Iran's Praetorian Guard

I was going to write something long and informative on the rise of the IRGC as a political force and opponent of the Iranian clergy's rule, but apparently, someone beat me to it. 

Mullah's v Iranian Guard

Or, as I styled this post, the Praetorian Guard.  In history, Rome's Praetorian Guard started out as a loyal group of soldiers, hand picked by Caesar from close and loyal associates within the Roman Legions.  Eventually, what was once an honor that came with gifts and privileges, became a form of power brokerage with eventual Caesar's, such as Caligula and Nero, having to pay substantial bribes to the leaders and individuals to retain their nominal loyalty.

Like the IRGC, the Roman Praetorian Guard would often carry out the political dirty work of Caesar, assassinating and intimidating any opponents.  However, the Praetorian Guard was also most likely to murder the rulers.  Caligula and Nero meeting the same fate. 

That is just about the only the IRGC hasn't done yet, but I wouldn't bet the house that it stays that way.



 

Zubaydah Diaries: The Banality of Banal Assessments & Goofball Terrorists

Abu Zubaydah and the banality of 'jihadism' - Terry McDermot

The world is full of dangerous goofballs, but we can't treat them all as threats to civilization

Mr. McDermot may have some of that correct, but that and most of his article leave much to be desired.  Much. 

Abu Zubaydah's six released diaries can be located here.

Starting with this statement:

They also help substantiate what should by now be clear: The U.S. has made significant, basic errors in its response to 9/11 and the threat of radical Islam

It's fairly certain that the rest of everything you are going to read is some ideological manifestations of Mr. McDermott's opinion and policy preferences as opposed to actually showing, through excerpts or any substantiation or analysis of what Zubaydah wrote, that those who pursue jihad, and to a larger extent "terrorism", are "banal".  Common.  Or, even in Mr. McDermott's assessment "goofballs". 

It's true, when you read the first two diaries, Zubaydah presents himself as a young, confused man who has significant personal issues.  He struggles with his family where several parental separations occur, his mother is a weak personality while he spends much time talking about trying to please his father.  He has vague conversations with his friends about the Israeli-Palestine situation and comments once, early on, about an argument between friends concerning when jihad is permissible and whether it is permissible or good to align with any secular organization like the PLO.

However, Mr. Zubaydah's drive to go to jihad in Afghanistan is not made overtly manifest until he had spent over a year in India attending university to get a degree in computer science.  A project that his father frowned on, but paid for never the less.  Failure at university, lack of familial support, few external relationships and personal struggles with his adherence to the tenets of his faith, most notably "chastity until marriage", are several of his motivators for leaving India to join the mujihadeen in Afghanistan.

Other significant motivators are a few of the other expatriate friends he had made who were planning to travel to Afghanistan.  He also has some poor experiences with neighbors and people he believes to be his "friends".  He has little money and lives very poorly, sometimes convincing himself that is all he requires.  He is indirectly accused of having an affair or improper relations with his host's wife.  The adventure, the purpose and direction that he is missing, his personal trauma and drama, are what leads him to determine to leave school and travel with an acquaintance to Pakistan.

This is the "goofball" that Mr McDermott suggests and reads significantly similar to many other young men who have either traveled abroad to join one of the jihad organizations or even remained behind to commit acts of terror in their home countries.  Most recently, the Tsarnaev brothers (Boston), Adebolajo and Adebowale (murder of a British Soldier), Nidal Hasan (Ft. Hood) and Lindsay "Jamal" Graham (July 2005, London). 

None start out as violent extremist, but they do seek it out as a panacea for their other conceived failures or personal trauma.  With the exception of Hasan, these are young men who, prior to determination to turn to terrorism, would present as "goofballs".  As do a number of others in the recent past who committed violent crimes such as the Aurora Theater mass shooting, Columbine and Newtown mass murderer.

Describing Zubaydah as a "goofball" would certainly apply to his immaturity and inexperience.  Even though Zubaydah is approximately 20 when he begins his diaries, he writes and thinks with the dexterity, comprehension and focus of a fifteen year old.  This slowly disappears over the course of the war and later throughout his diaries.  By the end, Zubaydah has certainly matured and garnered considerable self-esteem and self-control. 

He is no longer "a goofball".  The fact that Mr. McDermott goes on to suggest this continues to be true throughout Zubaydah's career, even as he presents tidbits of information that suggests otherwise, is misleading at best and only plausible if someone had not actually read Zubaydah's diaries.

Zubaydah, born in Palestine and raised in middle-class comfort in Saudi Arabia, rose through the 1990s — by what abilities it is not clear — to a position of some stature within radical Islam

Zubaydah actually makes "clear" what "abilities" allow him to rise through the ranks until he becomes a significant player in the funding, organization and transit of fighters to the various camps for jihad.  When he first arrives in Afghanistan, Zubaydah, who styles himself as "Hani" in his diaries, goes to a number of basic training camps.  He struggles at first with the physical fitness aspects, but eventually pushes himself to improve, stop smoking and makes detailed, organized plans and sets goals for improving his fitness, maintaining his weight and becoming a more faithful follower of Islam. 

