Abu Zubaydah and the banality of 'jihadism' - Terry McDermot
Abu Zubaydah's six released diaries can be located here.
Starting with this statement:
It's true, when you read the first two diaries, Zubaydah presents himself as a young, confused man who has significant personal issues. He struggles with his family where several parental separations occur, his mother is a weak personality while he spends much time talking about trying to please his father. He has vague conversations with his friends about the Israeli-Palestine situation and comments once, early on, about an argument between friends concerning when jihad is permissible and whether it is permissible or good to align with any secular organization like the PLO.
However, Mr. Zubaydah's drive to go to jihad in Afghanistan is not made overtly manifest until he had spent over a year in India attending university to get a degree in computer science. A project that his father frowned on, but paid for never the less. Failure at university, lack of familial support, few external relationships and personal struggles with his adherence to the tenets of his faith, most notably "chastity until marriage", are several of his motivators for leaving India to join the mujihadeen in Afghanistan.
Other significant motivators are a few of the other expatriate friends he had made who were planning to travel to Afghanistan. He also has some poor experiences with neighbors and people he believes to be his "friends". He has little money and lives very poorly, sometimes convincing himself that is all he requires. He is indirectly accused of having an affair or improper relations with his host's wife. The adventure, the purpose and direction that he is missing, his personal trauma and drama, are what leads him to determine to leave school and travel with an acquaintance to Pakistan.
This is the "goofball" that Mr McDermott suggests and reads significantly similar to many other young men who have either traveled abroad to join one of the jihad organizations or even remained behind to commit acts of terror in their home countries. Most recently, the Tsarnaev brothers (Boston), Adebolajo and Adebowale (murder of a British Soldier), Nidal Hasan (Ft. Hood) and Lindsay "Jamal" Graham (July 2005, London).
None start out as violent extremist, but they do seek it out as a panacea for their other conceived failures or personal trauma. With the exception of Hasan, these are young men who, prior to determination to turn to terrorism, would present as "goofballs". As do a number of others in the recent past who committed violent crimes such as the Aurora Theater mass shooting, Columbine and Newtown mass murderer.
Describing Zubaydah as a "goofball" would certainly apply to his immaturity and inexperience. Even though Zubaydah is approximately 20 when he begins his diaries, he writes and thinks with the dexterity, comprehension and focus of a fifteen year old. This slowly disappears over the course of the war and later throughout his diaries. By the end, Zubaydah has certainly matured and garnered considerable self-esteem and self-control.
He is no longer "a goofball". The fact that Mr. McDermott goes on to suggest this continues to be true throughout Zubaydah's career, even as he presents tidbits of information that suggests otherwise, is misleading at best and only plausible if someone had not actually read Zubaydah's diaries.
Zubaydah actually makes "clear" what "abilities" allow him to rise through the ranks until he becomes a significant player in the funding, organization and transit of fighters to the various camps for jihad. When he first arrives in Afghanistan, Zubaydah, who styles himself as "Hani" in his diaries, goes to a number of basic training camps. He struggles at first with the physical fitness aspects, but eventually pushes himself to improve, stop smoking and makes detailed, organized plans and sets goals for improving his fitness, maintaining his weight and becoming a more faithful follower of Islam.
Zubaydah then organizes a plan to become better trained in all the aspects of war, moving from camp to camp that offers different or better training on weapons and tactics. He outlines these plans in specific detail. A trait that becomes a prominent "ability", helping him to rise through the ranks. Zubaydah has excellent organizational skills, he has battle experience after nearly two years at the front, he has significant experience in training camps, watched other leaders and received mentoring as well as assessed what was good and bad amongst all of these activities.
When the main war is over and the Communist government of Afghanistan had fallen, Zubaydah remains in Afghanistan even as the civil war gets underway. He's appalled at the disunity, but, having dedicated himself to the "cause" of jihad for the sake of his religion, is determined to remain and put his efforts where he feels he's been most successful. At this point, jihad against whomever, simply for the sake of Islam, without further context, is his motivator. Western policies have little room in his discourse except a brief internal discussion on whether he should go to Palestine.
