Thought I'd try a little exercise in writing down some general impressions of current events...
Syria -
If Assad falls, there will be an immediate civil war, likely more horrible & costly to civilians. Current militias are focused on Assad & Assad is focused on militias. Current terror being inflicted on civilians is still largely "collateral". All sides are still trying to present themselves as defenders of the people. Not necessarily true, but there is still a propaganda war to manage.
Once this proceeds to trying to gain power to rule Syria, all sides will likely turn, reminiscent of Afghanistan post Soviet withdrawal and collapse of Communist government. As one pundit put it, they will be fighting to be king's of ashes.
For ISIS, the most important aspect will be holding on to a large part of the state to create a safe haven and some pretense of an Islamic state, similar to their attempts in Iraq. They may, for a time, make some sort of pact with JAN, but any attempt by JAN to establish authority in a government or on a shura council will be rebuffed. Likely to cause JAN to break into further factions.
This will become a contest between the two AQ related organizations and, ultimately, prove whether ISIS, seeming on the outs with AQ central as embodied by Zawahiri, will establish it's own power base and become a truly rival organization to AQ's jihadist ideology. It's hard to say if this would be good or bad in the fight against extremism. Certainly, organizations developing internal rivalries can create weaknesses, but, as shown by such orgs as al Shabaab in Somalia and Belmohktar's AQIM, often pushes these organizations to do even greater violent acts to prove their strength and capabilities.
Already, ISIS certainly surpasses AQAP & AQIM as the most prominent group drawing money, fighters and recognition. However, current events in Africa and continuing operations in the Sinai suggest that this will only last so long and is contingent upon ISIS further survival.
If Assad should fall or ISIS is capable to form a rump state in some sort of ill sitting status quo, there's a possibility that greater cooperation amongst states will result in it being immediately under attack as a pariah state.
On the potential for Assad's fall or abdication, current situations suggest that this is a serious possibility. First, the US pushing for the removal of Assad's chemical weapons and the agreement of various states including Russia and Iran, suggests that the idea is not foreign or out of the realm of plausibility. Assad seems to imagine that this process, along with his assertion that he is fighting terrorists like AQ, is some form of rehabilitation to allow him to remain in the political process. My impression is that Assad is dispensable by the outside groups involved.
More worrisome is the devolution of the Syrian state in which all manner of arms & equipment would then be available to any number of non-state actors and be a danger to every state in the region. Assad would be fooling himself if he imagined this was not the major driver for all those involved, but it's hard to say what he believes as the circle around him creates a real barrier to reality.
Some of these realities include what appears to be a clear choking off of supplies, fuel & munitions. Aside from the scarcity of food and the clear hi-jacking of humanitarian aid then being sold in markets, other scarcities are apparent. Reports include the destruction or inoperability of electrical and heating plants along with reports that several water plants have completely shut down, likely also due to fuel shortages and inability to perform maintenance. In essence, the only places still getting light are in the north, like Raqqa, where ISIS is nominally running utilities, and very localized to immediate areas around Assad's command in Damascus.
Other indicators include the reduction of tank battles and few, if any, fighter jets flying missions. This is partly due to the rebels overtaking several bases and appropriating or destroying equipment. It's also indicative of the state of fuel and the remaining equipment. The little oil that Syria is currently receiving is coming either from the ports in Latakia and Tartus via Russian shipments or possibly overland from Iraq. Both of these logistical routes are constantly threatened by "rebel" groups, possession of key towns along the routes routinely switching hands.
Another indicator has been his choice of weapons/munitions and their delivery. Earlier events, such as the chemical weapons attacks on areas like Ghoutta that have sparked removal, seemed to indicate two very important aspects: 1) some form of desperation in attempting to break the siege and 2) conservation of men & munitions. This seems to be re-enforced by more recent events which includes the use of homemade barrel bombs delivered via helicopters.
The barrel bombs, as shown in various photos, are filled with fuel and ignited with very basic fuses. What's interesting there is the use of fuel and oil. This seems to indicate that, while fuel is short, there's a likelihood that equipment that could use the fuel is even less available. The question would be better answered if the type of fuel being used was known, such as jet fuel, diesel, regular petrol or even raw oil (inability to refine for use in machinery would limit it's value beyond an ignition source).
