Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: Militant Puritanical Islam and History of Combative Religious Orders

Similar movements have existed throughout history including Christian monastic orders that have, at times, been combative in nature. 

The period of the Christian Crusades became a period of highly religiously charged combat and combat orders such as Teutonic Knights, The Knight's Templar, The Hospitalers, The Knights of St. John.  The crusading orders were not alone in this period where nobles and peasants alike were drawn by evangelical concepts of martyrdom in the name of God as a manner of salvation for the sinners.  What had largely started out as relatively disorganized movements became more organized as orders were established and nation states took up the call. 

Later, after the crusades had resulted in failure, the returning knights and combative orders presented a problem for the nation states.  Many had developed banking and financial systems outside of the control of these states, holding more assets and income than the states themselves.  To these states, these orders presented a direct threat to their own control, holding transnational assets that could form a large state, dwarfing the state in revenue and as often as not, dwarfing the state's armies.

There were also large numbers of unemployed knights and men at arms who were outside of the service of the monastic orders as well as the noble houses, roaming the countryside as self-organized groups that committed general banditry, kidnapping, extortion, etc.  Where once noble religious ideas no longer served to organize or control their purpose.  This was the first breakdown of that original religious fervor and order. 

The second came as monarch's realized the danger of a transnational combat organization to the very survival of their states and moved to break the orders, such as the Knight's Templar, killing their leadership, stripping them of land and money and propagating stories about the group's fall into Satanic or Heretical worship.  Free ranging knights were motivated to become members of houses or return home lest they face the same fate as their monastic brothers. 

Other concepts that this period and combative religious orders held in common besides martyrdom, included puritanical views of sexuality and women; ascetic living, renouncing all material goods or giving those goods and any income to the order, to live closer to the model of the prophet/savior; belief that their cause was just and for the defense of a weaker community; belief that the "other" was a pagan or infidel and thus killing them was a just act; belief they were acting as tools of God and at his command as determined by a holy book and establishment of stringent rules of conduct where any infringement was forgiven by doing combat in the name of this cause or achieving martyrdom would abrogate these sins.

Thus, the slaughter of innocents was justified even if those innocents shared the same religion or were not combatants.  Even the killing of captured enemy who were hors d' combat was considered a noble and just act.  The rape of women, particularly not of their religion, was not considered a foul crime as much as proliferating the religious race. Even as the monastic combat orders forbade it as a sin and adultery outside of marriage and, in many cases, forbade even marriage for their monastic members in order to prevent their attention from being split from the cause and the order.

Other concepts included the migration of warriors between groups with Hospitalers sometimes joining Templars or St. John merging with Hospitalers.   There were also wondering priests who went from village to village, preaching this new gospel and compelling simple people to leave their homes to join the crusades.  Trains of knights and men at arms were followed by a large numbers of civilians, some motivated by the religious fervor, others in the potential for economic gain or social movement. 

At one point, the preaching had reached such a fevered pitch that an entire army of poor civilians was raised up and marched towards the Holy Land, eventually ending before they reached their destination in starvation and disease.  Along the way, this army was provided with food and tinder, if only to get them to move along and not raid all the wares from the local store houses and farms. 

This was not the first and certainly not the last organization of western combat around religious ideas.  The reformation of the church and the proliferation of puritanical Christianity saw both the Church and the puritanical movements take up arms, sometimes as "free armies" and just as often in the service of one kingdom or another.  This same organization became resurgent in England as Rounders or "Round Heads" (so called because they would cut their hair short while fashion had men in long curls and lace) espousing Calvinist ideas unseated the king of England not once, but twice. 

Much later, one can even see this similar religious combat order being reconstituted within the Nazi doctrine where purity of race and idea became a pseudo-religion that gripped whole parts of the German nation.  Soldiers were lauded as defenders of the race and presented as modern knights.  Units of specially hand picked and trained men were imbued with nearly religious mysticism, embodying the virtues of the movement and even inducted with mystical or pseudo-religious rites. 

Like their future counterparts in modern Global Jihad, they were considered a vanguard for future expansion of this idea, encouraged to marry and create future soldiers in the name of their pseudo-religio-political idea.  They were the symbol and propagators of propaganda, spreading the ideas through presence, image, words and actions. 