Zubaydah was actually the administrator of a very large camp that was filtering up to 400 trainees from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, etc. He outlines numerous issues he had with organizing and obtaining supplies and shelter for the number of recruits sent to him when the original number was supposed to be 100. He discusses disciplinary issues, money, theft, obtaining trainers, organizing classes and equipment and so on.
Some of his other duties include meeting with other groups (like Al Qaeda), transportation to and from the borders, documentation and a continuous plethora of details. He even laments the poor condition, abilities and general commitment of the recruits, without any irony or vague recognition of his own condition when he first arrived in Afghanistan. What is apparent is his organizational abilities, similar to those attributed to bin Laden, and growing leadership experiences and abilities.
This is the actual "banality of jihad". The details that must be managed to move men, equipment, weapons, munitions and money in order to run a training camp. This was discussed in Dr. Shapiro's book, "The Terrorist's Dilemma, The Management of Violent Covert Organizations", an overview and discussion with Dr. Shapiro can be found here.
While the details of running any organization are, in fact, "banal", these details make up a significant and important aspect of terrorist activities. Without obtaining, distributing and accounting for funds or organized logistics, no organization can long function or exist. McDermott seems to suggest that this is insignificant and, therefore, Zubaydah's role, tracking and arrest was equally insignificant or unimportant.
For McDermott, going after individuals amounts to conflating them into something they are not and is the wrong focus of US efforts. What those actual efforts ought to be, he gives few directions or ideas. Except that the west should not be worried about "goofballs" that go off to jihad.
Worse, the US may have gotten the wrong man since Zubaydah, he insists, was never a member of al Qaeda. This completely misses the original rationale and organization of Al Qaeda. Not as a singular entity, but an umbrella of multiple organizations that are connected, maintain similar goals, share funding, logistics, men and materials.
However, al Qaeda's origination and main threat was and continuous to be it's organizational, logistical, funding and management abilities, ideological draw and that it is the repository of the original veterans of "global jihad". All of which gives the designated "core" of al Qaeda significant position and power amongst the groups if not actual "command and control" over all groups pledging "bayat" (allegiance, or, more accurately, getting plugged in to the network).
Zubaydah does not mention bin Laden or Al Qaeda by name until book five and shortly before the September 11, 2001 attacks. This may be why McDermott states, almost emphatically, that Zubaydah had little or no relationship with Al Qaeda. Zubaydah's own diaries indicate other wise, all be it in seriously self censored style that Zubaydah even states in the diaries was necessary because writing things down was very dangerous.
For instance, in the early period of Zubaydah's training in Afghanistan, he repeatedly mentions going to the Kunar camp. One that is originally funded and organized by bin Laden prior to the organizational establishment of "Al Qaeda" and that continues to run through out the 90's. During his period as administrator at the "Shayk's camp", Zubaydah makes several trips to the Kunar camp to obtain trainers, materials and organize transportation of the Uzbeks and Tajiks who are coming and going from his camp.
Though Zubaydah could not be considered a card carrying member of Al Qaeda "core" in the early nineties, he was no stranger to the organization and was not, as McDermott suggests, a "competitor".
Even from the beginning, as Zubaydah described his original training and throughout his comments on the various camps, the organization and distribution of the camps depended on their focus and associations. For instance, some camps were basic training, beginning weapons, advanced weapons, bomb making, artillery, etc. Other camps were run by and recruited from specific groups, local or foreign, while others were fairly integrated as the different recruits arrived.
Most of the camps cooperated logistically and tactically. It was only after Afghanistan fell into civil war that greater rivalries existed. Zubaydah indicates that he and the camp he was administrating steered clear of the conflict, concentrating on developing recruits for external, regional activities. Bin Laden appeared to have supported the Taliban with funding and equipment. In essence, Zubaydah avoids becoming a part of the rivalry that instigated the civil war.
