Thomas Hegghammer writes, Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring. Rethinking Islamist Politics. In it, Hegghammer lays out several questions about what has occurred over the course of this long developing conflict and how certain assumptions may be leading to bad analysis. Some issues affecting analysis addressed here, Al Qaeda and the Politics of Analysis (how policy may be driving analysis instead of the other way around); Who is Fooling Whom? (effect of information and disinformation campaigns on analysis).
The top of Hegghammer's article notes that this is part of a series for "Rethinking Islamist Politics". This may be the most important comment on the subject with an emphasis on "politics". In the various studies of terrorism, particularly the Islamic Jihad variety, one thing that continues to be missed is that this is a political movement. As Mr. Hegghammer notes, there is often too much emphasis placed on ideology as a driving force and not enough placed on the absolutely political nature and aims of the movement, those who founded the movement and continue to guide it in many ways still today.
The problem, of course, is that the movement uses the language of religion, specifically Islam, in order to justify it's acts, motivate it's followers and establish a legalistic form of rules (sharia) that it uses as a framework for controlling and governing its people and the areas that it nominally controls. However, this IS a political movement and it has specific political and geo-political goals. The fact that it uses "terrorism" (political violence), a tactic, to achieve these goals is only relevant to the stage and strength of the political movement and organizations within the movement's network.
The Islamist ideology that is espoused is not the sole basis of the ideology even if it is the language used to convey their ideas, plans and strategies. For instance, as noted in Lessons from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Letters and Mao, a thorough reading of the letters shows that Mao's works on revolution, most significantly "On Guerilla War", has had significant influence on the thinking and strategies of the movement. Not only do several of the letters rest on the frame work of Mao's work, but bin Laden is clearly paraphrasing several of Mao's better known quotes and tenets.
This is not the first time this occurs. In the video released of Bin Laden celebrating the 9/11 attacks he clearly uses the phrase "America is a paper tiger". This is also Mao and we see that in the writings of others, such as al Suri who articulates the idea of focusing all jihadis attention on the "external enemy" and, later, Naji in 2004 where he paraphrases Mao on the problems of "militants" (Mao, militarists) that do not understand the need for political work to go hand in hand with military efforts. Both al Suri and Naji are channeling Mao's "On Guerilla War".
Even Zawahiri gets into the picture when he recently released the Guidelines for Conducting Jihad. This is nearly parallel to Mao's Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. Zawahiri peppers his guidelines with a few more items and tailors it towards the Islamic Jihad movement. We may even see Mao's influence in Al Qaeda's "20yr plan" where one of the first points of the plan was "The Awakening", a direct construct from Mao's principles of revolution. We may also see a knowledge of the actual history of the Chinese Communist revolution, the methods used to propagate Communism and how long it actually took Mao and the Communists to take over the Chinese state.
There are likely many more examples of this interesting amalgamation of ideas and concepts, not only with Mao, but other internationally recognized political and military thinkers. After the shooting of the young Pakistani woman, Malala, by the Taliban, the Taliban spokesman made a reference to Rousseau, amongst other philosophers, greatly consternating a number of Rousseau's philosophical followers. In the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, bin Laden makes note of a Rand study he read, a recent book by a western military theorist and asks that a list of books be translated for his consumption.
At the same time, all of the above mentioned "jihad thinkers" use references, stories and verses from the Hadith and various Islamic thinkers to support these other ideas that are obviously not Islamic in nature or origination. This is done because this is the language that they understand and that many of their followers, who are not as educated in other philosophies or histories, can readily understand, imbibe and regurgitate because they do have a basic Islamic education. These references to Islamic precepts of faith and noted Islamic thinkers also lend a significant amount of authority to the ideas and strategies that they do wish to proliferate. This is further re-enforced by commentary and fatwas (religious rulings) of modern scholars of jurisprudence and respected clerics.
What does this say then about the ideology of the Islamic Jihad movement? Primarily, that despite our own narrow focus on Salafism or Wahhabism as THE ideological driver, these are nothing more than a base frame work. This is simply a tool by which to further their political cause and to delineate who may be a member of the group even as they claim to represent the interests of a much wider body of people; exclusive and inclusive at the same time. This very nature is one of the reasons that the movement appeals across a wide stratum of people, even those that are not practicing Muslims, newly minted "reverts" (converts), those who have been "back sliders" and those that are not living within the conflict areas.
