There are two situations that are being closely watched in Egypt: the political stand off between the new/old powers and the once again disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's failing economy. Both issues are so entwined that a wrong move, a serious rupture from either situation could tip the scales of Egypt's future towards the status of "failed state".
The actors on either side of the political divide are the main actors in Egypt's flailing economy. The current political crisis is as much about power plays in the economic structure of Egypt as it is about the control of government levers. Those who control one power structure can use it to control the other and have done so for decades.
In the middle of these power plays are "the street" and the average Egyptian or "the People". "The street" for either side is a conglomeration of people who are being loosely described by journalists, politicians and each adversary depending on their position. The street chants slogans, throws out vicious insults, passes propaganda and rumors like candy and has been ratcheted to the point of breaking bad by the leaders of the seemingly insurmountable divide.
On the one side: "Islamists", "Pro-Morsi", "Pro-Muslim Brotherhood", "Pro-Democracy" and "Anti-coup". In their simplicity, these definitions describe the various reasons many say the remained in Rabaa al Adiway square and continue marching in demonstrations. Each reason or sentiment may overlap amongst the members of the crowd, but it cannot be denied that the over-arching reason is that, for whichever reason, this group believes it was, and will continue to be, largely disenfranchised from political participation and the levers of government.
Worse, based on past and current experience, they will become the persecuted pariahs of Egypt. Including such things as criminal charges, sham trials, imprisonment, discrimination from jobs and government assistance, exclusion from public life and general harassment if not death from extra-judicial killings. Things that have happened in the past, are happening now and will, indeed, happen in the future regardless of what political resolution may be reached.
On the other side are the "Non-Islamists", "Liberals", "Seculars", "Anti-Morsi", "Anti-Muslim Brotherhood", and "Pro-military" (as opposed to "pro-coup"). As with the group in Rabaa, Nada and other places, the reasons for being in the square over lap and, at times, are distinct from each other.
This group ultimately believes that now deposed President Mohammed Morsi had abused his powers and failed to create a functioning government or address the multitude of economic, security and social issues facing Egypt. Many believe that he did so in an illegitimate attempt to install Islamist ideology and governance over the will of "the people" instead of acting in good faith to achieve the goals of "the revolution" (January 25, 2011) or the good of "the people".
Worse, the Brotherhood and it's various adherents are "terrorists" and "extremists" who are responsible for internecine sectarian violence as wells as the uptick in militant violence in Sinai. From their position, the Brotherhood, once the parent organization for terrorist off shoots, is barely concealing their still existing ties to terrorism and is preparing to orchestrate wider attacks against a host of people. Something that has happened in the past, is happening now, and, regardless of political outcomes, will happen in the future.
Depending who any observer chooses to believe, each side of the street claims to represent some overwhelming majority of "the people". Each side attempts to validate their position as acting in the true meaning of democracy and the name of a rather mysterious group of people called "Egyptians". Most of whom are no where to be seen on the streets, whose opinions are uttered among friends, family and acquaintances or even only to themselves and are waiting for an out come so they can get on with their lives.
Their opinions may reside in various shades with each side of the street, but invariably are muted behind the daily struggle to find work, money, fuel and food while maintaining shelter and security for their families. These mysterious Egyptians would very much like for the situation to be settled in whatever manner so that the overwhelming demands of survival may begin to be addressed and alleviated. For "the people", it doesn't matter which side gains power as it is likely it will not change their own condition much accept that they may, at least, get back to what they were doing before the entire mess began: surviving.
As the days go by and stresses mount on this group, fractures appear including heightened violence and increasing criminal activity. Each side of the street claims that the other is responsible for these fractures and violence. Declaring each incident to be representative of the other or orchestrated by the other. Either as a directive, a derivative or an attempt to sabotage the "reputation" of the other through staged events.
Neither is completely wrong nor are they completely accurate. In the streets are large gangs of young men. Some are politically motivated, some are acting as vigilantes, some are, in fact, "thugs" and some participate because there is nothing else to do in the long days of summer, Ramadan and when there are no jobs. All taking sides and generally adding to the tension and mayhem.
Above these groups are several powerful forces. These include "The Military", "Wealthy Businessmen" (from inside and outside of Egypt) and "The Muslim Brotherhood Leadership". Some of these are redundant as "The Military" (at least, it's upper officer cadre) are "Wealthy Businessmen" as are a number of "The Muslim Brotherhood Leadership".
