Syria & Gunboat Diplomacy

There is a considerable amount of noise being made over the potential use of military power by the US against Assad.  Most of it centers around two binary options:

1) That too small of an attack will not change anything on the ground (ie, force Assad to abdicate or strengthen rebel positions exponentially), therefore, it is a waste of effort and poor use of US hard power that will only appear to weaken the United States supposedly already floundering global political position and continue a long drawn out war where Syria is so weakened that it eventually collapses anyway and all the bad forces (AQ & Hezbollah) use Syria as their play ground to attack western allies, interests & possibly the west itself.  Equally bad, it may continue & simply spread, creating instability in US allies and interests such as Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel & even, yes, Egypt and the Saudi Kingdom.

2) That these strikes might, indeed, be capable of collapsing Assad's regime militarily & politically, leaving a security vacuum that will be filled by the strongest actors (AQ affiliates & Hezbollah), resulting in either further escalating the nature of the sectarian loaded civil war, empowering these forces and giving them heretofore unprecedented access to advanced weapons such as land to air missiles, heavy weaponry and, most fearful, chemical or biological weapons.  Of course, leading to the same worries of spreading war and instability to neighbors, allies, interests and the West in general.

Most agree that there are no "good options" for Syria.  Except one option that, until this moment, appeared to drop off the face of the planet.  That third option is a negotiated end to Syria's civil war. 

All parties involved have agreed there is "no military solution.  At least, most have given lip service to this idea.  The Assad, Russian and Iranian contingent appear to believe this negotiation will only occur after Assad has largely defeated the rebels and it is negotiating their unconditional surrender.

The Obama administration and it's general allies disagree and believe that their best interest and continuing stability of post Syria can only occur after Assad steps down as the symbolic leader of the Ba'athist regime.  Negotiations would then entail formulating a new national government, appropriate representatives and keeping the military and security structure largely intact.

Russia and Iran state that the abdication of Assad is a "precondition" and that no preconditions are an acceptable method of approaching negotiations.  At the same time, by insisting Assad's departure is a non-starter "pre-condition", they have stated their own pre-condition for the negotiations.  The entire process and the much touted Geneva II became paralyzed and the war dragged on.

As these attempts to negotiate fell to the way side, each of the players have attempted to swing the balance of the battlefield in it's favor.  Or, in the case of the US and western allies, just off the "tipping point".  The US position really hasn't changed.  The US does not want a total collapse, but it does want the war to end and preferably with a less Iranian and Russian friendly government in place if not an ally with the US.

US allies began sending more money and greater numbers of weapons to the Syrian rebels.  This tipped the balance briefly towards the rebels as they gained considerable territory.  The Iranians then pushed back by sending in Hezbollah, it's own third party proxy.  Hezbollahs addition tipped the advantage back to Assad whose forces pushed forward briefly into Homs, but are now held in place. 

The US upped the ante by getting congressional approval to send weapons to "approved" rebel forces.  The Russians threw in their next card by suggesting they were going to fulfill an outstanding contract for S-300 missiles.  So called "ship killers" that could threaten allies and US commerce traveling through area waters. 

The US immediately sent Kerry to Russia while it "evaluated" (slowed down) it's arming of rebel forces.  While Russia's foreign minister kept Kerry waiting, apparent slap in the face, at the end, the Russians withheld the shipment of missiles.  Those missiles have occasionally re-appeared in the news as the Russians still dangled the threat while the US and allies began to slowly increase the flow of weapons and, as some times reported, provided training.

On the battlefield, the tit for tat exchange of territory continued with the rebels making several key gains and edging their territory ever deeper into Damascus.  Damascus being one of three areas that are significant in control of Syria. 

The first being the oil fields in the north, currently under rebel control.  The second being the coast line, thus main ports for economic trade and military supplies that are currently being contested, but are largely believed to be currently in the regime's control.  The third being Damascus, the seat of government power, also being contested with the rebels firmly seated in various districts.  As noted "edging" their way, ever slowly, inwards.

That evinces the use of chemical weapons.  A strange myopia appears to cover the comprehension of facts on the battlefield whereby the Russian/Iranian assertion that Assad was "winning" and would have no rationale to use these weapons, becomes an accepted "truth".  Assad was not "winning".  At best, he has been able to re-establish some balance on the field, creating a new, but still unsustainable "status quo". 