Zubaydah then organizes a plan to become better trained in all the aspects of war, moving from camp to camp that offers different or better training on weapons and tactics.  He outlines these plans in specific detail.  A trait that becomes a prominent "ability", helping him to rise through the ranks.  Zubaydah has excellent organizational skills, he has battle experience after nearly two years at the front, he has significant experience in training camps, watched other leaders and received mentoring as well as assessed what was good and bad amongst all of these activities.

When the main war is over and the Communist government of Afghanistan had fallen, Zubaydah remains in Afghanistan even as the civil war gets underway.  He's appalled at the disunity, but, having dedicated himself to the "cause" of jihad for the sake of his religion, is determined to remain and put his efforts where he feels he's been most successful.  At this point, jihad against whomever, simply for the sake of Islam, without further context, is his motivator.  Western policies have little room in his discourse except a brief internal discussion on whether he should go to Palestine. 

In the late 1990s he was instrumental in running a training camp just across the Pakistani border in Afghanistan

Zubaydah was actually the administrator of a very large camp that was filtering up to 400 trainees from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, etc.  He outlines numerous issues he had with organizing and obtaining supplies and shelter for the number of recruits sent to him when the original number was supposed to be 100.  He discusses disciplinary issues, money, theft, obtaining trainers, organizing classes and equipment and so on. 

Some of his other duties include meeting with other groups (like Al Qaeda), transportation to and from the borders, documentation and a continuous plethora of details.  He even laments the poor condition, abilities and general commitment of the recruits, without any irony or vague recognition of his own condition when he first arrived in Afghanistan.  What is apparent is his organizational abilities, similar to those attributed to bin Laden, and growing leadership experiences and abilities.

This is the actual "banality of jihad".  The details that must be managed to move men, equipment, weapons, munitions and money in order to run a training camp.  This was discussed in Dr. Shapiro's book, "The Terrorist's Dilemma, The Management of Violent Covert Organizations", an overview and discussion with Dr. Shapiro can be found here. 

While the details of running any organization are, in fact, "banal", these details make up a significant and important aspect of terrorist activities.  Without obtaining, distributing and accounting for funds or organized logistics, no organization can long function or exist.  McDermott seems to suggest that this is insignificant and, therefore, Zubaydah's role, tracking and arrest was equally insignificant or unimportant.   

For McDermott, going after individuals amounts to conflating them into something they are not and is the wrong focus of US efforts.  What those actual efforts ought to be, he gives few directions or ideas.  Except that the west should not be worried about "goofballs" that go off to jihad. 


Worse, the US may have gotten the wrong man since Zubaydah, he insists, was never a member of al Qaeda.  This completely misses the original rationale and organization of Al Qaeda.  Not as a singular entity, but an umbrella of multiple organizations that are connected, maintain similar goals, share funding, logistics, men and materials.

It turned out the link to Al-Qaeda was more tenuous than the U.S. government had imagined. For years, the U.S. government had viewed him as a major figure within the group, at one point even elevating him to the No. 3 position on what turned out to be a fanciful Al-Qaeda organizational chart.

It's true, the US comprehension and assessment of the organization known as "Al Qaeda" was limited by it's own views of vertical organizations with clear, delineated leadership and roles.  This isn't how Al Qaeda worked then or now, largely because of the manner in which these organizations recognize leaders.  Those that are "successful" and can draw significant recruits and funding are leaders by self-selection, not appointed or given a specific title or command.  Those are given out of respect, success on the battlefield or ones they sometimes choose for themselves (see, Syria's various emirs and commanders). 

However, al Qaeda's origination and main threat was and continuous to be it's organizational, logistical, funding and management abilities, ideological draw and that it is the repository of the original veterans of "global jihad".  All of which gives the designated "core" of al Qaeda significant position and power amongst the groups if not actual "command and control" over all groups pledging "bayat" (allegiance, or, more accurately, getting plugged in to the network). 

Zubaydah does not mention bin Laden or Al Qaeda by name until book five and shortly before the September 11, 2001 attacks.  This may be why McDermott states, almost emphatically, that Zubaydah had little or no relationship with Al Qaeda.  Zubaydah's own diaries indicate other wise, all be it in seriously self censored style that Zubaydah even states in the diaries was necessary because writing things down was very dangerous. 

For instance, in the early period of Zubaydah's training in Afghanistan, he repeatedly mentions going to the Kunar camp.  One that is originally funded and organized by bin Laden prior to the organizational establishment of "Al Qaeda" and that continues to run through out the 90's.  During his period as administrator at the "Shayk's camp", Zubaydah makes several trips to the Kunar camp to obtain trainers, materials and organize transportation of the Uzbeks and Tajiks who are coming and going from his camp.

Though Zubaydah could not be considered a card carrying member of Al Qaeda "core" in the early nineties, he was no stranger to the organization and was not, as McDermott suggests, a "competitor". 

Even from the beginning, as Zubaydah described his original training and throughout his comments on the various camps, the organization and distribution of the camps depended on their focus and associations.  For instance, some camps were basic training, beginning weapons, advanced weapons, bomb making, artillery, etc.  Other camps were run by and recruited from specific groups, local or foreign, while others were fairly integrated as the different recruits arrived. 

