Now that Egypt has done a "reset" on their revolution, it's time to revisit our (US) own problem with Foreign Policy. Namely, the rise of "realpolitik" as the guiding principle for foreign policy and the subjugation of United States values to this ramshackle, dubiously short sighted approach.
I wrote "In Search of Principled Foreign Policy" in 2011 at the height of the Arab Spring after reading a New Yorker article titled "How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy". I said at the time, the article should have been called:
"How Events Make You Spin On Your Head and Do Incomprehensible and Contradictory Things When You Lack Principled Policies"
In the article, President Obama states that he would have no "blanket policies" for dealing with states, particularly in the Middle East. Instead, he would assess the situations as they arose and react accordingly. This is "realpolitik" writ large and is, in fact, a "blanket policy", ie to have no policy at all, but to deal with events as they arise.
"Realpolitik" is not a principle. It is a reactionary behavior that is sometimes necessary when dealing with nations and events. To have that in the primary and overt role of US foreign policy means that the US is ALWAYS reacting to events instead of setting the tone and reaching for a satisfactory goal.
It doesn't matter what forum or agency or organization, when having to react on the fly, mistakes will constantly be made over and over again. In today's world of constant fluctuating events, it means that the US is constantly caught off guard and reeling without a firm foundation to stand on or guide it's policies. It not only makes the US appear weak to it's enemies and allies alike, it also leaves an untold number of people in definitely unfree places looking to the light of that free "city on the hill" and wondering if the lights have gone out for good. Thinking that the United States has abandoned them and is, in fact, no better than any of the other nations trying to protect their interests at the expense of those masses "yearning to be free".
The case of Egypt is an excellent point. At the height of the Arab Spring, President Obama congratulated the people of Egypt for their fight for "self determination". I wondered in that moment why we were using that language. "Self Determination" left the door wide open for all sorts of government to be established including another dictatorship disguised as an unhealthy "democracy" under the guise of any ideology that was not "free" and inclusive, regardless of whether it was voted in. As John Stuart Mills called it, "the tyranny of the majority".
Later, the word "Democracy" was introduced, but it remained alone without it's necessary guiding principle of "freedom". The reason was clear. The United States had looked into the roiling masses and determined two things: first, that the Egyptian military would remain the power broker in Egypt and second, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most organized and politically ready organization, would likely win any on coming elections.
These were not wrong assumptions at that time. Demographics and polling in Egypt indicated that the Brotherhood did enjoy broad support. The military was and is the most stable and powerful organization in Egypt and it had no intention of being subjugated to the "reactionary" masses in a democracy.
What the United States saw on the other side of the political landscape included, indeed, reactionary, disorganized and disparate groups whose political ideologies spanned the political landscape. None of whom presented a viable platform for running a political campaign, much less governing a state.
Instead of political platforms, the "Revolutionary Youth" dispensed a 26 point list of demands, most focused on prosecuting the old regime. Intent on regaining Egypt's glory, there were calls to destroy the Camp David Accords, march to Palestine and rip open the borders to Gaza. Economic plans echoed the ultra-socialist programs of South America including nationalizing untold numbers of privately owned enterprises, prosecution of any who had purchased previous state enterprises and even increasing the Suez Canal transport fees by ten times their current rate. All allegedly to make Egypt a utopian "self sustaining" state when it had neither the raw resources or industrial infrastructure to do so. Policies that would take Egypt to the brink of war and quickly have it listing on the bottom of failed states. Or, at least, a listing, almost failed welfare state whose bank would be the economically fraught US and western allies. Not an option.
The Muslim Brotherhood, politically poised to take the helm, was obviously the entity the United States would have to work with in the coming years. They were not selected by the United States, but by popular elections. In that election, they became the default partners of the United States.
In the run up to the elections, US envoys met with the Muslim Brotherhood several times and the Brotherhood took advantage of US NGO's to help refine their political address. Of course, US envoys met with the opposition numerous times, but there were over 20 competing parties and not all of them were received as often as the Brotherhood. While many attended meetings and met with civil society NGOs, they were just getting started, while the Brotherhood with it's organized groups was able to take full advantage of the information and training being provided.
This led to an unchallenged rumor that the United States was supporting the MBs and assisting them to win the elections. Chosen by an outside force, not an elective democratic process. That became even worse as the Brothers challenged not only parliamentary elections and won, but the presidency and constitutional referendums. Partly by the use of pulpits in the Mosque. A technique that the opposition could not match and felt was undemocratic in a civil state. The Brotherhood insisted they did no such thing, but it was clear that their influence and that of their allies in the Mosque had paved the way.
As these events unfolded, the MB continued to consolidate their hold on government entities, the Upper Shura Council, the constitutional process and the state media among others. They used old and new laws to silence the worst of their critics, branding them as traitors to the revolution, infidels and many other unsavory insults. They were doing exactly as the previous regime had done.
Worse, they were doing it under the guise of the revolution and democracy. A revolution who brought them to power with the idea that surely, having faced similar persecution and inequality, the Muslim Brothers would not do the same.