The "thinkers" that have inspired and influenced the movement are much more pragmatic about incorporating other ideas into their ideology because they have been influenced by more than Islam. This may not be a novel revelation to some analysts, but it is likely to be novel to others, as well as some within the political class, whose focus has remained on the Islamic and religious language and ideas of the movement.
Mr. Hegghammer would be correct then in noting that there is too much focus on the ideology in respect to analysis that does not reflect what is obviously a pragmatic approach to revolutionary ideals. Particularly if analysis focuses on the narrow constraints of it's religious meme. Where analysis seems to be falling down is in recognizing these other influences and how they may effect the dynamic evolution of the movement. Not only the ideology, but it's appeal to a wide range of people, the strategies that the movement employs and how it may relate other seemingly disconnected groups and activities to the larger movement.
Mr. Hegghammer says:
He goes on to note:
And:
Mr. Hegghammer then suggests that this is a "mis-match between rhetoric and behavior" and that there was nothing in past rhetoric that suggested Syria would be a destination of choice. The question then is what motivates the organizations within the movement to focus on Syria and what motivates foreign fighters to flock to that destination as opposed to anywhere else?
First, I'd like to agree that relying too heavily on the rhetoric or ideology for explanations or to predict future actions is a highly fallible methodology. However, it would be remiss to ignore completely the previous writings of the "jihad thinkers" that shaped, not only the ideology, but the general trajectory and strategy of the revolution.
The operative words here are "relying too heavily". Because, having read the many writings of al Suri, Zawahiri, Naji and bin Laden (who may be Naji as well) and others, they were all relatively explicit about how they saw the revolution unfolding, to which countries it would move to and a general order they believed this would occur. Not all of them agreed on the order that it would occur, but they almost all agreed which countries it would occur in and they went about setting up their networks to facilitate these activities. But we see, in the formulation of their ideology, the actual strategy they will employ.
For instance, Zawahiri issues a directive to Zarqawi in Iraq, 2005, that, instead of focusing solely on ejecting US forces and overthrowing the entire Shi'ite led government, Zarqawi should work to set up a network extending through the Levant. A form of this network was already in place as it had been facilitating fighters to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq from many other destinations and back again, but they had yet to formalize or focus on establishing robust revolutionary cells that would spread their ideas and accelerate facilitating revolution inside the designated countries.
The letter essaying these directives is chockfull of ideological and mytho-historical references as well as some relatively normal religious invocations for the success of the plan.
On the other hand, the well known idiom, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy", would apply here. While Zawahiri gives some specifics about how he thinks this initiative will take place, the broad strategy for this was laid out in the "20 Year Plan" publicly published in 2005. The plan had suggested that Syria was the next target and suggested the date range would be between 2007 and 2010. This was feasible because the group had already established a network through Syria and this network had been greatly facilitated by the Iraq war, but more importantly, by Assad's intelligence agency.
The infiltration by Assad's intelligence agencies is a significant factor in derailing the time table for this expected event. Being inside the network, Assad's agencies could not be unaware of the plan and, in 2008 thru 2009, as the Iraq War wound to a close, Assad's security forces began to aggressively round up and imprison many known members of the network. In many ways, not only stopping the known cells from acting, but holding them hostage against future incursions by the Al Qaeda network.
In the west, we view these activities as being part of Western strategy where the United States had pressured Assad to reel in these militants and help bring the war to a close. We should be viewing it as it really was, a self-serving act that not only staved off an immediate insurgency inside Syria, but allowed Assad to ingratiate himself to the United States and the West in general. The problem for Assad was that the jihad militants were not the only rabble rousing rebels in Syria and that he miscalculated his ability to put down the other rebels.
When his first act of outright massacring of civilians did not stop the rebellion, Assad's regime released hundreds of prisoners, most, as the non-Islamist rebels insist, were Islamist militants. Here we see Assad's actions facilitate putting the Islamic Jihad movements back on track with their originally stated goals.
Many reject this idea on the grounds that it would seem illogical to set up a second foe, particularly one that would appear to be more dedicated in his destruction. Those that do reject this idea apparently have never read the histories of various revolutions; from the Russian revolution in 1917 when the newly formed predecessor of the KGB instigated a terror campaign by extremists in order to discredit the Bolshevik movement, to the Algerian Civil War where the Islamist movements were infiltrated by the intelligence agencies and proceeded to drive them towards ever more discrediting acts of unmitigated and inexplicable violence.