Western history is not the only history replete with these types of movements.  Islam itself was propagated through similar means from the 7th century through the 17th century until it had created one of the largest empires on the face of the earth.  The Caliphate that currently resides as the primary goal of Global Jihad and the proliferation of Puritanical Islam.  Asia and India have seen similar combative religions and cults, each becoming part of the historical fabric and historic mythology of the various nations. 

From thugees in India to Shaolin monks, combat organized around a religious idea is not new or original.  It most happens in societies were economic and social movement are stagnated or rigid, where religious orders and combat become a method for movement as well as a means of new political order.   At times, it's been coopted by states to further their political agendas and, at others, destroyed because it threatened the accepted order. 

In some cases, it either established an entire new political system or was subsumed or annexed by the existing system as a new "norm".  Many have sought to draw a distinction between the various movements, judging one as more moral or just than the other.  However, moral judgment is not the point of this article, but a simple review of the rise of puritanical idealism and combative, militant orders, their precepts and place within context of time and politics. 

All of which seems repetitive throughout history and yet we see them as completely separate phenomena.  Accept through the lens of history and sociology. 

 

Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: On Developing a Model

In trying to determine the who and the what of Al Qaeda or the differences between any group proclaiming "jihad" or "global jihad" or generally Islamic Militant language, it helps first to have some basic understanding of how sociological and ideological movements develop and proliferate.  There are a number of excellent books about terrorism, terrorist organizations and psychology of both groups and individuals involved in this activity.  Many of these books focus on the sociological, psychological and ideological drives of individuals and groups that might lead them to decide to join a group or commit acts of terrorism.

One book, The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and State of Mind, included an essay by Dr. Martha Crenshaw on the "psycho-logical" aspects of decision making for committing an act of terrorism.  Studies have focused on the make up of groups, their networks and how they behave.  Many more hours have been spent on mapping out connections between various groups.  Even towards developing complicated algorithms to establish risk factors and networking. 

And, yet, we remain here, stuck with unsatisfying answers  that remain contentious amongst experts and intelligence agencies, media and pundits, politicians and the population.  In some ways it's because the mode and manner of communication has demanded simplification for consumption.  In others, because it may be deemed too complicated or even a point of secrecy belaying the necessity to convey it properly to the population at large. 

This may explain the inability or lack of interest of providing explanation to the population, producing confusion, but it hardly explains why there is such a cognitive difference amongst all those whose job it is to actually determine this information and provide it for national, agency or academic consumption.  In either case, the dichotomy may provide a wider range of views and ideas from which to approach the situation, but it may also create a bifurcation in policy that results in less successful counter measures.  Or, equally important, evaluating situations for dangers to the population, nation, interests and personnel abroad such as the case of Benghazi.

While political motivations as well as misapprehension of the nature of threats continues to push this debate along, the most recent report actually suggests that, indeed, we are in need of a new method of evaluating and conveying the basics; stepping back from the noise of the multitude opinions, studies and books and surveying the groundwork for a workable model.  One that is comprehensible for all those that must make policy as well as the population that must consume information and push those policies along. 

First issue that must be recognized is that there are many forms of Islamic militant activity and groups.  Al Qaeda is one manifestation.  It's language, ideology and political goals are global in nature even as it is confined to acting largely in specific locations within the Middle East and Central Asia.  It has chosen to attack targets around the world as an offensive measure in order to intimidate nations from acting to defend their interests; force countries to withdraw militarily, politically and economically from specific areas; and, provoke reactions that will re-enforce it's propaganda and ideology among it's target population for proliferation. 

That ideology insists that Muslims and Islam are under attack by both non-Islamic nations (infidels, kufr) as well as leaders of Islamic nations who are heretics, apostates or non-believers (takfir, munifiqeen) and their various government agencies, employees and even many citizens.  Their goals are to establish Islamic government based on their stringent interpretation of Islam and it's law (shar'iah) within nations that are largely populated by Muslims or nations that they claim are historically part of a greater Islamic empire (Caliphate). 

While many other groups espouse a similar ideology, their goals and capabilities are focused on specific locales within this larger region.  Many of these same groups expect that, once they have established within these nations, they will join this greater Islamic union to form a larger Pan-Islamic empire (Caliphate).  Others, still espousing similar ideology, may not have any confidence in creating this trans-national Caliphate, but believe they will have established one of many like minded nations that will ally for defense of their newly established Islamic state. 