The fact that it's being delivered by helicopter likely means that this is the equipment that is still most reliable mechanically as well as has pilots to fly. It's possible that the grounding of jets could be related to early defections of pilots, a fear of loss of loyalty in these ranks or simply that there is not enough parts or capable mechanics to perform maintenance and keep them flying. Loss of significant air bases, like Menagh, would also limit availability.
One other event that went by with little fanfare was the attempt to barrel bomb a dam on the Euphrates in September in one of the few remaining attacks using a jet. This may have simply been an attempt to deprive the upper area of Syria, controlled by the rebels, of any electricity or water, but it's success would have had even more significant destructive outcome flooding the valley below and likely killing hundreds of civilians in one fell swoop.
A form of "total war" that would hope to decimate rebel strongholds in the rear that supplies the forces currently putting Damascus to siege. As with the other events, including a short lived mechanized push through Ghoutta, this seems a very desperate, "Hail Mary" attempt in the face of dwindling resources and forces.
In essence, Assad remains under siege and has been unable to break it even with the influx of militias like Hezbollah and their related groups from Iraq. The Iranian Qods who have been helping to train the NDF (national defense forces) have suffered several key losses in officers. They have also met with major difficulties in organizing the forces, discipline and equipment. Hezbollah has suffered hundreds of casualties and appear less enthusiastic about confronting the rebel and jihadi groups after key victories that were quickly halted.
Further, attacks on Hezbollah and Iranian property and specific individuals in Lebanon, with concomitant political fall, out may also be depleting Hezbollah's will to invest further as they're position in Lebanon, political and militia holding territory, may be weakened. The question also remains whether Iran will continue to invest or invest even more in shoring up Assad's government and military forces.
If Assad falls, Iran's direct, physical link with Hezbollah will be broken along with it's ability to provide physical and political support. Equally troubling for Iran is that it's corridor to the Mediterranean via Syria and Lebanon will cease to exist along with it's conceived defensive/offensive corridor to Israel. With Israel still making noises about attacking Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure.
It's fairly certain that his is a major issue for Iran and is likely one of the reasons that Iran was willing to negotiate, not only over Assad's chemical weapons, but over it's nuclear activities. In essence, attempting to forestall what could possibly be an immediate strike by Israel post Assad demise. Another indicator that the Iranians are not confident in the continued survival of Assad's regime.
As an aside on Iran, recent events such as unexplained explosions and fires at nuclear facilities and research sites as well as very public assassinations of key figures, may indicate that Israel has a bead on these sites and people through intelligent networks. Or, equally troubling, that there is, indeed, some internal fractures that are becoming very apparent to the outside world and may shake Iran politically.
The possibility of Geneva II resulting in any sort of peace agreement seems far off and unlikely. More importantly, this pushing the date back could be equally a device by the greater interlocutors to allow the fighting to grind on and grind down the participants. Of course, winter has arrived and makes some war activities more difficult and the build up, repositioning of equipment and supplies for a spring offensive, by both sides in hopes of finally breaking the status quo, equally possible.
By Jolani's (JAN) recent interview, the rebels and AQ groups seem fairly confident that they will have the upper hand even as Assad seems willing to go to Geneva for negotiations.
One other player that seems to have receded into the background, but remains vital to Assad's continued existence, is Russia. There are few if any reports coming out that indicates what type and quantity of supplies are being shipped in as this remains the vital key to the SAAs survival and capabilities. If Assad were to fall, Tartus would become a flash point and Russia would lose it's last Mediterranean base for fueling and maintenance of it's external fleet.
That Russia is considering this a possibility seems apparent by recent announcements of beefing up it's Black Sea and Baltic fleets. The Black Sea fleet would act as a wedge or bulk head against the potential restriction or closing of the Mediterranean shipping lanes. Even the potential that it will become, once again, completely controlled by European and US fleets would be a fearful prospect in Moscow. The Baltic Fleet would be it's wedge against constriction of it's Atlantic reach.
Even with both of these, Russia would be at a significant strategic disadvantage and completely reliant on the good will of it's neighbors for import and export of goods, oil, natural gas and fuel. This would give the EU, for instance, greater leverage in negotiation for fuel and natural gas. Considering Russia's strong arm tactics in past negotiations and it's heavy economic reliance on these resources, that is a terrifying outcome.