Viewing it from the Assad regime's position, this makes perfect sense as they were already inside the network, knew who the different members were, how they worked and their contacts. They could, by their estimation, finish off the non-Islamist rebellion and then turn to either make accommodation with the Islamists or, as they had done before, quickly round them up and finish the movement off in Syria. While, at the same time, be able to claim on the world stage that he was fighting everyone's arch nemesis, Islamic terrorists. As the saying goes, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy". Enter the United States, Turkey, KSA and the Gulf States.
Obviously, these facts have occurred to the policy makers in Washington as they resist Assad's assertions to make "fighting terrorism" the primary aegis of Geneva II and dismiss offers to coordinate with his intelligence agency to round up known terrorists. We even see this in the calculation of the West's demands that Assad must go, but his military and security apparatus should remain place. Not just to broadly secure the country, but because, indeed, they know who the militants are and are inside those organizations.
What do these events have to do with ideology? The original thinkers and founders had laid Syria out as part of their broader goals and in context with the very broad ideas of their revolutionary ideology, where Syria and Damascus features prominently in the Quran and Hadith, where Israel and Jews are the perpetual enemy of Islam in all rhetoric and the liberation of Palestine features prominently in the ideology. Strategically, Syria is geographically close to Israel and can be used as a base to strike it, thus fulfilling both ideology and the next phase of the revolutions strategy.
The second problem then is not that we are viewing their ideology too rigidly, but that we are conflating ideology with strategy. Wherein, ideology may inform the strategy and can contain elements of the strategy, but is not the strategy itself.
How does ideology shape this strategy when, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, Syria does not fit within the ideological rhetoric that seems to prevail and Mali, with French forces seeming to invade and appear to fit the notion of the "clash of civilizations"? I would first direct attention back to the original writings of the "jihad thinkers" and their list of countries. Mali actually does not appear on the list. The countries on the list for revolution are all Arab countries or where there are high concentrations of Arab people.
This may be an oversight, but it is more likely rooted in another, little recognized fact, that there is a streak of bigotry in the ideology. This can be seen throughout the development of the Islamic jihad movement when, during the Russian Afghan war, it is well known and reported that the Saudi Arabian contingent of the mujahedeen largely kept themselves separate from the rest. Even Zubaydah remarked on this in his diaries and that other mujahedeen believed they were arrogant, elitist snobs.
This is also apparent in how the Global Islamic Jihad counsel was constituted when bin Laden, Zawahiri and his compatriots made sure to stack the counsel with their fellow "Arabs" and, equally important, those who shared their general view of appropriate strategy for their revolution. They may have had to include the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban on the counsel because they were their hosts and they needed allies as the US invaded Afghanistan, but, despite all of the niceties of referring to each other as "brothers" in religion and arms, with it's concomitant inclusionary rhetoric, the TTP are often viewed as backwards and, at times, are lectured for their lack of Islamic Jihad values.
It is ridiculous to assume that such a highly exclusionary ideology views everyone and every area in the struggle as equal or a priority. Thus, Mali falls outside of ideology and can be viewed largely in context of the strategic, providing a base for operation. The actual goals of AQIM have always been focused on Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, areas that al Suri said their movement will "spread out along the base". Before they turn towards their central goal of overtaking Saudi Arabia, Medina and Mecca.
Other, less ideological reasons are likely to play a role in why Mali is not a choice destination. It's farther away than Syria. It does not have as robust a network for funneling fighters into the area. It is difficult to access. It is not on the nightly news, but only mentioned in passing. That other, higher conflict areas like Syria, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq, generally pre-occupy the forums and social media of the jihad and non-jihad network.
For Al Qaeda, Syria is about strategy. The general strategy is to move as close to Israel as possible and strike there, hoping that this strike will further "awaken" the Muslim population and draw them to their cause as the only and true "defenders" of Islam, Muslims and the Arab people. This is also an essential part of their ideology.
As for the other supporting ideology, Syria hits the trifecta. The three criteria being "an external" supporting "enemy"; corrupt, non-Islamic leadership and occupied by a corrupt form of Islam. Westerners, having imbibed long years of Al Qaeda's rhetoric, believe that this idea of "external enemy" only applies to them and mostly to the United States.