There are also groups that espouse an Islamic militant ideology whose goals are entirely local and consider themselves defending their existing population, proselytizing stringent, fundamental Islam and organizing local governance in compliance with their ideology.  In any scenario, trans-national, regional, national or local, these organizations and groups, the general ideology, is hostile to any nation, population or organization that does not fit within their ideology or who they see as hostile or an obstruction to their over all goals. 

There are groups who organize under an Islamic name, that are militant in nature and espouse an Islamic language, may be defensive or offensive in nature, but do not align with groups or organizations that profess Global Islamic Jihad.  Who they are hostile towards depends largely on local political situations, but may bleed over onto national or international groups or organizations as they struggle to defend, take or hold specific territory. 

Finally, there are groups who organize under an Islamic name, who are political or evangelical in nature, who may espouse Global Islamic goals or simply proselytize a stringent, fundamental Islam.  They are not militant, but may become militant or create militant offshoots if they believe they are under threat or are unable to reach their goals through generally peaceful means.  They may also become militant once they reach a certain number of members or if certain members begin to espouse militant ideas.

Each of these organizations presents a different threat.  The issue is how to determine which category each of these organizations belong to and what risk they pose to nations, populations and any transnational interests.  While there is a danger in not recognizing that all militant groups in these categories represent a security threat on various levels, there is also a danger in lumping all of these groups into one category. 

In doing so, it suggests only one solution to a multi-layered political and security landscape.  In order to reduce the threat or potential threat from these various groups, it would be better to have different policies and tools to address each situation and reduce the likelihood of these differing groups refining or redefining their struggle or goals to match those of Global Islamic Jihad and specifically Al Qaeda.

However, it should be recognized plainly that any non-state militant organization can be a threat to personnel, locations and interests.  Particularly in locations where on-going hostilities, internecine or intermittent combat or violent clashes continue due to political unrest.  Further, when there is a weak government, military or other security apparatus that cannot be relied on to provide consistent security for international agencies, embassies or interests, political or commercial. 

The last appears to be an accepted logic, but, as the events at the Benghazi indicate, the actual nature of these threats can be underestimated or risks to security underplayed for purely political reasons.  In this case, a newly "liberated" nation where various groups formed nominal alliances with local, national and international groups, but quickly fell into political discord and internecine clashes of a power struggle.  Where once they may have considered the United States an ally, some determined that the presence of the United States, or it's political power behind other groups, would become an obstacle to their political goals, locally and nationally. 

The Libyan political and militant landscape is an excellent representation of the levels of Islamic Militant organizations and the multiplicity of security threats posed by these organizations.  It also provides another important lesson as reports continue to muddle through who was involved in Benghazi, what organization and what rationales were used for the attack.  That lesson is that these different organizations and their political goals may be separate, but that there is no absolute delineation between members and organizations. 

In fact, many members migrate between organizations, they may share resources and many organizations may cooperate in small and large ways in order to accomplish their separate goals.  This, too, has attributed to the general population's view that, indeed, then they are all part of the Global Islamic Jihad movement and represent the same threat. Or, more succinctly, are part of Al Qaeda, considered to be the main and most persistent threat.  As has the idea that, because they all espouse some form of Islamist militant language and/or ideology, that all Muslims then pose the same threat. 

All of which percolates into our intelligence, security and academic organizations to create multiple and convoluted models and assessments that do little to clear the situation, develop appropriate policies or present viable concepts for threat assessments.   This returns to the original point of this article, that after all these years and man power spent, we should have come to some universal conclusions and developed appropriate models for comprehending this current sociological movement and combatting it's threat when and wherever necessary. 

What is this model and is it necessarily a "new" model?  Or, amongst all the studies and assessments, does it already exist?  Should it necessarily be about or focus on Global Islamic Jihad as the only or largest threat, as many professionals consider other trans-national and national domestic terrorist and criminal organizations to be equally or more threatening? 

Moving along that line of thinking, haven't we seen this all before and is it possible that existing sociological studies and models can provide a better method for viewing this most recent incarnation? 
 

How a Radical New Teaching Method Could Unleash a Generation of Geniuses | Wired Business | Wired.com

How a Radical New Teaching Method Could Unleash a Generation of Geniuses | Wired Business | Wired.com

Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: The Unsatisfying Answer

As the debate over the Benghazi attack of September 11, 2012 continues, one issue remains prevalent and continues to be the focal point of the debate: was the attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda, an Al Qaeda linked "affiliate" or by a local group with it's own agenda?  Much of that debate is politically driven, but is of interest because it also mirrors the on going debate about what Al Qaeda is and it's over all structure or organization.  Most importantly, whether Al Qaeda is a growing organization with growing capabilities to direct attacks or whether it is slowly becoming just another player in the field as "global jihad" groups proliferate across the region and Al Qaeda's command and control slips away.

