In trying to determine the who and the what of Al Qaeda or the differences between any group proclaiming "jihad" or "global jihad" or generally Islamic Militant language, it helps first to have some basic understanding of how sociological and ideological movements develop and proliferate. There are a number of excellent books about terrorism, terrorist organizations and psychology of both groups and individuals involved in this activity. Many of these books focus on the sociological, psychological and ideological drives of individuals and groups that might lead them to decide to join a group or commit acts of terrorism.
One book, The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and State of Mind, included an essay by Dr. Martha Crenshaw on the "psycho-logical" aspects of decision making for committing an act of terrorism. Studies have focused on the make up of groups, their networks and how they behave. Many more hours have been spent on mapping out connections between various groups. Even towards developing complicated algorithms to establish risk factors and networking.
And, yet, we remain here, stuck with unsatisfying answers that remain contentious amongst experts and intelligence agencies, media and pundits, politicians and the population. In some ways it's because the mode and manner of communication has demanded simplification for consumption. In others, because it may be deemed too complicated or even a point of secrecy belaying the necessity to convey it properly to the population at large.
This may explain the inability or lack of interest of providing explanation to the population, producing confusion, but it hardly explains why there is such a cognitive difference amongst all those whose job it is to actually determine this information and provide it for national, agency or academic consumption. In either case, the dichotomy may provide a wider range of views and ideas from which to approach the situation, but it may also create a bifurcation in policy that results in less successful counter measures. Or, equally important, evaluating situations for dangers to the population, nation, interests and personnel abroad such as the case of Benghazi.
While political motivations as well as misapprehension of the nature of threats continues to push this debate along, the most recent report actually suggests that, indeed, we are in need of a new method of evaluating and conveying the basics; stepping back from the noise of the multitude opinions, studies and books and surveying the groundwork for a workable model. One that is comprehensible for all those that must make policy as well as the population that must consume information and push those policies along.
First issue that must be recognized is that there are many forms of Islamic militant activity and groups. Al Qaeda is one manifestation. It's language, ideology and political goals are global in nature even as it is confined to acting largely in specific locations within the Middle East and Central Asia. It has chosen to attack targets around the world as an offensive measure in order to intimidate nations from acting to defend their interests; force countries to withdraw militarily, politically and economically from specific areas; and, provoke reactions that will re-enforce it's propaganda and ideology among it's target population for proliferation.
That ideology insists that Muslims and Islam are under attack by both non-Islamic nations (infidels, kufr) as well as leaders of Islamic nations who are heretics, apostates or non-believers (takfir, munifiqeen) and their various government agencies, employees and even many citizens. Their goals are to establish Islamic government based on their stringent interpretation of Islam and it's law (shar'iah) within nations that are largely populated by Muslims or nations that they claim are historically part of a greater Islamic empire (Caliphate).
While many other groups espouse a similar ideology, their goals and capabilities are focused on specific locales within this larger region. Many of these same groups expect that, once they have established within these nations, they will join this greater Islamic union to form a larger Pan-Islamic empire (Caliphate). Others, still espousing similar ideology, may not have any confidence in creating this trans-national Caliphate, but believe they will have established one of many like minded nations that will ally for defense of their newly established Islamic state.
There are also groups that espouse an Islamic militant ideology whose goals are entirely local and consider themselves defending their existing population, proselytizing stringent, fundamental Islam and organizing local governance in compliance with their ideology. In any scenario, trans-national, regional, national or local, these organizations and groups, the general ideology, is hostile to any nation, population or organization that does not fit within their ideology or who they see as hostile or an obstruction to their over all goals.
There are groups who organize under an Islamic name, that are militant in nature and espouse an Islamic language, may be defensive or offensive in nature, but do not align with groups or organizations that profess Global Islamic Jihad. Who they are hostile towards depends largely on local political situations, but may bleed over onto national or international groups or organizations as they struggle to defend, take or hold specific territory.
Finally, there are groups who organize under an Islamic name, who are political or evangelical in nature, who may espouse Global Islamic goals or simply proselytize a stringent, fundamental Islam. They are not militant, but may become militant or create militant offshoots if they believe they are under threat or are unable to reach their goals through generally peaceful means. They may also become militant once they reach a certain number of members or if certain members begin to espouse militant ideas.
Each of these organizations presents a different threat. The issue is how to determine which category each of these organizations belong to and what risk they pose to nations, populations and any transnational interests. While there is a danger in not recognizing that all militant groups in these categories represent a security threat on various levels, there is also a danger in lumping all of these groups into one category.