Each of which is attempting to either maintain or obtain control of the levers of government and economic power (again, redundant). Each attempting to use "the street" and "the People" for their own agenda. Most of these agendas have very little to do with addressing the needs of "The People". Instead, as each side accurately accuses the other, these agendas are for the benefit of a select few. Whether that select few are "The Military", "Wealthy Businessmen" or "The Muslim Brotherhood Leadership".
Despite claims to the contrary, none of these powers are interested in sharing power. Not with each other, not with "the Street" and certainly not with "The People". These are alternately useful tools or useful fools. "The Street" would insist they are neither, but are making calculated choices based on which group is most likely to give them some of the things they demand. A start in the right direction that each side of the divide believes it can use as momentum to achieve their long term goals.
"The People" would also likely object to this description. Largely because they are not fooled by this great upheaval into believing there will be some awesome benefit to any out come. They may have, at one time, reluctantly placed their hopes on the January 25 movement, having apparently ousted "the Old Guard" and possibly nudged the gates open. Expectations, based on this perception of who had been responsible for their condition (ie, Mubarek & immediate cadre, jailed) became very high and then, inevitably, crashed.
"The People" would be happy if things simply returned to "normal" as in "before the Revolution" when there were at least jobs from tourism and construction, the dysfunctional system of subsidies at least functioned to provide a basic level of subsistence and no one was trying to make them a "secular" or an "Islamist".
Unfortunately, as very few of the Powerful have the interest of "the People" at the heart of their agendas, whatever relief they may achieve will be temporary. Egypt's economy has been broken, it's crumbling infrastructure only improved or repaired where it best suited the Powerful, it's government infrastructure bloated and inefficient except when the Powerful push the levers.
In which case, there are few regulations or laws that have any meaning or act as any hurdle that must be over come except where "the Greasing of the Palm" (baksheesh) is necessary inside the petty kingdoms and fiefdoms carved out within "the Establishment". "The Establishment" being the numerous government agencies which keep Egypt limping along. Sometimes, literally, as it includes the incredibly disastrous national health system.
"The Establishment" is in some ways a power unto itself, but also a useful tool. It is, possibly, one of the few agencies within Egypt that represents steady employment. All be it, for the lesser clerks and administrative types, for exceedingly low wages.
The trade off being that it is steady and comes with a few perks like government subsidized housing at retirement and a very small pension. The pension isn't much, but the subsidized housing can be turned into a lucrative monthly subsidy. The population boom and the increasing flow of rural populations to urban settings looking for jobs allows this underground economy to flourish.
By leasing it out at a higher rental fee and finding cheaper digs in the countryside or with other family members, this provided a higher standard of subsistence living. It's illegal, technically, but so is much else that goes on within Egypt.
Other perks include "baksheesh" that subsidizes current sad salaries and probably the enjoyment of whatever little power the individual gains over underlings or "the People". Of course, this does not attract the best and the brightest as those tend to look within the private sector for better paying jobs. Employment is most likely an outcome of nepotism and cronyism from the top to the bottom. The administrators at the top collecting the most fees from everyone including "The Powers", "the People" and their underpaid underlings.
It is obvious that "the Establishment" is a small power unto itself as each Power in the last two years attempted to appease it with increased wages. This is because "the Establishment" represents approximately fifty percent of the actual employed in Egypt. As such, it also over laps with a significant part of "the People" and "the Street".
"The Establishment" is also "the levers of Power". As such it can significantly speed up or slow down it's beauracratic processes either at the behest of a patron or under it's own will. The nominal control or mutual alignment of this petty power allows the Powers to by pass ridiculous things like government bidding processes, safety and health laws, workers rights, building standards and pesky real property value assessments that would necessarily "inflate" the price of desired land.
Now ousted President Morsi discovered the power of "the Establishment" when he attempted to place new leadership over some agencies or force it to work by his agenda. He referred to "the Establishment" as "the Deep State", implying that it was working on behest of the "felool" or "Old Guard" which includes the other Powers such as "The Military" and "Wealthy Businessmen".
This assessment is not entirely correct nor incorrect. Like his predecessor and his current successor, he initially tried to purchase "The Establishment's" loyalty by providing several wage increases. Unfortunately, he also tried to replace the heads of many agencies. While the opposition insisted these new managers were not capable "Technocrats", but Brotherhood allegiances (partially correct), the problem was multi-fold.