In viewing the various debates, studies and expert contentions, it seems more than likely that the answer will be unsatisfying to all and that is: all of the above. 

One of the issues is that this spread of militant Islamism and groups continues to be treated as a new phenomena as if violent organizations or even ideologically driven movements have never been seen before, on this scale or even coalesced to create either revolutionary movements or criminal, violent enterprises.  Or, in fact, not coalesced as a large organized movement, but did proceed to proliferate through societies, becoming a persistent danger to the societies wherein they operate, spawning offshoots and creating whole underground and commiserate, cooperating organizations that undermine or erode society and civil order. 

The debates and on-going struggle for definition is driven by the overwhelming desire to determine a way to successfully counter and hopefully defeat these movements.  In the end, as one observer called it, "defend civilization", but, more broadly, defend people, society, cities, nation states and interests. 

This, amongst other issues, has driven the search for "the answer" and, through out continued inability to comprehend sociological phenomena and movements, increasingly unsatisfactory answers as to what it is, how it works and how best to combat it.  Even the word "combat" is unsatisfying as it suggests "war" when not every instance of it's existence lends towards the physicality of "war" as the greater part of society understands it, even as violent activity surrounding those instances would seem to suggest just that solution. 

But, if we want to "combat" it, in any sense of the word, we have to have a place to start.  From the law enforcement, national security and intelligence view, that means focusing on it's known entities and operations.  The connectivity of those entities and operations once again suggesting a greater organization that can be identified and reduced through attrition at various key points such as funding as well as eliminating individuals seen as lynch pins. 

These activities are, in reality, "tactics" while a greater "strategy" appears murky and continuingly out of step with the entire advent of an apparently globalized sociological violent movement that is ever fluid.  Equally disconcerting is that it's proliferation has created a redundancy model.  Meaning that, even as one group or individual or method is countered or eliminated, another group or individual or resource arises to take it's place.     

This has created significant frustration within the general population in comprehending what is happening and how to put an end to it.  The debates over what it is and whether it is organized and controlled or not has led to general confusion within the population that lends to ever present disjointed policies or misapprehension of how those policies and commiserate tactics ought to be applied, to whom and to which situations. 

That is re-enforced by the movement's own rhetoric that professes global aspirations even as it acts or is confined to local spaces.  Their ability to appear and operate is completely dependent on local situations, existing conditions and the make up of the population itself.  Like similar sociological movements, it tends to take root in places where governance and security is weak, the economy is poor and other stressors, such as political or social disenfranchisement, are apparent. 

In the case of "global jihad", the other prevalent indicator is a Muslim population even as these groups take advantage of and interact with other, non-Islamic, populations, criminal organizations and activities or groups for smuggling weapons, drugs, diamonds, oil, stolen cars, cigarettes, knock off products, money laundering, etc.  The list is amazingly long and suggests a plethora of areas where intelligence and security operations must focus on and interdict in order to slow or attrite these various groups although it does nothing to combat the sociological movement itself. 

This is compounded even more by the advent of state actors using these movements as political tools without seeming to care that they are creating an ungovernable monster that, in the end, is likely to come back around to infiltrate amongst their own populations.  Authoritarian police states, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, are two such states that imagine their control is infinite and that the supposed homogeneity of their populations provide a buffer.  However, historical evidence of ideological and sociological movements suggests that it is impossible to completely eliminate or confine, even in a police state. 

China and Russia could be included in this list even as Pakistan, a grand purveyor of the non-state actors for indirect warfare, finds itself in a persistent state of internal, low grade civil war. This has become such a normative within Pakistan that the state itself has adapted and set it's goals for governance and control to specific areas or seats of power such as the military, treasury, huge bureaucracy with little control beyond specific population centers.  Thus, Pakistan has the appearance of a state with defined borders and government apparatus, but is more akin to a large, armed, occupying force barely keeping the lid on an ever boiling situation and using it to push it's regional political agenda that routinely bleeds out onto the international arena. 

Neither can we dismiss the interaction of western states where designation as terrorist groups and even outright support of particular groups is highly politically motivated.  As indicated by the European Union's slow and bifurcated approach to designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization or even the United States and allies debating whether to designate Jabhat al-Nusra even slightly after it pledged "bayt" or allegiance to Al Qaeda. 