And, then, there is Israel. If Assad falls, even in the midst of civil war, ISIS & JAN are very likely to immediately begin attacking Israel directly. The point being to establish their credentials as THE resistance against Israel, delegitimize any internal forces against them, draw in even more fighters and support. Even better, it would immediately force any surrounding nations to begin realigning or force a total admittance of support for it's existence. In essence, it would be calling out every Arab nation and their leaders on their policies towards Israel; policies which AQ and the general Global Jihad movement has painted as hypocritical.
Far beyond the side dramas of Egypt's internal political drama and any relationship with democracy, this possibility, along with the instability growing in Africa with it's disparate jihadi militant groups, is what is informing US policy. A neutral Egypt or one that at least performs as a backstop and defense in Israel's rear is far more important at this crucial moment. Since it aligns with Egypt's current political stance of "fighting terrorism", it will probably continue, if less visible to the public.
Finally, not forgetting Jordan, this is where the real possibility for instability and proliferation of AQ/jihad terrorism will come to land. In fact, there is a very real possibility that this would occur simultaneously or prior to any attack on Israel in an attempt to cut off any possible alliance. That Jordan has thus far escaped can be placed firmly on the amount of material, training and intelligence that the US and other nations are providing.
All of this is but slow motion probability as the sustainment of Assad's regime grows ever weaker without some other form of direct intervention.
Not to forget Iraq because ISIS never did. They're efforts there appear to be more of a rear guard than any real ability to break off and completely control the areas bordering Syria. Right now, according to Kirk Sowell, noted analyst, ISIS is using that area for extorting money, obtaining supplies, likely transit of foreign fighters from Saudi, GCC and Jordan and rest and respite. However, they have been picking up attacking military targets, expanding it's reach. This may change strategy to more fully take control of the area and create bumper for Syria activities.
One thing that seems clear from here, but not to groups like ISIS/JAN and their various cheerleaders on the internet...post Assad, their ability to actually exist will become extremely difficult as they become the central target of every regional and extra-regional nation. Unless they turn to attack Iran, there's a strong possibility some of their current backers around the Peninsula and Gulf will reduce their support. Then again, ISIS and JAN may not need as much as they will have immediate access to untold weapons and ammunition.
In the long run, it's hard to see Assad continuing to survive in any meaningful way over any significant period of time. Which begs the question....does anyone else have a plan for post Assad?
The answer seems to be "yes...fly by the seat of our pants."
Syria -
If Assad falls, there will be an immediate civil war, likely more horrible & costly to civilians. Current militias are focused on Assad & Assad is focused on militias. Current terror being inflicted on civilians is still largely "collateral". All sides are still trying to present themselves as defenders of the people. Not necessarily true, but there is still a propaganda war to manage.
Once this proceeds to trying to gain power to rule Syria, all sides will likely turn, reminiscent of Afghanistan post Soviet withdrawal and collapse of Communist government. As one pundit put it, they will be fighting to be king's of ashes.
For ISIS, the most important aspect will be holding on to a large part of the state to create a safe haven and some pretense of an Islamic state, similar to their attempts in Iraq. They may, for a time, make some sort of pact with JAN, but any attempt by JAN to establish authority in a government or on a shura council will be rebuffed. Likely to cause JAN to break into further factions.
This will become a contest between the two AQ related organizations and, ultimately, prove whether ISIS, seeming on the outs with AQ central as embodied by Zawahiri, will establish it's own power base and become a truly rival organization to AQ's jihadist ideology. It's hard to say if this would be good or bad in the fight against extremism. Certainly, organizations developing internal rivalries can create weaknesses, but, as shown by such orgs as al Shabaab in Somalia and Belmohktar's AQIM, often pushes these organizations to do even greater violent acts to prove their strength and capabilities.
Already, ISIS certainly surpasses AQAP & AQIM as the most prominent group drawing money, fighters and recognition. However, current events in Africa and continuing operations in the Sinai suggest that this will only last so long and is contingent upon ISIS further survival.
If Assad should fall or ISIS is capable to form a rump state in some sort of ill sitting status quo, there's a possibility that greater cooperation amongst states will result in it being immediately under attack as a pariah state.
On the potential for Assad's fall or abdication, current situations suggest that this is a serious possibility. First, the US pushing for the removal of Assad's chemical weapons and the agreement of various states including Russia and Iran, suggests that the idea is not foreign or out of the realm of plausibility. Assad seems to imagine that this process, along with his assertion that he is fighting terrorists like AQ, is some form of rehabilitation to allow him to remain in the political process. My impression is that Assad is dispensable by the outside groups involved.
