Most are now aware that Zawahiri has issued a statement disavowing association with ISIS. The reasons are many. Primary among them is ISIS refusing to heed the council of Zawahiri and other senior thinkers regarding the declaration of a state with Baghdadi at it's head.
The problems with declaring this state at this time are many. As outlined in the 17 Letters From Abbottabad, bin Laden and the prominent counselors around him largely believed that calling a state before it was viable, capable of governance or defending itself completely was inviting an attack that would likely result in it's complete destruction. Quite possibly, as bin Laden imagined, that it would have an extremely negative effect on their over all efforts, making people believe that the Islamic project was a failure and abandon the movement to it's fate.
However, bin Laden, then writing in 2011, also said he believed that it might be possible in two to three years. That would be now. Obviously, Baghdadi and his advisors have chosen to interpret those words in a literal sense and believe, as some of the other leaders of groups around the region, that Zawahiri is being overly cautious. This is not the first time that this argument has occurred.
Baghdadi has certainly been attempting to consolidate something that looks and acts like a state with courts, administration, public services, schools and, holding on to the oil wells in Deir Azzor, resources that provide an income. He also has considerable armed forces with tanks and other medium to heavy weapons. Of course, what he does not have is an air force.
Long time jihadis who have continued to fight guerrilla battles, even recognizing the serious danger from air forces and drones, do not seem to grasp that a state cannot be maintained through guerrilla fighting. It also cannot, in very early stages, rely on any commitment in full of any of the people who live in this "state". Al Suri in 2004 as well as Naji and a few other thinkers did lament the problem of so called "militarists" who do not comprehend politics (paraphrasing Mao to some extent).
While many are lauding this new turn of events as a good outcome, watching the jihadis fight between themselves and cause a rift, there are a few problems. First, ISIS will not be dislodged from Eastern Syria by the other groups that easily. The FSA and Ahrar al Sham are focusing largely on Assad and the front line even as ISIS continues to try to run up their chain of command and undermine their efficacy. JAN remains completely quiet, not speaking on the subject and neither making great activities towards Assad's regime even though a few attacks have happened over the last week.
At the same time ISIS controls the crossings with Iraq, enjoying a relatively secure logistics line. ISIS has also made significant headway in retaking several border crossings with Turkey, controlling the flow of supplies, money, weapons and men into Syria. This is a significant problem for the FSA and IF that may find themselves trapped between Assad and ISIS with JAN acting as a place holder.
Which brings up the next point. Despite Zawahiri disavowing ISIS, unless JAN makes a move against them with the other forces, ISIS will remain and further entrench itself. It is not that ISIS has more fighters, it is simply that it is wasting few on the front lines and shoring up its resources which will make it formidable. We should also not become so overly excited that we lose sight of the fact that other al Qaeda linked groups have not disavowed ISIS or Baghdadi.
This is significant because contractual agreements and understandings are from emir to emir. Which means those that have not given specific bayah to Zawahiri are actually free to choose who they would follow. Secondly, even those who have given bayah to Zawahiri are not, as of yet, directed to actually attack ISIS. Zawahiri could not be sure, even if he gave this order, that it would be carried out or that it wouldn't actually result in a further fissure within the groups (there are actually discussions around the forums and twitter to this extent, discussing examples from the hadith about refusing to carry out orders they consider wrong, also not a new concept and supported to an extent by bin Laden's strategic letters when he tried to show an example why they shouldn't just go around and attack everyone at the same time).
For now, the greater network is remaining watchful. As has been proven in the past, if ISIS and Baghdadi appear to be successful, it is likely that other groups will start signing on with him directly. A few very small groups have already made significant statements in that regard. In which case, we cannot be sure that the entire jihad network will stop working with ISIS and completely isolate it, keeping a steady flow of money, weapons and fighters into the group. Very much hedging their bets.
Further, it's possible Zawahiri is playing two games as well. Letting ISIS try to achieve the state, disavowing it now in case it fails (so that he can distance that failure from his over all movement and network), and may be induced to give it grudging acceptance at a later date. At which time, JAN remaining largely silent, may also be induced to give grudging bayah to ISIS although Jolani may not enjoy a comfortable relationship with Baghdadi in the future.
On the other hand, the lessons of Iraq cannot be forgotten. Fortunately for AQ/ISIS, Zarqawi was actually killed in 2006 and his overly brutal methods appear to have been tempered or at least shaped into a form of military campaign by the next two successive leaders: Omar Baghdadi and Bakr Baghdadi. This allowed ISIS/AQ to survive and rebuild in Iraq. If Baghdadi is actually killed that might mean a significant change in ISIS behavior.