The United States, for it's part, remained relatively silent except for those occasional utterances about self determination. There were attempts to slow the process and give the opposition time to form parties, competing effectively in elections and creating a balance against the Brotherhood. Then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, had advised that elections be put off for a year. Neither the Brotherhood, SCAF nor some of the opposition parties were interested in this slowing process. Their needs had coalesced. The Brothers knew they would have the upper hand in quick elections. SCAF wanted a civilian face on the government and a number of the reactionary revolutionaries were on fire to depose the remnants of the former regime. They wanted democracy and they wanted it now.
There are things to be said about the lack of real understanding regarding political processes, polls and demographics by various political entities in Egypt. There is even more that could be said about the differences between "freedom", "democracy" and "the rule of law". Ideas that the opposition had not fully digested.
Many at the time expressed the idea that democracy, the ability to choose their leaders at the ballot box, was equal to freedom. It never was or will be. It was a hard lesson for the opposition who were quickly shunted aside by the Brotherhood.
A lesson they may still not yet understand or be able to fully articulate to the masses as they perform yet another popular, leaderless revolt without expressing any defining ideas beyond rejection of the Brothers and their Islamic project. A lesson they ignore as they run full tilt at confrontation with the other half of Egypt under the same misconception of the Muslim Brotherhood and their earlier misconception in 2011: that some how numbers in the streets equals a clear majority that can reject or subjugate this other alleged minority.
Having listed but a few of these events, it is important to note what exactly was missing from the United States' rhetoric. The word "freedom" and any of it's corresponding ideas about rights, the dangers of democracy without them and a real emphasis on the social compact necessary for real, inclusive and successful democracy. Instead, we emphasized "self determination"; a "realpolitik" identification of what the United States expected would occur with the Muslim Brotherhood at the helm and the military at it's back door.
The issue here is not that "realpolitik" has no place in foreign policy, but that it's overt practice and iteration, as opposed to closed door evaluation, is a danger in it's self. In fact, publicly abdicating the United States role as the leader and arbiter of these very ideas that are in demand in the Middle East: Freedom and Democracy.
This missing language and support for freedom, this overt "realpolitik" was not missed by those revolutionaries who indeed believed in the western ideas of freedom. The continued silence over the Brotherhood's continued consolidation of power and acts that were expressly anti-freedom, not only as we would read them, but the other half of the non-Islamist Egyptians as well, led those revolutionaries to believe they had been abandoned without even the illusion of a lifeline. Worse, it seemed to explicitly imply that the Brother's Islamic Project and their lack of true consensus from the other half of Egypt had tacit approval of the United States. There were few words, if any, publicly or privately that held even a moderating hint of these principles.
There are limits, of course, to the influence of the United States, even in nations where extensive aid is provided. Recognizing those limits is "realpolitik". Being far sighted enough to recognize who will be the winners or losers in politics is "realpolitik". Establishing a working relationship with those "winners" is "realpolitik".
Voicing out loud those ideas that we call "values", freedom, democracy, rule of law, the ideas we always articulate, regardless of whom we may need to work with in any given nation, those are principles. Principles we can stand on and live by. Principles that, regardless of the "realpolitik" of having to work with various governments, are always "the beacon on the hill" for those masses living under those regimes. Masses yearning to be free. That is the story of the Arab Spring.
What might this have done in Egypt? Would the Brotherhood have moderated their behavior? Would SCAF have finally comprehended the need to include moderating ideas when meeting with the Brothers or designing their "road map"? Would this have empowered the much disparate and unorganized "liberal" opposition in developing a real political platform to contest elections? Move the dialogue forward on ideas of laws, government and freedom?
Could this current crisis in Egypt have been avoided? A crisis that may have entrenched a combative, uncooperative Muslim Brotherhood and equally combative opposition to the detriment of Egypt and the interests of the United States. Interests supposedly served by this non policy foreign policy.
Maybe. Maybe not. As I noted, there are limits to the ways in which an outside nation can influence internal politics of another nation. Usually, as in Egypt when SCAF removed President Mubarak, only when our political needs or desires align. Short of invasion or outright meddling in a nation's affairs, it is limited. That is "realpolitik".
What is most important is that, no matter what happened in Egypt or the surrounding countries, if the United States had maintained an overt foreign policy based on the principles of freedom and democracy, we would have been, and always would be, "on the right side of history".
When you are on the right side of history, you never go wrong.
But, here we are, reviled in Egypt by both sides as co-conspirators of the other. Because we did not articulate our principles clearly. Because we let "realpolitik" get in the way of establishing a real foreign policy on principles that have always allowed us to weather any storm. Principles for a world demanding freedom and democracy.
What influence will we have now as confrontation arises in Egypt and conflagration waits for the smallest spark? Hard to say. That is a dose of "realpolitik" for this administration.
On the other hand, it is not too late to find and re-affirm our principles, to adjust our foreign policy so that those principles rise to the top and "realpolitik" goes back where it belongs: in the service of freedom and democracy.
Not "self determination". Freedom and democracy.
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