All of this can be added to the pot and stirred around to create utterly unwieldy policy and security mechanisms along with confusion in the ranks from policy makers to those tasked with securing the nation and within the population itself.  The last simply wanting to know how those designated as "responsible" will keep them safe from what appears to be an ever growing violent movement. 

All the while, the power of the people's pleasure or displeasure is used to push one policy or another, represented in the political arena of party, national and international politics.  None of whom seem to agree what it is or isn't that we are up against.  Worse yet, that the general population have not comprehended the difference between being "safe" and "defeating" a movement. 

The first may be generally accomplished, the latter, based on history, may be impossible to accomplish completely until or if it coalesces into a state, government and army that can be directly targeted.  Or, as in the case with FARC in Colombia, after thirty years and the state slowly gaining governance, economic and security measures, the movement becomes exhausted and their sociological and political pull becomes irrelevant to the parts of society that once gave them support.  Only at that point taking out key entities within the organization and attrition of resources may result in it's final crumbling, although, again, not it's complete demise.

That unsatisfying answer is the elephant in the room, an answer that no one is willing to give because it means political death even if it would be more likely to result in better policies, mechanism and focus from all agencies and actors involved and, in the end, possibly keep us safer. 


 

Dr H.A. Hellyer discusses Egypt with Holt McCallany in the Cutting Room | Dr H.A. Hellyer د. إتش

Dr H.A. Hellyer discusses Egypt with Holt McCallany in the Cutting Room | Dr H.A. Hellyer د. إتش

Reading Syria: Articles, Studies

From Foreign Policy, overview: The Political Science of Syria's Civil War 

More In Depth from POMEPS, PDF: The Political Science of Syria's Civil War

Syria's Oil Pipeline

From Foreign Policy, Charles Lister - Next Phase of the Syrian Conflict  
 

Overview of Syria Situation and Related Issues

Thought I'd try a little exercise in writing down some general impressions of current events...

Syria -

If Assad falls, there will be an immediate civil war, likely more horrible & costly to civilians.  Current militias are focused on Assad & Assad is focused on militias.  Current terror being inflicted on civilians is still largely "collateral".  All sides are still trying to present themselves as defenders of the people.  Not necessarily true, but there is still a propaganda war to manage. 

Once this proceeds to trying to gain power to rule Syria, all sides will likely turn, reminiscent of Afghanistan post Soviet withdrawal and collapse of Communist government.  As one pundit put it, they will be fighting to be king's of ashes. 

For ISIS, the most important aspect will be holding on to a large part of the state to create a safe haven and some pretense of an Islamic state, similar to their attempts in Iraq.  They may, for a time, make some sort of pact with JAN, but any attempt by JAN to establish authority in a government or on a shura council will be rebuffed.  Likely to cause JAN to break into further factions. 

This will become a contest between the two AQ related organizations and, ultimately, prove whether ISIS, seeming on the outs with AQ central as embodied by Zawahiri, will establish it's own power base and become a truly rival organization to AQ's jihadist ideology.  It's hard to say if this would be good or bad in the fight against extremism.  Certainly, organizations developing internal rivalries can create weaknesses, but, as shown by such orgs as al Shabaab in Somalia and Belmohktar's AQIM, often pushes these organizations to do even greater violent acts to prove their strength and capabilities. 

Already, ISIS certainly surpasses AQAP & AQIM as the most prominent group drawing money, fighters and recognition.  However, current events in Africa and continuing operations in the Sinai suggest that this will only last so long and is contingent upon ISIS further survival. 

If Assad should fall or ISIS is capable to form a rump state in some sort of ill sitting status quo, there's a possibility that greater cooperation amongst states will result in it being immediately under attack as a pariah state. 

On the potential for Assad's fall or abdication, current situations suggest that this is a serious possibility.  First, the US pushing for the removal of Assad's chemical weapons and the agreement of various states including Russia and Iran, suggests that the idea is not foreign or out of the realm of plausibility.  Assad seems to imagine that this process, along with his assertion that he is fighting terrorists like AQ, is some form of rehabilitation to allow him to remain in the political process.  My impression is that Assad is dispensable by the outside groups involved. 

