Al Qaeda and Politics of Analysis

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross had an excellent article about why researchers and analysts kept getting Al Qaeda wrong.  Specifically, why we might be hearing, over and over, that al Qaeda was "on the run" or "all but done."  One of the issues was the possibility that politics might play a part in how people were interpreting the information. 

There was one point that I thought did not get enough attention in this and that is how the politics of policy making might interfere with good analysis.  Particularly when we should feel as if the political leadership is getting the right information as well as the public in order to make good policy.  Instead, what might be happening is that our policies are being derived first and then information requested or shaped by that understanding under those parameters.

For instance, a long standing policy has been to try to separate Al Qaeda from all other activities or groups.  Specifically, separate them from the larger Muslim population to counter al Qaeda's narrative that they are fighting on behalf of the Ummah, defending it from western aggression. 

In 2011, the White House released The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism and laid out very specifically who the United States was at war with; AQ, AQAP, AQIM, ISIS and a few other entities.  Even though the list of "terrorist" organizations derived is much larger and more diverse in ideology, goals and ability.  In essence, the strategy paper is meant to set boundaries and guidelines for who, what and where we will focus our attention.  Also, as Mr. Garenstein-Ross indicates, not everyone who speaks Islamist lingo or considers himself (or herself) a "mujihadeen" is fighting for AQ or expecting to join it in it's attempt to achieve a "global caliphate", but may have completely separate goals. 

Mr. Garenstein-Ross alludes to this issue of limits and boundaries when he comments on a discussion with others and suggests that this administration wants to get out of the war on terrorism mode.  Not just the administration, but plenty within the political and security apparatus, too.  Aside from that political notion, that we do not want to fight everybody, that may have been only one "political" factor that had influence on the policy. 

The strategy paper seems to be placing the focus on the groups deemed most dangerous, like AQ and affiliates, setting down the expectations for information and intelligence gathering.  One of the long standing narratives is that past administrations were not very good and focusing on, analyzing and countering the threat.  Therefore, the strategy page was created to set out the White House's priorities and direct all organizations and agencies towards those goals.

What can happen, though, is that "priorities" and "focus" can become very narrow windows through which people view a particular set of problems.  In establishing the "what" and the "who" of the priorities, information that suggests that an organization has few connections might place that group as a lesser priority or discarded from a set.  Even if some information may appear to the contrary of that conclusion. 

This is not unusual in any person or organization.  It's very natural to attempt to define and refine what an individual or organization is looking for or the information that needs to be evaluated.  Particularly within an agency where the focus and priorities are continuously preached in order to enforce it and achieve some desired efficiency and effect.  In doing so, unfortunately, it can also be detrimental as it enforces a type of group think.

Those inside these agencies will say this isn't so, that they are trained not to fall into this trap and the agency itself will suggest that they do everything possible to provide people with open space for thought or dissent.  That they "foster" that sort of behavior within their agency and in their people.  The agencies may, in fact, have numerous training programs, seminars and opportunities for people to do just that, but the mechanics of the organization and the push for priorities can easily overwhelm any well intentioned efforts to foster independent thinking. 

As this article, The Fog of Organizations by Peter Munson at War on the Rocks suggests, very large organizations seek to run in a uniform way because they seek to produce a consistently reliable product.  In this case, useful information and analysis to help guide policy and insure national security. 

This is an excellent example and a reminder of what larger organizations are built to do. They normalize actions and minimize deviations.

 Despite efforts not to fall into this pattern, large organizations, particularly ones that operate on a redundancy model to instill "resilience", do it as a matter of nature.  Upper management re-enforces it to middle management, they re-enforce it to lower management who then instills it in their subordinates.  "This is what is wanted and this is what is needed" will always over ride "and, by the way, look out for anything that might be different".  It doesn't take much to understand which of these two concepts are most likely to be more consistently followed as it is also most consistently rewarded.

In this way, a good intentioned policy meant to set out the strategic goals of the nation and provide focus (reduce "mission drift"), coupled with the nature of large, bureaucratic organizations, can become the onus by which consistent erroneous analysis can be produced.  It only gets worse as more and more layers, people and responsibilities are added because it is very typical for these same organizations to take what is believed to be a successful model, reproduce it and plug it into the larger organization. 