Most of the camps cooperated logistically and tactically.  It was only after Afghanistan fell into civil war that greater rivalries existed.  Zubaydah indicates that he and the camp he was administrating steered clear of the conflict, concentrating on developing recruits for external, regional activities.  Bin Laden appeared to have supported the Taliban with funding and equipment.   In essence, Zubaydah avoids becoming a part of the rivalry that instigated the civil war.

Zubaydah's connections with Al Qaeda become more clear in books five and six which seemed to have garnered little attention from Mr. McDermott.  Possibly because, aside from a very explicit entry regarding the death of Mehsoud in North Afghanistan and 9/11, Zubaydah is very careful in discussing his activities and naming names.  At the end of book five, Zubaydah is even more explicit that anything he writes to himself from that point on will likely be in "code" because the danger that it might fall into someone else's hands and be used against him is exceedingly high.

By the end of book five, the camp where Zubaydah was acting as an administrator has been shut down by the Taliban.  Zubaydah had been attending numerous meetings amongst all the leadership of the jihad training camps.  He appears to disagree with the idea, but he also is not overly angry.  In fact, he mentions multiple times that he has "ambitions" that are about to be met.  By this time, his views have become cemented towards the degradation of Western ideas, their infiltration into Islamic communities and the need to attack the West.  Clearly, he has been regularly in contact with and receiving further indoctrination into the ideas espoused by Al Qaeda.

In Book six, his entries are fewer and spread out over longer periods.  In many of the entries he indicates the reason is that he is about to realize his ambition.  In a next entry, he indicates he has taken over administrating "The House of Martyrs" after visiting the "Kunar Camp".  This is a significant entry and validates the opinion that Zubaydah has been admitted into the inner workings of Al Qaeda. 

"The House of Martyrs" is a network of safe houses that act as a transit point for fighters moving in and out of Afghanistan.  From Peshawar to Islamabad and throughout cities in Pakistan.  According to most information available, these houses were originally established and funded by bin Laden during the Afghanistan War.  These houses also acted as a place for respite and recovery for injured mujihadeen, a collection point for information on those coming and going as well as a conduit for funds that were used to administer the houses.  More significantly, these funds were distributed amongst the various groups, training camps and dispensed to cells for terrorist activities.

Zubaydah spends a great deal of book six discussing some of these activities, the trials of administration, the difficulty in finding good help, obtaining and managing funds, the problem of establishing leadership over this significant area, the risks of traveling back and forth to the camps, transporting of fighters to and from camps and the fact that the Pakistani ISI and police are continuously very close to finding or raiding the houses.  Despite the lack of names of the camps he is going to or group affiliations, it is clear that Zubaydah has an intricate part to play in the overall logistics and operations of the organization and funneling of trainees to camps and terrorists that go on to form active cells.

In another interim period, he indicates that he had travelled to a camp, which he does not explicitly name, and that something very significant is about to occur.  Shortly after, he announces the the events of September 11 in which he praises "Shaikh bin Laden" and those that perpetrated the attacks.  He even spells out exactly what locations the attacks were supposed to take out.  Most notably the failed Flight 93 that crashed into the Pennsylvania field.  In Zubaydah's remarks, coming right from a meeting in an undisclosed camp in Afghanistan, the plane was supposed to take out the White House. 

He even goes to great lengths justifying Mehsoud's assassination on the grounds that the Northern Alliance, post 9/11, would be most likely used as a conduit for attacks against "them" (as in, whatever group he is actually working with which seems to be Al Qaeda as it was manifested at that time, "the base" for jihad).  In any degree, it is hard to imagine that Zubaydah is not intricately involved in or aware of Al Qaeda activities. 

 In book six, Zubaydah does present himself as his own man in a way that he rarely indicates reporting directly to a superior.  He does mention having to provide some accounting for activities and funds, but rarely suggests he is being ordered or guided.  For many, including Mr. McDermott, this suggests some form of absolute autonomy from any organization.  As if Zubaydah has simply appeared from no where with no connections, direction or directive, to collect and send fighters and money willy-nilly into Afghanistan with only a vague purpose of "jihad against the west".

This is either extreme naivety or wishful thinking.  Even Zubaydah himself states in this last diary that he would not discuss anyone else, who he talked to or where he went to in Afghanistan.  Again, for the sake of secrecy and protection.  More importantly, Zubaydah knows, in detail, who is coming and going from the safe houses, to where and for what purpose.  If he did not know, he would have been unable to fulfill the function that he takes great pride in.

If anything is understood about Al Qaeda and it's various terrorist cells that have perpetrated attacks, division of activities and maintaining separation was and remains important to protect the other members and activities.   In some cases, not even knowing who the other members are until it becomes necessary to come together shortly before to put the pieces together and perpetrate the event such as 9/11 or the March 2003 attack in Madrid.

While Zubaydah's responsibilities and activities did not make him number 3 in the organization in any "linear" sense of leadership hierarchy, it does not make him a "low level member" of Al Qaeda either.  He was in charge of logistics and funding, a significant branch of activities for the over all organizational network even if it and Zubaydah appeared to operate as if separate and autonomous.  His operations are a significant "leg" of the over all network and information received from his arrest likely provided information on other parts or members of the network that could be followed up.