First, it attempted usurp the thrones of several petty kingdoms and their fiefdoms within the agencies. This interrupted the flow of business and money, not only at the top, but up and down the system. It was definitely more lucrative to work with the other two Powers who did not care to disturb the internal systems as it worked most efficiently for them when needed.
Second, nepotism and cronyism, from top to bottom means many owe their allegiance to family, friends and patrons. This is seen as a much more valuable relationship than that of simple employee of the State with it's low wages. Getting a job and keeping it, plus opportunities for advancement, assistance inside and outside of work; little actually relies on the actual performance of duties except for that all important word in Egypt: "Loyalty".
Third, early in his tenure, Morsi's appointed head of Housing attempted to cut off the extra-government pension of sub-leasing on the government dole. Assessments of housing had begun, ostensibly to rectify safety issues and improve standards of living for the poor. Also to assess whether land lords receiving these funds were maintaining the property by law.
As the Brotherhood had worked within these poor neighborhoods, they could not have been unaware of this underground economy. Or, that many of the poor were paying exponentially higher sub leases than the law allowed. Instead of bringing legal cases against the landlords and actual pensioners receiving illegal rents, the police were sent out to evict the poor "illegal" sub letters from government property.
This was amongst one of several public relations nightmares to haunt the Brotherhood's time in power. Not only did it affect the "poor" who they ostensibly worked with and provided part of their base, but it also threatened to cut off one of the few extra perks of even the least paid government employee.
As for the other two Powers, all of this constituted a threat to their economic empires. Not only because actual application of the rules and laws might cost them money on the front end of a project, but because the Brotherhood could do as The Military and the Wealthy Businessmen had been doing, stifling the competition in Egypt's semi-controlled economy or, equally as terrifying, open competition up. This would cost them much more money in the long run.
The question to consider is whether the Brotherhood through President Morsi were being honest actors? In respect to how the Brotherhood operated outside of the government and their international relations, the answer is likely not. Nepotism and cronyism is exactly how the Muslim Brotherhood's Leadership and various business associations are conducted. At best, and based on several reports, they may have pried the lid open a crack on Egypt's economy and competition, but never likely detrimental to their own businesses and very likely in the interest of some international partners like Qatar.
The two other petty powers that exist in Egypt are "the Judiciary" and the "Ministry of Interior" (MOI). Both of these petty powers are staffed and function along the same lines as "the Establishment". In the Judiciary, cronyism and nepotism not only decides who will be allowed to work as a lawyer or judge within the system, but it is effectively how most cases are "judged". Justice is not blind and her scales are invariably tipped in favor of the Powers.
Whether those trials are against political or business rivals, nascent opposition leaders, civil society NGO workers (from whence political rivals and nascent opposition leaders allegedly flow) or one of "the People" who simply won't get out of the way of lucrative land deals.
The Judiciary likes to style itself as "independent", but the only thing it is independent of is actual justice, the rule of law, ideas like actual evidence and the thing most Western nations like to believe exists: innocent until proven guilty. It's exceedingly rare for judges to recuse themselves on the grounds of conflict of interest unless an insurmountable amount of outside pressure is brought to bare.
There are a lot of conflicts of interest. Take for instance the head of Egypt's Constitutional Court, now Interim President, Adly Mansour of the fabulously wealthy Mansour family. The Mansours being part of the group of "Wealthy Businessmen" who financed Tamarod to oust President Morsi.
More directly, Adly Mansour presided over the Constitutional Court that dissolved the original elected parliament on the grounds that it did not meet constitutional law. What constitution and what law is in question. It appears, based on on going trials that began several years ago, the Judiciary does not deem it necessary to judge based on current law and much evidence is based on "here-say"; witnesses witnessing other witnesses who said they witnessed the defendant allegedly say or do something that is often in itself questionable as to whether it constitutes a crime or conspiracy to commit a crime.
Egypt is the home of tendentious lawsuits for libel and slander amongst several varieties. The back log of criminal and civil cases makes the NYC court system look like a race track. Except, of course, where such cases are politically or financially expedient in Egypt. Only then must justice act swiftly.
