most famous raid against the Ain Amenas Gas Plant in Algeria 2012. In the Palestinian Territories, a convoy carrying German diplomats was fired upon in a likely kidnapping attempt. Those are just the most recent or noted events and some, without direct claim, might be contributable to simple banditry. Yet, it would be completely irresponsible to suggest that these do not have any link to the directions given by bin Laden in these letters.
It would also be irresponsible to suggest that this would not apply to American citizens and diplomats even if the language seems to point out allied countries. Particularly when , throughout the 17 letters, bin Laden continues to exhort focusing attacks on the United States and it's interests. Repeatedly. Anyone inside the network or hanging around the fringes would have received this message loud and clear.
We know that several demonstrations occurred in different countries on September 11 at various US embassies. One might assume that US embassies, protests and September 11 simply go together, but that would assume that there is a giant protest outside of US embassies every September 11 in all of these countries and that is not historically true. Of note are three particular protests. The first in Pakistan organized by Al Qaeda's nearest and dearest partners in the area, the TTP, Terhik I Talibani Pakistan. The second in Cairo, Egypt, organized by Zawahiri's brother, Mohammed Zawahiri with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Ayman Zawahiri's original group), that stormed the walls and raised the Black Flag over the embassy. The Third significant was Benghazi, Libya where Ambassador Stevens met his demise.
This is carried out, per various government reports, by several allegedly disperate groups who are either "Al Qaeda linked" or have "Al Qaeda linked members" and has been alternately suggested as a purely spontaneous effort or "Al Qaeda inspired". Which is some fancy hair splitting to obfuscate the point that at least one or more of these groups and individuals is, in fact, part of the Al Qaeda network and did act on a strategic direction given by bin Laden even if it was not a current order or even coordinated with the central council. Something we don't actually know given the murkiness of their communication lines and our own intelligence unwilling to share that information.
These groups met at the consulate at approximately 9:40 and almost immediately proceeded to storm the building, leading to the death of Ambassador Stevens. They then went onto the "annex" and proceeded to lay down a large amount of firepower including the accurate use of mortar fire. Which seems to be less spontaneous and definitively coordinated, including apparent knowledge and reconnaissance of this area.
Who is fooling whom? Does this make the groups or individuals members of "Al Qaeda"? Does this make this an "Al Qaeda plot"? In the broad sense of the term, the answer is "yes" if we assume that there was a broad strategy iterated by bin Laden, likely endorsed by his leadership council, disseminated out among the various jihad groups via the network and then acted upon. The question of these groups affiliations then comes down to the hair splitting question of are they actually "Al Qaeda" as in having given bayah to Zawahiri & recognized by him as a member of Al Qaeda?
This is where the problem becomes more confusing. None of these groups have publicly stated that relationship and neither has Zawahiri who has been busy since Bin Laden's death actually admitting or recognizing groups to the common network. Those groups include al Shabaab in Somalia, Jahmat al Nusra in Syria. This was also a discussion amongst bin Laden, Zawahiri and others in the leadership council where bin Laden, seeming to have the last word at the time, suggested that this was problematic and did not fit with the broader strategy outlined in the letters.
That strategy, noted above and in Lessons from Abbottabad, is to maintain the links to these groups as shadowy as possibly while maintaining their local flavor in order to provide them room to do the basic work: spreading their ideology, building a shadow state and getting ready for the moment when they would be prepared to rise up and declare a state. This is to keep the target off these group's backs as much as possible while still working towards the goal.
"The Girl Scout Way", which is to have small local groups who act in their area, work within & through a larger network, refer to themselves as a local designation, even though they themselves consider their group to be part of the Islamic Jihad movement whose leadership council includes al Qaeda as the most politically powerful group at the table. The Al Qaeda leadership has held the "chair" on the council for decades. Many of these groups do not believe they are under any obligation to give bayah (swear allegiance) to Al Qaeda or Zawahiri to be part of this movement. Yet, if they were asked, they would, to a man, declare themselves mujahedeen committing jihad.
It would seem very simple then to cut to the chase and call these groups what they are, designate them as terrorists and go after them openly, forcefully and relentlessly. Where that runs afoul is in policy and strategy, the information and disinformation war, clearly the most significant reason why the State Department, Intelligence spokespeople and the White House refuse to acknowledge these links and obvious strategy of Al Qaeda and the council. Even though we can publicly see these groups interacting and have access to the strategy outlined in the 17 Letters.