This is sincere hubris and is not supported by other writings of the "jihad thinkers". Most significantly al Suri, who goes on at length in his book with a list of "external enemies" to Muslims and their revolutionary movement. These include Russia and Iran. We see this acted out as Zawahiri takes pains to connect with the Chechen Islamist movement, providing them with money, connections and training. We also see this in the networks and terrorist cells that were set up in the Balochistan province of Iran where the group authored increasing attacks, including attempting to assassinate then President Ahmadinejad during a tour of that province.
Russia proceeded to climb through the Islamist networks and eliminate it, largely through extra-judicial killings. Iran did the same, but also rounded up large numbers of militants, their families and connections around 2008, after the Iraq war was coming to a close and allowing the network to operate on their territory became more dangerous to them directly more than beneficial. Like Assad's regime in Syria, we can also view this as tantamount to hostage taking. Particularly when we see by the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, Iran was in silent negotiations with Al Qaeda to slowly release their members and family while insuring the groups good behavior on their turf.
In other words, as long as the fighters moved on and into Syria, leaving Iran alone, Al Qaeda would be relatively free to operate. This shows that ideology may inspire the strategy, but pragmatic approach to strategy trumps ideology.
Where we might get into trouble or be confused is that, in ideology or strategy, all pronouncements are mixed together with similar semantics, rhetoric, linguistics and religious references making it difficult at times to determine where this may fall: ideological rhetoric or strategy? For instance, Mr. Hegghammer gives the example of the declaration of war against the United States labeling it amongst others as "Crusaders" and "Jews". Throughout the rhetoric of the Islamic Jihad movement, this is rhetoric of attack against the United States and the West is often repeated.
Is this ideology? Yes. Where as the United States is represented as one of the primary reasons why Muslims are oppressed and why the Islamic Jihad movement must fight it. Is this denoting strategy? Yes. Selecting a single "external enemy" that is repeatedly referenced in ideological rhetoric, is also a strategy. Not only does it serve to continuously put pressure on the United States, but to put fear in the minds of it's citizens. It also serves as a single unifying point that, above all the other questions or issues surrounding the ideology, a great number of people can support, widening the support base of the movement itself.
This strategy of the "anti-(fill in the blank)" movement is laid out in Mao's "On Guerrilla War", the Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare:
However, we can only know if this suggests the priority in strategy or is the current priority in strategy by reading what was previously written, by reviewing other current intelligence and evaluating actions on the ground. Throughout the above referenced letter and the others in the trove, he spells out how to set priorities for attack and what to do if no US forces, personnel or interests are in the area.
Further, he says that, if they put away the external enemy and all that is left is the internal enemy, the mujahedeen must focus on a third priority which is building the basis of the Islamic state. This again is a construct of Mao's guerrilla war, translated to the realities and language of the Islamic Jihad movement. It also suggests that despite ideological rhetoric and general strategy that places the US at the top of the enemy list, the other aspects of the ideology and strategy, like apostate rulers, the indoctrination of the one true religion and the work to build a state, can move forward under the right circumstances.
In other words, Syria.
Does this then, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, show some "mis-match" between ideology and behavior? The answer must be "no", but only because we must know the rules by which we are judging words and actions, ideology v strategy:
Ideology can inform strategy.
Ideology can contain strategy.
Ideology can be part of the strategy.
But, ideology cannot be the strategy.
In closing, we should not ignore ideology for the above stated reasons, but we should place it in it's proper context and not conflate it's role in strategy with the actual strategy. Further, so long as we continue to emphasize "terrorism", a violent tactic, over the political nature of the movement we are likely to continue to mis-diagnose it's activities, it's relationship to other groups and it's trajectory in relations to it's stated goals. Finally, so long as we continue to emphasize the religious aspects of the ideology over it's political nature, that it is a revolutionary ideology, we will continue to misunderstand it's appeal to recruits, both "foreign" and "local".
Next up, what draws foreign fighters, specifically "western", to Syria more than Iraq or Afghanistan or, as Mr. Hegghammer asks, Mali? Do they act on strategy or ideology or is there another driver? Stay tuned for Part II - Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring - This is a Revolution
The top of Hegghammer's article notes that this is part of a series for "Rethinking Islamist Politics". This may be the most important comment on the subject with an emphasis on "politics". In the various studies of terrorism, particularly the Islamic Jihad variety, one thing that continues to be missed is that this is a political movement. As Mr. Hegghammer notes, there is often too much emphasis placed on ideology as a driving force and not enough placed on the absolutely political nature and aims of the movement, those who founded the movement and continue to guide it in many ways still today.
