As the debate over the Benghazi attack of September 11, 2012 continues, one issue remains prevalent and continues to be the focal point of the debate: was the attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda, an Al Qaeda linked "affiliate" or by a local group with it's own agenda? Much of that debate is politically driven, but is of interest because it also mirrors the on going debate about what Al Qaeda is and it's over all structure or organization. Most importantly, whether Al Qaeda is a growing organization with growing capabilities to direct attacks or whether it is slowly becoming just another player in the field as "global jihad" groups proliferate across the region and Al Qaeda's command and control slips away.
In viewing the various debates, studies and expert contentions, it seems more than likely that the answer will be unsatisfying to all and that is: all of the above.
One of the issues is that this spread of militant Islamism and groups continues to be treated as a new phenomena as if violent organizations or even ideologically driven movements have never been seen before, on this scale or even coalesced to create either revolutionary movements or criminal, violent enterprises. Or, in fact, not coalesced as a large organized movement, but did proceed to proliferate through societies, becoming a persistent danger to the societies wherein they operate, spawning offshoots and creating whole underground and commiserate, cooperating organizations that undermine or erode society and civil order.
The debates and on-going struggle for definition is driven by the overwhelming desire to determine a way to successfully counter and hopefully defeat these movements. In the end, as one observer called it, "defend civilization", but, more broadly, defend people, society, cities, nation states and interests.
This, amongst other issues, has driven the search for "the answer" and, through out continued inability to comprehend sociological phenomena and movements, increasingly unsatisfactory answers as to what it is, how it works and how best to combat it. Even the word "combat" is unsatisfying as it suggests "war" when not every instance of it's existence lends towards the physicality of "war" as the greater part of society understands it, even as violent activity surrounding those instances would seem to suggest just that solution.
But, if we want to "combat" it, in any sense of the word, we have to have a place to start. From the law enforcement, national security and intelligence view, that means focusing on it's known entities and operations. The connectivity of those entities and operations once again suggesting a greater organization that can be identified and reduced through attrition at various key points such as funding as well as eliminating individuals seen as lynch pins.
These activities are, in reality, "tactics" while a greater "strategy" appears murky and continuingly out of step with the entire advent of an apparently globalized sociological violent movement that is ever fluid. Equally disconcerting is that it's proliferation has created a redundancy model. Meaning that, even as one group or individual or method is countered or eliminated, another group or individual or resource arises to take it's place.
This has created significant frustration within the general population in comprehending what is happening and how to put an end to it. The debates over what it is and whether it is organized and controlled or not has led to general confusion within the population that lends to ever present disjointed policies or misapprehension of how those policies and commiserate tactics ought to be applied, to whom and to which situations.
That is re-enforced by the movement's own rhetoric that professes global aspirations even as it acts or is confined to local spaces. Their ability to appear and operate is completely dependent on local situations, existing conditions and the make up of the population itself. Like similar sociological movements, it tends to take root in places where governance and security is weak, the economy is poor and other stressors, such as political or social disenfranchisement, are apparent.
In the case of "global jihad", the other prevalent indicator is a Muslim population even as these groups take advantage of and interact with other, non-Islamic, populations, criminal organizations and activities or groups for smuggling weapons, drugs, diamonds, oil, stolen cars, cigarettes, knock off products, money laundering, etc. The list is amazingly long and suggests a plethora of areas where intelligence and security operations must focus on and interdict in order to slow or attrite these various groups although it does nothing to combat the sociological movement itself.
This is compounded even more by the advent of state actors using these movements as political tools without seeming to care that they are creating an ungovernable monster that, in the end, is likely to come back around to infiltrate amongst their own populations. Authoritarian police states, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, are two such states that imagine their control is infinite and that the supposed homogeneity of their populations provide a buffer. However, historical evidence of ideological and sociological movements suggests that it is impossible to completely eliminate or confine, even in a police state.
China and Russia could be included in this list even as Pakistan, a grand purveyor of the non-state actors for indirect warfare, finds itself in a persistent state of internal, low grade civil war. This has become such a normative within Pakistan that the state itself has adapted and set it's goals for governance and control to specific areas or seats of power such as the military, treasury, huge bureaucracy with little control beyond specific population centers. Thus, Pakistan has the appearance of a state with defined borders and government apparatus, but is more akin to a large, armed, occupying force barely keeping the lid on an ever boiling situation and using it to push it's regional political agenda that routinely bleeds out onto the international arena.
Neither can we dismiss the interaction of western states where designation as terrorist groups and even outright support of particular groups is highly politically motivated. As indicated by the European Union's slow and bifurcated approach to designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization or even the United States and allies debating whether to designate Jabhat al-Nusra even slightly after it pledged "bayt" or allegiance to Al Qaeda.
All of this can be added to the pot and stirred around to create utterly unwieldy policy and security mechanisms along with confusion in the ranks from policy makers to those tasked with securing the nation and within the population itself. The last simply wanting to know how those designated as "responsible" will keep them safe from what appears to be an ever growing violent movement.
All the while, the power of the people's pleasure or displeasure is used to push one policy or another, represented in the political arena of party, national and international politics. None of whom seem to agree what it is or isn't that we are up against. Worse yet, that the general population have not comprehended the difference between being "safe" and "defeating" a movement.
The first may be generally accomplished, the latter, based on history, may be impossible to accomplish completely until or if it coalesces into a state, government and army that can be directly targeted. Or, as in the case with FARC in Colombia, after thirty years and the state slowly gaining governance, economic and security measures, the movement becomes exhausted and their sociological and political pull becomes irrelevant to the parts of society that once gave them support. Only at that point taking out key entities within the organization and attrition of resources may result in it's final crumbling, although, again, not it's complete demise.