In the commercial sector, businesses do this all the time, some with fairly decent results, but many find themselves with a struggling or failing branch of business two to three years later, having to take on long and painful reviews, re-organization and restructuring to turn that line into a profitable model. Or, in some cases, jettison it all together because it does not fit the company's "strategic goals". 

That option is not available in matters of intelligence, analysis and national security.  So we are left with an organization that generally gets things right enough times to provide a base of security, but is not set up to handle deviations no matter how large it gets or how often it references "deviations" in it's policies. 

One of the other questions that Mr. Gerenstein-Ross raises is why did this erroneous analysis occur outside of these national agencies?  He goes on to explain that these terrorist organizations are "clandestine", making some information "difficult to glean" and that information on this "clandestine behavior" obtained by national agencies (also, "clandestine") is often listed as "classified" and outside of the purview of many open source analysts' domain. 

However, he also points out something very interesting and that is that the analysts who were much closer to the correct analysis of Al Qaeda's situation and potential were those who are essentially working outside of any government agency or sponsored program.  Which tends to suggest that there is another problem altogether.

Many of the set research programs (START - Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) and think tanks are funded by and/or do work with these central government organizations in an effort to put "mass" on the problem.  In doing so, they are necessarily impacted by the operations, priorities and policies of these agencies and, to put it bluntly, can be infected with the same problems that plague these agencies when it comes to evaluating or looking for deviancies within known data.

Of course, there will be great denial of this idea because people are, technically, outside of the organizational structures.  However, we only have to look at the nature of organizations to understand why and how they impact their outside partners. 

The short answer is that these organizations are looking for, expecting and demanding the same things from their partners as they do from themselves.  Consistency and focus on the policies and priorities of the "purchasing company" or customer.  Some may object to this presentation of the relationship in a commercial nature, but that is, in fact, the manner of the relationship. 

An example of this kind of relationship would be the Ford Motor Company.  It consistently and reliably produces masses of consistently reliable vehicles.  These are not luxury automobiles, like a Maybach, created one at a time and by hand.  They roll off a factory floor at a regular pace.  Ford requires many parts to create each vehicle and it needs reliable, consistent parts timely, reliably and consistently.  That is what it is looking for in it's suppliers and that is what it re-enforces to it's suppliers through various communications, policies and quality assurance programs. 

We can argue that research and analyst programs are not factories and individuals within are more autonomous.  More importantly, training and the nature of the business at hand rejects that type of behavior.  However, the same type of re-enforcement of these concepts occurs through repeated interaction with these centralized government organizations where by needs and demands of the organizations are consistently communicated through requests for information, by policy and procedures that dictate the relationship and, most importantly, re-enforcement by reward for expected outcomes (ie, government funding for programs or purchasing of final analytic product). 

In this manner, the behavior of the partner is influenced by the other and ideas and concepts spread like a contagion.  When it's a good idea, contagion is also good and can serve to produce masses of viable information and analytics.  The same holds true when it's a bad idea and the contagion can paralyze diverse thinking through out the system. 

Open source, independent analysts can also be infected with these erroneous ideas.  In many cases because, as Mr. Garenstein-Ross notes, much of the information on clandestine organizations collected clandestinely, remains beyond non-affiliated researchers' reach and that which is released is released from these same agencies with background information provided that often re-enforces the agency's position or view. 

Media reports, in particular, can be good sources of information, but can often skew towards the information provided by the agencies as staff writers look to provide news for consumption, not an avenue for investigation.  Which is why many independent, open source analysts have a variety of resources to choose from and don't feel necessarily constrained to those accepted or validated by these institutions. I.E. Independent.

At the end of the day, the entire process of analysis and established policy can create a circle of self-perpetuating erroneous analysis and behavior inside and outside of the various professional organizations and institutions.  Where the much more independent researchers and analysts have prevailed is that, in fact, they are not dependent on these relationships and the very important aspect of analysis and research, to challenge any information that seems to fit too readily into the accepted paradigm, is allowed to prevail. 