The problem, of course, is that the movement uses the language of religion, specifically Islam, in order to justify it's acts, motivate it's followers and establish a legalistic form of rules (sharia) that it uses as a framework for controlling and governing its people and the areas that it nominally controls. However, this IS a political movement and it has specific political and geo-political goals. The fact that it uses "terrorism" (political violence), a tactic, to achieve these goals is only relevant to the stage and strength of the political movement and organizations within the movement's network.
The Islamist ideology that is espoused is not the sole basis of the ideology even if it is the language used to convey their ideas, plans and strategies. For instance, as noted in Lessons from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Letters and Mao, a thorough reading of the letters shows that Mao's works on revolution, most significantly "On Guerilla War", has had significant influence on the thinking and strategies of the movement. Not only do several of the letters rest on the frame work of Mao's work, but bin Laden is clearly paraphrasing several of Mao's better known quotes and tenets.
"Without the people, the mujahedeen would be like fish without water."
This is not the first time this occurs. In the video released of Bin Laden celebrating the 9/11 attacks he clearly uses the phrase "America is a paper tiger". This is also Mao and we see that in the writings of others, such as al Suri who articulates the idea of focusing all jihadis attention on the "external enemy" and, later, Naji in 2004 where he paraphrases Mao on the problems of "militants" (Mao, militarists) that do not understand the need for political work to go hand in hand with military efforts. Both al Suri and Naji are channeling Mao's "On Guerilla War".
Even Zawahiri gets into the picture when he recently released the Guidelines for Conducting Jihad. This is nearly parallel to Mao's Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. Zawahiri peppers his guidelines with a few more items and tailors it towards the Islamic Jihad movement. We may even see Mao's influence in Al Qaeda's "20yr plan" where one of the first points of the plan was "The Awakening", a direct construct from Mao's principles of revolution. We may also see a knowledge of the actual history of the Chinese Communist revolution, the methods used to propagate Communism and how long it actually took Mao and the Communists to take over the Chinese state.
There are likely many more examples of this interesting amalgamation of ideas and concepts, not only with Mao, but other internationally recognized political and military thinkers. After the shooting of the young Pakistani woman, Malala, by the Taliban, the Taliban spokesman made a reference to Rousseau, amongst other philosophers, greatly consternating a number of Rousseau's philosophical followers. In the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, bin Laden makes note of a Rand study he read, a recent book by a western military theorist and asks that a list of books be translated for his consumption.
At the same time, all of the above mentioned "jihad thinkers" use references, stories and verses from the Hadith and various Islamic thinkers to support these other ideas that are obviously not Islamic in nature or origination. This is done because this is the language that they understand and that many of their followers, who are not as educated in other philosophies or histories, can readily understand, imbibe and regurgitate because they do have a basic Islamic education. These references to Islamic precepts of faith and noted Islamic thinkers also lend a significant amount of authority to the ideas and strategies that they do wish to proliferate. This is further re-enforced by commentary and fatwas (religious rulings) of modern scholars of jurisprudence and respected clerics.
What does this say then about the ideology of the Islamic Jihad movement? Primarily, that despite our own narrow focus on Salafism or Wahhabism as THE ideological driver, these are nothing more than a base frame work. This is simply a tool by which to further their political cause and to delineate who may be a member of the group even as they claim to represent the interests of a much wider body of people; exclusive and inclusive at the same time. This very nature is one of the reasons that the movement appeals across a wide stratum of people, even those that are not practicing Muslims, newly minted "reverts" (converts), those who have been "back sliders" and those that are not living within the conflict areas.
The "thinkers" that have inspired and influenced the movement are much more pragmatic about incorporating other ideas into their ideology because they have been influenced by more than Islam. This may not be a novel revelation to some analysts, but it is likely to be novel to others, as well as some within the political class, whose focus has remained on the Islamic and religious language and ideas of the movement.
Mr. Hegghammer would be correct then in noting that there is too much focus on the ideology in respect to analysis that does not reflect what is obviously a pragmatic approach to revolutionary ideals. Particularly if analysis focuses on the narrow constraints of it's religious meme. Where analysis seems to be falling down is in recognizing these other influences and how they may effect the dynamic evolution of the movement. Not only the ideology, but it's appeal to a wide range of people, the strategies that the movement employs and how it may relate other seemingly disconnected groups and activities to the larger movement.