We also know that it's been the long time strategy of Al Qaeda to fight a "Long War" where they bleed the United States and it's allies through "a thousand cuts", provoking outsized reactions in order to induce over spending on blood and treasure, forcing a "collapse" as they believe they did to the USSR in Afghanistan. Equally important, and re-emphasized in the 17 Letters, is the hope that such over-reaction will provoke a reaction from the greater Muslim population, bringing more fighters and money into their organization.
Our own strategy has turned to mirror that strategy by reducing our footprint and enabling local governments, with much more support from their own populations, to confront these groups. Pretending, as Al Qaeda does, that these are purely local phenomena with local solutions. In fact, creating a kind of force multiplier while the US and her allies conserve or rebuild their capabilities to confront anything that might arise as bigger and more threatening. Whether that be the Islamic Jihad movement in the Middle East or a threat in Asia.
The problem turns to explaining that to the public in some way that a) states a strategy without giving it wholly away to the enemy even though it can guess what that strategy is by public actions; b) keeps the public's fire burning, but banked to be able to continue to confront the threat; c) not let the worst tendencies of public opinion force a change in strategy and do exactly what Al Qaeda and the Global Islamic Jihad council would like, commit another army to smashing around the area; d) allows us to continue to pursue and destroy these groups quietly and as clandestinely possible as they attempt to operate.
All of which requires an information and disinformation campaign that suffers due to the very public nature and connectedness of modern communications. Which isn't that new, considering the WWII and invasion of Normandy example where a crossword puzzle with the names of operations was published in the media, all sorts of leaks occurred and, yet, the allies continued to act as if it was wholly false.
This will likely result in any administration in power to have to take it's licks politically while continuing to do what they were elected to do: keep the United States safe and steady in the face of on going conflict. It will also continue to result in a very confused and divided population that will use this very conflict between policy, strategy and information to deliver those political licks. At some point, the obvious may become so glaringly obvious or another devastating terrorist attack may occur that forces the United States and it's allies to change course on the tactical use of information.
Finally, we arrive at analysts and analysis, mostly outside of the intelligence agencies, but possibly inside as well, who are trying to fathom some truth out of the mess. A mess complicated, as Mrr. Gerenstein-Ross has stated, by the clandestine nature of both the Global Islamic Jihad movement and the nature of our own intelligence, muddled further by barely articulated policy and strategy with active information and disinformation campaigns from all sides.
The first defense is to recognize that, indeed, all of the things articulated in the last paragraph are true. "Half the battle is in the media" meaning that not only is it likely that the enemy is trying to mislead us, but that those in trusted positions, even ones considered a reliable source, may be doing so as well; because they believe it is the right policy and needs to be furthered or because they are held by oath of office to do so.
These are not terrible things as much as they make the job harder to accomplish. We are in the middle of a conflict where all things are fair. What needs to be recalled is why analysts outside of the policy and intelligence agencies are doing these analysis. Is it strictly for the benefit of academic careers, supporting public policy or is it equally and more importantly to provide the best information to the public as well as policy makers to insure the best decisions are made?
This is a very important function of the open source analysts community. Because, if analysts fail to remain independent and follow the precepts of their profession, analysts may end up simply re-confirming bad information amongst themselves and the public, leading to continuous cycle of bad policies that leads to devastating attacks.
In short, analysts should not consider information synonymous with the truth nor confuse public policy and strategy as actual analysis of a situation.
Al Qaeda may be dead. Or, as Mary Harf recently suggested "Core Al Qaeda is mostly dead" because most of the original planners or leaders of 9/11 are dead or in prison. Both of these assumptions may come as a complete surprise to Zawahiri who continues to issue statements in it's name and to the groups within the network who continue to follow his "advice", recognizing in speech and adherence, an organization called "Al Qa'idat al Jihad" and it's leader "Dr. Zawahiri".
As of the close of this writing, Al Qa'idat al Jihad has publicly disavowed an organization called ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, referring to them as just another "Jahmaat" or group, not a state, and calling all others to fall in line with that pronouncement, even as it leaves the door open for consultation with ISIS to mend it's ways. We may know the power of Al Qaeda and Zawahiri over the Islamic Jihad movement and the over all network by the response this message receives.