Zubaydah's connections with Al Qaeda become more clear in books five and six which seemed to have garnered little attention from Mr. McDermott. Possibly because, aside from a very explicit entry regarding the death of Mehsoud in North Afghanistan and 9/11, Zubaydah is very careful in discussing his activities and naming names. At the end of book five, Zubaydah is even more explicit that anything he writes to himself from that point on will likely be in "code" because the danger that it might fall into someone else's hands and be used against him is exceedingly high.
By the end of book five, the camp where Zubaydah was acting as an administrator has been shut down by the Taliban. Zubaydah had been attending numerous meetings amongst all the leadership of the jihad training camps. He appears to disagree with the idea, but he also is not overly angry. In fact, he mentions multiple times that he has "ambitions" that are about to be met. By this time, his views have become cemented towards the degradation of Western ideas, their infiltration into Islamic communities and the need to attack the West. Clearly, he has been regularly in contact with and receiving further indoctrination into the ideas espoused by Al Qaeda.
In Book six, his entries are fewer and spread out over longer periods. In many of the entries he indicates the reason is that he is about to realize his ambition. In a next entry, he indicates he has taken over administrating "The House of Martyrs" after visiting the "Kunar Camp". This is a significant entry and validates the opinion that Zubaydah has been admitted into the inner workings of Al Qaeda.
"The House of Martyrs" is a network of safe houses that act as a transit point for fighters moving in and out of Afghanistan. From Peshawar to Islamabad and throughout cities in Pakistan. According to most information available, these houses were originally established and funded by bin Laden during the Afghanistan War. These houses also acted as a place for respite and recovery for injured mujihadeen, a collection point for information on those coming and going as well as a conduit for funds that were used to administer the houses. More significantly, these funds were distributed amongst the various groups, training camps and dispensed to cells for terrorist activities.
Zubaydah spends a great deal of book six discussing some of these activities, the trials of administration, the difficulty in finding good help, obtaining and managing funds, the problem of establishing leadership over this significant area, the risks of traveling back and forth to the camps, transporting of fighters to and from camps and the fact that the Pakistani ISI and police are continuously very close to finding or raiding the houses. Despite the lack of names of the camps he is going to or group affiliations, it is clear that Zubaydah has an intricate part to play in the overall logistics and operations of the organization and funneling of trainees to camps and terrorists that go on to form active cells.
In another interim period, he indicates that he had travelled to a camp, which he does not explicitly name, and that something very significant is about to occur. Shortly after, he announces the the events of September 11 in which he praises "Shaikh bin Laden" and those that perpetrated the attacks. He even spells out exactly what locations the attacks were supposed to take out. Most notably the failed Flight 93 that crashed into the Pennsylvania field. In Zubaydah's remarks, coming right from a meeting in an undisclosed camp in Afghanistan, the plane was supposed to take out the White House.
He even goes to great lengths justifying Mehsoud's assassination on the grounds that the Northern Alliance, post 9/11, would be most likely used as a conduit for attacks against "them" (as in, whatever group he is actually working with which seems to be Al Qaeda as it was manifested at that time, "the base" for jihad). In any degree, it is hard to imagine that Zubaydah is not intricately involved in or aware of Al Qaeda activities.
In book six, Zubaydah does present himself as his own man in a way that he rarely indicates reporting directly to a superior. He does mention having to provide some accounting for activities and funds, but rarely suggests he is being ordered or guided. For many, including Mr. McDermott, this suggests some form of absolute autonomy from any organization. As if Zubaydah has simply appeared from no where with no connections, direction or directive, to collect and send fighters and money willy-nilly into Afghanistan with only a vague purpose of "jihad against the west".
This is either extreme naivety or wishful thinking. Even Zubaydah himself states in this last diary that he would not discuss anyone else, who he talked to or where he went to in Afghanistan. Again, for the sake of secrecy and protection. More importantly, Zubaydah knows, in detail, who is coming and going from the safe houses, to where and for what purpose. If he did not know, he would have been unable to fulfill the function that he takes great pride in.