Mr. Hegghammer says:
One of the biggest lessons of the past few years is that jihadi political thought, which scholars like me have studied as “ideology” (implying something relatively rigid), is more fickle and malleable than (at least I) previously assumed.
He goes on to note:
transnational jihadists in Syria and their adoption of a new enemy hierarchy with the Syrian regime and to some extent Shiites more broadly, at the top
And:
in the past transnational jihadis showed relatively little interest in sectarian conflicts — Iraq only interested them when the Americans were there. In fact, between 2012 and 2013 we should have expected foreign fighters to go to Mali, not Syria, because after the French‐led invasion, Mali fit the jihadi “civilizational conflict narrative
Mr. Hegghammer then suggests that this is a "mis-match between rhetoric and behavior" and that there was nothing in past rhetoric that suggested Syria would be a destination of choice. The question then is what motivates the organizations within the movement to focus on Syria and what motivates foreign fighters to flock to that destination as opposed to anywhere else?
First, I'd like to agree that relying too heavily on the rhetoric or ideology for explanations or to predict future actions is a highly fallible methodology. However, it would be remiss to ignore completely the previous writings of the "jihad thinkers" that shaped, not only the ideology, but the general trajectory and strategy of the revolution.
The operative words here are "relying too heavily". Because, having read the many writings of al Suri, Zawahiri, Naji and bin Laden (who may be Naji as well) and others, they were all relatively explicit about how they saw the revolution unfolding, to which countries it would move to and a general order they believed this would occur. Not all of them agreed on the order that it would occur, but they almost all agreed which countries it would occur in and they went about setting up their networks to facilitate these activities. But we see, in the formulation of their ideology, the actual strategy they will employ.
For instance, Zawahiri issues a directive to Zarqawi in Iraq, 2005, that, instead of focusing solely on ejecting US forces and overthrowing the entire Shi'ite led government, Zarqawi should work to set up a network extending through the Levant. A form of this network was already in place as it had been facilitating fighters to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq from many other destinations and back again, but they had yet to formalize or focus on establishing robust revolutionary cells that would spread their ideas and accelerate facilitating revolution inside the designated countries.
The letter essaying these directives is chockfull of ideological and mytho-historical references as well as some relatively normal religious invocations for the success of the plan.
On the other hand, the well known idiom, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy", would apply here. While Zawahiri gives some specifics about how he thinks this initiative will take place, the broad strategy for this was laid out in the "20 Year Plan" publicly published in 2005. The plan had suggested that Syria was the next target and suggested the date range would be between 2007 and 2010. This was feasible because the group had already established a network through Syria and this network had been greatly facilitated by the Iraq war, but more importantly, by Assad's intelligence agency.
The infiltration by Assad's intelligence agencies is a significant factor in derailing the time table for this expected event. Being inside the network, Assad's agencies could not be unaware of the plan and, in 2008 thru 2009, as the Iraq War wound to a close, Assad's security forces began to aggressively round up and imprison many known members of the network. In many ways, not only stopping the known cells from acting, but holding them hostage against future incursions by the Al Qaeda network.
In the west, we view these activities as being part of Western strategy where the United States had pressured Assad to reel in these militants and help bring the war to a close. We should be viewing it as it really was, a self-serving act that not only staved off an immediate insurgency inside Syria, but allowed Assad to ingratiate himself to the United States and the West in general. The problem for Assad was that the jihad militants were not the only rabble rousing rebels in Syria and that he miscalculated his ability to put down the other rebels.
When his first act of outright massacring of civilians did not stop the rebellion, Assad's regime released hundreds of prisoners, most, as the non-Islamist rebels insist, were Islamist militants. Here we see Assad's actions facilitate putting the Islamic Jihad movements back on track with their originally stated goals.
Many reject this idea on the grounds that it would seem illogical to set up a second foe, particularly one that would appear to be more dedicated in his destruction. Those that do reject this idea apparently have never read the histories of various revolutions; from the Russian revolution in 1917 when the newly formed predecessor of the KGB instigated a terror campaign by extremists in order to discredit the Bolshevik movement, to the Algerian Civil War where the Islamist movements were infiltrated by the intelligence agencies and proceeded to drive them towards ever more discrediting acts of unmitigated and inexplicable violence.