Then we may actually know if, as Phillip Mudd said in April 2013, "Al Qaeda is dead, the revolution lives on."
"Half the battle is in the media."
This is not a new concept. Information and disinformation campaigns have been a part of war since ancient times. Some examples would include the story of Alexander the Great and the Oracle of Delphi where his personal historian puts it about that the Oracle had essentially declared Alexander the Son of Zeus, a demi-god. This was used more than once in order to suggest Alexander's divine right to rule and, in the face of his enemies, a nearly immortal warrior whose forces were protected and acting by the grace of divine beings. A powerful statement made even more powerful by tales of actual battles that appeared to prove this fact.
Another ancient example of a powerful information campaign is the story of Genghis Kahn and the 10,000 head pyramid at the gates of Samarkand. This is one of many fierce stories of Genghis' exploits that included sometimes huge exaggerations of his forces and capabilities, using diversionary tactics as well as camouflaging the actual size of his forces by tying brush to the tails of their horses or forcing women and children to march in the train. True or not, as the stories of the campaigns in Khorasan made their way through the countryside, whole cities were induced to throw open their gates to avoid similar slaughter without any struggle.
In modern times, one of the more notable disinformation campaigns from World War II was the alleged build up of Allied forces in England, suggesting that these forces would be crossing to land at Calais, the closest landing point in France. This included disseminating stories to the press, pictures of wooden and blow up tanks and planes, and the placement of a large number of troops so that any reconnaissance from the air or spies would report this same information to the Germans. Many other disinformation campaigns were carried out. Instead, as is well known, massive Allied Forces were gathered near Devon and landed in Normandy on June 6. The rest, as they say, is history.
From these we can understand that information and disinformation plays a vital role in developing and carrying out strategies and specific campaigns. In the example of the Normandy invasion, history also informs us that, even though leaks occur and the reality of a situation can be right in front of the faces of the public as well as the enemy, insisting that the disinformation is still the correct information can continue to obscure the plan and allow a strategy or campaign to continue, even to success. Some people directly participate in this disinformation and information campaign, others are incidentally drawn into it, useful and often unknowing tools.
In the current struggle, this is no exception. Al Qaeda has used both tools to forward it's activities or cover it's mistakes. The United States and it's allies in the West and across the region have done the same. Both have used the latest media tools, from traditional media to the internet and social media in their information campaigns. No side, no country, no organization is innocent of these activities. Both have insisted that something is true when it is not or partially, even when the truth can be seen by the public.
All is fair in war and history is written by the victors. Or, anyone left standing to write their histories for their public's consumption.
The struggle with this revolutionary movement currently called "Al Qaeda" has been on going for over two decades although we may accept that the official "start" of outright war was declared in 1996 and again in 1998. The Western public typically links this to September 11, 2001 when instead of seeming minor "terrorist" events, that date represents a major act of war often compared in size and scope to December 7, 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor.
However, the United States and it's Allies did not accept this as an absolute act of war as it was not perpetrated openly by any nation state, but labeled it terrorism, thus beginning the Counter Offensive called the Global War on Terror. Many have complained about this naming device. From the rejection of the idea that this is "Global War", to the rejection of "Terror" as a tactic as opposed to a group of people, to the more literalists who would rather that it be described as a war with Islamic Extremists.
The purpose of referring to it as a war on "terror" was to both delegitimize any group participating as being simple, murderous criminals as well as avoid the issue of their claims to be fighting on behalf of a one billion strong population of Muslims. One of the core claims of "Al Qaeda" and a primary part of their information campaign. This idea did not satisfy many and, in fact, has later been used to stir up discontent among Muslim populations within the West and abroad who feel offended at being routinely, by their standards, lumped together as "terrorists".
Obviously, this had to be dealt with in order to prevent that disaffection turning into greater support for "Al Qaeda" across this population. Also, calling it a "Global War" had it's own bad connotations by suggesting, in deed, that the claims of "Al Qaeda" were true, that they were all around the globe in large numbers doing exactly what they claimed: fighting to free Muslims by being at war with the West. There was, and still is, very little acceptance of referring to the culprits as "Islamic Extremists" or by the cooperative name the groups had announced "Global Islamic Jihad Front" written on the 1998 declaration of war.