Reliably and consistently, these questions of what and how something went wrong arise whenever it's obvious that the system failed to perform as expected.  Most often when some large, unforeseen or devastating event occurs.  Mr. Garenstein-Ross provides some thoughts on how the system might be improved both in process and in thinking that may contribute to improving this important aspect of national security. 

As for the policy set forth in the National Strategy for Counter-terrorism and the policies derived thereof, it may have to be accepted for what it is, a policy meant to limit or set boundaries on what is defined as a threat to be countered, the actions applied or the groups it is applied to.  However, it is incumbent upon agencies, institutions and independents alike not to let the policy limit deviating data within their analysis or from challenging the established paradigm. 

Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: Militant Puritanical Islam and History of Combative Religious Orders

Similar movements have existed throughout history including Christian monastic orders that have, at times, been combative in nature. 

The period of the Christian Crusades became a period of highly religiously charged combat and combat orders such as Teutonic Knights, The Knight's Templar, The Hospitalers, The Knights of St. John.  The crusading orders were not alone in this period where nobles and peasants alike were drawn by evangelical concepts of martyrdom in the name of God as a manner of salvation for the sinners.  What had largely started out as relatively disorganized movements became more organized as orders were established and nation states took up the call. 

Later, after the crusades had resulted in failure, the returning knights and combative orders presented a problem for the nation states.  Many had developed banking and financial systems outside of the control of these states, holding more assets and income than the states themselves.  To these states, these orders presented a direct threat to their own control, holding transnational assets that could form a large state, dwarfing the state in revenue and as often as not, dwarfing the state's armies.

There were also large numbers of unemployed knights and men at arms who were outside of the service of the monastic orders as well as the noble houses, roaming the countryside as self-organized groups that committed general banditry, kidnapping, extortion, etc.  Where once noble religious ideas no longer served to organize or control their purpose.  This was the first breakdown of that original religious fervor and order. 

The second came as monarch's realized the danger of a transnational combat organization to the very survival of their states and moved to break the orders, such as the Knight's Templar, killing their leadership, stripping them of land and money and propagating stories about the group's fall into Satanic or Heretical worship.  Free ranging knights were motivated to become members of houses or return home lest they face the same fate as their monastic brothers. 

Other concepts that this period and combative religious orders held in common besides martyrdom, included puritanical views of sexuality and women; ascetic living, renouncing all material goods or giving those goods and any income to the order, to live closer to the model of the prophet/savior; belief that their cause was just and for the defense of a weaker community; belief that the "other" was a pagan or infidel and thus killing them was a just act; belief they were acting as tools of God and at his command as determined by a holy book and establishment of stringent rules of conduct where any infringement was forgiven by doing combat in the name of this cause or achieving martyrdom would abrogate these sins.

Thus, the slaughter of innocents was justified even if those innocents shared the same religion or were not combatants.  Even the killing of captured enemy who were hors d' combat was considered a noble and just act.  The rape of women, particularly not of their religion, was not considered a foul crime as much as proliferating the religious race. Even as the monastic combat orders forbade it as a sin and adultery outside of marriage and, in many cases, forbade even marriage for their monastic members in order to prevent their attention from being split from the cause and the order.

Other concepts included the migration of warriors between groups with Hospitalers sometimes joining Templars or St. John merging with Hospitalers.   There were also wondering priests who went from village to village, preaching this new gospel and compelling simple people to leave their homes to join the crusades.  Trains of knights and men at arms were followed by a large numbers of civilians, some motivated by the religious fervor, others in the potential for economic gain or social movement. 

At one point, the preaching had reached such a fevered pitch that an entire army of poor civilians was raised up and marched towards the Holy Land, eventually ending before they reached their destination in starvation and disease.  Along the way, this army was provided with food and tinder, if only to get them to move along and not raid all the wares from the local store houses and farms. 