Viewing it from the Assad regime's position, this makes perfect sense as they were already inside the network, knew who the different members were, how they worked and their contacts. They could, by their estimation, finish off the non-Islamist rebellion and then turn to either make accommodation with the Islamists or, as they had done before, quickly round them up and finish the movement off in Syria. While, at the same time, be able to claim on the world stage that he was fighting everyone's arch nemesis, Islamic terrorists. As the saying goes, "No plan survives first contact with the enemy". Enter the United States, Turkey, KSA and the Gulf States.
Obviously, these facts have occurred to the policy makers in Washington as they resist Assad's assertions to make "fighting terrorism" the primary aegis of Geneva II and dismiss offers to coordinate with his intelligence agency to round up known terrorists. We even see this in the calculation of the West's demands that Assad must go, but his military and security apparatus should remain place. Not just to broadly secure the country, but because, indeed, they know who the militants are and are inside those organizations.
What do these events have to do with ideology? The original thinkers and founders had laid Syria out as part of their broader goals and in context with the very broad ideas of their revolutionary ideology, where Syria and Damascus features prominently in the Quran and Hadith, where Israel and Jews are the perpetual enemy of Islam in all rhetoric and the liberation of Palestine features prominently in the ideology. Strategically, Syria is geographically close to Israel and can be used as a base to strike it, thus fulfilling both ideology and the next phase of the revolutions strategy.
The second problem then is not that we are viewing their ideology too rigidly, but that we are conflating ideology with strategy. Wherein, ideology may inform the strategy and can contain elements of the strategy, but is not the strategy itself.
How does ideology shape this strategy when, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, Syria does not fit within the ideological rhetoric that seems to prevail and Mali, with French forces seeming to invade and appear to fit the notion of the "clash of civilizations"? I would first direct attention back to the original writings of the "jihad thinkers" and their list of countries. Mali actually does not appear on the list. The countries on the list for revolution are all Arab countries or where there are high concentrations of Arab people.
This may be an oversight, but it is more likely rooted in another, little recognized fact, that there is a streak of bigotry in the ideology. This can be seen throughout the development of the Islamic jihad movement when, during the Russian Afghan war, it is well known and reported that the Saudi Arabian contingent of the mujahedeen largely kept themselves separate from the rest. Even Zubaydah remarked on this in his diaries and that other mujahedeen believed they were arrogant, elitist snobs.
This is also apparent in how the Global Islamic Jihad counsel was constituted when bin Laden, Zawahiri and his compatriots made sure to stack the counsel with their fellow "Arabs" and, equally important, those who shared their general view of appropriate strategy for their revolution. They may have had to include the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban on the counsel because they were their hosts and they needed allies as the US invaded Afghanistan, but, despite all of the niceties of referring to each other as "brothers" in religion and arms, with it's concomitant inclusionary rhetoric, the TTP are often viewed as backwards and, at times, are lectured for their lack of Islamic Jihad values.
It is ridiculous to assume that such a highly exclusionary ideology views everyone and every area in the struggle as equal or a priority. Thus, Mali falls outside of ideology and can be viewed largely in context of the strategic, providing a base for operation. The actual goals of AQIM have always been focused on Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, areas that al Suri said their movement will "spread out along the base". Before they turn towards their central goal of overtaking Saudi Arabia, Medina and Mecca.
Other, less ideological reasons are likely to play a role in why Mali is not a choice destination. It's farther away than Syria. It does not have as robust a network for funneling fighters into the area. It is difficult to access. It is not on the nightly news, but only mentioned in passing. That other, higher conflict areas like Syria, Yemen, Somalia and Iraq, generally pre-occupy the forums and social media of the jihad and non-jihad network.
For Al Qaeda, Syria is about strategy. The general strategy is to move as close to Israel as possible and strike there, hoping that this strike will further "awaken" the Muslim population and draw them to their cause as the only and true "defenders" of Islam, Muslims and the Arab people. This is also an essential part of their ideology.
As for the other supporting ideology, Syria hits the trifecta. The three criteria being "an external" supporting "enemy"; corrupt, non-Islamic leadership and occupied by a corrupt form of Islam. Westerners, having imbibed long years of Al Qaeda's rhetoric, believe that this idea of "external enemy" only applies to them and mostly to the United States.
This is sincere hubris and is not supported by other writings of the "jihad thinkers". Most significantly al Suri, who goes on at length in his book with a list of "external enemies" to Muslims and their revolutionary movement. These include Russia and Iran. We see this acted out as Zawahiri takes pains to connect with the Chechen Islamist movement, providing them with money, connections and training. We also see this in the networks and terrorist cells that were set up in the Balochistan province of Iran where the group authored increasing attacks, including attempting to assassinate then President Ahmadinejad during a tour of that province.