If anything is understood about Al Qaeda and it's various terrorist cells that have perpetrated attacks, division of activities and maintaining separation was and remains important to protect the other members and activities. In some cases, not even knowing who the other members are until it becomes necessary to come together shortly before to put the pieces together and perpetrate the event such as 9/11 or the March 2003 attack in Madrid.
While Zubaydah's responsibilities and activities did not make him number 3 in the organization in any "linear" sense of leadership hierarchy, it does not make him a "low level member" of Al Qaeda either. He was in charge of logistics and funding, a significant branch of activities for the over all organizational network even if it and Zubaydah appeared to operate as if separate and autonomous. His operations are a significant "leg" of the over all network and information received from his arrest likely provided information on other parts or members of the network that could be followed up.
There is one statement that can be fully agreed upon generally:
This is generally true as the network relies on many different people with different skill sets, few of whom represent any type of overall genius, but who are fairly capable at the jobs and activities assigned. If they are not, they are either replaced or discovered. More importantly, they are bound by the rules of the world in which they operate even as they seek to undermine those rules. Even the act of organizing and committing terrorist activities demands time and attention to mundane details, interaction and exposure to people, the limits of time, space and travel and the necessity to maintain some records of activities in order to manage towards the over all goals.
This is why Zubaydah's capture was important and relatively significant to undermining the Al Qaeda network. At least, temporarily. Al Qaeda as a networked organization, like many legitimate organizations, has established forms of redundancy throughout it's activities. It's dispersed hierarchy, whether intentional or incidental, means that one disruption could slow operations, but may not ever create a "killing blow".
Mr. McDermott suggests that focusing on individuals puts too much significance on these individuals as opposed to evaluating and determining a plan to interdict radical Islam as an ideology. Not having an effective plan against the ideology may be one of the major issues effecting the ability to counter or create the demise of radical Islam, but not focusing on individuals who play significant parts in the network is equally fallible. It suggests leaving them to proliferate and widen their capabilities without any attempt to slow or disrupt.
He goes further in suggesting that, just like the mass shooters of Columbine and Newtown, the ability to prevent death by an individual or group of "goofballs" is limited so why focus on it? Which shows that Mr. McDermott has spent little time in analyzing these events where, in fact, the perpetrators gave off signals and presented several periods where they could have been interdicted. It may never be perfect, but it hardly suggests not looking for ways to maintain the safety of people and nations.
Far from the lessons that McDermott says he learned from reading Zubaydah's diary, that these were a bunch of "small" and hapless "goofballs" who happened to get lucky a few times, the lesson is that the organization and perpetration of "jihad" terrorism do require attention to numerous banal details. It is effectively mapping and connecting these banal details that allows the disruption of actual attacks such as the Christmas Shoe bomber, Richard Reid, or the attempted underwear bombing and even the placement of bombs in printing toner cartridges on cargo air planes.
These interventions keep people safe in the near term, but Mr. McDermott may be correct in asking if we have established an effective plan against the proliferation of radical Islam. The answer he may have provided accidentally:
Why do a bunch of "goofballs" go off to join an ideology and violent terrorist organization? Individuals may differ slightly, but the overall, banal answer seems to be, as in Zubaydah's case, because they have nothing better to do.
The world is full of dangerous goofballs, but we can't treat them all as threats to civilizationMr. McDermot may have some of that correct, but that and most of his article leave much to be desired. Much.
Abu Zubaydah's six released diaries can be located here.
Starting with this statement:
They also help substantiate what should by now be clear: The U.S. has made significant, basic errors in its response to 9/11 and the threat of radical IslamIt's fairly certain that the rest of everything you are going to read is some ideological manifestations of Mr. McDermott's opinion and policy preferences as opposed to actually showing, through excerpts or any substantiation or analysis of what Zubaydah wrote, that those who pursue jihad, and to a larger extent "terrorism", are "banal". Common. Or, even in Mr. McDermott's assessment "goofballs".