That unsatisfying answer is the elephant in the room, an answer that no one is willing to give because it means political death even if it would be more likely to result in better policies, mechanism and focus from all agencies and actors involved and, in the end, possibly keep us safer.
In viewing the various debates, studies and expert contentions, it seems more than likely that the answer will be unsatisfying to all and that is: all of the above.
One of the issues is that this spread of militant Islamism and groups continues to be treated as a new phenomena as if violent organizations or even ideologically driven movements have never been seen before, on this scale or even coalesced to create either revolutionary movements or criminal, violent enterprises. Or, in fact, not coalesced as a large organized movement, but did proceed to proliferate through societies, becoming a persistent danger to the societies wherein they operate, spawning offshoots and creating whole underground and commiserate, cooperating organizations that undermine or erode society and civil order.
The debates and on-going struggle for definition is driven by the overwhelming desire to determine a way to successfully counter and hopefully defeat these movements. In the end, as one observer called it, "defend civilization", but, more broadly, defend people, society, cities, nation states and interests.
This, amongst other issues, has driven the search for "the answer" and, through out continued inability to comprehend sociological phenomena and movements, increasingly unsatisfactory answers as to what it is, how it works and how best to combat it. Even the word "combat" is unsatisfying as it suggests "war" when not every instance of it's existence lends towards the physicality of "war" as the greater part of society understands it, even as violent activity surrounding those instances would seem to suggest just that solution.
But, if we want to "combat" it, in any sense of the word, we have to have a place to start. From the law enforcement, national security and intelligence view, that means focusing on it's known entities and operations. The connectivity of those entities and operations once again suggesting a greater organization that can be identified and reduced through attrition at various key points such as funding as well as eliminating individuals seen as lynch pins.
These activities are, in reality, "tactics" while a greater "strategy" appears murky and continuingly out of step with the entire advent of an apparently globalized sociological violent movement that is ever fluid. Equally disconcerting is that it's proliferation has created a redundancy model. Meaning that, even as one group or individual or method is countered or eliminated, another group or individual or resource arises to take it's place.
This has created significant frustration within the general population in comprehending what is happening and how to put an end to it. The debates over what it is and whether it is organized and controlled or not has led to general confusion within the population that lends to ever present disjointed policies or misapprehension of how those policies and commiserate tactics ought to be applied, to whom and to which situations.
That is re-enforced by the movement's own rhetoric that professes global aspirations even as it acts or is confined to local spaces. Their ability to appear and operate is completely dependent on local situations, existing conditions and the make up of the population itself. Like similar sociological movements, it tends to take root in places where governance and security is weak, the economy is poor and other stressors, such as political or social disenfranchisement, are apparent.
In the case of "global jihad", the other prevalent indicator is a Muslim population even as these groups take advantage of and interact with other, non-Islamic, populations, criminal organizations and activities or groups for smuggling weapons, drugs, diamonds, oil, stolen cars, cigarettes, knock off products, money laundering, etc. The list is amazingly long and suggests a plethora of areas where intelligence and security operations must focus on and interdict in order to slow or attrite these various groups although it does nothing to combat the sociological movement itself.
This is compounded even more by the advent of state actors using these movements as political tools without seeming to care that they are creating an ungovernable monster that, in the end, is likely to come back around to infiltrate amongst their own populations. Authoritarian police states, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, are two such states that imagine their control is infinite and that the supposed homogeneity of their populations provide a buffer. However, historical evidence of ideological and sociological movements suggests that it is impossible to completely eliminate or confine, even in a police state.
China and Russia could be included in this list even as Pakistan, a grand purveyor of the non-state actors for indirect warfare, finds itself in a persistent state of internal, low grade civil war. This has become such a normative within Pakistan that the state itself has adapted and set it's goals for governance and control to specific areas or seats of power such as the military, treasury, huge bureaucracy with little control beyond specific population centers. Thus, Pakistan has the appearance of a state with defined borders and government apparatus, but is more akin to a large, armed, occupying force barely keeping the lid on an ever boiling situation and using it to push it's regional political agenda that routinely bleeds out onto the international arena.
Neither can we dismiss the interaction of western states where designation as terrorist groups and even outright support of particular groups is highly politically motivated. As indicated by the European Union's slow and bifurcated approach to designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization or even the United States and allies debating whether to designate Jabhat al-Nusra even slightly after it pledged "bayt" or allegiance to Al Qaeda.
All of this can be added to the pot and stirred around to create utterly unwieldy policy and security mechanisms along with confusion in the ranks from policy makers to those tasked with securing the nation and within the population itself. The last simply wanting to know how those designated as "responsible" will keep them safe from what appears to be an ever growing violent movement.
All the while, the power of the people's pleasure or displeasure is used to push one policy or another, represented in the political arena of party, national and international politics. None of whom seem to agree what it is or isn't that we are up against. Worse yet, that the general population have not comprehended the difference between being "safe" and "defeating" a movement.
The first may be generally accomplished, the latter, based on history, may be impossible to accomplish completely until or if it coalesces into a state, government and army that can be directly targeted. Or, as in the case with FARC in Colombia, after thirty years and the state slowly gaining governance, economic and security measures, the movement becomes exhausted and their sociological and political pull becomes irrelevant to the parts of society that once gave them support. Only at that point taking out key entities within the organization and attrition of resources may result in it's final crumbling, although, again, not it's complete demise.
That unsatisfying answer is the elephant in the room, an answer that no one is willing to give because it means political death even if it would be more likely to result in better policies, mechanism and focus from all agencies and actors involved and, in the end, possibly keep us safer.
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