As of this writing, there are reports that Baghdadi had been shot in the leg and wounded. 48 hours before, there were rumors circulating that he had actually been killed. A few hours before that, a single bomb in the center of Raqaa, Baghdadi's HQ, had been reported. No confirmation was ever given over those reports until today's report of being wounded. Today there were also reports that a group called "The Men of Ghouta" had taken an oath to assassinate Baghdadi and any other "jihad leaders" which seems to be aimed at ISIS.
Even though JAN remains silent, it would be a mistake to assume that it is not actively, covertly making plans against Baghdadi. The possibility of a Zarqawi scenario would help them considerably. If ISIS collapsed and was forced back into Iraq, a significant number of foreign fighters and that equipment would likely fall into JAN's hands. It's unlikely that foreign fighters or even local recruits would end up with FSA or IF/Ahrar as both have gone to great lengths to actually kill and capture as many fighters as possible from ISIS.
This will create a windfall for JAN, allowing it to build it's forces and spread it's area of control, even to the oil fields for resources. Further, it would leave JAN largely in the rear of FSA and IF, controlling by default the border crossings with Turkey making these groups now dependent on his good will and desires.
If it isn't clear, controlling the border crossings is paramount for the FSA/IF factions unless they can make headway into linking up with the south or a port area. The port areas seem to be off limits and almost impossible. The southern routes are largely cut off by Assad's forces in the south and west with ISIS commanding control of most of the Iraq/Syria border in the east.
In essence, FSA/IF forces are going to have to make another push to gain and keep control of the border crossings. This is made difficult by Assad picking up attacks in rebel held areas with barrel bombs and, recently again, fighter plane attacks as ISIS continues to slowly roll back up the rear, using suicide bombs and other drastic measures to regain those holdings.
One area that Zawahiri is correct to worry about is that, if some agreement is reached with the regime and the FSA/IF rebels, any ceasefires that hold and become anything else, ISIS will be an immediate target for any forces in the area. It might even leave JAN as a significant player on the field if it can turn it's patience into a form of political acceptance where it can then carry out the other field work all of the jihad groups have been tasked with since Bin Laden's strategic letter of 2011. Wherein bin Laden tells them to make agreements with local government so that they can carry out dawa, recruiting and embedding themselves in the population.
In this, ISIS demise and withdrawal will be extremely helpful as JAN already enjoys a different reputation among the rest of the rebel groups. Which means that, despite JAN's outward silence, it's likely that they may also take steps to insure ISIS/Baghdadi's demise. That could be anything from direct action to indirect, such as providing intelligence to the other groups to act on.
Already, a former member of ISIS with inside information has been releasing details in the last two weeks about who Baghdadi is, the shape of his command counsel and his general organizations capabilities. Even though he alludes to the relationship between ISIS and JAN, the leaker never criticizes or directly refers to JAN thereafter, suggesting JAN is in fact the leaker's benefactor. Considering that shortly before the leaks began and reported by the leaks, Haji Bakr, Baghdadi's most prominent military leader and right hand man, had been killed by rebels, that there may have been up to two attempts on Baghdadi's life in the last 72 hours, or at least one that was nearly successful, it's entirely likely that this last scenario is true.
Giving the intelligence to others to use is an excellent cover for Jolani and JAN. They will get everything they hope for while appearing to keep their hands clean among the mujahedeen and other organizations. If things do not work to this plan, they can still make an alliance with ISIS again.
There is some thought that the enmity caused by Zawahiri's announcement might make this future impossible, but there are remedies ISIS could take including removing Jolani and simply annexing JAN as they did to groups in Iraq. However, before any of these other assumptions can be determined as possible, the next five days will prove significant depending on the reaction of the other jihad groups around the region.
Zawahiri, in many ways, has staked his continuing leadership on this outcome even as he attempts to distance himself from it over all, insisting that the doors to dialogue are always open. If any of the other groups openly support ISIS, Zawahiri's political power as voice and high seat at the counsel table may become diminished. If they remain silent, then we can expect that these groups will continue to follow Zawahiri's leadership until the outcome is known and his reaction to that is gauged. If ISIS fails as Zawahiri has predicted, then we may expect that his political power will be enhanced and the plans that he has put forward (bin Laden's plans w/Zawahiri twist) will be even more closely followed.
As for Syria and the rebels, the outcomes of the talks have garnered a few interesting changes. Somewhere there is a tacit agreement that Assad would go, but there is no agreement on what would come next. Meaning, if the non-AQ forces cannot find some political agreement and balance, they will still be at the mercy of what's left of Assad's regime and the AQ Islamists in their rear.
Expect also that, as with the recent plot in Israel, there may be some diversionary efforts made to take the pressure and view off of the "fitnah" in Syria. This may be an attack on Syria, it may continue to be attacks in Lebanon or it could be, frankly, a spectacular attack in Turkey or Jordan as both may have multiple cells or sympathizers inside.