The Judiciary even has it's own protective law against "insulting the Judiciary". It's a criminal offense, subject to fines and imprisonment. This may, at first, appear to be similar to ideas of "contempt of court".
In Egypt, a defendant does not actually have to be in court or under a court order to have committed this alleged crime. This application of "law" is strictly to protect the petty power of the Judiciary as opposed to maintaining order in the courts or enforcing actual judgements. Thus, anyone that is even remotely viewed as challenging that power, verbally, physically or legally, can be charged as a criminal and imprisoned.
The charge of "insulting the Judiciary" is one being laid against Morsi. He attempted to cut off the top layer of entrenched judges by passing laws like mandatory retirement at age 65 instead of life time appointments. The Brotherhood, of course, has it's own petty fiefdom carved out within the court system and has routinely abused the same defunct system for it's own efforts. The move to retire judges would have opened up space for Brotherhood appointees and, thus, Brotherhood related judicial efforts against opponents or in favor of certain business transactions.
The Brotherhood's fiefdom is largely at the lower version of "circuit courts" where as the appellate courts are divided between multiple powers, the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court remain in control of the entrenched Powers. However, the on going trials of activists and the now completed NGO trials were not necessarily at the Brotherhood's behest or in their direct power of their intra-judiciary fiefdom. These were old trials brought by the old/new Powers that essentially aligned with the Brother's agenda. That being to squash any current or potential mutual opponents of The Three Powers.
This is another moment when the Brother's made a fatal mistake alienating what should have been their allies against the entrenched Two Powers, "the revolutionaries" and "the street". Instead of strengthening laws protecting free speech and association, speaking out against the trials or even issuing Presidential pardons, they allowed the trials to go on and even prompted several more.
The worst, though, may have been the out come of the Port Said trials. A riot in the football (soccer) stadium in Port Said left some 70 dead. Many were killed by security forces who were later cleared of almost all charges while a few rioters received the death sentence. Then President Morsi even issued a grateful approval to the security forces for their efforts against "thugs". "Thugs" being the code word for anybody the Three Powers deemed dangerous to their shaky alliance.
It wasn't the first time he had publicly thanked the security forces from MOI for their violent efforts killing "thugs" (protesters). No thanks were needed and were likely scoffed at as these cases were just another moment when the needs of the Three Powers and one of the Petty Powers aligned. That Petty Power being the Ministry of Interior.
Finally, we come to the Ministry of Interior which, to put it bluntly, is where the criminals favored by the Powers find employment. They are "The Enforcers". For the most part, they are aligned with the first two Powers, The Military and The Wealthy Businessmen. Largely because those at the very top have received largesse from the Two Powers currently in power for doing their dirty work as well as run what is, essentially, one of the largest organized criminal rings in Egypt.
Like most organized crime, anarchy is not good for business. Lawlessness and a general disregard for many laws, yes, anarchy, no. Which is why this group that has been largely allied with the old regime and the current Powers seemed to be acting at the behest of ousted President Morsi and the Brotherhood when it acted against protesters in Maspero and again against the Constitution protests on Mohammed Mahmoud Street.
For the MOI, this is about tenuous things like stability and security. Not to mention, the new constitution under the Brotherhood still provided for their continuing existence, even against the wishes of the other "revolutionary forces" in the street.
The MOI is one of the most brutal and dreaded organizations in Egypt. The arrest, beatings and even outright torture of activists of all stripes during the Mubarek era made them a primary target of January 25.
In fact, it was the acts of police who are the employees of MOI that led to the burgeoning January 25 revolt. The beating and murder of Khaled Said by police officers. A murder they then tried to pass off as a drug over dose or suicide even though the young man had been obviously beaten and stomped to death. Young Khaled had the gall to record officers at a drug bust pocketing the proceeds and quite a bit of the product.
In stifling other protests post January 25, from the MOIs perspective, the people at Maspero and Mohammed Mahmoud Street protests weren't just destabilizing Egypt, but were the enemy of the MOIs continuing existence and extensive enterprises.
The MOI is also the home of the hard core nationalists and believers in the necessity of the police state. Those inside the MOI, particularly at the top and in the special intelligence unit and Central Security Forces have been programmed to view most Egyptians as either criminals or criminals in waiting. Fairly ironic considering the amount of criminal activity the MOI participates in or provides protection to in it's own interest.