There is one statement that can be fully agreed upon generally:

Terrorists are not supermen; they are not brilliant tacticians or highly trained warriors

This is generally true as the network relies on many different people with different skill sets, few of whom represent any type of overall genius, but who are fairly capable at the jobs and activities assigned.  If they are not, they are either replaced or discovered.  More importantly, they are bound by the rules of the world in which they operate even as they seek to undermine those rules.  Even the act of organizing and committing terrorist activities demands time and attention to mundane details, interaction and exposure to people, the limits of time, space and travel and the necessity to maintain some records of activities in order to manage towards the over all goals. 

This is why Zubaydah's capture was important and relatively significant to undermining the Al Qaeda network.  At least, temporarily.  Al Qaeda as a networked organization, like many legitimate organizations, has established forms of redundancy throughout it's activities.  It's dispersed hierarchy, whether intentional or incidental, means that one disruption could slow operations, but may not ever create a "killing blow". 

Mr. McDermott suggests that focusing on individuals puts too much significance on these individuals as opposed to evaluating and determining a plan to interdict radical Islam as an ideology.  Not having an effective plan against the ideology may be one of the major issues effecting the ability to counter or create the demise of radical Islam, but not focusing on individuals who play significant parts in the network is equally fallible.  It suggests leaving them to proliferate and widen their capabilities without any attempt to slow or disrupt.

He goes further in suggesting that, just like the mass shooters of Columbine and Newtown, the ability to prevent death by an individual or group of "goofballs" is limited so why focus on it?  Which shows that Mr. McDermott has spent little time in analyzing these events where, in fact, the perpetrators gave off signals and presented several periods where they could have been interdicted.  It may never be perfect, but it hardly suggests not looking for ways to maintain the safety of people and nations.

Far from the lessons that McDermott says he learned from reading Zubaydah's diary, that these were a bunch of "small" and hapless "goofballs" who happened to get lucky a few times, the lesson is that the organization and perpetration of "jihad" terrorism do require attention to numerous banal details.  It is effectively mapping and connecting these banal details that allows the disruption of actual attacks such as the Christmas Shoe bomber, Richard Reid, or the attempted underwear bombing and even the placement of bombs in printing toner cartridges on cargo air planes.

 These interventions keep people safe in the near term, but Mr. McDermott may be correct in asking if we have established an effective plan against the proliferation of radical Islam.  The answer he may have provided accidentally:

Why do a bunch of "goofballs" go off to join an ideology and violent terrorist organization?  Individuals may differ slightly, but the overall, banal answer seems to be, as in Zubaydah's case, because they have nothing better to do.

Answering Prof. Nichols: This Is Not the Murder of Hypatia

"The Democratization of Knowledge" is not "The Murder of Hypatia". 

I am sure I do not need to give Prof. Nichols a lesson in history, but, as I intend to use it as a point of contention with Prof. Nichols' complaints, I'll simply have to beg forgiveness for my presumption in doing so. 

For the sake of the readers here, Hypatia was a well known female scholar in the city of Alexandria who was murdered by religious zealots circa 415 A.D.  Her story or legend, what will you, has been used as an allegory for the destruction of reason by the ignorance of dogma represented by the uneducated and unwashed masses of religious zealots. 

The event was handily married to one of the multitudinous destructions of the Library of Alexandria in the movie "Agora".  A film I recommend even if some of the historical content (the sacking of the library illustrated takes place in 391 AD and drastically shortens the period after in which Hypatia is murdered) may prove inaccurate.  It does capture the idea of "the death of reason" rather neatly and resounds with Prof. Nichols' polemic on "The Death of Expertise". 

While I sympathize with the professor's position, I must disagree with him on his supposition.  The current period of "flattening of information" and "the democratization of knowledge" does not equate to "the murder of Hypatia". 

While it may feel chaotic and challenging, the advent of the internet (the flattening of information) along with scores of treatise, papers,  e-books, websites, blogs and forums (professional and otherwise) with the appearance of professors, professionals and experts, such as Prof. Nichols and Prof. Schindler, enumerable conversations and challenges via this forum, Twitter, etc with all comers (the democratization of knowledge using tools that flatten information) would be comparable to more felicitous and momentous occasions in history. 

Moments like the invention of the Gutenberg Press in 1450 (the flattening of information) at the height of the Renaissance  thru the Age of Enlightenment  where the ability to read, write and think critically or even independently began to filter down from higher echelons to the common people ("demo"; the Democratization of Knowledge).   A period in time when even a butcher's son imagined that he had the tools at his finger tips to change his destiny and the world, to, in fact, challenge a professor (experts?) on the ideas that the professor had spent a life time divining and refining. 

The "Age of Enlightenment" would never have happened without the invention of the Gutenberg Press nor had such a resounding impact on civilization, society, politics and religion.  As the noted philosopher Francis Bacon wrote, the press was one of the three inventions that "changed the whole face and state of the world."  The other two inventions, equally useful and democratizing, were the firearm and the compass. 