Russia proceeded to climb through the Islamist networks and eliminate it, largely through extra-judicial killings. Iran did the same, but also rounded up large numbers of militants, their families and connections around 2008, after the Iraq war was coming to a close and allowing the network to operate on their territory became more dangerous to them directly more than beneficial. Like Assad's regime in Syria, we can also view this as tantamount to hostage taking. Particularly when we see by the 17 Letters from Abbottabad, Iran was in silent negotiations with Al Qaeda to slowly release their members and family while insuring the groups good behavior on their turf.
In other words, as long as the fighters moved on and into Syria, leaving Iran alone, Al Qaeda would be relatively free to operate. This shows that ideology may inspire the strategy, but pragmatic approach to strategy trumps ideology.
Where we might get into trouble or be confused is that, in ideology or strategy, all pronouncements are mixed together with similar semantics, rhetoric, linguistics and religious references making it difficult at times to determine where this may fall: ideological rhetoric or strategy? For instance, Mr. Hegghammer gives the example of the declaration of war against the United States labeling it amongst others as "Crusaders" and "Jews". Throughout the rhetoric of the Islamic Jihad movement, this is rhetoric of attack against the United States and the West is often repeated.
Is this ideology? Yes. Where as the United States is represented as one of the primary reasons why Muslims are oppressed and why the Islamic Jihad movement must fight it. Is this denoting strategy? Yes. Selecting a single "external enemy" that is repeatedly referenced in ideological rhetoric, is also a strategy. Not only does it serve to continuously put pressure on the United States, but to put fear in the minds of it's citizens. It also serves as a single unifying point that, above all the other questions or issues surrounding the ideology, a great number of people can support, widening the support base of the movement itself.
This strategy of the "anti-(fill in the blank)" movement is laid out in Mao's "On Guerrilla War", the Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare:
First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragement....Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.Mao continues in the same vein throughout the chapter and insists that "anti-Japanism" must also be presented and re-enforced to the people in the areas of guerrilla zones so that they may be better induced to join or assist the guerrillas. Bin Laden goes on in the same vein in this letter from Abbottabad: where he repeats continuously that the focus of Al Qaeda in message and acts must be the "external enemy", America. That people educated in their ideology must be sent out among people in other countries, particularly where the mujahedeen are present or soon to arrive, to educate these people in their ideology with a focus on expelling American hegemony.
However, we can only know if this suggests the priority in strategy or is the current priority in strategy by reading what was previously written, by reviewing other current intelligence and evaluating actions on the ground. Throughout the above referenced letter and the others in the trove, he spells out how to set priorities for attack and what to do if no US forces, personnel or interests are in the area.
Further, he says that, if they put away the external enemy and all that is left is the internal enemy, the mujahedeen must focus on a third priority which is building the basis of the Islamic state. This again is a construct of Mao's guerrilla war, translated to the realities and language of the Islamic Jihad movement. It also suggests that despite ideological rhetoric and general strategy that places the US at the top of the enemy list, the other aspects of the ideology and strategy, like apostate rulers, the indoctrination of the one true religion and the work to build a state, can move forward under the right circumstances.
In other words, Syria.
Does this then, as Mr. Hegghammer suggests, show some "mis-match" between ideology and behavior? The answer must be "no", but only because we must know the rules by which we are judging words and actions, ideology v strategy:
Ideology can inform strategy.
Ideology can contain strategy.
Ideology can be part of the strategy.
But, ideology cannot be the strategy.
In closing, we should not ignore ideology for the above stated reasons, but we should place it in it's proper context and not conflate it's role in strategy with the actual strategy. Further, so long as we continue to emphasize "terrorism", a violent tactic, over the political nature of the movement we are likely to continue to mis-diagnose it's activities, it's relationship to other groups and it's trajectory in relations to it's stated goals. Finally, so long as we continue to emphasize the religious aspects of the ideology over it's political nature, that it is a revolutionary ideology, we will continue to misunderstand it's appeal to recruits, both "foreign" and "local".
Next up, what draws foreign fighters, specifically "western", to Syria more than Iraq or Afghanistan or, as Mr. Hegghammer asks, Mali? Do they act on strategy or ideology or is there another driver? Stay tuned for Part II - Jihadism: Seven Assumptions Shaken by the Arab Spring - This is a Revolution
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