This was not the first and certainly not the last organization of western combat around religious ideas.  The reformation of the church and the proliferation of puritanical Christianity saw both the Church and the puritanical movements take up arms, sometimes as "free armies" and just as often in the service of one kingdom or another.  This same organization became resurgent in England as Rounders or "Round Heads" (so called because they would cut their hair short while fashion had men in long curls and lace) espousing Calvinist ideas unseated the king of England not once, but twice. 

Much later, one can even see this similar religious combat order being reconstituted within the Nazi doctrine where purity of race and idea became a pseudo-religion that gripped whole parts of the German nation.  Soldiers were lauded as defenders of the race and presented as modern knights.  Units of specially hand picked and trained men were imbued with nearly religious mysticism, embodying the virtues of the movement and even inducted with mystical or pseudo-religious rites. 

Like their future counterparts in modern Global Jihad, they were considered a vanguard for future expansion of this idea, encouraged to marry and create future soldiers in the name of their pseudo-religio-political idea.  They were the symbol and propagators of propaganda, spreading the ideas through presence, image, words and actions. 

Western history is not the only history replete with these types of movements.  Islam itself was propagated through similar means from the 7th century through the 17th century until it had created one of the largest empires on the face of the earth.  The Caliphate that currently resides as the primary goal of Global Jihad and the proliferation of Puritanical Islam.  Asia and India have seen similar combative religions and cults, each becoming part of the historical fabric and historic mythology of the various nations. 

From thugees in India to Shaolin monks, combat organized around a religious idea is not new or original.  It most happens in societies were economic and social movement are stagnated or rigid, where religious orders and combat become a method for movement as well as a means of new political order.   At times, it's been coopted by states to further their political agendas and, at others, destroyed because it threatened the accepted order. 

In some cases, it either established an entire new political system or was subsumed or annexed by the existing system as a new "norm".  Many have sought to draw a distinction between the various movements, judging one as more moral or just than the other.  However, moral judgment is not the point of this article, but a simple review of the rise of puritanical idealism and combative, militant orders, their precepts and place within context of time and politics. 

All of which seems repetitive throughout history and yet we see them as completely separate phenomena.  Accept through the lens of history and sociology. 

 

Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: On Developing a Model

In trying to determine the who and the what of Al Qaeda or the differences between any group proclaiming "jihad" or "global jihad" or generally Islamic Militant language, it helps first to have some basic understanding of how sociological and ideological movements develop and proliferate.  There are a number of excellent books about terrorism, terrorist organizations and psychology of both groups and individuals involved in this activity.  Many of these books focus on the sociological, psychological and ideological drives of individuals and groups that might lead them to decide to join a group or commit acts of terrorism.

One book, The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies and State of Mind, included an essay by Dr. Martha Crenshaw on the "psycho-logical" aspects of decision making for committing an act of terrorism.  Studies have focused on the make up of groups, their networks and how they behave.  Many more hours have been spent on mapping out connections between various groups.  Even towards developing complicated algorithms to establish risk factors and networking. 

And, yet, we remain here, stuck with unsatisfying answers  that remain contentious amongst experts and intelligence agencies, media and pundits, politicians and the population.  In some ways it's because the mode and manner of communication has demanded simplification for consumption.  In others, because it may be deemed too complicated or even a point of secrecy belaying the necessity to convey it properly to the population at large. 

This may explain the inability or lack of interest of providing explanation to the population, producing confusion, but it hardly explains why there is such a cognitive difference amongst all those whose job it is to actually determine this information and provide it for national, agency or academic consumption.  In either case, the dichotomy may provide a wider range of views and ideas from which to approach the situation, but it may also create a bifurcation in policy that results in less successful counter measures.  Or, equally important, evaluating situations for dangers to the population, nation, interests and personnel abroad such as the case of Benghazi.

While political motivations as well as misapprehension of the nature of threats continues to push this debate along, the most recent report actually suggests that, indeed, we are in need of a new method of evaluating and conveying the basics; stepping back from the noise of the multitude opinions, studies and books and surveying the groundwork for a workable model.  One that is comprehensible for all those that must make policy as well as the population that must consume information and push those policies along. 