The Gutenberg Press is most often noted as having printed hundreds of thousands of copies of the Bible in multiple languages.  This ability to read and discern the religious texts by common laymen leads to the creation of religious sects by every other Tom, Dick and Martin Luther, directly challenging the orthodoxy and authority of the church in Rome. 

The idea that new technology used to disseminate information, that permits the flattening of information and the democratization of knowledge, is dangerous as it may be abused by the uninformed to spread uninformed ideas is hardly new.  I frequently imagine these types of conversations occurring in the Vatican about the time the one hundred thousandth Bible had been printed.

This new technology and democratization of information was dangerous.  Largely for the order of things held sacrosanct.  It led to the decimation of the organizational power of the Church and to religiously tinged political wars of empire. During these wars, thousands of "heretics", who imagined themselves capable of determining their own faith and fate of their souls, are tortured, hung and burned at the stake by either side of the divide. 

The persecution of heretics eventually leads to mass exodus or exile to a newly discovered continent.  Their travel aided and abetted by the compass, their defense in a hostile territory provided by the currently lamented firearm.  A few hundred years later, the proliferation of firearms and ideas spread to every common man via the printing press (again) eventually results in a revolution and truths that are now commonly believed to be "self evident".  The rest, as they say, is history. 

It's not a bad history.  During this same period from the invention of the press through the Age of Enlightenment, even as the world was turned upside down, the social order was irrevocably changed and everyone and anyone felt capable of challenging religious, political or even scientific orthodoxy, the one thing that did not happen was the ignoble demise of expertise.  Rather, it led to the proliferation of universities and the demand for more experts and professors in every field.

Universities, education and the educator were irrevocably changed by this democratizing technology.  It demanded that these professors (experts), be even more educated, to take their knowledge to greater heights (not moribund and stagnated), continuously refine that knowledge and be prepared to defend their ideas from all comers.  While universities continued their age old traditions of learning at a master's knee and "peer to peer" review anointing another lettered professor, they did not and could not prevent ideas proliferating in the streets from sneaking in and up through the ranks, challenging perceived knowledge and, yes, improving educators and the educated alike. 

For which we should be eternally grateful lest we still be writing with quills and ink pots by candlelight or being unmercifully bled for "ill humors" every time we felt a bit off.  Looking at beautifully scripted letters in a book we could not touch, much less read.  Subjects bound to land and lord begging for crumbs from his table, hoping that next winter he won't come out of his castle and destroy our crops because we objected to his onerous taxation.  And, so on.

(Is it ironic that we are having this conversation via personal computers invented by men who never finished university?) 

In conclusion, instead of fearing this technology and the challenges of the every man "layman", it should be celebrated.  As history clearly shows, it is these moments, this convergence of technology and the democratization of knowledge, even the temerity of a poor layman to imagine his opinions and ideas equal to those of a professor, that leads to great leaps and bounds forward of human civilization, survival and proliferation of knowledge.  

Dangers abound.  There are barbarians at the gates and zealots ready to tear Hypatia from her carriage and stone her in the temple, but she is not dead yet.  Indeed, instead of imagining the bliss of being shut away in that ivory tower, protected from the clamoring, uninformed masses, it should be embraced and nurtured.  Because, surely as the sun rises in the east and the earth spins round the sun, this rejection runs counter to the tides of history and human advancement. 

Unless we imagine the first caveman to pick up two stones and strike them together, creating fire, did so under the auspices of a professor?

I thank Prof. Nichols for the forum and opportunity to address his comments.  Though I disagree with his opinion on this matter, I give full respect to his position and long years of education and experience.  This is, after all, one of the reasons that I follow him: to receive knowledge and challenge my own.  Possibly proving his point that knowledge is built upon knowledge of experts. 

Finally, I thank that long ago blacksmith, Mr. Gutenberg.  Without whom this common daughter of a policeman would never have had the tools or been so bold as to challenge the ideas of a professor. 

God bless you, sirs, and God grant that our descendants look back in history to find this moment not the beginning of the next Dark Age, but the Second Age of Enlightenment.

The Flattening of Information v Democratization of Knowledge

“Knowledge forbidden?
Suspicious, reasonless. Why should their Lord
Envy them that? Can it be a sin to know?
Can it be death?”
― John Milton, Paradise Lost    

In a strange twist of internet fate, one of my general follows, Prof, Tom Nichols, posted a rather stirring rant on the Death of Expertise in which he laments the "democratization of knowledge". 

But democracy, as I wrote in an essay about C.S. Lewis and the Snowden affair, denotes a system of government, not an actual state of equality. Having equal rights does not mean having equal talents, equal abilities, or equal knowledge. It means, instead, that we enjoy equal rights versus the government, and in relation to each other.

It assuredly does not mean that “everyone’s opinion about anything is as good as anyone else’s,” because no one really lives that way.

He then proceeds to give various examples that are generally true i.e. surgeons, mechanics, etc.  I mean, who would you rather have performing your brain surgery?  Your mechanic or a highly trained neuro-surgeon with years of experience? 

The Flattening of Information: Experts and Heretics

In a recent Twitter exchange on the difference between intelligence, knowledge and wisdom along with the evaluation of the Internet and social media, a commenter noted a key accomplishment of this technology: the flattening of information. 