More worrisome is the devolution of the Syrian state in which all manner of arms & equipment would then be available to any number of non-state actors and be a danger to every state in the region. Assad would be fooling himself if he imagined this was not the major driver for all those involved, but it's hard to say what he believes as the circle around him creates a real barrier to reality.
Some of these realities include what appears to be a clear choking off of supplies, fuel & munitions. Aside from the scarcity of food and the clear hi-jacking of humanitarian aid then being sold in markets, other scarcities are apparent. Reports include the destruction or inoperability of electrical and heating plants along with reports that several water plants have completely shut down, likely also due to fuel shortages and inability to perform maintenance. In essence, the only places still getting light are in the north, like Raqqa, where ISIS is nominally running utilities, and very localized to immediate areas around Assad's command in Damascus.
Other indicators include the reduction of tank battles and few, if any, fighter jets flying missions. This is partly due to the rebels overtaking several bases and appropriating or destroying equipment. It's also indicative of the state of fuel and the remaining equipment. The little oil that Syria is currently receiving is coming either from the ports in Latakia and Tartus via Russian shipments or possibly overland from Iraq. Both of these logistical routes are constantly threatened by "rebel" groups, possession of key towns along the routes routinely switching hands.
Another indicator has been his choice of weapons/munitions and their delivery. Earlier events, such as the chemical weapons attacks on areas like Ghoutta that have sparked removal, seemed to indicate two very important aspects: 1) some form of desperation in attempting to break the siege and 2) conservation of men & munitions. This seems to be re-enforced by more recent events which includes the use of homemade barrel bombs delivered via helicopters.
The barrel bombs, as shown in various photos, are filled with fuel and ignited with very basic fuses. What's interesting there is the use of fuel and oil. This seems to indicate that, while fuel is short, there's a likelihood that equipment that could use the fuel is even less available. The question would be better answered if the type of fuel being used was known, such as jet fuel, diesel, regular petrol or even raw oil (inability to refine for use in machinery would limit it's value beyond an ignition source).
The fact that it's being delivered by helicopter likely means that this is the equipment that is still most reliable mechanically as well as has pilots to fly. It's possible that the grounding of jets could be related to early defections of pilots, a fear of loss of loyalty in these ranks or simply that there is not enough parts or capable mechanics to perform maintenance and keep them flying. Loss of significant air bases, like Menagh, would also limit availability.
One other event that went by with little fanfare was the attempt to barrel bomb a dam on the Euphrates in September in one of the few remaining attacks using a jet. This may have simply been an attempt to deprive the upper area of Syria, controlled by the rebels, of any electricity or water, but it's success would have had even more significant destructive outcome flooding the valley below and likely killing hundreds of civilians in one fell swoop.
A form of "total war" that would hope to decimate rebel strongholds in the rear that supplies the forces currently putting Damascus to siege. As with the other events, including a short lived mechanized push through Ghoutta, this seems a very desperate, "Hail Mary" attempt in the face of dwindling resources and forces.
In essence, Assad remains under siege and has been unable to break it even with the influx of militias like Hezbollah and their related groups from Iraq. The Iranian Qods who have been helping to train the NDF (national defense forces) have suffered several key losses in officers. They have also met with major difficulties in organizing the forces, discipline and equipment. Hezbollah has suffered hundreds of casualties and appear less enthusiastic about confronting the rebel and jihadi groups after key victories that were quickly halted.
Further, attacks on Hezbollah and Iranian property and specific individuals in Lebanon, with concomitant political fall, out may also be depleting Hezbollah's will to invest further as they're position in Lebanon, political and militia holding territory, may be weakened. The question also remains whether Iran will continue to invest or invest even more in shoring up Assad's government and military forces.
If Assad falls, Iran's direct, physical link with Hezbollah will be broken along with it's ability to provide physical and political support. Equally troubling for Iran is that it's corridor to the Mediterranean via Syria and Lebanon will cease to exist along with it's conceived defensive/offensive corridor to Israel. With Israel still making noises about attacking Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure.
It's fairly certain that his is a major issue for Iran and is likely one of the reasons that Iran was willing to negotiate, not only over Assad's chemical weapons, but over it's nuclear activities. In essence, attempting to forestall what could possibly be an immediate strike by Israel post Assad demise. Another indicator that the Iranians are not confident in the continued survival of Assad's regime.