The problems with declaring this state at this time are many. As outlined in the 17 Letters From Abbottabad, bin Laden and the prominent counselors around him largely believed that calling a state before it was viable, capable of governance or defending itself completely was inviting an attack that would likely result in it's complete destruction. Quite possibly, as bin Laden imagined, that it would have an extremely negative effect on their over all efforts, making people believe that the Islamic project was a failure and abandon the movement to it's fate.
However, bin Laden, then writing in 2011, also said he believed that it might be possible in two to three years. That would be now. Obviously, Baghdadi and his advisors have chosen to interpret those words in a literal sense and believe, as some of the other leaders of groups around the region, that Zawahiri is being overly cautious. This is not the first time that this argument has occurred.
Baghdadi has certainly been attempting to consolidate something that looks and acts like a state with courts, administration, public services, schools and, holding on to the oil wells in Deir Azzor, resources that provide an income. He also has considerable armed forces with tanks and other medium to heavy weapons. Of course, what he does not have is an air force.
Long time jihadis who have continued to fight guerrilla battles, even recognizing the serious danger from air forces and drones, do not seem to grasp that a state cannot be maintained through guerrilla fighting. It also cannot, in very early stages, rely on any commitment in full of any of the people who live in this "state". Al Suri in 2004 as well as Naji and a few other thinkers did lament the problem of so called "militarists" who do not comprehend politics (paraphrasing Mao to some extent).
While many are lauding this new turn of events as a good outcome, watching the jihadis fight between themselves and cause a rift, there are a few problems. First, ISIS will not be dislodged from Eastern Syria by the other groups that easily. The FSA and Ahrar al Sham are focusing largely on Assad and the front line even as ISIS continues to try to run up their chain of command and undermine their efficacy. JAN remains completely quiet, not speaking on the subject and neither making great activities towards Assad's regime even though a few attacks have happened over the last week.
At the same time ISIS controls the crossings with Iraq, enjoying a relatively secure logistics line. ISIS has also made significant headway in retaking several border crossings with Turkey, controlling the flow of supplies, money, weapons and men into Syria. This is a significant problem for the FSA and IF that may find themselves trapped between Assad and ISIS with JAN acting as a place holder.
Which brings up the next point. Despite Zawahiri disavowing ISIS, unless JAN makes a move against them with the other forces, ISIS will remain and further entrench itself. It is not that ISIS has more fighters, it is simply that it is wasting few on the front lines and shoring up its resources which will make it formidable. We should also not become so overly excited that we lose sight of the fact that other al Qaeda linked groups have not disavowed ISIS or Baghdadi.
This is significant because contractual agreements and understandings are from emir to emir. Which means those that have not given specific bayah to Zawahiri are actually free to choose who they would follow. Secondly, even those who have given bayah to Zawahiri are not, as of yet, directed to actually attack ISIS. Zawahiri could not be sure, even if he gave this order, that it would be carried out or that it wouldn't actually result in a further fissure within the groups (there are actually discussions around the forums and twitter to this extent, discussing examples from the hadith about refusing to carry out orders they consider wrong, also not a new concept and supported to an extent by bin Laden's strategic letters when he tried to show an example why they shouldn't just go around and attack everyone at the same time).
For now, the greater network is remaining watchful. As has been proven in the past, if ISIS and Baghdadi appear to be successful, it is likely that other groups will start signing on with him directly. A few very small groups have already made significant statements in that regard. In which case, we cannot be sure that the entire jihad network will stop working with ISIS and completely isolate it, keeping a steady flow of money, weapons and fighters into the group. Very much hedging their bets.
Further, it's possible Zawahiri is playing two games as well. Letting ISIS try to achieve the state, disavowing it now in case it fails (so that he can distance that failure from his over all movement and network), and may be induced to give it grudging acceptance at a later date. At which time, JAN remaining largely silent, may also be induced to give grudging bayah to ISIS although Jolani may not enjoy a comfortable relationship with Baghdadi in the future.
On the other hand, the lessons of Iraq cannot be forgotten. Fortunately for AQ/ISIS, Zarqawi was actually killed in 2006 and his overly brutal methods appear to have been tempered or at least shaped into a form of military campaign by the next two successive leaders: Omar Baghdadi and Bakr Baghdadi. This allowed ISIS/AQ to survive and rebuild in Iraq. If Baghdadi is actually killed that might mean a significant change in ISIS behavior.