Instead, we have the Obama administration presenting a new strategy white paper in 2011 stating that the United States was at war with Al Qaeda, but, interestingly, referring to each branch as a separate and distinct entity such as Core Al Qaeda (AQC), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda In the Meghreb (AQIM), etc. This is meant to suggest these groups are smaller, localized and have a more tenuous attachment to the central leadership. This strategy is, again, meant to delegitimize the size, scope and ability of the organization, not only to the population they wish to win over, but within the organization itself as well as to the greater world.
It even suggests the over all US strategy: to attack these areas and groups as separate entities using strategies and tactics best suited to defeat each section or locale, leading to the over all defeat (we hope) of the entire organization. We do this by supporting local governments with money, intelligence, weapons and even consultative and training forces creating regional (think "global") army, defusing cost and effort while creating force multipliers. A necessity when fighting a long war.
This naming problem, it's information value as well as strategic importance is also a problem for "Al Qaeda". In the 17 letters released in May 2012, we see the leadership council discussing it amongst themselves. For instance, the US has successfully reduced the Al Qaeda name to just those two words and, per AQC, has disassociated the group from it's cause as well as from the people they wish most to influence on their behalf, the Muslim Ummah (community). They also discuss how events in the past had impacted the value of that name, had caused great focus to be placed on their central organization and, if any other group takes it up, could lead to that group being tarnished and targeted.
The men discuss the possibility of renaming the group as well as suggestions for insuring other groups, who are not part of the militant base but participating in other low profile activities, should be named something that suggests their work in spreading their ideology. It is interesting to note that the released document with the suggested names is actually incomplete, cut off at page 3 of a longer document. Here we can see that the US does not want to let the group know what we know about their organization while simultaneously informing them that the US does know. Meaning also that those on the outside do not know what the intelligence agencies might actually have in regards to what names may relate to now existing organizations. Those outside include enemy forces, western or middle east populations and, to the consternation of academia, open source analysts.
In the midst of this, there are a number of analysts trying to make sense of the organization and what is happening inside of it and to it. There are any number of current and former public officials, elected and appointed, making numerous statements. Some of them quite obviously geared towards shaping the public perception of policy and strategy. Al Qaeda, for want of a better name and in keeping with policy, makes its own statements and plans, some of which are known due to these 17 Letters.
In that time, Al Qaeda has been pronounced dead or dying several times. Osama bin Laden's demise not only obfuscating the reality of the network, but lending to the shaping of policy and strategy. Clearly, at the same time, the groups within this network are working hard to expand their capabilities while also suffering set backs and attempting to obfuscate their activities and losses. Each event being analyzed against the backdrop of the locale and individual group, trying to determine each group's status. This is not completely wrong unless each separate event is being used to analyze the entire picture that is "Al Qaeda" network as opposed to the other way around.
This leads to Benghazi, September 11, 2012, the death of Ambassador Stevens, a movie and so called "AQ linked" terrorists or terrorist groups. Looking at the broad picture, obviously September 11 is an important date for the Al Qaeda organization. Every year since September 11, this group has gone to great pains to release a statement on or around that time. In fact, this is discussed several times in the 17 Letters from Abbottabad.
The 17 letters lay out both a broad strategy for Al Qaeda and it's associates as well as directions for conducting an array of activities, some in great detail. An example is bin Laden giving specific directions regarding avoiding drone strikes, intelligence efforts and the security of his son. One of those broad strategies include:
View the list of countries which had deployed troops to
Afghanistan, to help the Americans there. Then, kidnap citizensof those countries, especially diplomats. The kidnapping of
diplomats of a country is far more embarrassing to that country
than the kidnapping of ordinary citizens. The pressure on that
country to free its diplomats is far greater than to free
ordinary citizens.
Here bin Laden is directing all associated groups and commanders to conduct kidnappings of citizens and diplomats. He specifically suggests any countries that are assisting the United States, particularly any who have forces deployed to Afghanistan. This is in 2011, just prior to bin Laden's demise.
We can see that this is being carried out throughout the areas that Al Qaeda associates exist including Libya where a Korean commerce official was kidnapped as well as Egyptian diplomats. In Yemen they managed to kidnap an Iranian diplomat. AQIM's most famous raid against the Ain Amenas Gas Plant in Algeria 2012. In the Palestinian Territories, a convoy carrying German diplomats was fired upon in a likely kidnapping attempt. Those are just the most recent or noted events and some, without direct claim, might be contributable to simple banditry. Yet, it would be completely irresponsible to suggest that these do not have any link to the directions given by bin Laden in these letters.