It's true, when you read the first two diaries, Zubaydah presents himself as a young, confused man who has significant personal issues. He struggles with his family where several parental separations occur, his mother is a weak personality while he spends much time talking about trying to please his father. He has vague conversations with his friends about the Israeli-Palestine situation and comments once, early on, about an argument between friends concerning when jihad is permissible and whether it is permissible or good to align with any secular organization like the PLO.
However, Mr. Zubaydah's drive to go to jihad in Afghanistan is not made overtly manifest until he had spent over a year in India attending university to get a degree in computer science. A project that his father frowned on, but paid for never the less. Failure at university, lack of familial support, few external relationships and personal struggles with his adherence to the tenets of his faith, most notably "chastity until marriage", are several of his motivators for leaving India to join the mujihadeen in Afghanistan.
Other significant motivators are a few of the other expatriate friends he had made who were planning to travel to Afghanistan. He also has some poor experiences with neighbors and people he believes to be his "friends". He has little money and lives very poorly, sometimes convincing himself that is all he requires. He is indirectly accused of having an affair or improper relations with his host's wife. The adventure, the purpose and direction that he is missing, his personal trauma and drama, are what leads him to determine to leave school and travel with an acquaintance to Pakistan.
This is the "goofball" that Mr McDermott suggests and reads significantly similar to many other young men who have either traveled abroad to join one of the jihad organizations or even remained behind to commit acts of terror in their home countries. Most recently, the Tsarnaev brothers (Boston), Adebolajo and Adebowale (murder of a British Soldier), Nidal Hasan (Ft. Hood) and Lindsay "Jamal" Graham (July 2005, London).
None start out as violent extremist, but they do seek it out as a panacea for their other conceived failures or personal trauma. With the exception of Hasan, these are young men who, prior to determination to turn to terrorism, would present as "goofballs". As do a number of others in the recent past who committed violent crimes such as the Aurora Theater mass shooting, Columbine and Newtown mass murderer.
Describing Zubaydah as a "goofball" would certainly apply to his immaturity and inexperience. Even though Zubaydah is approximately 20 when he begins his diaries, he writes and thinks with the dexterity, comprehension and focus of a fifteen year old. This slowly disappears over the course of the war and later throughout his diaries. By the end, Zubaydah has certainly matured and garnered considerable self-esteem and self-control.
He is no longer "a goofball". The fact that Mr. McDermott goes on to suggest this continues to be true throughout Zubaydah's career, even as he presents tidbits of information that suggests otherwise, is misleading at best and only plausible if someone had not actually read Zubaydah's diaries.
Zubaydah, born in Palestine and raised in middle-class comfort in Saudi Arabia, rose through the 1990s — by what abilities it is not clear — to a position of some stature within radical Islam
Zubaydah actually makes "clear" what "abilities" allow him to rise through the ranks until he becomes a significant player in the funding, organization and transit of fighters to the various camps for jihad. When he first arrives in Afghanistan, Zubaydah, who styles himself as "Hani" in his diaries, goes to a number of basic training camps. He struggles at first with the physical fitness aspects, but eventually pushes himself to improve, stop smoking and makes detailed, organized plans and sets goals for improving his fitness, maintaining his weight and becoming a more faithful follower of Islam.
Zubaydah then organizes a plan to become better trained in all the aspects of war, moving from camp to camp that offers different or better training on weapons and tactics. He outlines these plans in specific detail. A trait that becomes a prominent "ability", helping him to rise through the ranks. Zubaydah has excellent organizational skills, he has battle experience after nearly two years at the front, he has significant experience in training camps, watched other leaders and received mentoring as well as assessed what was good and bad amongst all of these activities.
When the main war is over and the Communist government of Afghanistan had fallen, Zubaydah remains in Afghanistan even as the civil war gets underway. He's appalled at the disunity, but, having dedicated himself to the "cause" of jihad for the sake of his religion, is determined to remain and put his efforts where he feels he's been most successful. At this point, jihad against whomever, simply for the sake of Islam, without further context, is his motivator. Western policies have little room in his discourse except a brief internal discussion on whether he should go to Palestine.