First issue that must be recognized is that there are many forms of Islamic militant activity and groups.  Al Qaeda is one manifestation.  It's language, ideology and political goals are global in nature even as it is confined to acting largely in specific locations within the Middle East and Central Asia.  It has chosen to attack targets around the world as an offensive measure in order to intimidate nations from acting to defend their interests; force countries to withdraw militarily, politically and economically from specific areas; and, provoke reactions that will re-enforce it's propaganda and ideology among it's target population for proliferation. 

That ideology insists that Muslims and Islam are under attack by both non-Islamic nations (infidels, kufr) as well as leaders of Islamic nations who are heretics, apostates or non-believers (takfir, munifiqeen) and their various government agencies, employees and even many citizens.  Their goals are to establish Islamic government based on their stringent interpretation of Islam and it's law (shar'iah) within nations that are largely populated by Muslims or nations that they claim are historically part of a greater Islamic empire (Caliphate). 

While many other groups espouse a similar ideology, their goals and capabilities are focused on specific locales within this larger region.  Many of these same groups expect that, once they have established within these nations, they will join this greater Islamic union to form a larger Pan-Islamic empire (Caliphate).  Others, still espousing similar ideology, may not have any confidence in creating this trans-national Caliphate, but believe they will have established one of many like minded nations that will ally for defense of their newly established Islamic state. 

There are also groups that espouse an Islamic militant ideology whose goals are entirely local and consider themselves defending their existing population, proselytizing stringent, fundamental Islam and organizing local governance in compliance with their ideology.  In any scenario, trans-national, regional, national or local, these organizations and groups, the general ideology, is hostile to any nation, population or organization that does not fit within their ideology or who they see as hostile or an obstruction to their over all goals. 

There are groups who organize under an Islamic name, that are militant in nature and espouse an Islamic language, may be defensive or offensive in nature, but do not align with groups or organizations that profess Global Islamic Jihad.  Who they are hostile towards depends largely on local political situations, but may bleed over onto national or international groups or organizations as they struggle to defend, take or hold specific territory. 

Finally, there are groups who organize under an Islamic name, who are political or evangelical in nature, who may espouse Global Islamic goals or simply proselytize a stringent, fundamental Islam.  They are not militant, but may become militant or create militant offshoots if they believe they are under threat or are unable to reach their goals through generally peaceful means.  They may also become militant once they reach a certain number of members or if certain members begin to espouse militant ideas.

Each of these organizations presents a different threat.  The issue is how to determine which category each of these organizations belong to and what risk they pose to nations, populations and any transnational interests.  While there is a danger in not recognizing that all militant groups in these categories represent a security threat on various levels, there is also a danger in lumping all of these groups into one category. 

In doing so, it suggests only one solution to a multi-layered political and security landscape.  In order to reduce the threat or potential threat from these various groups, it would be better to have different policies and tools to address each situation and reduce the likelihood of these differing groups refining or redefining their struggle or goals to match those of Global Islamic Jihad and specifically Al Qaeda.

However, it should be recognized plainly that any non-state militant organization can be a threat to personnel, locations and interests.  Particularly in locations where on-going hostilities, internecine or intermittent combat or violent clashes continue due to political unrest.  Further, when there is a weak government, military or other security apparatus that cannot be relied on to provide consistent security for international agencies, embassies or interests, political or commercial. 

The last appears to be an accepted logic, but, as the events at the Benghazi indicate, the actual nature of these threats can be underestimated or risks to security underplayed for purely political reasons.  In this case, a newly "liberated" nation where various groups formed nominal alliances with local, national and international groups, but quickly fell into political discord and internecine clashes of a power struggle.  Where once they may have considered the United States an ally, some determined that the presence of the United States, or it's political power behind other groups, would become an obstacle to their political goals, locally and nationally. 

The Libyan political and militant landscape is an excellent representation of the levels of Islamic Militant organizations and the multiplicity of security threats posed by these organizations.  It also provides another important lesson as reports continue to muddle through who was involved in Benghazi, what organization and what rationales were used for the attack.  That lesson is that these different organizations and their political goals may be separate, but that there is no absolute delineation between members and organizations. 