In doing so, it suggests only one solution to a multi-layered political and security landscape. In order to reduce the threat or potential threat from these various groups, it would be better to have different policies and tools to address each situation and reduce the likelihood of these differing groups refining or redefining their struggle or goals to match those of Global Islamic Jihad and specifically Al Qaeda.
However, it should be recognized plainly that any non-state militant organization can be a threat to personnel, locations and interests. Particularly in locations where on-going hostilities, internecine or intermittent combat or violent clashes continue due to political unrest. Further, when there is a weak government, military or other security apparatus that cannot be relied on to provide consistent security for international agencies, embassies or interests, political or commercial.
The last appears to be an accepted logic, but, as the events at the Benghazi indicate, the actual nature of these threats can be underestimated or risks to security underplayed for purely political reasons. In this case, a newly "liberated" nation where various groups formed nominal alliances with local, national and international groups, but quickly fell into political discord and internecine clashes of a power struggle. Where once they may have considered the United States an ally, some determined that the presence of the United States, or it's political power behind other groups, would become an obstacle to their political goals, locally and nationally.
The Libyan political and militant landscape is an excellent representation of the levels of Islamic Militant organizations and the multiplicity of security threats posed by these organizations. It also provides another important lesson as reports continue to muddle through who was involved in Benghazi, what organization and what rationales were used for the attack. That lesson is that these different organizations and their political goals may be separate, but that there is no absolute delineation between members and organizations.
In fact, many members migrate between organizations, they may share resources and many organizations may cooperate in small and large ways in order to accomplish their separate goals. This, too, has attributed to the general population's view that, indeed, then they are all part of the Global Islamic Jihad movement and represent the same threat. Or, more succinctly, are part of Al Qaeda, considered to be the main and most persistent threat. As has the idea that, because they all espouse some form of Islamist militant language and/or ideology, that all Muslims then pose the same threat.
All of which percolates into our intelligence, security and academic organizations to create multiple and convoluted models and assessments that do little to clear the situation, develop appropriate policies or present viable concepts for threat assessments. This returns to the original point of this article, that after all these years and man power spent, we should have come to some universal conclusions and developed appropriate models for comprehending this current sociological movement and combatting it's threat when and wherever necessary.
What is this model and is it necessarily a "new" model? Or, amongst all the studies and assessments, does it already exist? Should it necessarily be about or focus on Global Islamic Jihad as the only or largest threat, as many professionals consider other trans-national and national domestic terrorist and criminal organizations to be equally or more threatening?
Moving along that line of thinking, haven't we seen this all before and is it possible that existing sociological studies and models can provide a better method for viewing this most recent incarnation?
One book, The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and State of Mind, included an essay by Dr. Martha Crenshaw on the "psycho-logical" aspects of decision making for committing an act of terrorism. Studies have focused on the make up of groups, their networks and how they behave. Many more hours have been spent on mapping out connections between various groups. Even towards developing complicated algorithms to establish risk factors and networking.
And, yet, we remain here, stuck with unsatisfying answers that remain contentious amongst experts and intelligence agencies, media and pundits, politicians and the population. In some ways it's because the mode and manner of communication has demanded simplification for consumption. In others, because it may be deemed too complicated or even a point of secrecy belaying the necessity to convey it properly to the population at large.
This may explain the inability or lack of interest of providing explanation to the population, producing confusion, but it hardly explains why there is such a cognitive difference amongst all those whose job it is to actually determine this information and provide it for national, agency or academic consumption. In either case, the dichotomy may provide a wider range of views and ideas from which to approach the situation, but it may also create a bifurcation in policy that results in less successful counter measures. Or, equally important, evaluating situations for dangers to the population, nation, interests and personnel abroad such as the case of Benghazi.
While political motivations as well as misapprehension of the nature of threats continues to push this debate along, the most recent report actually suggests that, indeed, we are in need of a new method of evaluating and conveying the basics; stepping back from the noise of the multitude opinions, studies and books and surveying the groundwork for a workable model. One that is comprehensible for all those that must make policy as well as the population that must consume information and push those policies along.
First issue that must be recognized is that there are many forms of Islamic militant activity and groups. Al Qaeda is one manifestation. It's language, ideology and political goals are global in nature even as it is confined to acting largely in specific locations within the Middle East and Central Asia. It has chosen to attack targets around the world as an offensive measure in order to intimidate nations from acting to defend their interests; force countries to withdraw militarily, politically and economically from specific areas; and, provoke reactions that will re-enforce it's propaganda and ideology among it's target population for proliferation.