In the late 1990s he was instrumental in running a training camp just across the Pakistani border in Afghanistan
Zubaydah was actually the administrator of a very large camp that was filtering up to 400 trainees from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, etc. He outlines numerous issues he had with organizing and obtaining supplies and shelter for the number of recruits sent to him when the original number was supposed to be 100. He discusses disciplinary issues, money, theft, obtaining trainers, organizing classes and equipment and so on.
Some of his other duties include meeting with other groups (like Al Qaeda), transportation to and from the borders, documentation and a continuous plethora of details. He even laments the poor condition, abilities and general commitment of the recruits, without any irony or vague recognition of his own condition when he first arrived in Afghanistan. What is apparent is his organizational abilities, similar to those attributed to bin Laden, and growing leadership experiences and abilities.
This is the actual "banality of jihad". The details that must be managed to move men, equipment, weapons, munitions and money in order to run a training camp. This was discussed in Dr. Shapiro's book, "The Terrorist's Dilemma, The Management of Violent Covert Organizations", an overview and discussion with Dr. Shapiro can be found here.
While the details of running any organization are, in fact, "banal", these details make up a significant and important aspect of terrorist activities. Without obtaining, distributing and accounting for funds or organized logistics, no organization can long function or exist. McDermott seems to suggest that this is insignificant and, therefore, Zubaydah's role, tracking and arrest was equally insignificant or unimportant.
For McDermott, going after individuals amounts to conflating them into something they are not and is the wrong focus of US efforts. What those actual efforts ought to be, he gives few directions or ideas. Except that the west should not be worried about "goofballs" that go off to jihad.
Worse, the US may have gotten the wrong man since Zubaydah, he insists, was never a member of al Qaeda. This completely misses the original rationale and organization of Al Qaeda. Not as a singular entity, but an umbrella of multiple organizations that are connected, maintain similar goals, share funding, logistics, men and materials.
It turned out the link to Al-Qaeda was more tenuous than the U.S. government had imagined. For years, the U.S. government had viewed him as a major figure within the group, at one point even elevating him to the No. 3 position on what turned out to be a fanciful Al-Qaeda organizational chart.It's true, the US comprehension and assessment of the organization known as "Al Qaeda" was limited by it's own views of vertical organizations with clear, delineated leadership and roles. This isn't how Al Qaeda worked then or now, largely because of the manner in which these organizations recognize leaders. Those that are "successful" and can draw significant recruits and funding are leaders by self-selection, not appointed or given a specific title or command. Those are given out of respect, success on the battlefield or ones they sometimes choose for themselves (see, Syria's various emirs and commanders).
However, al Qaeda's origination and main threat was and continuous to be it's organizational, logistical, funding and management abilities, ideological draw and that it is the repository of the original veterans of "global jihad". All of which gives the designated "core" of al Qaeda significant position and power amongst the groups if not actual "command and control" over all groups pledging "bayat" (allegiance, or, more accurately, getting plugged in to the network).
Zubaydah does not mention bin Laden or Al Qaeda by name until book five and shortly before the September 11, 2001 attacks. This may be why McDermott states, almost emphatically, that Zubaydah had little or no relationship with Al Qaeda. Zubaydah's own diaries indicate other wise, all be it in seriously self censored style that Zubaydah even states in the diaries was necessary because writing things down was very dangerous.
For instance, in the early period of Zubaydah's training in Afghanistan, he repeatedly mentions going to the Kunar camp. One that is originally funded and organized by bin Laden prior to the organizational establishment of "Al Qaeda" and that continues to run through out the 90's. During his period as administrator at the "Shayk's camp", Zubaydah makes several trips to the Kunar camp to obtain trainers, materials and organize transportation of the Uzbeks and Tajiks who are coming and going from his camp.
Though Zubaydah could not be considered a card carrying member of Al Qaeda "core" in the early nineties, he was no stranger to the organization and was not, as McDermott suggests, a "competitor".