More worrisome is the devolution of the Syrian state in which all manner of arms & equipment would then be available to any number of non-state actors and be a danger to every state in the region.  Assad would be fooling himself if he imagined this was not the major driver for all those involved, but it's hard to say what he believes as the circle around him creates a real barrier to reality.

Some of these realities include what appears to be a clear choking off of supplies, fuel & munitions.  Aside from the scarcity of food and the clear hi-jacking of humanitarian aid then being sold in markets, other scarcities are apparent.  Reports include the destruction or inoperability of electrical and heating plants along with reports that several water plants have completely shut down, likely also due to fuel shortages and inability to perform maintenance.  In essence, the only places still getting light are in the north, like Raqqa, where ISIS is nominally running utilities, and very localized to immediate areas around Assad's command in Damascus.

Other indicators include the reduction of tank battles and few, if any, fighter jets flying missions.  This is partly due to the rebels overtaking several bases and appropriating or destroying equipment.  It's also indicative of the state of fuel and the remaining equipment.  The little oil that Syria is currently receiving is coming either from the ports in Latakia and Tartus via Russian shipments or possibly overland from Iraq.  Both of these logistical routes are constantly threatened by "rebel" groups, possession of key towns along the routes routinely switching hands. 

Another indicator has been his choice of weapons/munitions and their delivery.  Earlier events, such as the chemical weapons attacks on areas like Ghoutta that have sparked removal, seemed to indicate two very important aspects: 1) some form of desperation in attempting to break the siege and 2) conservation of men & munitions. This seems to be re-enforced by more recent events which includes the use of homemade barrel bombs delivered via helicopters.

The barrel bombs, as shown in various photos, are filled with fuel and ignited with very basic fuses.  What's interesting there is the use of fuel and oil.  This seems to indicate that, while fuel is short, there's a likelihood that equipment that could use the fuel is even less available.  The question would be better answered if the type of fuel being used was known, such as jet fuel, diesel, regular petrol or even raw oil (inability to refine for use in machinery would limit it's value beyond an ignition source). 

The fact that it's being delivered by helicopter likely means that this is the equipment that is still most reliable mechanically as well as has pilots to fly.  It's possible that the grounding of jets could be related to early defections of pilots, a fear of loss of loyalty in these ranks or simply that there is not enough parts or capable mechanics to perform maintenance and keep them flying. Loss of significant air bases, like Menagh, would also limit availability. 

One other event that went by with little fanfare was the attempt to barrel bomb a dam on the Euphrates in September in one of the few remaining attacks using a jet.  This may have simply been an attempt to deprive the upper area of Syria, controlled by the rebels, of any electricity or water, but it's success would have had even more significant destructive outcome flooding the valley below and likely killing hundreds of civilians in one fell swoop. 

A form of "total war" that would hope to decimate rebel strongholds in the rear that supplies the forces currently putting Damascus to siege.  As with the other events, including a short lived mechanized push through Ghoutta, this seems a very desperate, "Hail Mary" attempt in the face of dwindling resources and forces.

In essence, Assad remains under siege and has been unable to break it even with the influx of militias like Hezbollah and their related groups from Iraq.  The Iranian Qods who have been helping to train the NDF (national defense forces) have suffered several key losses in officers.  They have also met with major difficulties in organizing the forces, discipline and equipment.  Hezbollah has suffered hundreds of casualties and appear less enthusiastic about confronting the rebel and jihadi groups after key victories that were quickly halted. 

Further, attacks on Hezbollah and Iranian property and specific individuals in Lebanon, with concomitant political fall, out may also be depleting Hezbollah's will to invest further as they're position in Lebanon, political and militia holding territory, may be weakened.  The question also remains whether Iran will continue to invest or invest even more in shoring up Assad's government and military forces.

If Assad falls, Iran's direct, physical link with Hezbollah will be broken along with it's ability to provide physical and political support.  Equally troubling for Iran is that it's corridor to the Mediterranean via Syria and Lebanon will cease to exist along with it's conceived defensive/offensive corridor to Israel.  With Israel still making noises about attacking Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure.

It's fairly certain that his is a major issue for Iran and is likely one of the reasons that Iran was willing to negotiate, not only over Assad's chemical weapons, but over it's nuclear activities.  In essence, attempting to forestall what could possibly be an immediate strike by Israel post Assad demise.  Another indicator that the Iranians are not confident in the continued survival of Assad's regime. 