In fact, many members migrate between organizations, they may share resources and many organizations may cooperate in small and large ways in order to accomplish their separate goals.  This, too, has attributed to the general population's view that, indeed, then they are all part of the Global Islamic Jihad movement and represent the same threat. Or, more succinctly, are part of Al Qaeda, considered to be the main and most persistent threat.  As has the idea that, because they all espouse some form of Islamist militant language and/or ideology, that all Muslims then pose the same threat. 

All of which percolates into our intelligence, security and academic organizations to create multiple and convoluted models and assessments that do little to clear the situation, develop appropriate policies or present viable concepts for threat assessments.   This returns to the original point of this article, that after all these years and man power spent, we should have come to some universal conclusions and developed appropriate models for comprehending this current sociological movement and combatting it's threat when and wherever necessary. 

What is this model and is it necessarily a "new" model?  Or, amongst all the studies and assessments, does it already exist?  Should it necessarily be about or focus on Global Islamic Jihad as the only or largest threat, as many professionals consider other trans-national and national domestic terrorist and criminal organizations to be equally or more threatening? 

Moving along that line of thinking, haven't we seen this all before and is it possible that existing sociological studies and models can provide a better method for viewing this most recent incarnation? 
 

How a Radical New Teaching Method Could Unleash a Generation of Geniuses | Wired Business | Wired.com

How a Radical New Teaching Method Could Unleash a Generation of Geniuses | Wired Business | Wired.com

Combatting Global Islamic Jihad: The Unsatisfying Answer

As the debate over the Benghazi attack of September 11, 2012 continues, one issue remains prevalent and continues to be the focal point of the debate: was the attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda, an Al Qaeda linked "affiliate" or by a local group with it's own agenda?  Much of that debate is politically driven, but is of interest because it also mirrors the on going debate about what Al Qaeda is and it's over all structure or organization.  Most importantly, whether Al Qaeda is a growing organization with growing capabilities to direct attacks or whether it is slowly becoming just another player in the field as "global jihad" groups proliferate across the region and Al Qaeda's command and control slips away.

In viewing the various debates, studies and expert contentions, it seems more than likely that the answer will be unsatisfying to all and that is: all of the above. 

One of the issues is that this spread of militant Islamism and groups continues to be treated as a new phenomena as if violent organizations or even ideologically driven movements have never been seen before, on this scale or even coalesced to create either revolutionary movements or criminal, violent enterprises.  Or, in fact, not coalesced as a large organized movement, but did proceed to proliferate through societies, becoming a persistent danger to the societies wherein they operate, spawning offshoots and creating whole underground and commiserate, cooperating organizations that undermine or erode society and civil order. 

The debates and on-going struggle for definition is driven by the overwhelming desire to determine a way to successfully counter and hopefully defeat these movements.  In the end, as one observer called it, "defend civilization", but, more broadly, defend people, society, cities, nation states and interests. 

This, amongst other issues, has driven the search for "the answer" and, through out continued inability to comprehend sociological phenomena and movements, increasingly unsatisfactory answers as to what it is, how it works and how best to combat it.  Even the word "combat" is unsatisfying as it suggests "war" when not every instance of it's existence lends towards the physicality of "war" as the greater part of society understands it, even as violent activity surrounding those instances would seem to suggest just that solution. 

But, if we want to "combat" it, in any sense of the word, we have to have a place to start.  From the law enforcement, national security and intelligence view, that means focusing on it's known entities and operations.  The connectivity of those entities and operations once again suggesting a greater organization that can be identified and reduced through attrition at various key points such as funding as well as eliminating individuals seen as lynch pins. 

These activities are, in reality, "tactics" while a greater "strategy" appears murky and continuingly out of step with the entire advent of an apparently globalized sociological violent movement that is ever fluid.  Equally disconcerting is that it's proliferation has created a redundancy model.  Meaning that, even as one group or individual or method is countered or eliminated, another group or individual or resource arises to take it's place.     