As an aside on Iran, recent events such as unexplained explosions and fires at nuclear facilities and research sites as well as very public assassinations of key figures, may indicate that Israel has a bead on these sites and people through intelligent networks. Or, equally troubling, that there is, indeed, some internal fractures that are becoming very apparent to the outside world and may shake Iran politically.
The possibility of Geneva II resulting in any sort of peace agreement seems far off and unlikely. More importantly, this pushing the date back could be equally a device by the greater interlocutors to allow the fighting to grind on and grind down the participants. Of course, winter has arrived and makes some war activities more difficult and the build up, repositioning of equipment and supplies for a spring offensive, by both sides in hopes of finally breaking the status quo, equally possible.
By Jolani's (JAN) recent interview, the rebels and AQ groups seem fairly confident that they will have the upper hand even as Assad seems willing to go to Geneva for negotiations.
One other player that seems to have receded into the background, but remains vital to Assad's continued existence, is Russia. There are few if any reports coming out that indicates what type and quantity of supplies are being shipped in as this remains the vital key to the SAAs survival and capabilities. If Assad were to fall, Tartus would become a flash point and Russia would lose it's last Mediterranean base for fueling and maintenance of it's external fleet.
That Russia is considering this a possibility seems apparent by recent announcements of beefing up it's Black Sea and Baltic fleets. The Black Sea fleet would act as a wedge or bulk head against the potential restriction or closing of the Mediterranean shipping lanes. Even the potential that it will become, once again, completely controlled by European and US fleets would be a fearful prospect in Moscow. The Baltic Fleet would be it's wedge against constriction of it's Atlantic reach.
Even with both of these, Russia would be at a significant strategic disadvantage and completely reliant on the good will of it's neighbors for import and export of goods, oil, natural gas and fuel. This would give the EU, for instance, greater leverage in negotiation for fuel and natural gas. Considering Russia's strong arm tactics in past negotiations and it's heavy economic reliance on these resources, that is a terrifying outcome.
And, then, there is Israel. If Assad falls, even in the midst of civil war, ISIS & JAN are very likely to immediately begin attacking Israel directly. The point being to establish their credentials as THE resistance against Israel, delegitimize any internal forces against them, draw in even more fighters and support. Even better, it would immediately force any surrounding nations to begin realigning or force a total admittance of support for it's existence. In essence, it would be calling out every Arab nation and their leaders on their policies towards Israel; policies which AQ and the general Global Jihad movement has painted as hypocritical.
Far beyond the side dramas of Egypt's internal political drama and any relationship with democracy, this possibility, along with the instability growing in Africa with it's disparate jihadi militant groups, is what is informing US policy. A neutral Egypt or one that at least performs as a backstop and defense in Israel's rear is far more important at this crucial moment. Since it aligns with Egypt's current political stance of "fighting terrorism", it will probably continue, if less visible to the public.
Finally, not forgetting Jordan, this is where the real possibility for instability and proliferation of AQ/jihad terrorism will come to land. In fact, there is a very real possibility that this would occur simultaneously or prior to any attack on Israel in an attempt to cut off any possible alliance. That Jordan has thus far escaped can be placed firmly on the amount of material, training and intelligence that the US and other nations are providing.
All of this is but slow motion probability as the sustainment of Assad's regime grows ever weaker without some other form of direct intervention.
Not to forget Iraq because ISIS never did. They're efforts there appear to be more of a rear guard than any real ability to break off and completely control the areas bordering Syria. Right now, according to Kirk Sowell, noted analyst, ISIS is using that area for extorting money, obtaining supplies, likely transit of foreign fighters from Saudi, GCC and Jordan and rest and respite. However, they have been picking up attacking military targets, expanding it's reach. This may change strategy to more fully take control of the area and create bumper for Syria activities.
One thing that seems clear from here, but not to groups like ISIS/JAN and their various cheerleaders on the internet...post Assad, their ability to actually exist will become extremely difficult as they become the central target of every regional and extra-regional nation. Unless they turn to attack Iran, there's a strong possibility some of their current backers around the Peninsula and Gulf will reduce their support. Then again, ISIS and JAN may not need as much as they will have immediate access to untold weapons and ammunition.
In the long run, it's hard to see Assad continuing to survive in any meaningful way over any significant period of time. Which begs the question....does anyone else have a plan for post Assad?
The answer seems to be "yes...fly by the seat of our pants."
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