He's lost several important bases, troops and a plethora of equipment.  Enough equipment that the rebels can actually engage in tank battles, lay bases under siege and shoot down an occasional helicopter or fighter. Equally, after two years, maintenance and wear and tear on equipment has been slowly eroding viability.  While Russia and Iran send small arms, munitions and equipment for repairing these larger arms like tanks, Syria cannot afford to replace them nor are likely to receive new tanks, etc from Russia. 

Equally, humanitarian conditions inside government held territory are near or as bad as those in rebel territory.  Most food and medical supplies being held for the immediate regime and military, all others have increased beyond the reach of average citizens.  Economically, the Syrian pound has reached 270/US dollar and appears to be heading towards utter collapse.  Without the finances provided by the oil and gas in the north, Syria is on a slowly descending, total economic collapse as it increasingly spends what's left of it's treasury and beyond for weapons and munitions.

A battlefield paralysis or "status quo", simply shifting territory back and forth without significant advancements bringing it under government control, in the long run, equates to defeat for Assad.  This is very likely the calculation that led to the use, although "limited", of chemical weapons.  A crude attempt to shift the balance on the battlefield and regain more credible control of the seat of government, the third leg underpinning Syria's, thus the regime's, sustainability.

This event also appears to underline Assad's thinking and likely response as the long rolling collapse of his regime continues unless his forces make real, significant advances and sooner rather than later.  The distinct possibility that Assad may use these weapons on a more massive basis or even shift them to third party players for use against western allies, interests or the west directly, in a last ditch effort to release pressure from his failing, flailing regime, cannot be ignored. 

That possibility brings the current situation to the fore.  The US has parked significant missile and air power off of Syria's shores with the threat, all be it, long rolling, of a "punitive strike" against Assad.  This is essentially the "trump card" in the slowly ratcheting attempt to make negotiations a more likely, if not palatable, outcome.  It is also sending a clear signal to Assad that he and his regime would be held accountable for any transfer or use against US allies.  Certainly, at that moment, all bets would be off and the Syrian civil war would become something else entirely in such an event.

Analysts and political commentators appear to be stuck back on the bad solutions numbers one and two without having given any thought to option three: negotiations.  In the short term, as many agree, punitive strikes would not significantly change the situation on the battlefield.  In the long term, Assad's slowly eroding capabilities may end up eroding more quickly as even the minimal loss of bases for logistical support and any equipment is dangerous to his tenuous position. 

While many agree that Assad's total collapse is unwanted and that he may react more dangerously, these ideas clearly do not take into account any other significant players in the regime and their will to survive.  By slow rolling the possibility of strikes, the US has given Assad and his allies an opportunity to review their situation and, regardless of immediate outcomes, the long term likelihood of collapse. 

Assad may be betting on calling the US bluff or some rescue from his erstwhile allies.  Most of which is largely rhetorical political comments with Russia providing a token cover of parking one of it's smaller more dispensable carrier hybrids at Tartus.  This may give Assad additional time to attempt to consolidate his position or make gains, but unless it comes with significant delivery of tanks, jets and helicopters along with food, medicine and other necessities, it ends in the same way: the regime's collapse.

From this view, although not being stated in the open, it appears Obama is attempting to thread the needle between options one and two, bringing option three, negotiations, back to the fore.  It is clearly leaving Assad time to think, plan and act, but now within certain limitations that again puts things back to status quo and status quo is simply a longer death knell. 

It also leaves an opening for possible dialogue before the missiles start flying. 

There is a potential that this attempt at "gunboat diplomacy" may fail.  Assad may choose the "Berlin" option and determine to let Syria and Syrians burn around him and with him.  However, that option, as shown in Berlin in 1945, often means those around him would not agree and seek a different path. 

Obama could "blink" and withdraw forces without any significant gain, but this is highly unlikely as it does place US credibility on the line.  Congress could and likely will split over the option to attack, but it will simply be one more checked box leaving the ultimate decision in the President's hands. 

If this analysis holds correct, within the next ten days we will likely see several activities including ship maneuvers and practice flights as well as some political speechifying regarding the need for a political solution.  The Iranians and Russians have already made preliminary comments to that effect.  Expect to see Obama and Kerry "grudgingly" make the same concession. 

Whether this will move the situation along towards negotiations is yet to be seen, but as everyone else insists, there are no other "good options".  Unfortunately, it may, indeed, take a few missiles flying to make negotiations appear the "good".