As an aside on Iran, recent events such as unexplained explosions and fires at nuclear facilities and research sites as well as very public assassinations of key figures, may indicate that Israel has a bead on these sites and people through intelligent networks.  Or, equally troubling, that there is, indeed, some internal fractures that are becoming very apparent to the outside world and may shake Iran politically. 

The possibility of Geneva II resulting in any sort of peace agreement seems far off and unlikely.  More importantly, this pushing the date back could be equally a device by the greater interlocutors to allow the fighting to grind on and grind down the participants.  Of course, winter has arrived and makes some war activities more difficult and the build up, repositioning of equipment and supplies for a spring offensive, by both sides in hopes of finally breaking the status quo, equally possible. 

By Jolani's (JAN) recent interview, the rebels and AQ groups seem fairly confident that they will have the upper hand even as Assad seems willing to go to Geneva for negotiations. 

One other player that seems to have receded into the background, but remains vital to Assad's continued existence, is Russia.  There are few if any reports coming out that indicates what type and quantity of supplies are being shipped in as this remains the vital key to the SAAs survival and capabilities.  If Assad were to fall, Tartus would become a flash point and Russia would lose it's last Mediterranean base for fueling and maintenance of it's external fleet.

That Russia is considering this a possibility seems apparent by recent announcements of beefing up it's Black Sea and Baltic fleets.  The Black Sea fleet would act as a wedge or bulk head against the potential restriction or closing of the Mediterranean shipping lanes.  Even the potential that it will become, once again, completely controlled by European and US fleets would be a fearful prospect in Moscow.  The Baltic Fleet would be it's wedge against constriction of it's Atlantic reach. 

Even with both of these, Russia would be at a significant strategic disadvantage and completely reliant on the good will of it's neighbors for import and export of goods, oil, natural gas and fuel.  This would give the EU, for instance, greater leverage in negotiation for fuel and natural gas.  Considering Russia's strong arm tactics in past negotiations and it's heavy economic reliance on these resources, that is a terrifying outcome. 

And, then, there is Israel.  If Assad falls, even in the midst of civil war, ISIS & JAN are very likely to immediately begin attacking Israel directly.  The point being to establish their credentials as THE resistance against Israel, delegitimize any internal forces against them, draw in even more fighters and support.  Even better, it would immediately force any surrounding nations to begin realigning or force a total admittance of support for it's existence.  In essence, it would be calling out every Arab nation and their leaders on their policies towards Israel; policies which AQ and the general Global Jihad movement has painted as hypocritical. 

Far beyond the side dramas of Egypt's internal political drama and any relationship with democracy, this possibility, along with the instability growing in Africa with it's disparate jihadi militant groups, is what is informing US policy.  A neutral Egypt or one that at least performs as a backstop and defense in Israel's rear is far more important at this crucial moment.  Since it aligns with Egypt's current political stance of "fighting terrorism", it will probably continue, if less visible to the public. 

Finally, not forgetting Jordan, this is where the real possibility for instability and proliferation of AQ/jihad terrorism will come to land.  In fact, there is a very real possibility that this would occur simultaneously or prior to any attack on Israel in an attempt to cut off any possible alliance.  That Jordan has thus far escaped can be placed firmly on the amount of material, training and intelligence that the US and other nations are providing. 

All of this is but slow motion probability as the sustainment of Assad's regime grows ever weaker without some other form of direct intervention. 

Not to forget Iraq because ISIS never did.  They're efforts there appear to be more of a rear guard than any real ability to break off and completely control the areas bordering Syria.  Right now, according to Kirk Sowell, noted analyst, ISIS is using that area for extorting money, obtaining supplies, likely transit of foreign fighters from Saudi, GCC and Jordan and rest and respite.  However, they have been picking up attacking military targets, expanding it's reach.  This may change strategy to more fully take control of the area and create bumper for Syria activities.

One thing that seems clear from here, but not to groups like ISIS/JAN and their various cheerleaders on the internet...post Assad, their ability to actually exist will become extremely difficult as they become the central target of every regional and extra-regional nation.  Unless they turn to attack Iran, there's a strong possibility some of their current backers around the Peninsula and Gulf will reduce their support.  Then again, ISIS and JAN may not need as much as they will have immediate access to untold weapons and ammunition. 

In the long run, it's hard to see Assad continuing to survive in any meaningful way over any significant period of time.  Which begs the question....does anyone else have a plan for post Assad?

The answer seems to be "yes...fly by the seat of our pants."