As of this writing, there are reports that Baghdadi had been shot in the leg and wounded. 48 hours before, there were rumors circulating that he had actually been killed. A few hours before that, a single bomb in the center of Raqaa, Baghdadi's HQ, had been reported. No confirmation was ever given over those reports until today's report of being wounded. Today there were also reports that a group called "The Men of Ghouta" had taken an oath to assassinate Baghdadi and any other "jihad leaders" which seems to be aimed at ISIS.
Even though JAN remains silent, it would be a mistake to assume that it is not actively, covertly making plans against Baghdadi. The possibility of a Zarqawi scenario would help them considerably. If ISIS collapsed and was forced back into Iraq, a significant number of foreign fighters and that equipment would likely fall into JAN's hands. It's unlikely that foreign fighters or even local recruits would end up with FSA or IF/Ahrar as both have gone to great lengths to actually kill and capture as many fighters as possible from ISIS.
This will create a windfall for JAN, allowing it to build it's forces and spread it's area of control, even to the oil fields for resources. Further, it would leave JAN largely in the rear of FSA and IF, controlling by default the border crossings with Turkey making these groups now dependent on his good will and desires.
If it isn't clear, controlling the border crossings is paramount for the FSA/IF factions unless they can make headway into linking up with the south or a port area. The port areas seem to be off limits and almost impossible. The southern routes are largely cut off by Assad's forces in the south and west with ISIS commanding control of most of the Iraq/Syria border in the east.
In essence, FSA/IF forces are going to have to make another push to gain and keep control of the border crossings. This is made difficult by Assad picking up attacks in rebel held areas with barrel bombs and, recently again, fighter plane attacks as ISIS continues to slowly roll back up the rear, using suicide bombs and other drastic measures to regain those holdings.
One area that Zawahiri is correct to worry about is that, if some agreement is reached with the regime and the FSA/IF rebels, any ceasefires that hold and become anything else, ISIS will be an immediate target for any forces in the area. It might even leave JAN as a significant player on the field if it can turn it's patience into a form of political acceptance where it can then carry out the other field work all of the jihad groups have been tasked with since Bin Laden's strategic letter of 2011. Wherein bin Laden tells them to make agreements with local government so that they can carry out dawa, recruiting and embedding themselves in the population.
In this, ISIS demise and withdrawal will be extremely helpful as JAN already enjoys a different reputation among the rest of the rebel groups. Which means that, despite JAN's outward silence, it's likely that they may also take steps to insure ISIS/Baghdadi's demise. That could be anything from direct action to indirect, such as providing intelligence to the other groups to act on.
Already, a former member of ISIS with inside information has been releasing details in the last two weeks about who Baghdadi is, the shape of his command counsel and his general organizations capabilities. Even though he alludes to the relationship between ISIS and JAN, the leaker never criticizes or directly refers to JAN thereafter, suggesting JAN is in fact the leaker's benefactor. Considering that shortly before the leaks began and reported by the leaks, Haji Bakr, Baghdadi's most prominent military leader and right hand man, had been killed by rebels, that there may have been up to two attempts on Baghdadi's life in the last 72 hours, or at least one that was nearly successful, it's entirely likely that this last scenario is true.
Giving the intelligence to others to use is an excellent cover for Jolani and JAN. They will get everything they hope for while appearing to keep their hands clean among the mujahedeen and other organizations. If things do not work to this plan, they can still make an alliance with ISIS again.
There is some thought that the enmity caused by Zawahiri's announcement might make this future impossible, but there are remedies ISIS could take including removing Jolani and simply annexing JAN as they did to groups in Iraq. However, before any of these other assumptions can be determined as possible, the next five days will prove significant depending on the reaction of the other jihad groups around the region.
Zawahiri, in many ways, has staked his continuing leadership on this outcome even as he attempts to distance himself from it over all, insisting that the doors to dialogue are always open. If any of the other groups openly support ISIS, Zawahiri's political power as voice and high seat at the counsel table may become diminished. If they remain silent, then we can expect that these groups will continue to follow Zawahiri's leadership until the outcome is known and his reaction to that is gauged. If ISIS fails as Zawahiri has predicted, then we may expect that his political power will be enhanced and the plans that he has put forward (bin Laden's plans w/Zawahiri twist) will be even more closely followed.
As for Syria and the rebels, the outcomes of the talks have garnered a few interesting changes. Somewhere there is a tacit agreement that Assad would go, but there is no agreement on what would come next. Meaning, if the non-AQ forces cannot find some political agreement and balance, they will still be at the mercy of what's left of Assad's regime and the AQ Islamists in their rear.
Expect also that, as with the recent plot in Israel, there may be some diversionary efforts made to take the pressure and view off of the "fitnah" in Syria. This may be an attack on Syria, it may continue to be attacks in Lebanon or it could be, frankly, a spectacular attack in Turkey or Jordan as both may have multiple cells or sympathizers inside.
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