I can't say that this was said with any degree of happiness. 

As some may note, this blog gets little time from the owner as I spend a great deal of time on Twitter.  There, at any given time, "Tweeps", or people I follow on Twitter, are given to various complaints about the number of people posting on any given subject, their expertise or lack thereof.  In fact, this post was inspired by a now, ongoing Twitter meme about #YouMayNotBeAnIranExpertIf.  Expressing the disposition that if any person writing or commenting on Iran, the current Nuclear Agreement, etc did not know "X,Y, or Z" that they are not, in fact, an expert on Iran and should limit or leave the writing to those self-appointed experts that do.

I can't help but feel a few moments of ironic amusement at these various escapades.  They are, after all, posting on Twitter.  A social media application that has routinely received the scorn of people from all walks of life as being the scourge of modern communication and society as a whole.  It is also a tool that now boasts presidents and premiers of nations, ambassadors, activists, journalists, scientists, politicians, terrorists and every other form of "important" or average citizen with every sort of occupation, interest or general angst from nations around the world. 

Apropos the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement above, people from around the world were following this event via tweets from politicians, journalists and every other Tom, Dick or Harry tweeting and re-tweeting pictures, statements and events.  Including minutiae of an after negotiation event where various members of the Iranian negotiating team did a little jig while waiting for official photography to set up. 

Also, such memorable tweets as "Kerry is flying to Geneva"; "The Chinese FM is flying to Geneva".  Everyone watching those tweets knew that a deal was about to be struck and they were being re-tweeted hundreds of times.

Here is the most amazing part: most of the events were posted in real time.  Within minutes of the final handshake, the entire world of twitter, those interested anyway, knew not only that the deal was struck, but how, who, why and certain details.  Something that, only a few years ago, would have taken an hour or more to reach network or cable news rooms to be reported and a decade or more before, would have been reported the next day on headlines of newspapers around the world.

Twenty-four hours.  That seems like an eternity in modern communications and news dissemination.  Twenty-four hours after this event, the media did have even greater details, back stories, more reactions to the event.  However, those arrived without the impact or fanfare of the original event on Twitter.  At least, it seemed so on that venue.

Of course, not everyone gets their news from Twitter so these cable news and "print" reports still represent the normative when it comes to relaying news and information to a large part of society.  However, even those average citizens are likely getting fast and furious updates via news alerts on their smart phones or "front page" pieces popping up on their computer home page like Yahoo. 

This represents one of the many aspects of "the flattening of information".  In real terms, it means that anyone, anywhere can obtain information on a plethora of subjects and events, use the Internet to look up information, pass that along to others in their "network", obtain the opinions of various "experts" and "world leaders" in minutes.  Information, as they say, is power and it is no longer locked in the hands of a few. 

Governments and media are adapting as quickly as possible to this reality and technology understanding that the pace of information flying fast and furious can shape a story before they can react to it.  It is speeding up the decision making process and forcing people to think about and prepare for the reactions much more succinctly and in advance of their actions and statements. 

Media has long realized that it had to be the first on a story to have the impact, to be "the top dog" in this new information cycle, whirling ever faster.  When even a common bystander with a phone camera can beat them to the punch for that key, all defining image of an event.  Politicians are learning that this is equally important for their own needs and demands of their constituents.  They no longer have the time to formulate a response for the next day's news cycle.  It's now or never and has been moving to that for well over a decade.

What of the complaints of these "experts"?  Are they legitimate?  That, in fact, information that is being spread is not as complete or accurate as it should be because those spreading the information do not have the years of study, travel or expertise that they do.  Worse, that this inaccurate or incomplete information leads to the dissemination of "bad" information.  Meaning that real and good decision making, information that regular citizens to policy makers "ought to know", is being damaged by this flattening of information. 

That's a distinct possibility.  This isn't the first time these complaints have been heard.  It seems, almost as soon as the Internet was born into the public as a common tool for every average citizen, these complaints have existed. They became even louder and more vociferous as comment sections in media and blogs, then Facebook became prevalent.  Twitter has added a whole new level of angst to this possible flurry of bad information.

What is really at the head of this angst?  Is it a concern for the possible misleading of people through receiving bad information or information without context?  Or, is it equally the realization that "expertise", i.e. information, is only as good and valuable as it is when it is shared as widely and as quickly as possible?  In essence, making the hoarding of information and it's slow dissemination less profitable, less valuable to those that have spent many long years, spending time and money, learning this detailed information.

It's not just the value in dollars that is at stake, but the prestige that goes with it.  Are we losing the necessity for experts and sages?  The answer, of course, is "no".  Resoundingly.  However information flows and from where, there will always be a need for someone to pull the pieces together and create a bigger picture.  As the world comes closer together through new technology, as information flows faster, and more and more people are able to "input" information into the stream, it seems inevitable that the need for even more "experts" will rise, not slow. 

What is at issue here is whether the funneling of information remains narrow, can remain narrow, in the advent of modern technology and communication and how is value then placed upon it.  That, in this modern age, experts and sages now need to market themselves, aggressively, as opposed to having people come to them; that their knowledge is only as good and as valuable as it can be inserted and used within the ever increasing furious cycle of information.   