These interests include smuggling of goods into Gaza, into Egypt or across Egyptian borders to other locations. This activity can be seen by the plethora of smuggling tunnels the MOI has shut down in the last 30 days. Over 100 tunnels in all, many of them highly sophisticated works of engineering built right under their noses. Or, more likely, with a nod and a wink while receiving appropriate unofficial fees.
Then there are the shipment of arms that flow through the Suez Canal into Egypt, but also to other places like Gaza or Syria. Some of these arms have been diverted by their recipients or criminal counterparts and are now back flowing into the Sinai. This newly discovered danger of doing business has prompted the security forces to shut the tunnels and interrupt several arms shipments, conveniently providing the first two Powers with some much needed positive PR demonstrating MOI's importance for keeping Egypt "safe". From "terrorists".
That isn't to say there are no terrorist organizations in the Sinai. On the other hand, plenty of the violence in the Sinai has been directed towards the security forces alone. While the Powers may be able to weather the short term loss of revenues from the closing of smuggling tunnels, for many of the Bedouin this represents a significant decrease in income. A reason to have a beef with their unofficial partners in crime.
Unfortunately, it also provides the basis for Islamist propaganda on the duplicity of the state. This allows organizations like Islamic Jihad, a Gaza based AQ affiliate, to make additional inroads and alliances among disaffected tribes. More than the few who were originally outside of the existing "underground" economy. Islamic Jihad then becomes the dominant client slash partner as the only source providing income and protection. In the Sinai, this is as much about business as it is about ideology and probably more so.
The Brotherhood, for their part, had essentially brokered a deal that not only allowed more goods to flow through the official crossings like Rafah, but also the unofficial smuggling tunnels. Much of which is purchased from the Brotherhoods legal and illegal business networks. It was a "win/win" for most involved. The official state apparatus of Egypt and the Hamas controlled government in Gaza collected taxes as well as the unofficial "taxation" of underground goods. The Brotherhood's networks saw an increase in revenues that would solidify allegiances and provide a "war chest" for their upcoming political fight.
Unfortunatetly, the Brotherhood also attempted to replace the head of MOI with a man who was regarded as "incompetent" and did not hold that all important commodity, the "loyalty" of his men. Most likely because he was an interloper in the well "oiled" machine of the MOI. This was not an attempt by the Brotherhood to reform that institute, but control it and add it to it's physical and economic powerbase.
As the "taint" of the Brotherhood's rule is slowly expunged by the New/Old partnership of the Two Powers, the MOI returns to business as usual: arresting thousands, killing hundreds and intimidating and harrassing anyone that might pose a threat. Even those who sided with the Two Powers on June 30.
In the mean time, there are those among "the People" who find comfort in the return of the balance between the Three Powers, largely in favor of The Military and the Wealthy Businessmen. The appearance of substantial Gulf aid, providing a small cushion for the new/old government allows for the delusion that the ship of Egypt's state has been righted again.
The problem, of course, is that the listing of that ship had been going severely long before the arrival of the Brotherhood's stewardship. The three powers, largely competing to determine who steers the sinking ship as it breaks apart, have ignored, sidelined, used and abused Egypt's most precious cargo: the Egyptian people.
The new/old powers and their supporters have roundly congratulated themselves for having rallied "the People" to their cause, imagining, foolishly, like the Brotherhood that they have been given a "mandate" to re-establish the old system of Powers. This would be a myopic view of what has been driving people to the street as well as perverse blindness to the actual shift of power.
While January 25 is roundly regarded as simply a demand to remove Mubarek and June 30 a referrendum on the Brotherhood's rule, underneath are several currents that are swirling within Egypt. The People have now witnessed their own power. Not once, but twice. The things that they demand include the obvious: their voices to be heard and for improved economic conditions. The latter being one of two major issues driving revolt against the stagnated, short rule of the Brothers.
Second, more importantly, the two events of January 25 and June 30 coming only two years apart, with June 30 only one year after Morsi's election, indicates a significant factor against attempts by the Powers to maintain their old economic and political structures that inherently favor the Powers over the People. The People are very impatient. These two events closely together show the volatility of the situation and just how short the fuse is for the next revolution.
If the Powers do not voluntarily and signficantly share power or immediately provide for the economic relief of The People in a meaningful way, it is likely The People who will break Egypt.
Woe unto any of The Powers that stand in their way.