That ideology insists that Muslims and Islam are under attack by both non-Islamic nations (infidels, kufr) as well as leaders of Islamic nations who are heretics, apostates or non-believers (takfir, munifiqeen) and their various government agencies, employees and even many citizens. Their goals are to establish Islamic government based on their stringent interpretation of Islam and it's law (shar'iah) within nations that are largely populated by Muslims or nations that they claim are historically part of a greater Islamic empire (Caliphate).
While many other groups espouse a similar ideology, their goals and capabilities are focused on specific locales within this larger region. Many of these same groups expect that, once they have established within these nations, they will join this greater Islamic union to form a larger Pan-Islamic empire (Caliphate). Others, still espousing similar ideology, may not have any confidence in creating this trans-national Caliphate, but believe they will have established one of many like minded nations that will ally for defense of their newly established Islamic state.
There are also groups that espouse an Islamic militant ideology whose goals are entirely local and consider themselves defending their existing population, proselytizing stringent, fundamental Islam and organizing local governance in compliance with their ideology. In any scenario, trans-national, regional, national or local, these organizations and groups, the general ideology, is hostile to any nation, population or organization that does not fit within their ideology or who they see as hostile or an obstruction to their over all goals.
There are groups who organize under an Islamic name, that are militant in nature and espouse an Islamic language, may be defensive or offensive in nature, but do not align with groups or organizations that profess Global Islamic Jihad. Who they are hostile towards depends largely on local political situations, but may bleed over onto national or international groups or organizations as they struggle to defend, take or hold specific territory.
Finally, there are groups who organize under an Islamic name, who are political or evangelical in nature, who may espouse Global Islamic goals or simply proselytize a stringent, fundamental Islam. They are not militant, but may become militant or create militant offshoots if they believe they are under threat or are unable to reach their goals through generally peaceful means. They may also become militant once they reach a certain number of members or if certain members begin to espouse militant ideas.
Each of these organizations presents a different threat. The issue is how to determine which category each of these organizations belong to and what risk they pose to nations, populations and any transnational interests. While there is a danger in not recognizing that all militant groups in these categories represent a security threat on various levels, there is also a danger in lumping all of these groups into one category.
In doing so, it suggests only one solution to a multi-layered political and security landscape. In order to reduce the threat or potential threat from these various groups, it would be better to have different policies and tools to address each situation and reduce the likelihood of these differing groups refining or redefining their struggle or goals to match those of Global Islamic Jihad and specifically Al Qaeda.
However, it should be recognized plainly that any non-state militant organization can be a threat to personnel, locations and interests. Particularly in locations where on-going hostilities, internecine or intermittent combat or violent clashes continue due to political unrest. Further, when there is a weak government, military or other security apparatus that cannot be relied on to provide consistent security for international agencies, embassies or interests, political or commercial.
The last appears to be an accepted logic, but, as the events at the Benghazi indicate, the actual nature of these threats can be underestimated or risks to security underplayed for purely political reasons. In this case, a newly "liberated" nation where various groups formed nominal alliances with local, national and international groups, but quickly fell into political discord and internecine clashes of a power struggle. Where once they may have considered the United States an ally, some determined that the presence of the United States, or it's political power behind other groups, would become an obstacle to their political goals, locally and nationally.
The Libyan political and militant landscape is an excellent representation of the levels of Islamic Militant organizations and the multiplicity of security threats posed by these organizations. It also provides another important lesson as reports continue to muddle through who was involved in Benghazi, what organization and what rationales were used for the attack. That lesson is that these different organizations and their political goals may be separate, but that there is no absolute delineation between members and organizations.
In fact, many members migrate between organizations, they may share resources and many organizations may cooperate in small and large ways in order to accomplish their separate goals. This, too, has attributed to the general population's view that, indeed, then they are all part of the Global Islamic Jihad movement and represent the same threat. Or, more succinctly, are part of Al Qaeda, considered to be the main and most persistent threat. As has the idea that, because they all espouse some form of Islamist militant language and/or ideology, that all Muslims then pose the same threat.
All of which percolates into our intelligence, security and academic organizations to create multiple and convoluted models and assessments that do little to clear the situation, develop appropriate policies or present viable concepts for threat assessments. This returns to the original point of this article, that after all these years and man power spent, we should have come to some universal conclusions and developed appropriate models for comprehending this current sociological movement and combatting it's threat when and wherever necessary.
What is this model and is it necessarily a "new" model? Or, amongst all the studies and assessments, does it already exist? Should it necessarily be about or focus on Global Islamic Jihad as the only or largest threat, as many professionals consider other trans-national and national domestic terrorist and criminal organizations to be equally or more threatening?
Moving along that line of thinking, haven't we seen this all before and is it possible that existing sociological studies and models can provide a better method for viewing this most recent incarnation?
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