This has created significant frustration within the general population in comprehending what is happening and how to put an end to it.  The debates over what it is and whether it is organized and controlled or not has led to general confusion within the population that lends to ever present disjointed policies or misapprehension of how those policies and commiserate tactics ought to be applied, to whom and to which situations. 

That is re-enforced by the movement's own rhetoric that professes global aspirations even as it acts or is confined to local spaces.  Their ability to appear and operate is completely dependent on local situations, existing conditions and the make up of the population itself.  Like similar sociological movements, it tends to take root in places where governance and security is weak, the economy is poor and other stressors, such as political or social disenfranchisement, are apparent. 

In the case of "global jihad", the other prevalent indicator is a Muslim population even as these groups take advantage of and interact with other, non-Islamic, populations, criminal organizations and activities or groups for smuggling weapons, drugs, diamonds, oil, stolen cars, cigarettes, knock off products, money laundering, etc.  The list is amazingly long and suggests a plethora of areas where intelligence and security operations must focus on and interdict in order to slow or attrite these various groups although it does nothing to combat the sociological movement itself. 

This is compounded even more by the advent of state actors using these movements as political tools without seeming to care that they are creating an ungovernable monster that, in the end, is likely to come back around to infiltrate amongst their own populations.  Authoritarian police states, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, are two such states that imagine their control is infinite and that the supposed homogeneity of their populations provide a buffer.  However, historical evidence of ideological and sociological movements suggests that it is impossible to completely eliminate or confine, even in a police state. 

China and Russia could be included in this list even as Pakistan, a grand purveyor of the non-state actors for indirect warfare, finds itself in a persistent state of internal, low grade civil war. This has become such a normative within Pakistan that the state itself has adapted and set it's goals for governance and control to specific areas or seats of power such as the military, treasury, huge bureaucracy with little control beyond specific population centers.  Thus, Pakistan has the appearance of a state with defined borders and government apparatus, but is more akin to a large, armed, occupying force barely keeping the lid on an ever boiling situation and using it to push it's regional political agenda that routinely bleeds out onto the international arena. 

Neither can we dismiss the interaction of western states where designation as terrorist groups and even outright support of particular groups is highly politically motivated.  As indicated by the European Union's slow and bifurcated approach to designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization or even the United States and allies debating whether to designate Jabhat al-Nusra even slightly after it pledged "bayt" or allegiance to Al Qaeda. 

All of this can be added to the pot and stirred around to create utterly unwieldy policy and security mechanisms along with confusion in the ranks from policy makers to those tasked with securing the nation and within the population itself.  The last simply wanting to know how those designated as "responsible" will keep them safe from what appears to be an ever growing violent movement. 

All the while, the power of the people's pleasure or displeasure is used to push one policy or another, represented in the political arena of party, national and international politics.  None of whom seem to agree what it is or isn't that we are up against.  Worse yet, that the general population have not comprehended the difference between being "safe" and "defeating" a movement. 

The first may be generally accomplished, the latter, based on history, may be impossible to accomplish completely until or if it coalesces into a state, government and army that can be directly targeted.  Or, as in the case with FARC in Colombia, after thirty years and the state slowly gaining governance, economic and security measures, the movement becomes exhausted and their sociological and political pull becomes irrelevant to the parts of society that once gave them support.  Only at that point taking out key entities within the organization and attrition of resources may result in it's final crumbling, although, again, not it's complete demise.

That unsatisfying answer is the elephant in the room, an answer that no one is willing to give because it means political death even if it would be more likely to result in better policies, mechanism and focus from all agencies and actors involved and, in the end, possibly keep us safer. 


 

Dr H.A. Hellyer discusses Egypt with Holt McCallany in the Cutting Room | Dr H.A. Hellyer د. إتش

Dr H.A. Hellyer discusses Egypt with Holt McCallany in the Cutting Room | Dr H.A. Hellyer د. إتش

Reading Syria: Articles, Studies

From Foreign Policy, overview: The Political Science of Syria's Civil War 

More In Depth from POMEPS, PDF: The Political Science of Syria's Civil War

Syria's Oil Pipeline

From Foreign Policy, Charles Lister - Next Phase of the Syrian Conflict