This will create an ever growing field of "niche" "experts".  Niche because the increase of information will make it difficult to be an expert on everything, even an entire country, as quickly as necessary even as many people opine and discuss almost anything.  In essence, becoming a stream into the river and then the ocean of information. 

This is what has happened to almost every field as technology has advanced.  It becomes even more necessary as the man on the street, in a place witnessing an event or living in a particular area, who has access to technology, becomes "every man's expert".  He knows it because he lives it.  How does an "expert" compete with that?  Another source of angst: the expert middle man may be cut out completely if they do not learn that this "every man" is, in fact, an excellent source of information to add to their expert analysis.  Another issue that causes no shortage of angst about the accuracy and validity of information amongst the "experts". 

I write this blog post with some ironic amusement, knowing full well that it may never be read or commented on by anyone.  On the other hand, someone could read it and point out the error of my ways, the lack of academic writing or research, the somewhat jumbled way in which I've presented my ideas, or even the fact that I am an "expert" at nothing, least of all this subject. 

I will allow myself that amusement along with the thought that the earlier described complaints by so called experts made me imagine that THIS must be what it sounded like in the Vatican a decade or so after the Gutenberg press had been in operation.  When every Tom, Dick and Harry could have access to and read such important books as the Bible and come to their own conclusions about what God said or meant.  Or, preposterously, start their own sect of the religion.  Heresy!

It has already pre-saged a new aged version of the Inquisition where many a person, their name and reputation, has been publicly pilloried, scourged and burnt on the stake on the Internet for having presented themselves as an "expert" without proper title, authority or recognition from the expert powers that be.  Or, the gods of information forbid, some fool from Tuscaloosa has the temerity to discuss whatever subject catches his attention to the cry that he must confess his sins of ignorance and stop spreading his heresy.

We are nothing if not ever predictable.

Language, Analytics

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Syria & Gunboat Diplomacy: Maneuvers at Sea

Amongst the commentariat, the slow moving game of diplomacy over Syria is painful and, yes, slow.  Worse, because the commentary still insists there are only two options, to strike or do nothing, the current situation appears to be nothing more than a political morass that the US is unable to steer clear. 

From the original post, Syria & Gunboat Diplomacy, it was clear that the primary goal of deploying forces was not to engage in a military campaign, but to bring the third option back to the table: negotiations.  Placing five US destroyers, two carriers and a plethora of other strategic resources off shore was meant and received as the US indicating the choices were between military action and negotiating, not "doing nothing". 

This gambit has proved to be successful in restarting that original demand.  The US vote in congress was not completely assured to be an affirmation of the administration's authority to strike.  That, however, was not a risk that the Russians were willing to take. 

Despite many detractors discussing the inadvisability of the last two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, these do provide a powerful lesson on US politics vis-a-vis American wars and use of military power.  Security of the United States, one of three primary roles of any US president, will always come first.  No politician dare risk it or risk placing it second to any other issue.

Perceived threats have always aroused the American people to act, even if it is reluctantly.  That is not only a lesson of the last two wars, but over two hundred years of history.  Putin, despite his bravado, nor any of the other actors in this situation, can be unmindful of that nor of the fact that many people still do not trust Russian motives. 

Syria and Assad, as allies of Iran, cannot be confused on the subject either.  Regardless of the current fashion amongst some political factions of refashioning Assad as fighting terrorism, this is a new and unstable trend.  A potential friend today is tomorrow's ugly dictator.  This is not simply the political view in DC, but has been trending amongst the US public. 

While uncomfortable to some, these factors could not be dismissed and are among several that makes this use of US military power still credible even as some view US credibility and power waning.  There is something to be said about the current chaotic, unpredictable and seeming schizophrenic US policy and body politic. 

The Russians, for their part, are not unresponsive mannequins.  The Russian navy is slowly deploying multiple small ships to the Mediterranean, acting as a blocking force or, as some suspect, a potential evacuation force.  The question on many minds is whether the US is willing to risk war with Russia over Syria? 

A similar question can be asked of the Russian mind set and strategy.  Is Russia willing to risk war over Syria? 

For Russia, Syria represents several interests.  The first being it's sole remaining military base, all be it small and run down, outside of Russia.  More importantly, the only base beyond the Bosphorous Straits where the small naval force projecting "power" into the Mediterranean Sea, protecting Russia's only warm water access to the Atlantic, can rest and refuel.  This is no small matter in terms of the long history of Russia to gain and maintain this access for trade and defense. 

The second most important aspect is the projection of power into the Middle East.  Russia has slowly lost this projection over several decades of the Cold War and the two decades thereafter.  This projection has always been a lever against US and Western trade and energy resources.  An ability, as Russia has seen it, to act as a potential check against future aggression or expansion of western political and economic power and interdiction to militarily necessary resources. 

Vis-a-vis US and western presence and influence in the Eurasian countries as well as the 'Stans and Georgia, this has become an imperative for slowing or recovering Russia's shrinking borders and sphere of influence.  This also leads to the third issue for Russia, Putin's government specifically, as much of it's current power lies in the perception of it's strength abroad, re-enforcing it's perceived strength domestically. 