Even from the beginning, as Zubaydah described his original training and throughout his comments on the various camps, the organization and distribution of the camps depended on their focus and associations. For instance, some camps were basic training, beginning weapons, advanced weapons, bomb making, artillery, etc. Other camps were run by and recruited from specific groups, local or foreign, while others were fairly integrated as the different recruits arrived.
Most of the camps cooperated logistically and tactically. It was only after Afghanistan fell into civil war that greater rivalries existed. Zubaydah indicates that he and the camp he was administrating steered clear of the conflict, concentrating on developing recruits for external, regional activities. Bin Laden appeared to have supported the Taliban with funding and equipment. In essence, Zubaydah avoids becoming a part of the rivalry that instigated the civil war.
Zubaydah's connections with Al Qaeda become more clear in books five and six which seemed to have garnered little attention from Mr. McDermott. Possibly because, aside from a very explicit entry regarding the death of Mehsoud in North Afghanistan and 9/11, Zubaydah is very careful in discussing his activities and naming names. At the end of book five, Zubaydah is even more explicit that anything he writes to himself from that point on will likely be in "code" because the danger that it might fall into someone else's hands and be used against him is exceedingly high.
By the end of book five, the camp where Zubaydah was acting as an administrator has been shut down by the Taliban. Zubaydah had been attending numerous meetings amongst all the leadership of the jihad training camps. He appears to disagree with the idea, but he also is not overly angry. In fact, he mentions multiple times that he has "ambitions" that are about to be met. By this time, his views have become cemented towards the degradation of Western ideas, their infiltration into Islamic communities and the need to attack the West. Clearly, he has been regularly in contact with and receiving further indoctrination into the ideas espoused by Al Qaeda.
In Book six, his entries are fewer and spread out over longer periods. In many of the entries he indicates the reason is that he is about to realize his ambition. In a next entry, he indicates he has taken over administrating "The House of Martyrs" after visiting the "Kunar Camp". This is a significant entry and validates the opinion that Zubaydah has been admitted into the inner workings of Al Qaeda.
"The House of Martyrs" is a network of safe houses that act as a transit point for fighters moving in and out of Afghanistan. From Peshawar to Islamabad and throughout cities in Pakistan. According to most information available, these houses were originally established and funded by bin Laden during the Afghanistan War. These houses also acted as a place for respite and recovery for injured mujihadeen, a collection point for information on those coming and going as well as a conduit for funds that were used to administer the houses. More significantly, these funds were distributed amongst the various groups, training camps and dispensed to cells for terrorist activities.
Zubaydah spends a great deal of book six discussing some of these activities, the trials of administration, the difficulty in finding good help, obtaining and managing funds, the problem of establishing leadership over this significant area, the risks of traveling back and forth to the camps, transporting of fighters to and from camps and the fact that the Pakistani ISI and police are continuously very close to finding or raiding the houses. Despite the lack of names of the camps he is going to or group affiliations, it is clear that Zubaydah has an intricate part to play in the overall logistics and operations of the organization and funneling of trainees to camps and terrorists that go on to form active cells.
In another interim period, he indicates that he had travelled to a camp, which he does not explicitly name, and that something very significant is about to occur. Shortly after, he announces the the events of September 11 in which he praises "Shaikh bin Laden" and those that perpetrated the attacks. He even spells out exactly what locations the attacks were supposed to take out. Most notably the failed Flight 93 that crashed into the Pennsylvania field. In Zubaydah's remarks, coming right from a meeting in an undisclosed camp in Afghanistan, the plane was supposed to take out the White House.
He even goes to great lengths justifying Mehsoud's assassination on the grounds that the Northern Alliance, post 9/11, would be most likely used as a conduit for attacks against "them" (as in, whatever group he is actually working with which seems to be Al Qaeda as it was manifested at that time, "the base" for jihad). In any degree, it is hard to imagine that Zubaydah is not intricately involved in or aware of Al Qaeda activities.