It would also be irresponsible to suggest that this would not apply to American citizens and diplomats even if the language seems to point out allied countries. Particularly when , throughout the 17 letters, bin Laden continues to exhort focusing attacks on the United States and it's interests. Repeatedly. Anyone inside the network or hanging around the fringes would have received this message loud and clear.
We know that several demonstrations occurred in different countries on September 11 at various US embassies. One might assume that US embassies, protests and September 11 simply go together, but that would assume that there is a giant protest outside of US embassies every September 11 in all of these countries and that is not historically true. Of note are three particular protests. The first in Pakistan organized by Al Qaeda's nearest and dearest partners in the area, the TTP, Terhik I Talibani Pakistan. The second in Cairo, Egypt, organized by Zawahiri's brother, Mohammed Zawahiri with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Ayman Zawahiri's original group), that stormed the walls and raised the Black Flag over the embassy. The Third significant was Benghazi, Libya where Ambassador Stevens met his demise.
This is carried out, per various government reports, by several allegedly disperate groups who are either "Al Qaeda linked" or have "Al Qaeda linked members" and has been alternately suggested as a purely spontaneous effort or "Al Qaeda inspired". Which is some fancy hair splitting to obfuscate the point that at least one or more of these groups and individuals is, in fact, part of the Al Qaeda network and did act on a strategic direction given by bin Laden even if it was not a current order or even coordinated with the central council. Something we don't actually know given the murkiness of their communication lines and our own intelligence unwilling to share that information.
These groups met at the consulate at approximately 9:40 and almost immediately proceeded to storm the building, leading to the death of Ambassador Stevens. They then went onto the "annex" and proceeded to lay down a large amount of firepower including the accurate use of mortar fire. Which seems to be less spontaneous and definitively coordinated, including apparent knowledge and reconnaissance of this area.
Who is fooling whom? Does this make the groups or individuals members of "Al Qaeda"? Does this make this an "Al Qaeda plot"? In the broad sense of the term, the answer is "yes" if we assume that there was a broad strategy iterated by bin Laden, likely endorsed by his leadership council, disseminated out among the various jihad groups via the network and then acted upon. The question of these groups affiliations then comes down to the hair splitting question of are they actually "Al Qaeda" as in having given bayah to Zawahiri & recognized by him as a member of Al Qaeda?
This is where the problem becomes more confusing. None of these groups have publicly stated that relationship and neither has Zawahiri who has been busy since Bin Laden's death actually admitting or recognizing groups to the common network. Those groups include al Shabaab in Somalia, Jahmat al Nusra in Syria. This was also a discussion amongst bin Laden, Zawahiri and others in the leadership council where bin Laden, seeming to have the last word at the time, suggested that this was problematic and did not fit with the broader strategy outlined in the letters.
That strategy, noted above and in Lessons from Abbottabad, is to maintain the links to these groups as shadowy as possibly while maintaining their local flavor in order to provide them room to do the basic work: spreading their ideology, building a shadow state and getting ready for the moment when they would be prepared to rise up and declare a state. This is to keep the target off these group's backs as much as possible while still working towards the goal.
"The Girl Scout Way", which is to have small local groups who act in their area, work within & through a larger network, refer to themselves as a local designation, even though they themselves consider their group to be part of the Islamic Jihad movement whose leadership council includes al Qaeda as the most politically powerful group at the table. The Al Qaeda leadership has held the "chair" on the council for decades. Many of these groups do not believe they are under any obligation to give bayah (swear allegiance) to Al Qaeda or Zawahiri to be part of this movement. Yet, if they were asked, they would, to a man, declare themselves mujahedeen committing jihad.
It would seem very simple then to cut to the chase and call these groups what they are, designate them as terrorists and go after them openly, forcefully and relentlessly. Where that runs afoul is in policy and strategy, the information and disinformation war, clearly the most significant reason why the State Department, Intelligence spokespeople and the White House refuse to acknowledge these links and obvious strategy of Al Qaeda and the council. Even though we can publicly see these groups interacting and have access to the strategy outlined in the 17 Letters.