These interests take precedence for Russia beyond and above whether Syria survives as a state or who rules the nation or whether Assad maintains control of his chemical weapons.  This is why Russia was quick to jump on the opportunity to negotiate the removal of these weapons.   In essence, it is a very cheap price to pay for negotiating Russia's continued maintenance of the regime and, ultimately, Russia's presence in the Mediterranean. 

The emergence of Russia as Assad's chief, public interlocutor has caused considerable consternation amongst some viewers of the ongoing diplomatic dance.  With the positioning of Russian naval assets off Syria's shores and Putin's public defense of Assad's regime, many view this as an impenetrable umbrella under which Assad can survive. 

This ignores the reality of the situation.  Russia has been Assad's chief ally and lifeline as well as his international interlocutor for a very long time.  Without Russian arms, munitions and supplies, Assad's army and his regime whithers and dies.  Without Russia's political support, Assad becomes Kadafhi or Saddam: a dictator without friends who is then vulnerable to the whims of the other nation states.

Iran, Assad's second largest benefactor, provides oil, gas and fuel as well as military expertise and the assistance of it's proxy Hezbollah.  However, should the Russian supply line dwindle or be withdrawn, Iran is unlikely to be able to provide sufficient military material to take up the slack.  It would be logistically, monetarily and politically difficult, if not dangerous, to Iran.

The main supply route of oil, gas and fuel arrives through pipelines and land routes that are vulnerable to attack.  Other material support arrives by air that is not only limited by capacity, but also by locations/airports by which it can arrive.   Iran is already economically strapped and struggling to maintain it's own viability.  It is also in the midst of political changes at home and attempting to begin direct talks with the United States regarding it's nuclear activities.   Neither does Iran have the same international political clout as Russia and is drastically more vulnerable living under continually piling sanctions. 

In fashioning Russia as an "impenetrable barrier" to Assad's survival, it certainly provides Russia with a dash of international power it has been longing to re-establish.  However, this cover is hardly "impenetrable" and largely ignores Russian geopolitical behavior.  Russia remains coldly and clearly focused on it's own interests.  It's alliances are not made through friendship, kinship or any shared ideology.  It has often and quickly removed it's support from individual leaders so long as it's main interest in the allied nation remain intact. 

Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kadhafi in Libya provide an example.  In these two cases, Russia's interests were largely centered around the purchase of arms and munitions, one of Russia's major exports after oil and natural gas.  Russia provided military assistance and materials to both nations almost up to the last moment before military intervention.  It also withdrew and later returned to both countries as the primary supplier of military weapons, munitions and equipment. 

While Libya was a friendly port in the Mediterranean, it was no military base, just a port in the storm.  Iraq provided only a nominal projection into the Middle East and Saddam was considerably weakened by a decade of sanctions.  He was also unreliable and unpredictable.  In both cases,  while the primary Russian interest of preserving an arms market remains, Russia lost in Libya a friendly port in the Mediterranean and in Iraq it's illusion of "projection" into the Middle East beyond Iran.  

Syria represents the tri-fecta of Russian interests.  After these previous though smaller losses, Syria's importance to Russia becomes paramount.  Even the potential for a deep water port in Cyprus would not provide the same mechanisms as Tartaus where a very friendly alliance would allow Russian military flights into important air space amongst other privileges. 

If Assad falls, whether through actual war or through negotiations, the Russians are unlikely to have the same freedom of port and air space enjoyed under Assad and his predecessor regime.  Total collapse means that port becomes non-existent, negotiated end means, even if Russia retains access, a different relationship. 

The recent agreement for removal of chemical weapons appears to almost completely obscure the fact that Russia has made Assad a third, if not fourth, party to his own continued existence.  From this view, Russia has made it plain that it's own interests rise above Assad or the Syrian civil war. 

This is actually a positive development as it means that the primary source of Assad's survival has simplified a part of the negotiations and streamlined the process.  Russia knows what it wants, the United States has likely recognized those interests and will be part of future negotiations.  

The date of these "peace" negotiations is already being discussed.  Russia and the United States have agreed to discuss the date for Geneva 2 at the next UN meeting.  A significant gain as the original date had been given up by all and discussions tabled indefinitely. 

Russia, for it's part, has significant leverage with Assad to bring him to the table.  Conversely, the ability of the US to bring rebels to the table is not as simple as the political and military factions of the rebellion are fragmented.  US supply of weapons is less than their counterparts in Saudi Arabia.  It will be necessary to assure that the Saudis are on board as well to create the necessary pressure. 

The issue now becomes what Russia will accept for it's part in bringing Assad to the table and a future where Assad no longer rules Syria.  Will it accept keeping a base in the Mediterranean with, all be it, slightly diminished capacity vis-a-vis Middle East projection?  Will it also accept the likely retention of part of it's arms market as it is unlikely any future military in Syria will completely transition away from familiar Russian arms? 

These are the questions that must be answered first before future negotiations continue.  Where Russia may be satisfied, Assad's continued existence can no longer be guaranteed.  That is something that should be weighing heavily on Assad's mind and any assurances from Russia that they will not abandon him should be taken with an historical grain of salt.