In book six, Zubaydah does present himself as his own man in a way that he rarely indicates reporting directly to a superior. He does mention having to provide some accounting for activities and funds, but rarely suggests he is being ordered or guided. For many, including Mr. McDermott, this suggests some form of absolute autonomy from any organization. As if Zubaydah has simply appeared from no where with no connections, direction or directive, to collect and send fighters and money willy-nilly into Afghanistan with only a vague purpose of "jihad against the west".
This is either extreme naivety or wishful thinking. Even Zubaydah himself states in this last diary that he would not discuss anyone else, who he talked to or where he went to in Afghanistan. Again, for the sake of secrecy and protection. More importantly, Zubaydah knows, in detail, who is coming and going from the safe houses, to where and for what purpose. If he did not know, he would have been unable to fulfill the function that he takes great pride in.
If anything is understood about Al Qaeda and it's various terrorist cells that have perpetrated attacks, division of activities and maintaining separation was and remains important to protect the other members and activities. In some cases, not even knowing who the other members are until it becomes necessary to come together shortly before to put the pieces together and perpetrate the event such as 9/11 or the March 2003 attack in Madrid.
While Zubaydah's responsibilities and activities did not make him number 3 in the organization in any "linear" sense of leadership hierarchy, it does not make him a "low level member" of Al Qaeda either. He was in charge of logistics and funding, a significant branch of activities for the over all organizational network even if it and Zubaydah appeared to operate as if separate and autonomous. His operations are a significant "leg" of the over all network and information received from his arrest likely provided information on other parts or members of the network that could be followed up.
There is one statement that can be fully agreed upon generally:
Terrorists are not supermen; they are not brilliant tacticians or highly trained warriors
This is generally true as the network relies on many different people with different skill sets, few of whom represent any type of overall genius, but who are fairly capable at the jobs and activities assigned. If they are not, they are either replaced or discovered. More importantly, they are bound by the rules of the world in which they operate even as they seek to undermine those rules. Even the act of organizing and committing terrorist activities demands time and attention to mundane details, interaction and exposure to people, the limits of time, space and travel and the necessity to maintain some records of activities in order to manage towards the over all goals.
This is why Zubaydah's capture was important and relatively significant to undermining the Al Qaeda network. At least, temporarily. Al Qaeda as a networked organization, like many legitimate organizations, has established forms of redundancy throughout it's activities. It's dispersed hierarchy, whether intentional or incidental, means that one disruption could slow operations, but may not ever create a "killing blow".
Mr. McDermott suggests that focusing on individuals puts too much significance on these individuals as opposed to evaluating and determining a plan to interdict radical Islam as an ideology. Not having an effective plan against the ideology may be one of the major issues effecting the ability to counter or create the demise of radical Islam, but not focusing on individuals who play significant parts in the network is equally fallible. It suggests leaving them to proliferate and widen their capabilities without any attempt to slow or disrupt.
He goes further in suggesting that, just like the mass shooters of Columbine and Newtown, the ability to prevent death by an individual or group of "goofballs" is limited so why focus on it? Which shows that Mr. McDermott has spent little time in analyzing these events where, in fact, the perpetrators gave off signals and presented several periods where they could have been interdicted. It may never be perfect, but it hardly suggests not looking for ways to maintain the safety of people and nations.
Far from the lessons that McDermott says he learned from reading Zubaydah's diary, that these were a bunch of "small" and hapless "goofballs" who happened to get lucky a few times, the lesson is that the organization and perpetration of "jihad" terrorism do require attention to numerous banal details. It is effectively mapping and connecting these banal details that allows the disruption of actual attacks such as the Christmas Shoe bomber, Richard Reid, or the attempted underwear bombing and even the placement of bombs in printing toner cartridges on cargo air planes.
These interventions keep people safe in the near term, but Mr. McDermott may be correct in asking if we have established an effective plan against the proliferation of radical Islam. The answer he may have provided accidentally:
Why do a bunch of "goofballs" go off to join an ideology and violent terrorist organization? Individuals may differ slightly, but the overall, banal answer seems to be, as in Zubaydah's case, because they have nothing better to do.
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