We also know that it's been the long time strategy of Al Qaeda to fight a "Long War" where they bleed the United States and it's allies through "a thousand cuts", provoking outsized reactions in order to induce over spending on blood and treasure, forcing a "collapse" as they believe they did to the USSR in Afghanistan. Equally important, and re-emphasized in the 17 Letters, is the hope that such over-reaction will provoke a reaction from the greater Muslim population, bringing more fighters and money into their organization.
Our own strategy has turned to mirror that strategy by reducing our footprint and enabling local governments, with much more support from their own populations, to confront these groups. Pretending, as Al Qaeda does, that these are purely local phenomena with local solutions. In fact, creating a kind of force multiplier while the US and her allies conserve or rebuild their capabilities to confront anything that might arise as bigger and more threatening. Whether that be the Islamic Jihad movement in the Middle East or a threat in Asia.
The problem turns to explaining that to the public in some way that a) states a strategy without giving it wholly away to the enemy even though it can guess what that strategy is by public actions; b) keeps the public's fire burning, but banked to be able to continue to confront the threat; c) not let the worst tendencies of public opinion force a change in strategy and do exactly what Al Qaeda and the Global Islamic Jihad council would like, commit another army to smashing around the area; d) allows us to continue to pursue and destroy these groups quietly and as clandestinely possible as they attempt to operate.
All of which requires an information and disinformation campaign that suffers due to the very public nature and connectedness of modern communications. Which isn't that new, considering the WWII and invasion of Normandy example where a crossword puzzle with the names of operations was published in the media, all sorts of leaks occurred and, yet, the allies continued to act as if it was wholly false.
This will likely result in any administration in power to have to take it's licks politically while continuing to do what they were elected to do: keep the United States safe and steady in the face of on going conflict. It will also continue to result in a very confused and divided population that will use this very conflict between policy, strategy and information to deliver those political licks. At some point, the obvious may become so glaringly obvious or another devastating terrorist attack may occur that forces the United States and it's allies to change course on the tactical use of information.
Finally, we arrive at analysts and analysis, mostly outside of the intelligence agencies, but possibly inside as well, who are trying to fathom some truth out of the mess. A mess complicated, as Mrr. Gerenstein-Ross has stated, by the clandestine nature of both the Global Islamic Jihad movement and the nature of our own intelligence, muddled further by barely articulated policy and strategy with active information and disinformation campaigns from all sides.
The first defense is to recognize that, indeed, all of the things articulated in the last paragraph are true. "Half the battle is in the media" meaning that not only is it likely that the enemy is trying to mislead us, but that those in trusted positions, even ones considered a reliable source, may be doing so as well; because they believe it is the right policy and needs to be furthered or because they are held by oath of office to do so.
These are not terrible things as much as they make the job harder to accomplish. We are in the middle of a conflict where all things are fair. What needs to be recalled is why analysts outside of the policy and intelligence agencies are doing these analysis. Is it strictly for the benefit of academic careers, supporting public policy or is it equally and more importantly to provide the best information to the public as well as policy makers to insure the best decisions are made?
This is a very important function of the open source analysts community. Because, if analysts fail to remain independent and follow the precepts of their profession, analysts may end up simply re-confirming bad information amongst themselves and the public, leading to continuous cycle of bad policies that leads to devastating attacks.
In short, analysts should not consider information synonymous with the truth nor confuse public policy and strategy as actual analysis of a situation.
Al Qaeda may be dead. Or, as Mary Harf recently suggested "Core Al Qaeda is mostly dead" because most of the original planners or leaders of 9/11 are dead or in prison. Both of these assumptions may come as a complete surprise to Zawahiri who continues to issue statements in it's name and to the groups within the network who continue to follow his "advice", recognizing in speech and adherence, an organization called "Al Qa'idat al Jihad" and it's leader "Dr. Zawahiri".
As of the close of this writing, Al Qa'idat al Jihad has publicly disavowed an organization called ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, referring to them as just another "Jahmaat" or group, not a state, and calling all others to fall in line with that pronouncement, even as it leaves the door open for consultation with ISIS to mend it's ways. We may know the power of Al Qaeda and Zawahiri over the Islamic Jihad movement and the over all network by the response this message receives.
Then we may actually know if, as Phillip Mudd said in April 2013, "Al Qaeda is dead, the revolution lives on."
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